

Statement to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Quality of  
Life and Veterans Affairs

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Chairman Walsh, Congressman Edwards, and members of the subcommittee, we are pleased to appear before you today.

Our appearance marks another milestone in the Administration's close consultations with Congress on the global defense posture changes. It follows:

- Under Secretary Feith's testimony to the House Armed Services Committee in June 2004;
- Secretary Rumsfeld's and General Myers' testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in September 2004; and
- Multiple appearances by the geographic combatant commanders before various committees.

We have regularly briefed Members of Congress and their personal and committee staffs throughout the review, with over 40 such briefings to date. We provided a detailed Report to Congress in the fall of 2004. We also have worked closely with the Overseas Basing Commission in its efforts to provide Congress with its assessment of our global presence, basing, and infrastructure needs. In all these cases, our efforts have been jointly conducted with the State Department, which is a good indicator of the close interagency integration that has been the rule throughout the process.

Background

Mr. Chairman, the Administration's efforts to strengthen America's global defense posture will result in the most profound re-ordering of U.S. military forces overseas since the Cold War. It will redefine our military's

forward presence by strengthening our ability to meet our security commitments in the midst of a dynamic and uncertain geo-political landscape. Transforming our global defense posture is an important part of our broader effort to transform the Department of Defense to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The impact of our planned global defense posture changes will be significant for improving our:

- alliance and partner relationships;
- operational capabilities;
- overseas and domestic infrastructure; and
- quality of life for our Service members and their families.

We conducted our review thoroughly and deliberately over the past three years, and we pulled in our interagency partners – particularly the State Department – early in the process. We made an intensive effort to consult with our allies and partners to incorporate their views. The results were, frankly, gratifying: within 24 hours of President Bush’s speech last August announcing our intention to move forward with our global posture plans, officials of key allies and partners made strong statements of support for our strategy and our proposals. Because we had kept our Russian and Chinese counterparts apprised of our proposed changes, there was no negative reaction from these countries. This helped assure our European and Asian allies.

### Context

Mr. Chairman, we would like to reiterate some of the strategic principles of the global posture changes; summarize some of the most prominent changes; and address the BRAC process in more detail.

First, let us clarify what we have aimed to achieve:

- We are not aiming at retrenchment, curtailing U.S. commitments, isolationism or unilateralism. Instead, we want to strengthen our ability to fulfill our international commitments.
- We want to ensure our future alliances are capable, affordable, sustainable, and relevant.

- We are not narrowly focused on numbers of troops overseas; instead we are focusing on the effective capabilities of our forces and those of our allies.
- We are not talking about fighting in place, but about our ability to rapidly get to the fight.
- We are not only talking about basing, we're talking about relationships and activities and the ability to move forces when and where they are needed.

Some historical context may be useful. The September 11 attacks clarified our understanding of the key security issues that we will face in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. These include:

- the nexus among terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- ungoverned areas within states, which can serve as both a breeding ground and a sanctuary for terrorists; and
- the adoption of asymmetric approaches – including irregular warfare – that adversaries could use to counter U.S. conventional military superiority.

Just as we've updated our National Defense Strategy and worked to transform our alliances to meet these security challenges, we also recognized the importance of transforming our global posture. Much of our current posture still reflects a Cold War structure – forward deployed forces configured to fight near where they were based.

Our forces overseas cannot remain positioned to fight Cold War battles. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's disintegration, we reduced U.S. troops deployed forward. But U.S. forces still remained primarily in their "Cold War" locations in Western Europe and Northeast Asia. It is from these locations that they deployed to deal with crises in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and other locations.

Now, nearly 15 years after the end of the Cold War, we know that the premises underlying our forward posture have changed fundamentally: we no longer expect our forces to fight in place; our forces need to be able to project power into theaters that may be far from where they are based.

## Global Posture Strategy

Mr. Chairman, five key strategy themes guided our review:

*First is the requirement to strengthen allied roles and build new partnerships.* We want to ensure that our allies and friends recognize that we're actually strengthening our commitment to secure our common interests. Changes to the U.S. global posture also aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, strategies, and doctrines. We are exploring ways in which we and they together can transform our military capabilities. At the same time, we seek to tailor the physical U.S. "footprint" to suit local conditions, to reduce friction with host nations, and to respect local sensitivities.

*Second is the need to improve flexibility to contend with uncertainty.* Much of our existing overseas posture was established during the Cold War, when we knew, or thought we knew, where we would fight. Today, however, we often fight in places that few, if any, had predicted. Thus, we should recognize the limits of our intelligence. We need to plan to counteract surprise. Our goal is to have forces deployed forward in areas with access and facilities that enable them to reach potential crisis spots quickly.

*Third is creating the capacity to act both within and across regions.* During the Cold War, we focused on threats to specific regions and tailored our military presence to those regions. Now we're dealing with challenges that are global in nature. We need to improve our ability to project power from one region to another and to manage forces on a global basis.

*Fourth, we must develop rapidly deployable capabilities.* U.S. forces need to be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations, which puts a premium on establishing flexible legal and support arrangements with our allies and partners.

*Finally, we have to focus on effective military capabilities, not numbers of personnel, units, or equipment.* Our key purpose is to push relevant capabilities forward. That does not necessarily require us to push additional forces and personnel forward. In fact, we now can have far greater capabilities forward than in the past, with smaller numbers of permanently stationed forces. In the Cold War, "bean counting" numbers of personnel in administrative regions had a direct relationship to our ability to succeed in anticipated conflicts. But this is no longer the case. Capabilities matter, not numbers.

## Elements of our Global Defense Posture

Mr. Chairman, we want to make clear what we mean by the word “posture.” Many think only of bases or facilities, but posture also includes relationships, activities, legal arrangements, and surge capability.

First, our ability to act militarily around the world is supported by key security **relationships** with allies and partners. These relationships involve interactions at all levels – from heads of state to individual students in our professional military schools. Command structures are an important part of our relationships and are being tailored to our new operational needs.

Second, our posture includes the many military **activities** we conduct worldwide. These activities include training, exercises, and operations. They involve both small units working together in a wide range of capacities and major formations conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in joint and combined operations.

Our posture includes the **facilities** where our forces live, train, and operate. We will retain and consolidate many of our main operating bases in places like Germany, Italy, the U.K., Japan, and Korea, but we also will rely on forward operating sites with rotational presence and pre-positioned equipment. We’ll also need access to a broader range of facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence, but with periodic service or contractor support, which we call cooperative security locations.

Fourth, many of our current **legal arrangements** date back a half a century or more. Our international agreements need to reflect new realities and enable the rapid deployment of U.S. and coalition forces. These legal arrangements also should encourage responsibility and burden-sharing between ourselves and our partners and provide sufficient legal protections for our personnel.

Finally, our military forces need to be managed globally in a way that allows us to **surge** a greater percentage of the force where and when it is needed anywhere in the world. Combatant Commanders no longer “own” forces in their theaters. Forces are apportioned as needed and sourced from anywhere in the world.

## Key Changes and Continuities

Mr. Chairman, these changes in relationships, activities, facilities, legal arrangements and surge capacity will reshape our ability to support diplomacy and project necessary military power, in all theaters.

In Asia, we are building upon our traditional ground, air, and naval access in Northeast Asia to operate effectively despite the vast distances in the theater. This will require additional naval and air capabilities forward in the region. We are consolidating facilities and headquarters in Japan and Korea to gain efficiencies and to enable regional and global action. We will have a more frequent presence of special operations forces throughout the region.

Our future posture in Europe will be characterized by lighter and more deployable ground capabilities, leading-edge air and naval power and advanced training facilities. The center of gravity of our presence in Europe will shift south and east, allowing for more rapid deployment to the Middle East, Africa, and other potential hot spots. A major change will be the return of the two legacy maneuver divisions from Europe to the United States, replacing them with our transformational Stryker capability. We are also retaining our mobility infrastructure in places like Ramstein in Germany.

In the Middle East, our goal is presence without permanence. We are maintaining what we call “warm” facilities for rotational forces and contingency purposes, building on cooperation and access provided by host nations during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, we’ll require an array of smaller cooperative security locations for contingency access in sometimes remote areas, but we will not be building new bases.

### Military Quality of Life

Mr. Chairman, an aspect of our global posture changes that will be of central importance to this committee is the impact on military quality of life issues.

As President Bush stated in August 2004, posture changes are an important component of the Department’s overall effort to provide more predictability and stability to our military members and their families. A significantly reduced number of permanent changes of station to overseas locations will combine with Service initiatives like the Army’s modularity and unit rotation concepts and the Navy’s new Fleet Response Plan to alleviate some of the stresses on our forces and families.

Part of the problem today stems from our legacy Cold War posture. Accompanied tours that were designed in an era of static deployments have today become more of a hardship for families. Service members are

deploying more frequently from their forward stations, leaving dependents separated both from the service member and from their extended families and support networks in the United States. Our posture changes are designed to reduce these cases of “double separation.”

### Base Realignment and Closure

Mr. Chairman, the global defense posture changes and domestic Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round are key, interlinked elements that support transformation. A well supported, capabilities-based force structure should have infrastructure that is best sized and placed to support national security needs and emerging mission requirements. The revised *BRAC Force Structure Plan* and the *Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing Infrastructure Requirements at Overseas Facilities*, both recently transmitted to you, align with our National Defense Strategy. Since some overseas personnel will return to the United States, global posture changes will influence BRAC recommendations designed to support the warfighter more effectively and efficiently. The Secretary will provide his recommendations for domestic closures and realignments to the Commission and Congress by May 16th as required by the BRAC 2005 statute.

Mr. Chairman, we want to conclude by commending this subcommittee’s ongoing support as the Department works to implement necessary, far-reaching, and enduring changes to strengthen America’s global defense posture.