1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	JERRY W. GUNN, ET AL., :
4	Petitioners : No. 11-1118
5	v. :
6	VERNON F. MINTON :
7	x
8	Washington, D.C.
9	Wednesday, January 16, 2013
LO	
11	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
12	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
13	at 11:05 a.m.
14	APPEARANCES:
15	JANE WEBRE, ESQ., Austin, Texas; on behalf of
16	Petitioners.
17	THOMAS M. MICHEL, ESQ., Fort Worth, Texas; on behalf of
18	Respondent.
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	JANE WEBRE, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioners	3
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
6	THOMAS M. MICHEL, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Respondent	24
8	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
9	JANE WEBRE, ESQ.	
10	On behalf of the Petitioners	50
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:05 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
4	argument next this morning in Case Number 11-1118,
5	Gunn v. Minton.
6	Ms. Webre?
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF JANE WEBRE
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
9	MS. WEBRE: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
_0	please the Court:
.1	In Grable, this Court explained that
_2	"arising under" jurisdiction demands, not only a
_3	contested Federal issue, but a substantial one embedded
_4	in a State claim in order to indicate whether there is a
.5	serious Federal interest in exercising Federal
_6	jurisdiction over the State claim.
_7	This Court should reverse the judgment below
-8	because Minton Mr. Minton's claims do not present a
_9	substantial Federal issue, and exercising Federal
20	jurisdiction over his claim and legal malpractice claims
21	like his, State legal malpractice claims would
22	JUSTICE GINSBURG: The question is whether
23	the experimental use whether that was a viable
24	theory. Why isn't that a substantial what do you
25	mean by "substantial"?

1 MS. WEBRE: Well, Your Honor, defining substantiality is a difficult point. I -- I would 2 3 answer in two layers. First, Mr. Minton's claim did not involve a legal question of does the -- how does the 4 5 experimental use doctrine work; how is it applied, what 6 are its parameters? 7 The question was did his fact-bound and situation-specific affidavit present relevant evidence 8 9 of the application here in this particular case. And it is not a substantial question because, first, from a --10 11 a unique case perspective, it involved merely a 12 hypothetical determination. 13 There were no actual patent rights that would be at issue. Those were already fully, finally, 14 15 irrevocably determined in the underlying patent 16 litigation in Federal court. 17 And, second, from a jurisprudence standpoint, the -- the question of uniformity of patent 18 law, any decision by a State court, in Mr. Minton's 19 20 legal malpractice claim, would not be binding in any way, on either the PTO in a patent application, or on 21 22 any subsequent Federal court deciding a real patent 23 case. 24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Do you mean substantial beyond the -- the -- this particular case? 25

Τ.	MS. WEBRE: Yes, Your Honor. And I I
2	think that that's where the Federal circuit's
3	jurisdictional the Federal circuit's "arising under"
4	jurisdiction standard, which the Supreme Court of Texas
5	applied here, that's exactly where it goes awry, is that
6	the court improperly conflates the the question of
7	necessity of a Federal issue with the question of
8	whether that issue is substantial.
9	And, in the Grable case, this Court
10	emphasized that those are two separate issues. There
11	are four prongs to the Grable test. The Federal issue
12	embedded in the State claim must be necessary to the
13	State claim; actually disputed; substantial; and then
14	there is a federalism inquiry that exercised a Federal
15	jurisdiction over this State claim can't upend the
16	proper balance between State and Federal authority.
17	The Grable court announced that, and then
18	just a year later, in the Empire HealthChoice case, You
19	Honor Justice Ginsburg, you wrote that opinion for
20	the Court, and that acted sort of as an underscoring of
21	"and here's how limited the Grable rule really is."
22	The Empire HealthChoice opinion
23	distinguishes between Grable, which presented a merely
24	pure question of law, and the claims at issue in Empire
25	HealthChoice which were fact-bound and

- 1 situation-specific. It distinguished the -- the
- 2 question of whether a State court is competent to apply
- 3 Federal law to the extent relevant to the claims and
- 4 found that, yes, it was.
- 5 And the -- the Court emphasized that,
- 6 certainly, the State courts are going to be deciding the
- 7 occasional Federal issue here and there, but let's not
- 8 make a Federal case out of each and every State tort
- 9 claim that might have an embedded Federal issue.
- Now, in the earlier argument, there was some
- 11 discussion of the fact that jurisdiction means a lot of
- 12 different things in a lot of different contexts. But,
- 13 here, this Court has, on more than one occasion,
- 14 determined that jurisdiction -- "arising under"
- 15 jurisdiction means the same thing in 1331, the general
- 16 Federal question jurisdictional grant, and 1338(a),
- 17 the -- the exclusive provision that's applicable
- 18 specifically to patents.
- 19 Now, that has been amended slightly. It --
- 20 it, now, includes compulsory counterclaims where they
- 21 didn't used to be a part, but the jurisdictional grant
- that Congress gave through the first sentence of 1338(a)
- 23 uses the same exact phrase, the "arising under," "any
- 24 civil action arising under Federal law."
- 25 And, Justice Scalia, you wrote the opinion

- 1 for the Court in the Holmes Group case and explained
- 2 that the linguistic consistency between those two means
- 3 that they mean the same thing.
- 4 There is nothing unique about this subject
- 5 matter -- the patent subject matter, that changes the
- 6 scope of the jurisdictional grant. To be sure, the --
- 7 the grant of original jurisdiction to the district
- 8 courts is exclusive, and that is different from the
- 9 general Federal question.
- 10 And to be --
- JUSTICE ALITO: Well, why isn't that
- 12 significant? Doesn't that manifest Congress's view
- 13 that -- that -- that this is -- that this is a
- 14 complicated specialty area? And so there would be,
- 15 arguably, a special reason for having these cases, cases
- 16 that involve a patent issue, in Federal court, rather
- 17 than State court?
- 18 MS. WEBRE: Yes, Your Honor. But the --
- 19 Congress did that in a couple of different ways. First
- 20 of all, I think it begs the question -- it begs the --
- 21 the core question, to say that exclusive -- the fact
- 22 that jurisdiction is exclusive answers the
- 23 substantiality because, in order to get to exclusivity
- 24 of the jurisdiction, you have to get to jurisdiction
- 25 first.

1	You have to it has to be "arising under"
2	an act of Congress relating to patents before it can
3	then be exclusive. So so we still have the first
4	step. But, also, Congress did not cast a net broader
5	than the general "arising under" standard.
6	Even under the the statutory framework
7	after the America Invents Act amendment under the
8	statutory structure, there are still a number of patent
9	issues legal issues that are going to be decided in
_0	the State courts that do not come within the exclusive
.1	jurisdiction of the Federal courts. For example,
2	compulsory counterclaims, now, come within the exclusive
.3	jurisdiction, but permissive counterclaims don't.
4	Permissive counterclaims can certainly
.5	present just as substantive a question of patent law,
<u> </u>	and, yet, those are excluded under the statutory scheme
_7	of 1338(a). Patent issues raised as a defensive matter
-8	are not sufficient to support "arising under"
_9	jurisdiction under 1338(a).
20	So, certainly, Congress contemplated a
21	situation where some patent issues are just not going to
22	come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
23	courts.
24	And I think it's interesting to to back
25	up a little bit and look at the Federal circuit's

- 1 evolved perception of its own exclusive jurisdiction.
- 2 In the early years of the Federal circuit, in 1984, the
- 3 first Chief Justice -- the first chief judge of the
- 4 court, Chief Judge Markey, in the Atari case that is
- 5 cited at page 21 of the amicus brief filed by the
- 6 American Intellectual Property Lawyers Association, the
- 7 Federal circuit wrote, "Congress was not concerned that
- 8 an occasional patent law decision of a regional circuit
- 9 court or of a State court would defeat its goal of
- 10 increased uniformity in the national law of patents."
- 11 And that was the view of the Federal
- 12 circuit's own jurisdiction in 1984. But, in the time
- 13 evolved, the Federal circuit has changed its perception
- of its own jurisdiction, and that's why we are here
- 15 today, is, in 2007, the Federal circuit went awry and --
- 16 and changed the standard that no longer follows what
- 17 this Court articulated in Grable.
- 18 They -- they have improperly conflated the
- 19 necessity and substantiality components of the -- of an
- 20 appropriate Grable analysis. And they totally disregard
- 21 a proper balance of the State and Federal interests.
- 22 The Federal circuit announced that there's an interest
- 23 in -- Federal interest in uniformity of patent law, and
- 24 then that was that. That was the end of the inquiry.
- 25 There is no balance if you don't look at the State

- 1 interest on the other side.
- 2 And, in legal malpractice cases, in general
- 3 and in Mr. Minton's claim in particular, there are
- 4 substantial State interests. There is the general
- 5 interest, the right of a State to develop its own State
- 6 claims, its own State law, and its own State courts.
- 7 But there is also a State interest in
- 8 governing the relationship between attorney and client
- 9 that happens through the legal malpractice process.
- 10 But, specifically, with regard to Mr. Minton's claim,
- 11 one of his primary theories in -- in this case -- in the
- 12 legal malpractice case, is that the attorney's error,
- 13 with regard to bringing up the Experimental Use
- 14 Doctrine, deprived him of an opportunity to make a
- 15 lucrative settlement with the NASD in the underlying
- 16 patent litigation.
- 17 Well, the question of exactly how you prove
- 18 whether and to what extent the NASD would have paid a
- 19 settlement and for how much in the underlying case is a
- 20 matter of tremendous dispute right now. That is an
- 21 evolving issue in the -- in the legal malpractice
- 22 jurisprudence of the State of Texas.
- In fact, in the month of December 2012, the
- 24 Supreme Court of Texas heard argument in a case called
- 25 Elizondo v. Krist that addresses that precise issue.

- 1 How do you prove that NASDAQ would have paid him
- 2 \$100 million, if only these lawyers had raised this
- 3 issue earlier?
- 4 And, yet, if this -- if Mr. Minton's claims
- 5 are hailed into Federal court because of the fact-bound
- 6 and situation-specific application of the Experimental
- 7 Law Doctrine, the Federal courts would be Erie guessers
- 8 as to that important issue that the State courts really
- 9 need to resolve.
- 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Ms. Webre, is there any
- 11 binding effect of a Federal determination here on State
- 12 law? And is there any binding effect of any State
- 13 determination here on Federal law?
- MS. WEBRE: No, Your Honor.
- 15 JUSTICE SCALIA: If it was left to the
- 16 State, would what the States say about -- about patent
- 17 law be binding in any Federal cases? And, vice-versa,
- 18 if it went to the Federal jurisdiction, would anything
- 19 that the Federal court says about -- about State tort
- 20 law be binding on State courts?
- 21 MS. WEBRE: In neither direction would any
- 22 decision be binding. The -- the State -- any decision
- 23 in a State court on a legal malpractice matter regarding
- 24 issues of patent law would not be binding in any way on
- 25 the Federal courts or on the PTO in handling any of the

- 1 patent applications -- prosecution of patents.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, that -- that being
- 3 so, your -- your last argument about the Federal
- 4 government messing up -- you know, State tort law in an
- 5 area that -- that is currently very much in the fore in
- 6 the -- in the decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, that
- 7 doesn't really carry a lot of weight, except in this
- 8 single case.
- I mean, they are not going to mess up Texas
- 10 law in that regard. They may get this case wrong,
- 11 but --
- MS. WEBRE: You -- you are right that --
- 13 that it will not, substantially, adversely impact Texas
- 14 State law, but that's an illustration of a substantial
- 15 State interest.
- 16 And, in a way, it's akin to the issue in
- 17 Grable because the -- the embedded issue in Grable that
- 18 justified this Court reaching down and grabbing a State
- 19 law claim and bringing it up into Federal court wasn't
- 20 just that the issue was disputed, the -- the
- 21 construction of that statute was unresolved. But that
- 22 it needed resolving. It needed resolving by a court
- 23 whose decision could be precedential, so then it's
- 24 resolved from then on.
- 25 And so the -- the question of how do you 12

- 1 prove a settlement is an issue that needs resolving by a
- 2 court who's going to advance the jurisprudence.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: What about the Federal
- 4 issue? Doesn't that need resolving?
- 5 MS. WEBRE: There are no Federal issues that
- 6 need resolving here because it's solely a question of
- 7 the application of these specific facts in this
- 8 affidavit to the doctrine. There's -- there's no
- 9 overarching question of -- of patent law that needs
- 10 resolving.
- 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Let me -- me ask this
- 12 question: Suppose you have two cases, hypothetical,
- 13 case A, case B, both involve the Experimental Use
- 14 Doctrine in Federal patent law. In case A, it's a very
- 15 weak argument; it's most unlikely it's not going to
- 16 apply. Case B, very strong argument, Experimental Use
- 17 Doctrine applies.
- 18 Any difference in the removability in those
- 19 two cases?
- MS. WEBRE: I don't believe so, Your Honor,
- 21 because the question isn't the -- the significance to
- 22 the particular claim. The question is the Federal
- 23 issue. Is there a --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, if -- if you say --
- 25 since you're going to say it -- I mean, if it's a

- 1 "substantial" Federal issue, then it's substantial in
- 2 hypothetical B, but not in hypothetical A?
- 3 MS. WEBRE: Well, it's -- it's, perhaps,
- 4 more necessary. But -- and maybe what I need to do is
- 5 back up a little bit and discuss what I think are the
- 6 factors for a court to look at, when deciding whether or
- 7 not an embedded Federal issue is a substantial one.
- 8 In looking at this -- this Court's
- 9 articulation in the Grable case and the Empire
- 10 HealthChoice case, the -- the issues that the Court
- 11 looked at -- one was the nature of the Federal -- of the
- 12 Federal question itself -- the Federal issue, is it a
- 13 constitutional issue?
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So does that mean that,
- 15 if the claim in the malpractice action is that the PTO
- 16 acted unconstitutionally -- assume that set of facts --
- 17 how does that change your analysis?
- 18 MS. WEBRE: That -- that would be a more
- 19 substantial Federal question than the one presented
- 20 here, but I submit that it would not be sufficient to
- 21 warrant "arising under" jurisdiction here because it
- 22 is -- it involves only a hypothetical actual set of
- 23 patent rights. No judgment that can happen in a State
- 24 legal malpractice case actually impacts any patent
- 25 rights.

1	Let's say Mr. Minton won a judgment from a
2	State legal malpractice court saying, it was the
3	negligence, that you would have won the experimental use
4	exception, your patent would have been declared valid.
5	And so he has a judgment from a State court saying,
6	the the loss of your patent was the result of a
7	negligence and not because it was actually invalid.
8	That doesn't give him a valid patent. He
9	cannot take that judgment and then sue somebody and say,
_0	look, look, I've got a patent. And it's
.1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So go back to you
_2	were going through a list of questions, and I posited
_3	let's assume that the malpractice claim does involve a
_4	constitutional question.
_5	MS. WEBRE: Yes. So
_6	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Then what other
_7	factors
_8	MS. WEBRE: Well, the the in the
_9	continuum constitutional issues would be more
20	substantial; statutory issues would be a little less
21	substantial. In fact, this Court grappled with that in
22	the Grable case and said, we're not going to draw a hard
23	and fast line on statutory issues.
24	But then, in the Empire HealthChoice
25	opinion, the Court noted that this is a the issue 15

- 1 the Federal issue there was nonstatutory, and so,
- 2 therefore, let's not make a Federal case out of it. So,
- 3 in that continuum, that would be one factor to look at.
- 4 Another factor to look at would be, is the
- 5 Federal issue -- the legal issue undisputed or
- 6 uncertain? Not necessarily the application of these
- 7 particular facts to the legal issue because there really
- 8 isn't a Federal interest in how this affidavit is
- 9 construed or not.
- 10 But, in -- in the resolution of the legal
- 11 issues, as in Grable, is the question of law disputed or
- 12 uncertain? And the corollary to that is does it need
- 13 resolving? Because that was the situation in the Grable
- 14 case. But just because an issue is novel doesn't ipso
- 15 facto make it a -- a substantial issue.
- 16 This Court, in the Merrell Dow case,
- 17 discussed that, that --
- 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why -- why do all -- why do
- 19 all of these issues cut in your favor, in all cases
- 20 involving malpractice? I mean, you're urging, not just
- 21 that your client win here, but you want us to adopt a
- 22 general rule that malpractice suits involving patent
- 23 rights can never, ever come under "Federal arising"
- 24 under jurisdiction.
- Isn't that -- isn't that what you want us to

- Official Subject to Final Review 1 say? 2 MS. WEBRE: Yes, Your Honor. 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: So the burden would be on you to show that every one of these factors, in all of 4 5 those cases, is always going to cut in your favor. 6 That -- what, that they will never involve a 7 constitutional issue? That they will never, ever determine future patent decisions? 8 MS. WEBRE: Well, Your Honor, I -- I urge 9 that because I think that's the only appropriate 10 11 12 cases. And it's not that --
- application of the Grable test to legal malpractice 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I like -- I like
- bright-line rules. In fact -- you know, I thought 14 Holmes had it right. It doesn't arise under, unless the 15 16 cause of action is a Federal cause of action. But once 17 we've gone down -- down the road of Grable, I don't --
- you're -- you're proving a negative. 18
- 19 The burden is on you to prove a negative, that there is no situation that can arise in -- in 20
- 21 malpractice cases involving patents where the Federal
- 22 issue would justify arising. That's a hard road to hoe.
- 23 MS. WEBRE: I think there are two reasons --
- 24 there are two reasons why that's the only appropriate
- way to apply the Grable test to legal malpractice cases, 25

- 1 and both of them involve the lack of precedent from the
- 2 case.
- 3 One is it can never involve actual patent
- 4 rights. The consequence of a judge's --
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How about fraud on -- a
- 6 claim of fraud on -- that the malpractice was fraud on
- 7 the PTO? Lawyer loses that. It's been litigated.
- 8 Isn't it res judicata, and won't it affect the patent --
- 9 or might it not affect the patent in a patent action?
- 10 MS. WEBRE: No, Your Honor, it would not.
- 11 It would not affect the patent office, either, as a
- 12 matter of res judicata or as a matter of issue
- 13 preclusion -- non-mutual issue preclusion or as a matter
- 14 of jurisprudential precedence, for a couple of reasons.
- 15 One is that, as a starting point, the -- the
- 16 question of attorney misconduct can affect the issuance
- of a patent before the patent office, but that would
- 18 happen not in the context of a legal malpractice claim,
- 19 but in the context of the actual prosecution of the
- 20 patent before the PTO itself.
- 21 So the PTO would have made a -- its own
- 22 determination and granted or not granted limited
- 23 sanction, whatever action it is the PTO takes in --
- 24 before -- in a proceeding before itself, the PTO would
- 25 be deciding that.

			_	_				_
7	a -	_	7 ~ ~ ~ 7	malpractice	~~~			- 1
I .	≤ 0	_	I ACTA I	mainractice	cace	$M \cap M \cap M$	$-\alpha n + \tau$	/ ne
_	\mathcal{L}	α	TCGGT	marpractice.	Cabc	WOULU	CIII	

- 2 subsequent to that. So, in -- in the first instance,
- 3 the PTO gets to decide that.
- From a res judicata standpoint, the PTO's
- 5 patent review manual -- the Manual of Examination of
- 6 Patents provides that res judicata effect is only given
- 7 to decisions by either the Board of Patent Review or
- 8 Interferences, the United States District Court for the
- 9 District of Columbia, and the Federal circuit. No State
- 10 courts make that list.
- So, from a res judicata standpoint, only
- 12 going right up the chain is going to bind the PTO. And,
- 13 from an issue preclusion standpoint, the PTO would never
- 14 be a party -- could never be a party to a -- a legal
- 15 malpractice claim and, therefore, would not be bound by
- 16 any State court decision.
- 17 And what's kind of a funny --
- 18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I find that somewhat
- 19 hard to follow.
- 20 Let's assume, in adjudicating a medical -- a
- 21 malpractice claim, the State court finds that the
- 22 attorney suppressed information. It's a finding of
- 23 fact. He has this information in his or her file, and
- 24 they didn't disclose it. I'm not quite sure how the PTO
- 25 ignores that litigation.

1	MS. WEBRE: The PTO may not ignore it. The
	ins. William The Tro may not remove the time
2	PTO
3	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Or the district court
4	does, if it gets to review that in a later action.
5	MS. WEBRE: Well, but
6	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm only raising this
7	question to address Justice Scalia's point. You're
8	asking for an absolute rule, and I posited a situation
9	where I think it's not so clear that a State court
10	finding might not have an effect.
11	So do we have to go to your absolute rule?
12	MS. WEBRE: No, Your Honor. You do not have
13	to go to my absolute rule. I think that the absolute
14	rule is the the most sensible and appropriate
15	application of the Grable test to State law legal
16	malpractice claims, and it has the added benefit of
17	certainty. It it doesn't roll us back to the Justice
18	Holmes' rule.
19	JUSTICE SCALIA: I guess you might argue

- 20 that, even if it fails the Grable test in a couple of
- 21 isolated cases, we should still adopt that rule because
- 22 the benefits of having a -- a clear rule that doesn't
- have to be litigated in every -- every case outweigh the 23
- 24 fact that one or two might -- might not come out that
- way if we applied Grable. 25

1	MS. WEBRE: Well
2	JUSTICE SCALIA: Because we're making it up
3	anyway, right?
4	(Laughter.)
5	MS. WEBRE: Well, Your Honor, I I would
6	take it a step further than that because I think that
7	any actual impact of of what you're positing, Justice
8	Sotomayor, is so ephemeral. The idea that that the
9	PTO will look at a fact-finding in a legal malpractice
10	case, and, oh, goodness, I didn't realize there was this
11	suppression of evidence, I'm now going to dig further.
12	Well, that's such a speculative and
13	ephemeral possibility, it doesn't disrupt the fabric of
14	patent jurisprudence patent law, in any way, and it
15	doesn't tie the hands of the PTO in any way. It doesn't
16	bind the PTO in any future consideration of a
17	continuation patent or any other related
18	continuation-in-part patent.
19	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Let let me ask you
20	this: The Brighton Miller treatise is rather
21	complimentary of Grable, and said it brought
22	considerable certainty to the area. I was pleased to
23	hear that because I'm not sure that it's true.
24	(Laughter.)
25	JUSTICE KENNEDY: But can you just tell me, 21

- 1 as an -- as an empirical matter, does "arising under"
- 2 for removal jurisdiction cases consume a tremendous
- 3 amount of time in litigation in the Federal courts?
- 4 It's just --
- 5 MS. WEBRE: Well, it -- it does a couple of
- 6 things. First is it consumes a lot of time of the
- 7 courts and the litigants in removing and then getting
- 8 remanded again. And it -- as is discussed in the --
- 9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What I -- yes. What I
- 10 mean is the argument over "arising under" over
- 11 jurisdiction.
- MS. WEBRE: There are, on this issue of the
- 13 legal malpractice cases, in the wake of the Federal
- 14 circuit's opinions, the Air Measurement case and
- 15 Immunocept case in 2007, scores and scores and scores of
- 16 courts -- State and Federal courts have been grappling
- 17 with this precise jurisdictional issue.
- 18 I think this case is about the fifth or
- 19 sixth cert petition that came up to this Court on this
- 20 jurisdictional question. I think there are three or
- 21 four behind us in queue, and there -- there continues to
- 22 be uncertainty in the lower courts on this precise
- 23 issue.
- 24 And -- and it really presents for this Court
- 25 a question of is "arising under" jurisdiction truly a

- lenient standard, as the Federal court has articulated?
- Now, it's true that the -- the entire body
- 3 of State law legal malpractice cases arising out of
- 4 patent representation is not going to overwhelm the
- 5 Federal court. It's not going to -- to --
- 6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So my question was even
- 7 broader. Let's say we resolve legal malpractice.
- 8 Then -- then we will have products liability with a
- 9 particular product, and then we will have some food and
- 10 agriculture cases. It goes on and on.
- MS. WEBRE: Well, I think that is a -- that
- 12 is a -- that's a substantial issue. But, like
- 13 Justice Scalia said, that -- you know, the -- this Court
- 14 departed from Justice Holmes' construct some years ago.
- 15 But I think that there is the opportunity in this case
- 16 to provide a great deal of certainty, to provide
- 17 absolute certainty vis-à-vis legal malpractice cases
- 18 because of their unique hypothetical aspect. The
- 19 consequence of the judgment affects no rights.
- But, second, in reaffirming --
- 21 rearticulating the Grable test, emphasizing the
- 22 importance and the separateness of the substantiality
- 23 inquiry, emphasizing the importance of the federalism
- 24 aspect, this Court has a great opportunity to resolve a
- 25 lot of uncertainty.

1	And, if there are no further questions, I						
2	would like to reserve the the remainder of my time.						
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.						
4	Mr. Michel?						
5	Is that correct, "Michel"?						
6	ORAL ARGUMENT OF THOMAS M. MICHEL						
7	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT						
8	MR. MICHEL: It is, Your Honor. Thank you.						
9	Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the						
0	Court:						
.1	This case is about whether a State court has						
_2	subject matter jurisdiction over a State law patent						
_3	malpractice claim that rests entirely on an issue of						
_4	patent law that is only heard in Federal court, and when						
.5	that issue is dispositive, central to the case, has						
-6	issues of first impression in them, has no State						
_7	analogue in any other area of the law, and whether in						
_8	the deciding issues of questions of law and will not						
_9	disturb the balance between State and Federal judicial						
20	responsibility.						
21	JUSTICE GINSBURG: What about other areas of						
22	exclusive Federal jurisdiction, where the claim, if you						
23	are stating it initially, would have to go into Federal						
24	court and not State court, say, an antitrust claim, a						
25	copyright claim?						

- 1 Is -- is what you're saying about patents, does that go for every area, where initial jurisdiction 2 3 is exclusively in the Federal court? MR. MICHEL: No, Your Honor. It does not. 4 5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Then what's the difference between, say, antitrust and patent? 6 7 MR. MICHEL: There -- there are many differences, Your Honor. First, antitrust has -- has a 8 9 State analogue. The Texas Supreme Court in Coca-Cola v. Harmer, 218 Southwest --10 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Then take immigration 12 law. 13 MR. MICHEL: Yes. 14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Don't get in the weeds. Take immigration law. 15 16 MR. MICHEL: Yes. Now, once again, the 17 issues -- immigration law may be a -- a different area where there is exclusive Federal court jurisdiction in 18 that area, possibly. But, once again, the analysis and 19 20 the application in immigration law, from a malpractice 21 case, may give rise in that area. 22 However --
- 23 JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me. I guess I just
- 24 don't understand this. Is it the case that there is
- "arising under" jurisdiction only when the Federal cause 25

- 1 of action presented is one over which Federal courts
- 2 have exclusive jurisdiction?
- 3 MR. MICHEL: That --
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: If that -- is that the
- 5 rule?
- 6 MR. MICHEL: I believe, in part.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, any -- any Federal
- 8 statute that can be sued upon, both in Federal courts
- 9 and in State courts, but as to which Federal courts are
- 10 the dispositive adjudicators, you say that that does not
- 11 come within this "arising under" rule?
- MR. MICHEL: Does -- does not come within
- 13 this Court's doctrinal holdings in Grable and Empire
- 14 because we have a Federal balancing and State balancing
- 15 issue. And, as we've articulated, when Congress has
- 16 articulated --
- 17 JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you have a case for
- 18 that, that says, if a suit could be brought in State
- 19 court, even though it involves a dispositive Federal
- 20 question as to which this Court would be the -- you
- 21 know, the last interpreter, it cannot possibly come
- 22 within "arising under" jurisdiction?
- Have you got a case for that.
- MR. MICHEL: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I don't
- 25 know if I followed your question.

1	JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you have a case which
2	says that, when a Federal question is presented in a
3	case over which Federal courts have jurisdiction, but
4	also State courts have jurisdiction, although, needless
5	to say, the Federal courts would be dispositive on the
6	issue, such a case cannot come within the "arising
7	under" jurisdiction?
8	MR. MICHEL: No, I don't think anything that
9	expressly. But the A&T and the
LO	JUSTICE SCALIA: I would find it
11	extraordinary for for that to be the rule.
L2	MR. MICHEL: Well, you can't isolate it.
13	That rule is more complicated because it is the
L4	application of the Grable standard that's the analysis.
15	JUSTICE KENNEDY: But getting back
16	Justice Ginsburg simply made the point, I had thought,
L7	that you place a good deal of reliance on the fact that
18	there is exclusive jurisdiction. And her question to me
19	pointed out how far-reaching this case might be because
20	it it could involve patents, copyright, all other
21	areas of exclusive jurisdiction. If that is going to be
22	your special rule, it's not so confined as you suggest.
23	That's all that question meant to me.
24	Certainly certainly, you you could have cases
25	where there is concurrent jurisdiction, 1983, in which 27

- 1 we'd have the same problem.
- 2 MR. MICHEL: I think -- I think the factors
- 3 that go into determining the -- one of the grounds that
- 4 has been articulated by Grable and the balancing for
- 5 Merrell Dow is the number of cases that would come into
- 6 Federal court, and it is a doctrinal decision. It is a
- 7 doctrinal rule.
- 8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So patent law cases of
- 9 malpractice are smaller in number than copyright
- 10 cases --
- MR. MICHEL: Patent law cases --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR -- immigration, other
- 13 exclusive jurisdictions, so that's okay to -- to remove,
- 14 but those others aren't?
- MR. MICHEL: Those --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Does that make a whole
- 17 lot of sense?
- 18 MR. MICHEL: That is the articulation in
- 19 Grable, Your Honor.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, how about a
- 21 different one, the one that's being proposed by your
- 22 adversary --
- MR. MICHEL: That --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- which is define
- 25 "substantial" as to how it affects Federal law, which I 28

- 1 think was the bottom line -- or the development of
- 2 Federal law, the bottom line of Grable.
- 3 And she says -- you dispute this in your
- 4 brief -- that it doesn't affect the invalidated patent,
- 5 that there's no way that a judgment on the malpractice
- 6 is going to be used in a continuation patent dispute
- 7 because it's not one of the listed preclusive courts.
- 8 So how does a ruling affect patent law?
- 9 MR. MICHEL: Sure. Many -- many ways, Your
- 10 Honor.
- 11 First, the test is uniformity, under Grable,
- 12 the uniformity of patent law -- Federal law, not whether
- 13 the --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why is -- who's going to
- 15 follow it?
- 16 MR. MICHEL: In many situations. For
- 17 example, she -- she conflates -- Petitioners conflate,
- 18 res judicata with issue preclusion. That goes back to
- 19 your earlier question, Justice Sotomayor, and that issue
- 20 preclusion will have an affect. And as, in fact --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Issue preclusion applies
- 22 only to someone who was a party.
- 23 MR. MICHEL: Correct. That would only apply
- 24 to the inventor; it would not apply to the PTO. It can
- only be used against, in this, case Mr. Minton. And, in

- 1 fact, patent counsel in this case, under the rules of
- 2 the Federal circuit, under patent law and the Patent
- 3 Manual, disclosed the State court's rulings in this case
- 4 to the Patent Office during its continuing patent. The
- 5 State district court judge made a scope and claim
- 6 decision.
- 7 So, Justice Sotomayor, back to your
- 8 question --
- 10 not binding. The -- whatever the State -- whatever the
- 11 State court says, as a matter of patent law, has no
- 12 binding effect on that question coming into Federal
- 13 court.
- MR. MICHEL: It does.
- 15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How?
- 16 MR. MICHEL: Under this Court's decision
- 17 Marrese v. The Academy of Orthopedic Assertions --
- 18 Surgeons, a State court's decision is entitled to issue
- 19 preclusion, even in Federal forum. And so that is
- 20 why -- also the patent -- the continuation patent
- 21 would -- could be declared invalid for failing to
- 22 disclose that information.
- We are not saying it's binding on the PTO,
- 24 but it is an issue of issue preclusion as against Minton
- 25 that would be in front of the PTO and is in front of the

- 1 PTO, as we speak.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, is that -- my
- 3 goodness, but you are going to have a purely
- 4 hypothetical State decision here. The State will have
- 5 held that -- you know, if -- if he had said this, the
- 6 result would have been something else. And you think
- 7 that that precludes the -- the issue when it arises in
- 8 real life?
- And you say, since the State court made that
- 10 hypothetical determination, it precludes me from arguing
- 11 it in -- in real life.
- MR. MICHEL: Yes. It is a factor --
- 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you have any cases like
- 14 that? It seems, to me, a rather weird -- weird
- 15 situation. I mean, maybe it could, but it -- it's
- 16 strange.
- 17 MR. MICHEL: Well, it is a matter of issue
- 18 preclusion. This Court -- that is the danger of
- 19 allowing these patent law issues to proceed in State
- 20 court.
- 21 This Court -- the State district court in
- 22 this case entered in a brand-new issue of Federal
- 23 interpretation -- Petitioners and Respondents totally
- 24 disagree as to whether this is a fact-specific case or
- 25 whether this case involves issues of law. And, in fact,

1			2 -		<u>.</u>		e	2
T	we	contena	10	invoives	ıssue	OI	Ilrst	impression.

- In this case, the State district court made
- 3 holdings about issues of whether the question of -- the
- 4 experimental use exception is a question of law or a
- 5 question of fact.
- It made the requirement that experimental
- 7 use had to go to a required claim element, as opposed to
- 8 a claimed element. It made the determination -- and the
- 9 Court of Appeals made the legal determination that
- 10 knowledge of the buyer is conclusive, rather than as a
- 11 factor.
- Those are all issues of not only disputed
- 13 substantial issues of Federal patent law that both
- 14 parties submitted briefings in the trial court and the
- 15 court of appeals, 70 pages long, disputing the legal --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Besides the parties --
- MR. MICHEL: Yes.
- 18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- how else does it
- 19 affect the development of patent law?
- MR. MICHEL: The --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Who else is going to
- 22 follow --
- MR. MICHEL: They're --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- this malpractice
- 25 determination?

- 1 MR. MICHEL: It's going to have a really
- 2 profound effect on the patent law practitioners who are
- 3 uniquely situated and work in parcel -- and interlocking
- 4 with the Patent Office.
- 5 It is the patent lawyers who draft the
- 6 patents, it is the patent lawyers who present them to
- 7 the Patent Office, they are the ones who engage when
- 8 they need to be amended or refined or narrowed or
- 9 broadened.
- 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: They knew -- they knew
- 11 these were controverted issues. You say that they --
- 12 they are controverted issues. So they would have been
- 13 alerted to a problem anyway. And they certainly would
- 14 not accept a State court determination as authoritative
- 15 resolution of that problem.
- MR. MICHEL: The patent --
- 17 JUSTICE SCALIA: The patent attorneys. I
- 18 mean, you --
- MR. MICHEL: No, the Patent Office will have
- 20 to take that as guidance because their new taskmaster
- 21 will not be -- be following Federal patent law because,
- 22 in this case, the Court injected a brand-new requirement
- 23 that was never held by a patent lawyer, that you had to
- 24 have an expert witness testify to establish your
- 25 experimental use testing exception.

1	That's never been held anywhere in Federal
2	patent law. So, now, who's the patent lawyer going to
3	be looking to for guidance? The exclusive Federal
4	courts? The Patent Office? Guidance from the Federal
5	circuits?
6	No, they are going to have their backs
7	watched by the State courts, saying, uh-huh, you know
8	what? I'm going to impose a new legal obligation on
9	you, and you are going to be held for malpractice. And
10	that's not that's not
11	JUSTICE GINSBURG: What would happen what
12	would happen if that came up in an ordinary litigation
13	in Federal court, and the Federal circuit, ultimately,
L4	decided the question, that the State court was entirely
15	wrong about this; you don't need a witness.
16	Well, that's the end of it, right? Once the
L7	Federal court decides the question, then whatever the
18	the State judge thought was the Federal law is is
19	gone.
20	MR. MICHEL: No, that's exactly the problem.
21	The State courts aren't bound by the Federal circuit's
22	holding. There will be no Federal review of substantial
23	issues of Federal law zero unless this Court is
24	going to

JUSTICE SCALIA:

Excuse me. The State

25

- 1 courts are not bound by the Federal court's holding?
- 2 You mean State courts can resolve patent questions,
- 3 contrary to what the Supreme Court of the United States
- 4 says the law is?
- 5 MR. MICHEL: No, not contrary -- that was
- 6 the point I was going to make -- not contrary to the
- 7 holdings of the United States Supreme Court, contrary to
- 8 the Federal circuit's holding. And, in fact, the Fort
- 9 Worth Court of Appeals did not follow the Federal
- 10 circuit's holding in this area.
- 11 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, are you saying,
- 12 Mr. Michel, that what -- what the State courts are going
- 13 to do is to say that, notwithstanding that the Federal
- 14 circuit has ruled on a matter and notwithstanding that
- 15 the lawyer has complied with the rule as articulated by
- 16 the Federal circuit, that, nonetheless, they will be
- 17 held to have committed malpractice because they didn't
- 18 comply with the State's rule?
- 19 Is -- is that what you think the State
- 20 judges are really going to do?
- 21 MR. MICHEL: I think the State judges are
- 22 going to try to, possibly, apply Federal circuit
- 23 holdings. And, in this case, they did not. They
- 24 injected a new holding, which established a new
- 25 liability for the patent lawyers, which is not

	Official - Subject to Filial Review
1	reviewable, unless this Court were to grant certiorari
2	review.
3	And so that then leaves the only review on
4	these materials these are going to be substantial
5	issues of
6	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what you're arguing,
7	they're going to make a mistake, and, because we might
8	not accept certiorari, that's binding on everybody
9	else
-0	MR. MICHEL: It's
1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: in the State
_2	MR. MICHEL: No. It's binding on the State
_3	court practitioners, in that State, who get sued for
4	legal malpractice. And it's that interrelationship
_5	between the lawyers who are drafting patents they
L 6	are going to be getting
_7	JUSTICE KAGAN: What if a lawyer says to
8_	the you know, I complied with all the Federal law
_9	all the rules in the Federal circuit, I complied with.
20	MR. MICHEL: Yes.
21	JUSTICE KAGAN: You are suggesting that the
22	State court is going to say, too bad, you committed

MR. MICHEL: They did that in this case. At 36

hypothetical law about patents?

malpractice anyway because you didn't comply with our

23

24

- 1 214 --
- 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It's not -- it's
- 3 not -- I guess it's not their hypothetical law. They
- 4 would be saying, this is what we think the Federal law
- 5 requires, and while we're happy -- or not happy -- but
- 6 it's interesting that the Federal circuit thinks
- 7 something else, but that doesn't bind us.
- 8 MR. MICHEL: Correct. Correct. And it's
- 9 not just hypothetical. The hypothetical doesn't mean
- 10 insubstantial. The hypothetical doesn't mean --
- 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why is that worse than the
- 12 fact that, if it goes to Federal court, all of the
- 13 lawyers in the State, in all malpractice cases, are
- 14 going to be, supposedly, bound by the Federal court's
- 15 holding as to State issues of malpractice?
- 16 I mean, it seems to me it's Twiddle Dum or
- 17 Twiddle Dee, whichever court system you go to, you are
- 18 going to terrorize the lawyers of that State on the
- 19 basis of an opinion of a court that is not dispositive
- 20 on those issues.
- So I don't -- I don't know why --
- MR. MICHEL: I think we disagree. Here,
- 23 when you try -- for example, in the patent infringement
- 24 case, the sole trial is going to be the patent
- 25 infringement.

- 1 You are going to try the Federal lawsuit,
- 2 Your Honor -- Justice Scalia, you are trying that patent
- 3 infringement lawsuit in State court, in the -- in the
- 4 case within the case analysis. The Federal rules,
- 5 that's what is so troubling about --
- 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: And you -- you are trying
- 7 the malpractice lawsuit -- the State practice
- 8 malpractice lawsuit, in Federal court.
- 9 MR. MICHEL: Correct. But the application
- 10 and the rules governing it are going to be by Federal
- 11 law. The rules in this case -- in particular, the
- 12 substantial issue of the experimental use exception, the
- 13 only issue that saved was the -- the experimental use
- 14 exception. We disagree, but, just because the State
- 15 court makes an opinion and a holding, it doesn't have
- 16 real-world effects. It really does. It's not an
- 17 advisory opinion.
- 18 And there needs to be a distinguishment
- 19 between the side issue the Petitioners are saying --
- 20 they are trying to get you focus on this one micro-issue
- 21 of whether it will affect an actual patent -- as to
- 22 whether it will affect patent law. And it will affect
- 23 patent law, and it will affect the application of patent
- law. And so what you're going to have is you're going
- 25 to have two divergent systems.

1	You're going to have actually, you will
2	have one on the Federal side, and then you will have 50
3	jurisdictions espousing whether they think the law is of
4	patent law and not being bound by the Federal circuit,
5	which is going to
6	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Anytime anytime I
7	mean, a lot of patent questions as you already
8	pointed out, a lot of patent questions come up in State
9	court litigations, contract litigations, every time you
10	have a patent question, then must the case go to the
11	Federal court, in your view?
12	MR. MICHEL: No, that is not our position.
13	JUSTICE GINSBURG: So what is the dividing
14	line between patent questions that belong in State court
15	and patent questions that belong only in Federal court?
16	MR. MICHEL: For example, not every
17	malpractice case it will be the case within the case
18	doctrine in a patent case that will go to Federal court.
19	For example, failure to communicate a
20	settlement offer does not have a case within the case.
21	In a business transaction, it doesn't have the case
22	within the case analysis.
23	So those malpractices arising from them will
24	not go to Federal court. Breaches of fiduciary duty for
25	divertiture of feer don't have the causation element

- 1 So we are --
- 2 JUSTICE SCALIA: So you are talking about a
- 3 patent case that has a patent issue, whether it's a
- 4 contract case, a tort case, a malpractice case -- if it
- 5 has a patent issue, you think it has to go to Federal
- 6 court?
- 7 MR. MICHEL: We do not.
- 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, then I repeat Justice
- 9 Ginsburg's question, how do you decide which of those do
- 10 and which of those don't?
- 11 MR. MICHEL: I think this is a case in
- 12 point. This case is on all fours with Grable. There is
- 13 no exception. The only distinguishing factor is this
- 14 hypothetical argument of the case within the case
- 15 analysis.
- 16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, why don't you stay
- 17 within the lines that you give us? You have said not
- 18 every patent question that comes up in a State court, if
- 19 it's dismissed, just so you can start over in Federal
- 20 court, what patent questions -- now, let's not talk
- 21 about breach of fiduciary duty general questions -- what
- 22 patent questions are properly adjudicated in the State
- 23 court as part of a lawsuit that --
- MR. MICHEL: Well, the -- the distinction
- is, for example, in a licensing case, in a patent case,

- 1 where you -- those cases are brought in Federal -- I
- 2 mean -- I'm sorry -- brought in State court -- our --
- 3 our request here is following Grable, that what will go
- 4 to Federal court are legal malpractice cases arising
- 5 from substantial issues of Federal patent law that have
- 6 that case within the case analysis.
- 7 And it's that narrow -- extremely narrow
- 8 window of cases. This is not, "Katie, bar the door."
- 9 We -- we set forth the empirical numbers. They are
- 10 going to be microscopic. But what they do have is
- 11 Grable's test. Every element that Grable articulated,
- 12 this case meets.
- 13 It does involve substantial issues of first
- 14 impression.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: But what was the
- 16 substantial Federal matter in Grable?
- 17 MR. MICHEL: The issue of the IRS, whether
- 18 personal service had to be given under an IRS --
- 19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes. And that was in the
- 20 control, the actions of the Federal agency, of IRS.
- MR. MICHEL: Correct.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: And you have no
- 23 counterpart for that here?
- 24 MR. MICHEL: We do have rules that will
- 25 govern the law on experimental use exception.

1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You have -- you have --MR. MICHEL: And that would govern the 2 3 application in Federal court. That's why it should be 4 in Federal court, to govern how the agency -- and 5 whether a patent -- and this suit goes directly -- it 6 affects patents. This is going to patent validity. 7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the -- but the Federal court -- you said before that whatever the 8 9 Federal circuit says, the State doesn't have to follow it the next time there's a case in State court, but the 10 11 Federal court is certainly not going to follow what the 12 State says on experimental use. 13 MR. MICHEL: It does. I will tell you -the reason why it does, it's in the doctrine of 14 collateral estoppel. It affects the inventor. It's 15 16 affecting the inventor in this case. This holding of 17 the State district court and the State court of appeals 18 are now before the Patent Office --19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. How does 20 it -- the patent's invalid. 21 MR. MICHEL: I'm sorry? 22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The patent's invalid. 23 Nothing the Court does here is going to change that invalidity. That -- that's what I don't understand. 24 25 MR. MICHEL: Correct.

42

- 1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: He's not going to get
- 2 his patent back from this action.
- MR. MICHEL: That's correct.
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: He's going to get money
- 5 for losing it, maybe.
- 6 MR. MICHEL: Correct.
- 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So how does it affect
- 8 the patent?
- 9 MR. MICHEL: There is a pending continuation
- 10 patent. And --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We're back to that
- 12 issue. Okay.
- 13 MR. MICHEL: Yes, but that is a collateral
- 14 estoppel issue. Here, let me -- let me give up another
- 15 scenario because, in a different role, when the patent
- 16 is not declared invalid and, instead, there is a finding
- of non-infringement, and that's what gives rise to the
- 18 legal malpractice case.
- 19 Then you go to State court, and, in that
- 20 situation, the determination of -- of infringement will
- 21 be raised as a basis for legal malpractice against the
- 22 lawyer in the malpractice action. Then the lawyers
- 23 raise, as within the case within the case exception, is
- 24 that, oh, the patent was invalid.
- So, then, in that situation, a State

- 1 district court will be rendering an opinion on a live
- 2 patent, and then that will be binding on the inventor
- 3 and will affect real live actual patents, and it does
- 4 affect patents before the Patent Office.
- 5 Petitioner said we -- it's not an issue of
- 6 res judicata. They cite a rule. That's not our
- 7 argument. It's an issue of issue preclusion. It's also
- 8 the duty and the obligation of the lawyer to disclose
- 9 that judicial discussion -- discussion to the Patent
- 10 Office.
- 11 Otherwise his, continuation patent could be
- 12 declared invalid for inequitable conduct -- for not
- 13 disclosing material information.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: And your -- your
- 15 distinction between other areas of Federal jurisdiction
- 16 where the Federal law controls and patent is what?
- 17 What -- Justice Sotomayor brought up immigration law --
- MR. MICHEL: Yes.
- 19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- copyright law. Why
- 20 don't they -- why doesn't what you said work the same
- 21 way in those fields?
- 22 MR. MICHEL: I think there are -- there are
- 23 distinctions in the area of patent law versus any other
- 24 area of the law namely because, as we get to the
- 25 State -- and this -- this goes to the analysis of the

- 1 State/Federal balance. That's why the exclusive Federal
- 2 court jurisdiction.
- 3 That's why exclusive nationwide jurisdiction
- 4 in patent law in the Federal circuit is different than
- 5 any other area of the law. It is that balancing test
- 6 that we are required to engage in.
- 7 That's why it's unique from antitrust,
- 8 trademark, civil rights, securities, employment. Those
- 9 have concurrent jurisdiction. They may not have an
- 10 agency involved.
- 11 For example, bankruptcy initially sounds
- 12 like it's exclusively Federal court issues, but, when
- 13 you look underneath the bankruptcy, there is core
- 14 proceedings, and there's non-core. Non-core are
- 15 concurrent. Those could be heard in State court.
- 16 Secondly, those underlying issues in
- 17 bankruptcy, typically, involve State property right
- 18 issues anyway. So they are really applying whether
- 19 somebody has a perfected security interest lien, whether
- 20 somebody has a justified debt, whether -- things of that
- 21 nature.
- 22 So rather than in any other area of law,
- 23 these other areas, even if they are exclusive in Federal
- 24 court jurisdiction, some of those underlying issues are
- 25 basically based on who the party is.

1	And they are still applying underlying
2	State issues.
3	JUSTICE GINSBURG: So your case turns on
4	the the Federal circuit having exclusive appellate
5	jurisdiction?
6	MR. MICHEL: That is one of the most
7	defining factors on the State/Federal balance of
8	judicial responsibility. Our understanding of that
9	analysis of the federalism and, also, the articulation
10	of just as we have showed up Petitioners said a
11	whole ton of cases were going to come in.
12	We supported statistics that the numbers
13	would be very small. But the distinguishing factor
14	because of the balancing test that we are required to
15	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But, if there's a large
16	Federal interest, I mean, that's a you're saying that
17	there is in the Federal/State balance the Federal
18	balance it's preponderant on the Federal side.
19	If there is that large Federal interest, is
20	it surprising that the government hasn't come into this
21	case, if there's such a Federal interest to be
22	protected?
23	MR. MICHEL: No, I think the Federal
24	government I can't I can't speculate to for
25	that, Justice Ginsburg. There could be just many 46

- 1 reasons why they didn't come in on this case, just like
- 2 they don't come in on many other cases.
- 3 But the Federal interest here, in the
- 4 national uniformity, I think, has been well stated, both
- 5 by this Court and the Federal circuit.
- 6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: There's a difference
- 7 between you and your colleague on what "substantial"
- 8 means.
- 9 MR. MICHEL: Yes.
- 10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And she says it doesn't
- 11 just mean necessary -- essential in this particular
- 12 litigation, but, as in the Grable case and the Kansas
- 13 City Title & Trust, has larger ramifications for many
- 14 other cases, not just this case and whether there's
- 15 going to be issue preclusion as to this particular
- 16 inventor.
- 17 Those -- I don't see an issue in this case
- 18 comparable to those.
- 19 MR. MICHEL: I think there are -- there are
- 20 a number of issues of -- of greater importance than just
- 21 this case. The question is the ongoing conflict in
- 22 Federal patent law on whether the experimental use
- 23 exception is a question of law or a question of fact.
- The Federal circuit has gone both ways on
- 25 that, whether the issue of buyer knowledge is a 47

- 1 conclusive factor or whether it is just one of 13
- 2 factors.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Whether they -- those
- 4 questions will come to the Federal circuit, and they'll
- 5 decide it, and then they'll be settled.
- 6 MR. MICHEL: Well, we would hope they would
- 7 be settled, but, then, we're going to have this whole
- 8 other body of law out there in State courts that aren't
- 9 bound by the Federal court to answer those questions.
- 10 And those will govern the practice of patent -- patent
- 11 lawyers.
- 12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How likely is that, in
- 13 practice, that once the Federal circuit weighs in, that
- 14 the State judges will go their own way?
- 15 MR. MICHEL: I think it's a very real
- 16 possibility. We've had --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, my -- my experience
- 18 is that Federal judges, including this Federal judge,
- 19 are not interested in -- in getting into the weeds of
- 20 patent law, and, if -- if they could rely on a decision
- 21 of the Federal circuit, they would do that just as fast
- 22 as they can.
- 23 MR. MICHEL: You -- you would -- you would
- 24 think so. It doesn't appear to be the case because, in
- 25 this case, we had holdings that -- that experimental

- 1 testing had to be on a required claim element. There is
- 2 also an issue in this case of whether you had to have an
- 3 expert witness testify to prove up the experimental use
- 4 exception, nowhere held in Federal law.
- 5 The problem is these judges often will have
- 6 never handled a patent law in their career. This will
- 7 go to some judges who have been in family law, got
- 8 elected at the district court, and will never have
- 9 decided or looked at a patent law case.
- We're requesting --
- 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Would that be the same
- thing for antitrust, be the same for copyright?
- 13 MR. MICHEL: But the articulation isn't the
- 14 same. There are other -- in antitrust, there are State
- 15 analogs. The -- the judges are familiar with applying
- 16 it. In fact, the State of Texas, in Coca-Cola v.
- 17 Harmar, stated that there's a high interest in its own
- 18 State interest -- I mean, antitrust laws. The same with
- 19 trademark, trademark is concurrent jurisdiction.
- The limited area that applies these factors,
- 21 going back to the balancing test, is extremely narrow.
- 22 Patent law is unique in that area of almost any other
- 23 area of law. We think the Texas Supreme Court got this
- 24 decision right, and we request that the Court follow
- 25 Grable and apply Grable to the case at hand.

1	Thank you.
2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
3	Ms. Webre, you have four minutes remaining.
4	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JANE WEBRE
5	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
6	JUSTICE SCALIA: Ms. Webre, can I ask you
7	about the question presented?
8	The way you presented it to us, it it was
9	as though we're we're reviewing whether the Federal
_0	circuit was right to reject Grable in in whatever the
.1	names of those opinions are. But. In fact, that's not
_2	the situation at all.
_3	The Texas Supreme Court here applied Grable,
_4	and I think just the way you would want it applied. So
-5	your your contention is simply they didn't apply it
-6	correctly; isn't that right?
_7	MS. WEBRE: I disagree, Your Honor. The
-8	Texas Supreme Court didn't properly apply Grable. What
_9	they applied was the Federal circuit's improper
20	departure from Grable, in two ways.
21	One is they conflated necessity with
22	substantiality, and that comes in the Federal
23	circuit's jurisprudence, that comes from a sound bite
24	from the earlier Christiansen case, where the the
25	line goes something like, "There is a substantial 50

- 1 Federal issue because it is necessary to the parties'
- 2 claim."
- 3 And so it conflates necessity with
- 4 substantiality, and the -- the Texas Supreme Court
- 5 followed the Federal circuit's construct. They said,
- 6 we're applying Grable, we're looking at substantiality,
- 7 but then they did exactly what the Federal circuit did.
- 8 And ditto with -- with the Federalism
- 9 balance. They pointed to the needs of the Federal
- 10 interest in the uniformity of patent law, and that was
- 11 the end of the inquiry.
- 12 And I think that that is a measure of the
- 13 deference that the Supreme Court of Texas -- as other
- 14 State courts would do, the deference they grant to the
- 15 Federal circuit in deciding the question of appropriate
- 16 scope of patent jurisprudence and the relative
- importance of the -- the uniformity of patent law.
- 18 And so we arrive to you from the Supreme
- 19 Court of Texas, but truly presenting the -- the
- 20 appropriateness of the Federal circuit's redone
- 21 application of the Grable test.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you answer the one
- 23 point your adversary raised that -- that gives me
- 24 pause -- a lot of pause.
- 25 He says a ruling on patent law of how you 51

- 1 should or should not behave in a State malpractice claim
- 2 will affect all of the lawyers who practice in -- in
- 3 your State because each of them will have to do or not
- 4 do whatever that malpractice ruling was because that's
- 5 what the State is going to -- State courts will follow
- 6 in the future.
- 7 So it will change those lawyers' behaviors
- 8 in Federal court.
- 9 MS. WEBRE: Your Honor, I think that is
- 10 such a speculative road to go down. What is it the
- 11 lawyers are going to do different? A lawyer --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: They are going to
- 13 present an expert all of the time when they don't need
- 14 to.
- 15 MS. WEBRE: They are -- they are going to do
- 16 some extra work and make an extra belt along with the
- 17 suspenders that they are required to do.
- 18 And where is the harm in that? And where is
- 19 the undermining of -- of the uniformity of patent law if
- 20 a lawyer in a-- in a real patent case in Federal
- 21 court --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But you can think of an
- 23 example where -- not perhaps on the facts of this case,
- 24 but where a State court's ruling could, in fact,
- 25 establish a -- a code of behavior that's not just belts

- 1 and suspenders, that's something else.
- MS. WEBRE: Your Honor, I think that -- that
- 3 spinning out a hypothetical on that would be truly
- 4 speculative. It's hard to imagine a situation where it
- 5 would be contrary or intentioned with what -- what the
- 6 Federal courts would hold, particularly since it's -- I
- 7 agree with Justice Scalia's construct, that the State
- 8 courts are going to try to apply appropriate Federal
- 9 law --
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What about just
- 11 the -- just the flip side of this case? Let's suppose
- 12 they said, the one -- no, you don't need an expert. So
- it's not belt and suspenders; it's neither belt nor
- 14 suspenders.
- 15 That's going to affect the conduct of the
- 16 lawyers in the State in the way that would be disruptive
- 17 of -- of the uniformity of Federal patent law.
- 18 MS. WEBRE: If an expert is required under
- 19 Federal jurisprudence, then an expert is required in a
- 20 real patent case. And if the State court makes the
- 21 mistake in -- in an occasional case here or there, then
- 22 a lawyer practicing in a real patent case -- in a real
- 23 case in Federal court, needs to make sure that they are
- 24 complying with the requirements.
- 25 And -- and if you're going to --

Τ	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, right, the
2	requirements of the Federal law. The question is
3	there's going to be a different interpretation of what
4	that means in the State court and in the Federal
5	circuit.
6	MS. WEBRE: Well, Your Honor, if there is a
7	conflict, then what you're supposed to follow is the
8	jurisprudence of the courts who before whom you are
9	practicing. If if the Federal circuit or Federal
_0	district court has something about patent law, then
.1	that's what the lawyers should follow in prosecuting a
_2	patent case.
.3	And a lawyer who decides, I'm going to
_4	disregard the Federal circuit standards on fact
_5	question, expert required, whatever it is, and, instead,
_6	follow the Fort Worth court of appeals on this issue, I
_7	submit that that the lawyer does so at his peril, and
8_	that doesn't undermine the appropriate uniformity of
_9	patent law.
20	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
21	The case is submitted.
22	(Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the case in the
23	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
24	

A	agriculture	20:15 25:20	16:23 17:22	26:14 28:4
above-entitled	23:10	27:14 38:9,23	22:1,10,25	45:5 46:14
1:11 54:23	Air 22:14	42:3 51:21	23:3 25:25	49:21
absolute 20:8,11	akin 12:16	applications	26:11,22 27:6	bankruptcy
20:13,13 23:17	AL 1:3	12:1	39:23 41:4	45:11,13,17
Academy 30:17	alerted 33:13	applied 4:5 5:5	arrive 51:18	bar 41:8
accept 33:14	ALITO 7:11	20:25 50:13,14	articulated 9:17	based 45:25
36:8	allowing 31:19	50:19	23:1 26:15,16	basically 45:25
act 8:2,7	amended 6:19	applies 13:17	28:4 35:15	basis 37:19
acted 5:20 14:16	33:8	29:21 49:20	41:11	43:21
action 6:24	amendment 8:7	apply 6:2 13:16	articulation	begs 7:20,20
14:15 17:16,16	America 8:7	17:25 29:23,24	14:9 28:18	behalf 1:15,17
18:9,23 20:4	American 9:6	35:22 49:25	46:9 49:13	2:4,7,10 3:8
26:1 43:2,22	amicus 9:5	50:15,18 53:8	asking 20:8	24:7 50:5
actions 41:20	amount 22:3	applying 45:18	aspect 23:18,24	behave 52:1
actual 4:13	analogs 49:15	46:1 49:15	Assertions	behavior 52:25
14:22 18:3,19	analogue 24:17	51:6	30:17	behaviors 52:7
21:7 38:21	25:9	appropriate	Association 9:6	believe 13:20
44:3	analysis 9:20	9:20 17:10,24	assume 14:16	26:6
added 20:16	14:17 25:19	20:14 51:15	15:13 19:20	belong 39:14,15
address 20:7	27:14 38:4	53:8 54:18	Atari 9:4	belt 52:16 53:13
addresses 10:25	39:22 40:15	appropriateness	attorney 10:8	53:13
adjudicated	41:6 44:25	51:20	18:16 19:22	belts 52:25
40:22	46:9	area 7:14 12:5	attorneys 33:17	benefit 20:16
adjudicating	announced 5:17	21:22 24:17	attorney's 10:12	benefits 20:22
19:20	9:22	25:2,17,19,21	Austin 1:15	beyond 4:25
adjudicators	answer 4:3 48:9	35:10 44:23,24	authoritative	bind 19:12
26:10	51:22	45:5,22 49:20	33:14	21:16 37:7
adopt 16:21	answers 7:22	49:22,23	authority 5:16	binding 4:20
20:21	antitrust 24:24	areas 24:21	awry 5:5 9:15	11:11,12,17,20
advance 13:2	25:6,8 45:7	27:21 44:15	A&T 27:9	11:22,24 30:10
adversary 28:22	49:12,14,18	45:23	a.m 1:13 3:2	30:12,23 36:8
51:23	anytime 39:6,6	arguably 7:15		36:12 44:2
adversely 12:13	anyway 21:3	argue 20:19	B	bit 8:25 14:5
advisory 38:17	33:13 36:23	arguing 31:10	B 13:13,16 14:2	bite 50:23
affect 18:8,9,11	45:18	36:6	back 8:24 14:5	Board 19:7
18:16 29:4,8	appeals 32:9,15	argument 1:12	15:11 20:17	body 23:2 48:8
29:20 32:19	35:9 42:17	2:2,5,8 3:4,7	27:15 29:18	bottom 29:1,2
38:21,22,22,23	54:16	6:10 10:24	30:7 43:2,11	bound 19:15
43:7 44:3,4	appear 48:24	12:3 13:15,16	49:21	34:21 35:1
52:2 53:15	APPEARAN	22:10 24:6	backs 34:6	37:14 39:4
affidavit 4:8	1:14	40:14 44:7	bad 36:22	48:9
13:8 16:8	appellate 46:4	50:4	balance 5:16	brand-new
agency 41:20	applicable 6:17	arises 31:7	9:21,25 24:19	31:22 33:22
42:4 45:10	application 4:9	arising 3:12 5:3	45:1 46:7,17	breach 40:21
ago 23:14	4:21 11:6 13:7	6:14,23,24 8:1	46:18 51:9	Breaches 39:24
agree 53:7	16:6 17:11	8:5,18 14:21	balancing 26:14	brief 9:5 29:4

briefings 32:14	40:25 41:6,6	34:13 35:14,16	47:2 48:4	considerable
Brighton 21:20	41:12 42:10,16	35:22 36:19	comes 40:18	21:22
bright-line	43:18,23,23	37:6 39:4 42:9	50:22,23	consideration
17:14	46:3,21 47:1	45:4 46:4 47:5	coming 30:12	21:16
bringing 10:13	47:12,14,17,21	47:24 48:4,13	committed	consistency 7:2
12:19	48:24,25 49:2	48:21 50:10	35:17 36:22	constitutional
broadened 33:9	49:9,25 50:24	51:7,15 54:5,9	communicate	14:13 15:14,19
broader 8:4	52:20,23 53:11	54:14	39:19	17:7
23:7	53:20,21,22,23	circuits 34:5	comparable	construct 23:14
brought 21:21	54:12,21,22	circuit's 5:2,3	47:18	51:5 53:7
26:18 41:1,2	cases 7:15,15	8:25 9:12	competent 6:2	construction
44:17	10:2 11:17	22:14 34:21	complicated	12:21
burden 17:3,19	13:12,19 16:19	35:8,10 50:19	7:14 27:13	construed 16:9
business 39:21	17:5,12,21,25	50:23 51:5,20	complied 35:15	consume 22:2
buyer 32:10	20:21 22:2,13	cite 44:6	36:18,19	consumes 22:6
47:25	23:3,10,17	cited 9:5	complimentary	contemplated
	27:24 28:5,8	City 47:13	21:21	8:20
<u> </u>	28:10,11 31:13	civil 6:24 45:8	comply 35:18	contend 32:1
C 2:1 3:1	37:13 41:1,4,8	claim 3:14,16,20	36:23	contention
called 10:24	46:11 47:2,14	4:3,20 5:12,13	complying	50:15
career 49:6	cast 8:4	5:15 6:9 10:3	53:24	contested 3:13
carry 12:7	causation 39:25	10:10 12:19	components	context 18:18,19
case 3:4 4:9,11	cause 17:16,16	13:22 14:15	9:19	contexts 6:12
4:23,25 5:9,18	25:25	15:13 18:6,18	compulsory	continuation
6:8 7:1 9:4	central 24:15	19:15,21 24:13	6:20 8:12	21:17 29:6
10:11,12,19,24	cert 22:19	24:22,24,25	concerned 9:7	30:20 43:9
12:8,10 13:13	certainly 6:6	30:5 32:7 49:1	conclusive 32:10	44:11
13:13,14,16	8:14,20 27:24	51:2 52:1	48:1	continuation-i
14:9,10,24	27:24 30:9	claimed 32:8	concurrent	21:18
15:22 16:2,14	33:13 42:11	claims 3:18,20	27:25 45:9,15	continues 22:21
16:16 18:2	certainty 20:17	3:21 5:24 6:3	49:19	continuing 30:4
19:1 20:23	21:22 23:16,17	10:6 11:4	conduct 44:12	continuum
21:10 22:14,15	certiorari 36:1,8	20:16	53:15	15:19 16:3
22:18 23:15	chain 19:12	clear 20:9,22	confined 27:22	contract 39:9
24:11,15 25:21	change 14:17	client 10:8 16:21	conflate 29:17	40:4
25:24 26:17,23	42:23 52:7	Coca-Cola	conflated 9:18	contrary 35:3,5
27:1,3,6,19	changed 9:13,16	25:10 49:16	50:21	35:6,7 53:5
29:25 30:1,3	changes 7:5	code 52:25	conflates 5:6	control 41:20
31:22,24,25	chief 3:3,9 9:3,3	collateral 42:15	29:17 51:3	controls 44:16
32:2 33:22	9:4 24:3,9 37:2	43:13	conflict 47:21	controverted
35:23 36:25	50:2 53:10	colleague 47:7	54:7	33:11,12
37:24 38:4,4	54:1,20	Columbia 19:9	Congress 6:22	copyright 24:25
38:11 39:10,17	Christiansen	come 8:10,12,22	7:19 8:2,4,20	27:20 28:9
39:17,17,18,20	50:24	16:23 20:24	9:7 26:15	44:19 49:12
39:20,21,22 40:3,4,4,4,11	circuit 9:2,7,8	26:11,12,21	Congress's 7:12	core 7:21 45:13
40:12,14,14,25	9:13,15,22	27:6 28:5 39:8	consequence	corollary 16:12
40.12,14,14,23	19:9 30:2	46:11,20 47:1	18:4 23:19	correct 24:5
	l	l	l	l

	l	l	ı	ı
29:23 37:8,8	42:23 43:19	48:20 49:24	30:22 44:8	doctrine 4:5
38:9 41:21	44:1 45:2,12	decisions 12:6	disclosed 30:3	10:14 11:7
42:25 43:3,6	45:15,24 47:5	17:8 19:7	disclosing 44:13	13:8,14,17
correctly 50:16	48:9 49:8,23	declared 15:4	discuss 14:5	39:18 42:14
counsel 24:3	49:24 50:13,18	30:21 43:16	discussed 16:17	door 41:8
30:1 50:2	51:4,13,19	44:12	22:8	Dow 16:16 28:5
54:20	52:8,21 53:20	Dee 37:17	discussion 6:11	draft 33:5
counterclaims	53:23 54:4,10	defeat 9:9	44:9.9	drafting 36:15
6:20 8:12,13	54:16	defensive 8:17	dismissed 40:19	draw 15:22
8:14	courts 6:6 7:8	deference 51:13	dispositive	Dum 37:16
counterpart	8:10,11,23	51:14	24:15 26:10,19	duty 39:24
41:23	10:6 11:7,8,20	define 28:24	27:5 37:19	40:21 44:8
couple 7:19	11:25 19:10	defining 4:1	dispute 10:20	D.C 1:8
18:14 20:20	22:3,7,16,16	46:7	29:3,6	D.C 1.0
22:5	22:22 26:1,8,9	demands 3:12	disputed 5:13	E
court 1:1,12	26:9 27:3,4,5	demands 3.12 departed 23:14	12:20 16:11	E 2:1 3:1,1
3:10,11,17	29:7 34:4,7,21	departure 50:20	32:12	earlier 6:10 11:3
4:16,19,22 5:4	35:1,2,12 48:8	deprived 10:14	disputing 32:15	29:19 50:24
5:6,9,17,20 6:2	51:14 52:5	determination	disregard 9:20	early 9:2
6:5,13 7:1,16	53:6,8 54:8	4:12 11:11,13	54:14	effect 11:11,12
7:17 9:4,9,9,17	court's 14:8	18:22 31:10	disrupt 21:13	19:6 20:10
10:24 11:5,19	26:13 30:3,16	32:8,9,25	disruptive 53:16	30:12 33:2
11:23 12:6,18	30:18 35:1	33:14 43:20	distinction	effects 38:16
12:19,22 13:2	37:14 52:24	determine 17:8	40:24 44:15	either 4:21
14:6,10 15:2,5	currently 12:5	determined 4:15	distinctions	18:11 19:7
15:21,25 16:16	cut 16:19 17:5	6:14	44:23	elected 49:8
19:8,16,21	cut 10.17 17.3	determining	distinguished	element 32:7,8
20:3,9 22:19	D	28:3	6:1	39:25 41:11
22:24 23:1,5	D 3:1	develop 10:5	distinguishes	49:1
23:13,24 24:10	danger 31:18	development	5:23	Elizondo 10:25
24:11,14,24,24	deal 23:16 27:17	29:1 32:19	distinguishing	embedded 3:13
25:3,9,18	debt 45:20	difference 13:18	40:13 46:13	5:12 6:9 12:17
26:19,20 28:6	December 10:23	25:6 47:6	distinguishment	14:7
30:5,11,13	decide 19:3 40:9	differences 25:8	38:18	emphasized
31:9,18,20,21	48:5	different 6:12	district 7:7 19:8	5:10 6:5
31:21 32:2,9	decided 8:9	6:12 7:8,19	19:9 20:3 30:5	emphasizing
32:14,15 33:14	34:14 49:9	25:17 28:21	31:21 32:2	23:21,23
· ·	decides 34:17		42:17 44:1	Empire 5:18,22
33:22 34:13,14	54:13	43:15 45:4		5:24 14:9
34:17,23 35:3	deciding 4:22	52:11 54:3	49:8 54:10	15:24 26:13
35:7,9 36:1,13	6:6 14:6 18:25	difficult 4:2	disturb 24:19	empirical 22:1
36:22 37:12,17	24:18 51:15	dig 21:11	ditto 51:8	41:9
37:19 38:3,8	decision 4:19	direction 11:21	divergent 38:25	employment
38:15 39:9,11	9:8 11:22,22	directly 42:5	divestiture	45:8
39:14,15,18,24	12:23 19:16	disagree 31:24	39:25	engage 33:7
40:6,18,20,23	28:6 30:6,16	37:22 38:14	dividing 39:13	45:6
41:2,4 42:3,4,8	30:18 31:4	50:17	doctrinal 26:13	entered 31:22
42:10,11,17,17	JU.10 J1. 4	disclose 19:24	28:6,7	cinci cu 31.22
	<u>l </u>	<u>l</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

	ī	ī		•
entire 23:2	exclusively 25:3	31:12 32:11	29:12 30:2,12	9:3 19:2 22:6
entirely 24:13	45:12	40:13 46:13	30:19 31:22	24:16 25:8
34:14	exclusivity 7:23	48:1	32:13 33:21	29:11 32:1
entitled 30:18	Excuse 25:23	factors 14:6	34:1,3,4,13,13	41:13
ephemeral 21:8	34:25	15:17 17:4	34:17,18,21,22	flip 53:11
21:13	exercised 5:14	28:2 46:7 48:2	34:23 35:1,8,9	focus 38:20
Erie 11:7	exercising 3:15	49:20	35:13,16,22	follow 19:19
error 10:12	3:19	facts 13:7 14:16	36:18,19 37:4	29:15 32:22
espousing 39:3	experience	16:7 52:23	37:6,12,14	35:9 42:9,11
ESQ 1:15,17 2:3	48:17	fact-bound 4:7	38:1,4,8,10	49:24 52:5
2:6,9	experimental	5:25 11:5	39:2,4,11,15	54:7,11,16
essential 47:11	3:23 4:5 10:13	fact-finding	39:18,24 40:5	followed 26:25
establish 33:24	11:6 13:13,16	21:9	40:19 41:1,4,5	51:5
52:25	15:3 32:4,6	fact-specific	41:16,20 42:3	following 33:21
established	33:25 38:12,13	31:24	42:4,8,9,11	41:3
35:24	41:25 42:12	failing 30:21	44:15,16 45:1	follows 9:16
estoppel 42:15	47:22 48:25	fails 20:20	45:4,12,23	food 23:9
43:14	49:3	failure 39:19	46:4,16,17,18	fore 12:5
ET 1:3	expert 33:24	familiar 49:15	46:19,21,23	Fort 1:17 35:8
everybody 36:8	49:3 52:13	family 49:7	47:3,5,22,24	54:16
evidence 4:8	53:12,18,19	far-reaching	48:4,9,13,18	forth 41:9
21:11	54:15	27:19	48:18,21 49:4	forum 30:19
evolved 9:1,13	explained 3:11	fast 15:23 48:21	50:9,19,22	found 6:4
evolving 10:21	7:1	favor 16:19 17:5	51:1,5,7,9,15	four 5:11 22:21
exact 6:23	expressly 27:9	Federal 3:13,15	51:20 52:8,20	50:3
exactly 5:5	extent 6:3 10:18	3:15,19,19	53:6,8,17,19	fours 40:12
10:17 34:20	extra 52:16,16	4:16,22 5:2,3,7	53:23 54:2,4,9	framework 8:6
51:7	extraordinary	5:11,14,16 6:3	54:9,14	fraud 18:5,6,6
Examination	27:11	6:7,8,9,16,24	federalism 5:14	front 30:25,25
19:5	extremely 41:7	7:9,16 8:11,22	23:23 46:9	fully 4:14
example 8:11	49:21	8:25 9:2,7,11	51:8	funny 19:17
29:17 37:23	F	9:13,15,21,22	Federal/State	further 21:6,11
39:16,19 40:25		9:23 11:5,7,11	46:17	24:1
45:11 52:23	F 1:6	11:13,17,18,19	fees 39:25	future 17:8
exception 15:4	fabric 21:13	11:25 12:3,19	fiduciary 39:24	21:16 52:6
32:4 33:25	fact 6:11 7:21	13:3,5,14,22	40:21	G
38:12,14 40:13	10:23 15:21	14:1,7,11,12	fields 44:21	
41:25 43:23	17:14 19:23	14:12,19 16:1	fifth 22:18	G 3:1
47:23 49:4	20:24 27:17	16:2,5,8,23	file 19:23	general 6:15 7:9
excluded 8:16	29:20 30:1	17:16,21 19:9	filed 9:5	8:5 10:2,4
exclusive 6:17	31:25 32:5	22:3,13,16	finally 4:14	16:22 40:21
7:8,21,22 8:3	35:8 37:12	23:1,5 24:14	find 19:18 27:10	getting 22:7
8:10,12,22 9:1	47:23 49:16	24:19,22,23	finding 19:22	27:15 36:16 48:19
24:22 25:18	50:11 52:24	25:3,18,25	20:10 43:16	
26:2 27:18,21	54:14 facto 16:15	26:1,7,8,9,14	finds 19:21	Ginsburg 3:22 4:24 5:19
28:13 34:3	factor 16:3,4	26:19 27:2,3,5	first 4:3,10 6:22	24:21 25:5
45:1,3,23 46:4	14001 10.3,4	28:6,25 29:2	7:19,25 8:3 9:3	2 4 .21 23.3
				l
-				

27:16 29:21 54:13 hand 49:25 hypothetical 30:9,15 34:11 good 27:17 goodness 21:10 handling 11:25 hands 21:15 23:18 31:4,10 35:24	
30:9,15 34:11 good 27:17 handled 49:6 4:12 13:12 45:11 39:6,13 40:16 goodness 21:10 handling 11:25 14:2,2,22 injected 41:15,19,22 31:3 23:18 31:4,10 35:24	
41:15,19,22 31:3 hands 21:15 23:18 31:4,10 35:24	22.22
	33:22
42.17.44.14	
42:1,7 44:14 govern 41:25 happen 14:23 36:24 37:3,9,9 inquiry 3	5:14
44:19 46:3,15 42:2,4 48:10 18:18 34:11,12 37:10 40:14 9:24 23	3:23
46:25 47:6,10 governing 10:8 happens 10:9 53:3 51:11	
48:3,12 49:11 38:10 happy 37:5,5 instance	19:2
Ginsburg's 40:9 government hard 15:22 I insubsta	ntial
give 15:8 25:21	
40:17 43:14 grabbing 12:18 53:4 ignore 20:1 Intellect	ual 9:6
given 19:6 41:18 Grable 3:11 5:9 harm 52:18 ignores 19:25 intention	ned 53:5
gives 43:17 5:11,17,21,23 Harmar 49:17 illustration interest	3:15
	3 10:1,5
go 15:11 20:11 12:17 14:9 HealthChoice imagine 53:4 10:7 12	
20:13 24:23 15:22 16:11,13 5:18,22,25 immigration 16:8 4:	
25:2 28:3 32:7 17:11,17,25 14:10 15:24 25:11,15,17,20 46:16,	*
	9:17,18
39:24 40:5 21:21 23:21 heard 10:24 Immunocept 51:10	
41:3 43:19 26:13 27:14 24:14 45:15 22:15 interested	
48:14 49:7 28:4,19 29:2 held 31:5 33:23 impact 12:13 interesti	ing 8:24
52:10 29:11 40:12 34:1,9 35:17 21:7 37:6	
goal 9:9 41:3,11,16 49:4 impacts 14:24 interests	s 9:21
goes 5:5 23:10 47:12 49:25,25 high 49:17 importance 10:4	
29:18 37:12 50:10,13,18,20 hoe 17:22 23:22,23 47:20 Interfer	ences
42:5 44:25 51:6,21 hold 53:6 51:17 19:8	
50:25 Grable's 41:11 holding 34:22 important 11:8 interlock	king
going 6:6 8:9,21 grant 6:16,21 35:1,8,10,24 impose 34:8 33:3	
12:9 13:2,15 7:6,7 36:1 37:15 38:15 impression interpre	
13:25 15:12,22 51:14 42:16 24:16 32:1 31:23 5	
17:5 19:12,12 granted 18:22 holdings 26:13 41:14 interpre	eter
21:11 23:4,5 18:22 32:3 35:7,23 improper 50:19 26:21	_
27:21 29:6,14 grappled 15:21 48:25 improperly 5:6 interrela	ations
31:3 32:21 grappling 22:16 Holmes 7:1 9:18 36:14	
33:1 34:2,6,8,9 great 23:16,24 17:15 20:18 includes 6:20 invalid 1	
	42:20,22
33.20,22 30.1 Grounds 20.3	24 44:12
30.7,10,22 Group 7.1	
37:14,18,24 guess 20:19 11:14 13:20 inequitable invalidit	•
30.1,10,24,24 23.23 37.3 17.2,7 10.10 mventor	
37.1,5 11.10 Sucside 1 1.7 20.12 21.5	16 44:2
1216,11,20 2116,201,10	0.7
13.1,1 10.11	
TT 00117 0219	
32.12,13 33.6	
53:15,25 54:3 hailed 11:5 hope 48:6 initial 25:2 27:20 4	+1.13

	1	1	i	Ī
45:17	41:5,13 45:12	50:23 51:16	36:17,21	48:8,20 49:4,6
involved 4:11	45:16,18,24	53:19 54:8	Kansas 47:12	49:7,9,22,23
45:10	46:2 47:20	jurisprudential	Katie 41:8	51:10,17,25
involves 14:22		18:14	KENNEDY	52:19 53:9,17
26:19 31:25	J	Justice 3:3,9,22	13:11,24 21:19	54:2,10,19
32:1	JANE 1:15 2:3,9	4:24 5:19 6:25	21:25 22:9	laws 49:18
involving 16:20	3:7 50:4	7:11 9:3 11:10	23:6 27:15	lawsuit 38:1,3,7
16:22 17:21	January 1:9	11:15 12:2	kind 19:17	38:8 40:23
ipso 16:14	JERRY 1:3	13:3,11,24	knew 33:10,10	lawyer 18:7
irrevocably 4:15	judge 9:3,4 30:5	14:14 15:11,16	know 12:4 17:14	33:23 34:2
IRS 41:17,18,20	34:18 48:18	16:18 17:3,13	23:13 26:21,25	35:15 36:17
isolate 27:12	judges 35:20,21	18:5 19:18	31:5 34:7	43:22 44:8
isolated 20:21	48:14,18 49:5	20:3,6,7,17,19	36:18 37:21	52:11,20 53:22
issuance 18:16	49:7,15	21:2,7,19,25	knowledge	54:13,17
issue 3:13,19	judge's 18:4	22:9 23:6,13	32:10 47:25	lawyers 9:6 11:2
4:14 5:7,8,11	judgment 3:17	23:14 24:3,9	Krist 10:25	33:5,6 35:25
5:24 6:7,9 7:16	14:23 15:1,5,9	24:21 25:5,11		36:15 37:13,18
10:21,25 11:3	23:19 29:5	25:14,23 26:4	L	43:22 48:11
11:8 12:16,17	judicata 18:8,12	26:7,17 27:1	lack 18:1	52:2,7,11
12:20 13:1,4	19:4,6,11	27:10,15,16	large 46:15,19	53:16 54:11
13:23 14:1,7	29:18 44:6	28:8,12,16,20	larger 47:13	layers 4:3
14:12,13 15:25	judicial 24:19	28:24 29:14,19	Laughter 21:4	leaves 36:3
16:1,5,5,7,14	44:9 46:8	29:21 30:7,9	21:24	left 11:15
16:15 17:7,22	jurisdiction	30:15 31:2,13	law 4:19 5:24	legal 3:20,21 4:4
18:12,13 19:13	3:12,16,20 5:4	32:16,18,21,24	6:3,24 8:15 9:8	4:20 8:9 10:2,9
22:12,17,23	5:15 6:11,14	33:10,17 34:11	9:10,23 10:6	10:12,21 11:23
23:12 24:13,15	6:15 7:7,22,24	34:25 35:11	11:7,12,13,17	14:24 15:2
26:15 27:6	7:24 8:11,13	36:6,11,17,21	11:20,24 12:4	16:5,7,10
29:18,19,21	8:19,22 9:1,12	37:2,11 38:2,6	12:10,14,19	17:11,25 18:18
30:18,24,24	9:14 11:18	39:6,13 40:2,8	13:9,14 16:11	19:1,14 20:15
31:7,17,22	14:21 16:24	40:8,16 41:15	20:15 21:14	21:9 22:13
32:1 38:12,13	22:2,11,25	41:19,22 42:1	23:3 24:12,14	23:3,7,17 32:9
38:19 40:3,5	24:12,22 25:2	42:7,19,22	24:17,18 25:12	32:15 34:8
41:17 43:12,14	25:18,25 26:2	43:1,4,7,11	25:15,17,20	36:14 41:4
44:5,7,7 47:15	26:22 27:3,4,7	44:14,17,19	28:8,11,25	43:18,21
47:17,25 49:2	27:18,21,25	46:3,15,25	29:2,8,12,12	lenient 23:1
51:1 54:16	44:15 45:2,3,9	47:6,10 48:3	30:2,11 31:19	let's 6:7 15:1,13
issues 5:10 8:9,9	45:24 46:5	48:12,17 49:11	31:25 32:4,13	16:2 19:20
8:17,21 11:24	49:19	50:2,6 51:22	32:19 33:2,21	23:7 40:20
13:5 14:10	jurisdictional	52:12,22 53:7	34:2,18,23	53:11
15:19,20,23	5:3 6:16,21 7:6	53:10 54:1,20	35:4 36:18,24	liability 23:8
16:11,19 24:16	22:17,20	justified 12:18	37:3,4 38:11	35:25
24:18 25:17	jurisdictions	45:20	38:22,23,24	licensing 40:25
31:19,25 32:3	28:13 39:3	justify 17:22	39:3,4 41:5,25	lien 45:19
32:12,13 33:11	jurisprudence	K	44:16,17,19,23	life 31:8,11
33:12 34:23	4:17 10:22		44:24 45:4,5	limited 5:21
36:5 37:15,20	13:2 21:14	KAGAN 35:11	45:22 47:22,23	18:22 49:20

1. 15.00.00.10	15.05.10.6.10		1	
line 15:23 29:1,2	17:25 18:6,18	5:23	morning 3:4	45:14
39:14 50:25	19:1,15,21	Merrell 16:16	N	non-infringe
lines 40:17	20:16 21:9	28:5		43:17
linguistic 7:2	22:13 23:3,7	mess 12:9	N 2:1,1 3:1	non-mutual
list 15:12 19:10	23:17 24:13	messing 12:4	names 50:11	18:13
listed 29:7	25:20 28:9	Michel 1:17 2:6	narrow 41:7,7	noted 15:25
litigants 22:7	29:5 32:24	24:4,5,6,8 25:4	49:21	notwithstandi
litigated 18:7	34:9 35:17	25:7,13,16	narrowed 33:8	35:13,14
20:23	36:14,23 37:13	26:3,6,12,24	NASD 10:15,18	novel 16:14
litigation 4:16	37:15 38:7,8	27:8,12 28:2	NASDAQ 11:1	number 3:4 8:8
10:16 19:25	39:17 40:4	28:11,15,18,23	national 9:10	28:5,9 47:20
22:3 34:12	41:4 43:18,21	29:9,16,23	47:4	numbers 41:9
47:12	43:22 52:1,4	30:14,16 31:12	nationwide 45:3	46:12
litigations 39:9	malpractices	31:17 32:17,20	nature 14:11	
39:9	39:23	32:23 33:1,16	45:21	<u> </u>
little 8:25 14:5	manifest 7:12	33:19 34:20	necessarily 16:6	O 2:1 3:1
15:20	manual 19:5,5	35:5,12,21	necessary 5:12	obligation 34:8
live 44:1,3	30:3	36:10,12,20,25	14:4 47:11	44:8
long 32:15	Markey 9:4	37:8,22 38:9	51:1	occasion 6:13
longer 9:16	Marrese 30:17	39:12,16 40:7	necessity 5:7	occasional 6:7
look 8:25 9:25	material 44:13	40:11,24 41:17	9:19 50:21	9:8 53:21
14:6 15:10,10	materials 36:4	41:21,24 42:2	51:3	offer 39:20
16:3,4 21:9	matter 1:11 7:5	42:13,21,25	need 11:9 13:4,6	office 18:11,17
45:13	7:5 8:17 10:20	43:3,6,9,13	14:4 16:12	30:4 33:4,7,19
looked 14:11	11:23 18:12,12	44:18,22 46:6	33:8 34:15	34:4 42:18
49:9	18:13 22:1	46:23 47:9,19	52:13 53:12	44:4,10
looking 14:8	24:12 30:11	48:6,15,23	needed 12:22,22	oh 21:10 43:24
34:3 51:6	31:17 35:14	49:13	needless 27:4	okay 28:13
loses 18:7	41:16 54:23	microscopic	needs 13:1,9	43:12
losing 43:5	mean 3:25 4:24	41:10	38:18 51:9	once 17:16
loss 15:6	7:3 12:9 13:25	micro-issue	53:23	25:16,19 34:16
lot 6:11,12 12:7	14:14 16:20	38:20	negative 17:18	48:13
22:6 23:25	22:10 26:7	Miller 21:20	17:19	ones 33:7
28:17 39:7,8	31:2,15 33:18	million 11:2	negligence 15:3	ongoing 47:21
51:24	35:2 37:9,10	Minton 1:6 3:5	15:7	opinion 5:19,22
lower 22:22	37:16 39:7	3:18 15:1	neither 11:21	6:25 15:25
lucrative 10:15	41:2 46:16	29:25 30:24	53:13	37:19 38:15,17
	47:11 49:18	Minton's 3:18	net 8:4	44:1
M	means 6:11,15	4:3,19 10:3,10	never 16:23 17:6	opinions 22:14
M 1:17 2:6 24:6	7:2 47:8 54:4	11:4	17:7 18:3	50:11
making 21:2	meant 27:23	minutes 50:3	19:13,14 33:23	opportunity
malpractice	measure 51:12	misconduct	34:1 49:6,8	10:14 23:15,24
3:20,21 4:20	Measurement	18:16	new 33:20 34:8	opposed 32:7
10:2,9,12,21	22:14	mistake 36:7	35:24,24	oral 1:11 2:2,5
11:23 14:15,24	medical 19:20	53:21	nonstatutory	3:7 24:6
15:2,13 16:20	meets 41:12	money 43:4	16:1	order 3:14 7:23
16:22 17:11,21	merely 4:11	month 10:23	non-core 45:14	ordinary 34:12
	incicity 7.11	111011111 10.23		J
	l	l	l	l

original 7:7	33.156716	please 3:10 24:9	presents 22:24	
Orthopedic	33:4,5,6,7,16 33:17,19,21,23	pleased 21:22	primary 10:11	Q
30:17	34:2,2,4 35:2	point 4:2 18:15	primary 10.11 problem 28:1	question 3:22
outweigh 20:23	35:25 37:23,24	20:7 27:16	33:13,15 34:20	4:4,7,10,18 5:6
overarching	38:2,21,22,23	35:6 40:12	49:5	5:7,24 6:2,16
13:9	38:23 39:4,7,8	51:23	proceed 31:19	7:9,20,21 8:15
overwhelm 23:4	39:10,14,15,18	pointed 27:19	proceeding	10:17 12:25
over whem 25.4	40:3,3,5,18,20	39:8 51:9	18:24	13:6,9,12,21
P	40:22,25 41:5	posited 15:12	proceedings	13:22 14:12,19
P 3:1	42:5,6,18 43:2	20:8	45:14	15:14 16:11
page 2:2 9:5	43:8,10,15,24	positing 21:7	process 10:9	18:16 20:7
pages 32:15	44:2,4,9,11,16	position 39:12	product 23:9	22:20,25 23:6
paid 10:18 11:1	44:23 45:4	position 37.12 possibility 21:13	products 23:8	26:20,25 27:2
parameters 4:6	47:22 48:10,10	48:16	profound 33:2	27:18,23 29:19
parcel 33:3	48:20 49:6,9	possibly 25:19	prongs 5:11	30:8,12 32:3,4
part 6:21 26:6	49:22 51:10,16	26:21 35:22	prongs 5.11 proper 5:16	32:5 34:14,17
40:23	51:17,25 52:19	practice 38:7	9:21	39:10 40:9,18
particular 4:9	52:20 53:17,20	48:10,13 52:2	properly 40:22	47:21,23,23 50:7 51:15
4:25 10:3	53:22 54:10,12	practicing 53:22	50:18	54:2,15
13:22 16:7	54:19	54:9	property 9:6	questions 15:12
23:9 38:11	patents 6:18 8:2	practitioners	45:17	24:1,18 35:2
47:11,15	9:10 12:1	33:2 36:13	proposed 28:21	39:7,8,14,15
particularly	17:21 19:6	precedence	prosecuting	40:20,21,22
53:6	25:1 27:20	18:14	54:11	48:4,9
parties 32:14,16	33:6 36:15,24	precedent 18:1	prosecution	queue 22:21
51:1	42:6 44:3,4	precedential	12:1 18:19	quite 19:24
party 19:14,14	patent's 42:20	12:23	protected 46:22	quite 17.24
29:22 45:25	42:22	precise 10:25	prove 10:17	R
patent 4:13,15	pause 51:24,24	22:17,22	11:1 13:1	R 3:1
4:18,21,22 7:5	pending 43:9	precludes 31:7	17:19 49:3	raise 43:23
7:16 8:8,15,17	perception 9:1	31:10	provide 23:16	raised 8:17 11:2
8:21 9:8,23	9:13	preclusion	23:16	43:21 51:23
10:16 11:16,24	perfected 45:19	18:13,13 19:13	provides 19:6	raising 20:6
12:1 13:9,14	peril 54:17	29:18,20,21	proving 17:18	ramifications
14:23,24 15:4	permissive 8:13	30:19,24 31:18	provision 6:17	47:13
15:6,8,10	8:14	44:7 47:15	PTO 4:21 11:25	reaching 12:18
16:22 17:8	personal 41:18	preclusive 29:7	14:15 18:7,20	reaffirming
18:3,8,9,9,11	perspective 4:11	preponderant	18:21,23,24	23:20
18:17,17,20	petition 22:19	46:18	19:3,12,13,24	real 4:22 31:8
19:5,7 21:14	Petitioner 44:5	present 3:18 4:8	20:1,2 21:9,15	31:11 44:3
21:14,17,18	Petitioners 1:4	8:15 33:6	21:16 29:24	48:15 52:20
23:4 24:12,14	1:16 2:4,10 3:8	52:13	30:23,25 31:1	53:20,22,22
25:6 28:8,11	29:17 31:23	presented 5:23	PTO's 19:4	realize 21:10
29:4,6,8,12	38:19 46:10	14:19 26:1	pure 5:24	really 5:21 11:8
30:1,2,2,4,4,11	50:5	27:2 50:7,8	purely 31:3	12:7 16:7
30:20,20 31:19	phrase 6:23	presenting	p.m 54:22	22:24 33:1
32:13,19 33:2	place 27:17	51:19		35:20 38:16

	ī	-	•	
45:18	requirement	role 43:15	51:16	sole 37:24
real-world	32:6 33:22	roll 20:17	scores 22:15,15	solely 13:6
38:16	requirements	rule 5:21 16:22	22:15	somebody 15:9
rearticulating	53:24 54:2	20:8,11,13,14	second 4:17	45:19,20
23:21	requires 37:5	20:18,21,22	23:20	somewhat 19:18
reason 7:15	res 18:8,12 19:4	26:5,11 27:11	Secondly 45:16	sorry 26:24 41:2
42:14	19:6,11 29:18	27:13,22 28:7	securities 45:8	42:19,21
reasons 17:23	44:6	35:15,18 44:6	security 45:19	sort 5:20
17:24 18:14	reserve 24:2	ruled 35:14	see 47:17	Sotomayor
47:1	resolution 16:10	rules 17:14 30:1	sense 28:17	14:14 15:11,16
REBUTTAL	33:15	36:19 38:4,10	sensible 20:14	18:5 19:18
2:8 50:4	resolve 11:9	38:11 41:24	sentence 6:22	20:3,6 21:8
redone 51:20	23:7,24 35:2	ruling 29:8	separate 5:10	25:11,14 28:8
refined 33:8	resolved 12:24	51:25 52:4,24	separateness	28:12,16,20,24
regard 10:10,13	resolving 12:22	rulings 30:3	23:22	29:14,19 30:7
12:10	12:22 13:1,4,6		serious 3:15	32:16,18,21,24
regarding 11:23	13:10 16:13	S	service 41:18	36:6,11 42:19
regional 9:8	Respondent	S 2:1 3:1	set 14:16,22	42:22 43:1,4,7
reject 50:10	1:18 2:7 24:7	sanction 18:23	41:9	43:11 44:17
related 21:17	Respondents	saved 38:13	settled 48:5,7	51:22 52:12,22
relating 8:2	31:23	saying 15:2,5	settlement 10:15	sound 50:23
relationship	responsibility	25:1 30:23	10:19 13:1	sounds 45:11
10:8	24:20 46:8	34:7 35:11	39:20	Southwest 25:10
relative 51:16	rests 24:13	37:4 38:19	show 17:4	speak 31:1
relevant 4:8 6:3	result 15:6 31:6	46:16	showed 46:10	special 7:15
reliance 27:17	reverse 3:17	says 11:19 26:18	side 10:1 38:19	27:22
rely 48:20	review 19:5,7	27:2 29:3	39:2 46:18	specialty 7:14
remainder 24:2	20:4 34:22	30:11 35:4	53:11	specific 13:7
remaining 50:3	36:2,3	36:17 42:9,12	significance	specifically 6:18
remanded 22:8	reviewable 36:1	47:10 51:25	13:21	10:10
removability	reviewing 50:9	Scalia 6:25	significant 7:12	speculate 46:24
13:18	right 10:5,20	11:10,15 12:2	simply 27:16	speculative
removal 22:2	12:12 17:15	13:3 16:18	50:15	21:12 52:10
remove 28:13	19:12 21:3	17:3,13 20:19	single 12:8	53:4
removing 22:7	34:16 45:17	21:2 23:13	situated 33:3	spinning 53:3
rendering 44:1	49:24 50:10,16	25:23 26:4,7	situation 8:21	standard 5:4 8:5
repeat 40:8	54:1	26:17 27:1,10	16:13 17:20	9:16 23:1
representation	rights 4:13	31:2,13 33:10	20:8 31:15	27:14
23:4	14:23,25 16:23	33:17 34:25	43:20,25 50:12	standards 54:14
request 41:3	18:4 23:19	37:11 38:2,6	53:4	standpoint 4:18
49:24	45:8	40:2,8 48:17	situations 29:16	19:4,11,13
requesting	rise 25:21 43:17	50:6	situation-spec	start 40:19
49:10	road 17:17,22	Scalia's 20:7 53:7	4:8 6:1 11:6	starting 18:15
required 32:7	52:10	scenario 43:15	sixth 22:19	State 3:14,16,21
45:6 46:14	ROBERTS 3:3	scenario 43:15 scheme 8:16	slightly 6:19	4:19 5:12,13
49:1 52:17	24:3 37:2 50:2	sciente 8:16 scope 7:6 30:5	small 46:13	5:15,16 6:2,6,8
53:18,19 54:15	53:10 54:1,20	scope 7.0 30.3	smaller 28:9	7:17 8:10 9:9
	<u>l</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

		1 .	l.,	l
9:21,25 10:4,5	strange 31:16	suppression	theories 10:11	truly 22:25
10:5,6,6,7,22	strong 13:16	21:11	theory 3:24	51:19 53:3
11:8,11,12,16	structure 8:8	Supreme 1:1,12	thing 6:15 7:3	Trust 47:13
11:19,20,22,23	subject 7:4,5	5:4 10:24 12:6	49:12	try 35:22 37:23
12:4,14,15,18	24:12	25:9 35:3,7	things 6:12 22:6	38:1 53:8
14:23 15:2,5	submit 14:20	49:23 50:13,18	45:20	trying 38:2,6,20
19:9,16,21	54:17	51:4,13,18	think 5:2 7:20	turns 46:3
20:9,15 22:16	submitted 32:14	sure 7:6 19:24	8:24 14:5	Twiddle 37:16
23:3 24:11,12	54:21,23	21:23 29:9	17:10,23 20:9	37:17
24:16,19,24	subsequent 4:22	53:23	20:13 21:6	two 4:3 5:10 7:2
25:9 26:9,14	19:2	Surgeons 30:18	22:18,20 23:11	13:12,19 17:23
26:18 27:4	substantial 3:13	surprising 46:20	23:15 27:8	17:24 20:24
30:3,5,10,11	3:19,24,25	suspenders	28:2,2 29:1	38:25 50:20
30:18 31:4,4,9	4:10,24 5:8,13	52:17 53:1,13	31:6 35:19,21	typically 45:17
31:19,21 32:2	10:4 12:14	53:14	37:4,22 39:3	
33:14 34:7,14	14:1,1,7,19	system 37:17	40:5,11 44:22	<u>U</u>
34:18,21,25	15:20,21 16:15	systems 38:25	46:23 47:4,19	uh-huh 34:7
35:2,12,19,21	23:12 28:25		48:15,24 49:23	ultimately 34:13
36:11,12,13,22	32:13 34:22	T	50:14 51:12	uncertain 16:6
37:13,15,18	36:4 38:12	T 2:1,1	52:9,22 53:2	16:12
38:3,7,14 39:8	41:5,13,16	take 15:9 21:6	thinks 37:6	uncertainty
39:14 40:18,22	47:7 50:25	25:11,15 33:20	THOMAS 1:17	22:22 23:25
41:2 42:9,10	substantiality	takes 18:23	2:6 24:6	unconstitutio
42:12,17,17	4:2 7:23 9:19	talk 40:20	thought 17:14	14:16
43:19,25 44:25	23:22 50:22	talking 40:2	27:16 34:18	underlying 4:15
45:15,17 46:2	51:4,6	taskmaster	three 22:20	10:15,19 45:16
48:8,14 49:14	substantially	33:20	tie 21:15	45:24 46:1
49:16,18 51:14	12:13	tell 21:25 42:13	time 9:12 22:3,6	undermine
52:1,3,5,5,24	substantive 8:15	terrorize 37:18	24:2 39:9	54:18
53:7,16,20	sue 15:9	test 5:11 17:11	42:10 52:13	undermining
54:4	sued 26:8 36:13	17:25 20:15,20	Title 47:13	52:19
stated 47:4	sufficient 8:18	23:21 29:11	today 9:15	underneath
49:17	14:20	41:11 45:5	ton 46:11	45:13
States 1:1,12	suggest 27:22	46:14 49:21	tort 6:8 11:19	underscoring
11:16 19:8	suggesting	51:21	12:4 40:4	5:20
35:3,7	36:21	testify 33:24	totally 9:20	understand
State's 35:18	suit 26:18 42:5	49:3	31:23	25:24 42:24
State/Federal	suits 16:22	testing 33:25	trademark 45:8	understanding
45:1 46:7	support 8:18	49:1	49:19,19	46:8
stating 24:23	supported 46:12	Texas 1:15,17	transaction	undisputed 16:5
statistics 46:12	suppose 13:12	5:4 10:22,24	39:21	uniformity 4:18
statute 12:21	53:11	12:6,9,13 25:9	treatise 21:20	9:10,23 29:11
26:8	supposed 54:7	49:16,23 50:13	tremendous	29:12 47:4
statutory 8:6,8	supposedly	50:18 51:4,13	10:20 22:2	51:10,17 52:19
8:16 15:20,23	37:14	51:19	trial 32:14 37:24	53:17 54:18
stay 40:16	suppressed	Thank 24:3,8	troubling 38:5	unique 4:11 7:4
step 8:4 21:6	19:22	50:1,2 54:20	true 21:23 23:2	23:18 45:7

49:22	weak 13:15	years 9:2 23:14		
uniquely 33:3	Webre 1:15 2:3	years 7.2 23.11		
United 1:1,12	2:9 3:6,7,9 4:1	\mathbf{Z}		
19:8 35:3,7	5:1 7:18 11:10	zero 34:23		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		2010 3 1.23		
unresolved	11:14,21 12:12	<u> </u>		
12:21	13:5,20 14:3	\$100 11:2		
upend 5:15	14:18 15:15,18	Ψ100 11.2		
urge 17:9	17:2,9,23	1		
urging 16:20	18:10 20:1,5	11-1118 1:4 3:4		
use 3:23 4:5	20:12 21:1,5	11:05 1:13 3:2		
10:13 13:13,16	22:5,12 23:11	12:03 54:22		
15:3 32:4,7	50:3,4,6,17	12.03 34.22 13 48:1		
33:25 38:12,13	52:9,15 53:2			
41:25 42:12	53:18 54:6	1331 6:15		
47:22 49:3	Wednesday 1:9	1338(a) 6:16,22		
uses 6:23	weeds 25:14	8:17,19		
	48:19	16 1:9		
${f V}$	weighs 48:13	1983 27:25		
v 1:5 3:5 10:25	weight 12:7	1984 9:2,12		
25:10 30:17	weight 12.7 weird 31:14,14			
49:16	,	2		
valid 15:4,8	went 9:15 11:18	2007 9:15 22:15		
	we're 15:22 21:2	2012 10:23		
validity 42:6	37:5 43:11	2013 1:9		
VERNON 1:6	48:7 49:10	21 9:5		
versus 44:23	50:9,9 51:6,6	214 37:1		
viable 3:23	we've 17:17	218 25:10		
vice-versa 11:17	26:15 48:16	24 2:7		
view 7:12 9:11	whichever 37:17	2.2.7		
39:11	win 16:21	3		
vis-à-vis 23:17	window 41:8	3 2:4		
	witness 33:24	0 2.1		
W	34:15 49:3	5		
W 1:3	won 15:1,3	50 2:10 39:2		
wake 22:13	work 4:5 33:3	202.1037.2		
want 16:21,25	44:20 52:16	7		
50:14	worse 37:11	70 32:15		
warrant 14:21		70 32.13		
Washington 1:8	Worth 1:17 35:9			
wasn't 12:19	54:16			
wash t 12.17 watched 34:7	wrong 12:10			
	34:15			
way 4:21 11:24	wrote 5:19 6:25			
12:16 17:25	9:7			
20:25 21:14,15				
29:5 44:21	X			
48:14 50:8,14	x 1:2,7			
53:16				
ways 7:19 29:9	Y			
47:24 50:20	year 5:18			
		I	l	<u> </u>