Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. 2 ___ (2009)
R078; No. 07-591; 6/25/09. The admission of laboratory certificates showing the results of
forensic tests on a substance identified as cocaine, without testimony by the laboratory
analysts who signed the certificates, violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront
the witnesses against him.
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Safford Unified School Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U. S. 2 ___ (2009)
R079; No. 08-479; 6/25/09. Because there were no reasons to believe that the drugs that
Savana Redding was suspected of having presented a danger or were concealed in her underwear,
the search of her underwear violated the Fourth Amendment; but because there is reason to
question the clarity with which Savana’s Fourth Amendment right was established, the officials
who ordered and carried out the search are entitled to qualified immunity from liability.
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Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U. S. 2 ___ (2009)
R080; No. 08-214; 6/25/09. Because punitive damages have long been an accepted remedy under
general maritime law, and because neither Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S.
19, nor the Jones Act altered this understanding, punitive damages for the willful and wanton
disregard of the maintenance and cure obligation remain available as a matter of general maritime
law.
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Horne v. Flores, 557 U. S. 2 ___ (2009)
R081; No. 08-289; 6/25/09. The lower courts did not engage in the proper analysis of
petitioners’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) motion for relief from a judgment,
entered in 2000, that Arizona had violated the federal Equal Educational Opportunities Act
of 1974 by inadequately funding the Nogales Unified School District’s program for English
Language-Learner students.
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Cuomo v. Clearing House Assn., L. L. C., 557 U. S. 2 ___ (2009)
R082; No. 08-453; 6/29/09. A regulation promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency purporting to pre-empt state law enforcement is not a reasonable
interpretation of the National Bank Act.
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Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U. S. 2 ___ (2009)
R083; No. 07-1428; 6/29/09. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, before
an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding
or remedying an unintentional, disparate impact on particular employees, the employer must
have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability
if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action; New Haven’s City’s
race-based rejection of firefighter promotion test results cannot satisfy the
strong-basis-in-evidence standard.
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