Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U. S. 1 ___ (2012)
R062; No. 11-45; 6/11/12. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 precludes district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims because it is fairly discernible that Congress intended the statute’s review scheme to provide the exclusive avenue to judicial review for covered employees who challenge covered adverse employment actions, even when those employees argue that a federal statute is unconstitutional.
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Parker v. Matthews, 567 U. S. 1 ___ (2012) (per curiam)
R063; No. 11-845; 6/11/12. Neither of the Sixth Circuit’s grounds for granting respondent habeas relief—(1) that the Kentucky Supreme Court impermissibly shifted to him the burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance and the Commonwealth failed to prove the absence of such disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) that certain remarks during the prosecutor’s closing argument constituted a denial of due process—is valid under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
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Williams v. Illinois, 567 U. S. 1 ___ (2012)
R064; No. 10-8505; 6/18/12. The Illinois Supreme Court’s judgment that, in petitioner’s bench trial for rape, the testimony of a State Police Crime lab forensic specialist—who matched a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory to a profile the state lab produced using a sample of petitioner’s blood—did not violate petitioner’s confrontation rights is affirmed.
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Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U. S. 1 ___ (2012)
R065; No. 11-204; 6/18/12. Petitioners, pharmaceutical sales representatives, are outside salesmen exempt from the overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
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Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U. S. 1 ___ (2012)
R066; No. 11-551; 6/18/12. Consistent with well-established Government contracting law principles, the Government must pay in full each respondent Tribe’s contract support costs incurred in relation to contracts entered into by the Secretary of the Interior and the Tribes pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, even where congressional appropriations are insufficient to pay the total amount due all tribal contractors collectively.
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Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U. S. 1 ___ (2012)
R067; No. 11-246; 6/18/12. Respondent Patchak’s Administrative Procedure Act suit challenging the Secretary of the Interior’s Indian Reorganization Act authority to take land into trust for petitioner Tribe did not assert a right, title, or interest in trust or restricted Indian land, and so was not an action under the Quiet Title Act, which reserves the Government’s sovereign immunity from suit; Patchak also had prudential standing to bring this suit.
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FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U. S. 1 ___ (2012)
R068; No. 10-1293; 6/21/12. Because the Federal Communications Commission failed to give Fox or ABC fair notice prior to the broadcasts at issue that fleeting expletives and momentary nudity could be found actionably indecent, the Commission’s standards as applied to these broadcasts were impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause.
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Dorsey v. United States, 567 U. S. 1 ___ (2012)
R069; No. 11-5683; 6/21/12. The Fair Sentencing Act’s lower mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine offenses apply to those who committed their offenses before the Act’s August 3, 2010, effective date but were sentenced after that date.
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Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. 1 ___ (2012)
R070; No. 10-1121; 6/21/12. Under the First Amendment, when a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase levied to meet expenses that were not disclosed when the union’s regular assessment was set, it must provide a fresh notice and may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their affirmative consent.
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Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U. S. 1 ___ (2012)
R071; No. 11-94; 6/21/12. The rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466―that the Sixth Amendment reserves to juries the determination of any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction that increases a criminal defendant’s maximum potential sentence―applies to the imposition of criminal fines.
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