1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, SECRETARY OF :
4	HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, :
5	Petitioner : No. 11-1231
6	v. :
7	AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL :
8	CENTER, ET AL. :
9	x
10	Washington, D.C.
11	Tuesday, December 4, 2012
12	
13	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
14	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
15	at 10:08 a.m.
16	APPEARANCES:
17	EDWIN S. KNEEDLER, ESQ., Deputy Solicitor General,
18	Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
19	Petitioner.
20	JOHN F. MANNING, ESQ., Cambridge, Massachusetts;
21	Court-Appointed amicus curiae.
22	ROBERT L. ROTH, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
23	Respondents.
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:08 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument
4	first this morning in Case 11-1231, Sebelius v. Auburn
5	Regional Medical Center.
6	Mr. Kneedler.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9	MR. KNEEDLER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may i
L O	please the Court:
L1	Under Part A of the Medicare program, the
L2	Federal government pays out more than \$230 billion
L3	annually to more than 30,000 institutional providers,
L 4	including more than 6,000 hospitals. The total amount
L5	to which each of these providers is entitled is
L 6	determined by a fiscal intermediary on the basis of a
L 7	cost report.
L8	The statute provides that a provider may
L9	obtain a hearing before the Provider Reimbursement
20	Review Board, only if he appeals the intermediary's
21	determination with within 180 days.
22	For the almost 40 years of the existence of
23	the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, the Secretary,
24	pursuant to her broad rulemaking authority, has
25	prohibited the board from extending that period and

- 1 instead, required dismissal of the appeal, except as
- 2 specifically provided in the Secretary's own
- 3 regulations.
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Kneedler,
- 5 there's a little bit of at least facial incongruity in
- 6 your position.
- 7 Congress sets in place the 180-day limit.
- 8 Then you say, oh, well, that, we can go beyond that.
- 9 The Secretary puts in the 3-year limit, and you say
- 10 that's it -- you know, that's the dead drop-off. I
- 11 would have thought what Congress says is entitled to
- 12 greater weight than what the Secretary says.
- MR. KNEEDLER: Well, the 180-day limitation
- 14 here is not a limitation applied to suits filed in
- 15 court, in which the court is the relevant tribunal, and
- 16 the court has -- has itself construed the statute's
- 17 regulating access to the courts or the appellate courts
- 18 as a matter -- a matter of internal judicial
- 19 administration.
- This deadline governs an appeal within the
- 21 Department of Health and Human Services, and that is
- 22 something that Congress has delegated the responsibility
- 23 to the Secretary to construe the relevant statutes and
- 24 to adopt the relevant regulations pursuant to her broad
- 25 rulemaking authority.

- So in -- in this setting, it is the board
- 2 that is the relevant tribunal, and the rules governing
- 3 the board's jurisdiction are established --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Excuse me.
- MR. KNEEDLER: Excuse me.
- 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You don't mention Union
- 7 Pacific in your brief. How can you be calling what
- 8 you're doing setting your jurisdictional limits? Didn't
- 9 we say, in Union Pacific, that agencies can't do that?
- 10 You can't define your own jurisdiction.
- 11 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, I --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now, you may or may not
- 13 be able to establish claim processing rules. That, I
- 14 think, is a totally different question. But why do you
- 15 continue to use it as jurisdictional language?
- MR. KNEEDLER: Well, I was responding to --
- 17 first of all, the -- the Secretary's regulations have,
- 18 from the outset, referred to these limitations as
- 19 limitations on the board's jurisdiction. This is --
- 20 this is set forth in the -- in the regulations
- 21 promulgated --
- 22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, in that respect, I
- 23 think the amici is right. You can't -- if they're
- 24 jurisdictional, we've clearly said that equitable
- tolling doesn't apply under any circumstances.

- 1 MR. KNEEDLER: Right. And we -- and we
- 2 clearly believe that equitable tolling does not apply.
- 3 That would be fundamentally inconsistent.
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what is good cause,
- 5 if not some form of equitable tolling?
- 6 MR. KNEEDLER: There is nothing incompatible
- 7 between a good cause -- a limited good cause extension
- 8 and a jurisdictional rule.
- 9 For example, in -- in the several cases that
- 10 this Court has considered finding provisions to be
- 11 jurisdictional, the time for taking an appeal and the
- 12 time for petitioning for certiorari are both
- 13 jurisdictional, but both allow extensions for good
- 14 cause. In fact, this Court's decision in Bowles
- involved the extension for good cause.
- So the question here for the Secretary --
- 17 and, again, this is just a narrow question of good
- 18 cause. It in no way suggests that equitable tolling
- 19 would be -- would be permitted.
- The narrow question is whether the Secretary
- 21 permissibly construed the statute to allow a comparable
- 22 good cause exception, where -- where something akin to
- 23 an act of God would prevent the provider from actually
- 24 appealing within the requisite period of time, just like
- 25 the district court can extend the appeal period.

1	JUSTICE GINSBURG: The the Court's
2	decision in Henderson against Shinseki, that also
3	involved an intra-agency appeal, and yet, we said that
4	equitable tolling was permissible.
5	MR. KNEEDLER: Well, I mean, there are a
6	number of differences there. I think, technically, it
7	was not intra-agency. It was it was an appeal from
8	the Board of Veterans Appeals to the Court of Veterans
9	Appeals, which is a separate body. It is not something
10	under the jurisdiction of the VA.
11	The VA was not given rulemaking authority
12	over that, unlike here, where the board is under the
13	Secretary's jurisdiction, and, in fact, she has adopted
14	regulations that have been in place for 40 years, which
15	have expressly barred any extensions and treated that
16	limitation as jurisdictional.
17	Also, very much unlike Henderson, this
18	statute is not one comparable to a statute regulating
19	benefits for veterans, to which there has always been a
20	solicitude by Congress and the courts
21	JUSTICE KAGAN: But, Mr. Kneedler, do you
22	think you could do the same thing in the veterans'
23	benefits context? Because in Henderson, of course, we
24	dropped a footnote saying that we weren't deciding

whether equitable tolling was available. All we were

25

- 1 saying was that this was a claims processing rule and
- 2 not a jurisdictional rule.
- 3 Could the Secretary of Veterans Affairs then
- 4 go on and say, okay, it's a claims processing rule, but,
- 5 still, we get to decide how much equitable tolling we
- 6 want, and we're going to adopt a regulation, much like
- 7 the one in this case, saying you can't come in after 3
- 8 years? Could you do that in Henderson?
- 9 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, I think, in Henderson,
- 10 there would have been the problem that the rule, as I
- 11 understand it, was a rule to -- for appealing to the
- 12 Court, which was outside the -- the Secretary's
- 13 rulemaking authority; whereas, here, this is a body
- 14 within HHS over which the Secretary has rulemaking
- 15 authority.
- But, yes, we -- we think that the Secretary
- 17 clearly had -- and she has very broad legislative
- 18 rulemaking authority under this statute -- has the
- 19 authority to adopt strict limitations, as she has done
- 20 on that --
- 21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Could she -- could she
- 22 have adopted equitable tolling?
- 23 MR. KNEEDLER: I -- we don't think that she
- 24 could have. We think that, as we say in our brief,
- 25 quite aside from the Secretary's regulation, we believe

- 1 the sort of open-ended equitable tolling that the court
- 2 of appeals has imposed on this program for the first
- 3 time in 40 years is fundamentally inconsistent with a
- 4 need for repose, especially given the sophisticated
- 5 nature of these providers, as this Court noted in the
- 6 Your Home nursing home case --
- 7 JUSTICE KAGAN: I guess the question I was
- 8 trying to ask, Mr. Kneedler, was do you think it's a
- 9 general principle of administrative law that, when there
- 10 is a claims processing rule that -- that relates only to
- 11 internal agency process, that the agency gets to decide
- 12 how much, if any, equitable tolling to allow?
- MR. KNEEDLER: Yes. We -- we certainly do
- 14 believe that.
- For -- for -- in the first place, most
- 16 agency time limits are established by the agency itself,
- 17 pursuant to regulation. So if there had been no
- 18 statutory 180-day limitation period here and the
- 19 Secretary had adopted a regulation imposing that, then
- 20 whether -- and the extent to which that provision would
- 21 be open to extensions for good cause, for some degree of
- 22 equitable tolling, whatever the factors, would be up to
- 23 the Secretary in construing her own regulation --
- JUSTICE ALITO: Now, you refer to these --
- 25 to the providers as sophisticated, and that certainly is

- 1 true. But are they really in a position to double-check
- 2 the calculation when -- if it were true -- and I know
- 3 you don't agree with this -- if it were true that
- 4 information needed to make the calculation was
- 5 intentionally withheld, concealed?
- 6 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, as you say, we do
- 7 not -- we do not agree with that. And the findings by
- 8 the district court in this case, which was the same
- 9 district judge who sat in the Baystate case, disagreed
- 10 with that -- with that conclusion.
- 11 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I understand that.
- 12 But if that were the case, would their sophistication
- 13 allow them to double-check this? Or is this just
- 14 something that is dependent on data that they cannot
- 15 access?
- MR. KNEEDLER: Well, it -- it may be more
- 17 difficult. This was a situation which required the
- 18 matching of data between CMS and the Social Security
- 19 administrative -- massive data files of 11 million
- 20 Medicare claims, I think 6 million SSI claims.
- 21 And when you have two agencies matching
- 22 something, there will be errors. And the -- the
- 23 providers did not know --
- 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Assume for the sake of
- 25 your answer that the error was intentional. Don't try

- 1 to go to the facts, but assume the error was
- 2 intentional. Now, answer Justice Alito's question.
- 3 MR. KNEEDLER: There -- it --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: There -- that might be a
- 5 contradiction in terms.
- 6 MR. KNEEDLER: There may be -- there may be
- 7 situations in which the provider would not know that,
- 8 but the need -- but the need for finality under this
- 9 program, we think, requires an across-the-board rule.
- 10 Otherwise, a provider could come in -- as this Court
- 11 suggested in the Your Home case, circumstances --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: If this is a claim
- 13 processing rule, under what theory could you shield
- 14 yourself against fraudulent conduct -- fraudulent
- 15 concealment? Under what theory of law would an agency's
- 16 rule be fair and -- and non-arbitrary --
- MR. KNEEDLER: Well --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- that shielded it from
- 19 fraudulent acts.
- MR. KNEEDLER: First of all, we do not
- 21 believe this is an ordinary claims processing rule. We
- 22 believe that this is a jurisdictional limitation imposed
- 23 by the -- by Congress, interpreted by the Court to allow
- 24 this narrow exception. So we do not believe that --
- 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why do you keep fighting

- 1 the -- the question?
- 2 MR. KNEEDLER: But with -- yes, we do
- 3 believe that the Secretary, in the interest of -- of
- 4 finality, can impose that sort of limitation. There's a
- 5 presumption of regularity in the -- in the operation
- 6 of -- administration of Federal programs. There are
- 7 criminal sanctions.
- 8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You keep fighting the
- 9 hypotheticals. There is an intent to save money and an
- 10 intent not to use the figures that are specified by
- 11 statute, and that is concealed. In that set of
- 12 circumstances, if this were a claim processing rule,
- 13 would you be authorized to treat -- not to -- not to
- 14 permit the action?
- 15 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes. We -- we believe the
- 16 Secretary would be -- would be required to, and we think
- 17 may well be compelled to. But let me point out, if
- 18 there was that sort of extraordinary circumstance, then
- 19 either Congress or the Secretary could provide a special
- 20 remedy in that situation.
- 21 If there was an inspector general's report
- 22 that showed widespread fraud in something, I think
- 23 Congress or the Secretary could be expected to respond
- 24 to that in an appropriate way. The question is whether
- 25 the hard and fast rules that have been adopted should

- 1 be -- should be open to general equitable tolling
- 2 principles.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Kneedler, you -- what I
- 4 find incompatible in your argument is you -- you assert
- 5 that this is a jurisdictional limitation.
- 6 MR. KNEEDLER: Insofar as the board is
- 7 concerned. The board has said and the Secretary has
- 8 said that the board -- this is jurisdictional, and the
- 9 board has no equitable powers to --
- 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Can you think of any other
- 11 instance in which we have found something to be a
- 12 jurisdictional limitation and allowed the person or
- 13 agency, subject to that limitation, to extend it? I --
- 14 I had always thought that once you say it's
- 15 jurisdictional, it means you have to abide by it.
- MR. KNEEDLER: As I said, in -- in Bowles,
- 17 the Court was dealing with the jurisdictional time limit
- 18 for an appeal, but there was a comparable -- there is a
- 19 comparable statutory provision for the Court to extend
- 20 that period for good cause. It remains jurisdictional.
- 21 That was the point in Bowles. It was -- there was a
- 22 question of whether the --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, if there is another
- 24 statutory provision, then that -- then that statutory
- 25 extension is part of the jurisdictional limitation.

- 1 That's fine.
- 2 But when you just have a jurisdictional 180
- 3 days, without any statutory provision for extension, if
- 4 it's jurisdictional, I thought that's the end of the
- 5 game.
- 6 MR. KNEEDLER: Right. And -- and the -- the
- 7 question is -- some time limitations have been
- 8 understood to contain explicit -- excuse me, explicit or
- 9 implicit authorizations for the tribunal concerned. And
- 10 this --
- 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Undoubtedly. But have any
- 12 jurisdictional time limitations?
- JUSTICE KAGAN: I mean, you don't need that
- 14 label, do you, Mr. Kneedler? You could do just as well
- 15 with a claims processing label. Maybe you could do
- 16 better, as Justice Scalia is suggesting, with a claims
- 17 processing label, as long as, with that label, comes the
- 18 general rule that the agency gets to determine the
- 19 extent of discretion as to late filings.
- MR. KNEEDLER: Right. This is a
- 21 mandatory -- this is a mandatory -- even if
- 22 nonjurisdictional, it is a mandatory limitation. And
- 23 the question is whether the statute contains an implicit
- 24 authorization, whether the Secretary could permissibly
- 25 construe it to allow for this narrow good cause

- 1 exception comparable to the one for extending the
- 2 time --
- 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: The problem with taking
- 4 that approach, of course -- and I assume why you assert
- 5 that it's jurisdictional, is that there is a long
- 6 history of both the board and the Secretary regarding
- 7 this as jurisdictional.
- 8 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes, that is --
- 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: They have said it.
- 10 MR. KNEEDLER: -- that is -- that is
- 11 correct. But we -- but I think it's also important to
- 12 recognize that the -- that this statute was enacted, the
- 13 regulations were adopted before this Court's recent
- 14 jurisprudence identifying some things as jurisdictional,
- 15 some things as claim processing, primarily focusing on
- 16 the judicial situation.
- 17 Here, we have a statute governing procedures
- 18 in an administrative agency and regulations adopted at a
- 19 time before that -- that bifurcated way of looking at
- 20 things arose.
- 21 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. But that --
- 22 that's why I wonder what the basic underlying principle
- 23 is. I mean, I would have thought -- but I'm not sure
- 24 what you think, that -- that the way to look at these
- 25 cases is, using ordinary principles of statutory

- 1 interpretation, would a reasonable legislator, having
- 2 enacted these words, intend to give the agency a degree
- 3 of leeway in interpreting the statute?
- 4 Now, if that's the basic question, it helps,
- 5 but isn't determinative whether you classify this as a
- 6 claims processing rule or a jurisdictional rule. Those
- 7 are conclusions. But, really, it's the question of
- 8 leeway that the Congress intended to -- to delegate to
- 9 the agency that is determinative.
- If the answer to that question is yes, your
- 11 rule stands, regardless of label, and if the answer to
- 12 the question is no, it fails regardless of label.
- 13 MR. KNEEDLER: That's --- that's correct.
- 14 And I want to make clear that under, whatever the answer
- 15 to that precise question, the Respondents in this case
- 16 lose because whether -- if it's an absolute rule to
- 17 which there can be no exception or the Secretary's
- 18 regulation allowing a limited exception is valid, in no
- 19 case would the sort of open-ended tolling regime that
- 20 the court of appeals imposed be permissible.
- 21 If I may, I'd like to reserve the balance of
- 22 my time.
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- Mr. Manning.
- ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN F. MANNING,

1	COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS CURIAE
2	MR. MANNING: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
3	please the Court:
4	Congress in two ways signaled its intention
5	to treat the time limitation prescribed by Subsection
6	(a)(3) as absolute; that is, as not subject to waiver
7	and not subject to equitable tolling.
8	First, Congress chose to locate that
9	provision in the very part of the statute that defines
10	the board's jurisdiction, that is to say, in the part
11	that determines the class
12	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It didn't talk about the
13	board. It talks about what a party can do, not what the
14	board can or cannot do.
15	MR. MANNING: You're entirely entirely
16	right, Justice Sotomayor. It talks about the the
17	right of the provider to get a hearing in the provision
18	of the statute that that determines the class of
19	cases that the provider may hear.
20	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's not the
21	prototypical limitation that that Congress uses when
22	it intends a jurisdictional limit on a court.
23	MR. MANNING: No, it's not, Your Honor. But
24	in several cases, this Court has held that similar

statutes that are framed in terms of the party's right

25

- 1 to invoke the power of the tribunal, that those are
- 2 jurisdictional statutes. The Court has never addressed
- 3 the question whether they can be -- they must be framed
- 4 in terms of the power of the board or in terms of the
- 5 right of the party to invoke the power of the board.
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We have talked about
- 7 what the -- the fact that there almost is a presumption
- 8 of a claims processing rule, rather than jurisdictional,
- 9 unless Congress is clear about that.
- 10 What policy supports an argument that we
- 11 should be reading limitations of this kind as
- 12 jurisdictional, particularly when, on the same day the
- 13 statute was passed, the agency, invoking its regulatory
- 14 powers, treated it like a claim processing? Whatever
- 15 your colleague argues, a good cause exception, the
- 16 3-year exception, everything else is -- is really
- 17 treating it like a claim processing rule, not as
- 18 jurisdictional.
- MR. MANNING: Justice Sotomayor, you're
- 20 entirely right, that the test that this Court has
- 21 prescribed in this area of law is focused on
- 22 congressional intent. In Arbaugh, this Court said that
- 23 the touchstone is congressional intent, that -- that the
- 24 design of this Court's rules is to put the ball in
- 25 Congress' court.

1	This Court has put a thumb on the scale
2	against jurisdiction because of the hard consequences
3	that follow from deeming a procedure jurisdictional. In
4	this case, the agency's regulation, no matter how old it
5	is, is invalid because Congress signaled a clear
6	intention to treat this as jurisdictional in two ways:
7	One, by putting it in the in the provision of the
8	statute that defines the board's jurisdiction. But,
9	secondly, Congress, in this statute, created two
10	different kinds of deadlines, one for providers and one
11	for beneficiaries.
12	Both set almost identical deadlines for
13	administrative appeals. It's 6 months for
14	beneficiaries, 180 days for providers. But there is a
15	fundamental difference in the way Congress treated these
16	two sets of deadlines, and the fundamental difference is
17	that Congress explicitly gave the Secretary authority
18	discretion, to extend the deadline for beneficiaries.
19	It gave no such discretion to extend the the deadline
20	for providers.
21	And the same story plays out in the 60-day
22	limits that govern judicial review. Discretion
23	JUSTICE GINSBURG: This this agency not
24	more than 3 years extension, that was adopted after
25	notice and comment, and Congress amended this statute

- 1 several times thereafter, but it left this -- this
- 2 3-year outside limit intact. So if Congress really
- 3 wanted there to be no leeway at all, then it should have
- 4 done something about that regulation.
- 5 MR. MANNING: Justice Ginsburg, you're
- 6 entirely right. Congress has amended the statute, in
- 7 fact, eight times since the Secretary promulgated her
- 8 regulation establishing a good cause requirement. But
- 9 this Court has, in recent years, been more careful about
- 10 finding acquiescence than it did at one time.
- 11 In the Solid Waste Authority of Northern
- 12 Cook County, what this Court said is that before it will
- 13 find that Congress has acquiesced, there must be
- 14 evidence that Congress was aware of the regulation and a
- 15 clear signal that Congress meant to embrace or put in
- 16 place this regulation.
- 17 And this is a sound policy because Congress
- 18 leaves regulations in place for all sorts of reasons
- 19 because somebody is using a parliamentary tactic,
- 20 because Congress doesn't have one opinion or the other
- 21 about whether the -- the regulation is right, because
- 22 Congress didn't think of the problem.
- 23 So, in recent years, this Court has insisted
- 24 upon a high degree of proof before it will find
- 25 acquiescence, and that degree is not present here.

- 1 There is no evidence that Congress was aware of this
- 2 regulation, much less that it approved of it.
- JUSTICE BREYER: Well, but you have three --
- 4 the point that you make is right, that -- that you have
- 5 specific language in the beneficiary part and not here;
- 6 but you have the other way, the point that Justice
- 7 Ginsburg made, the fact that the language here is --
- 8 is -- doesn't say file within 180 days. It says, you
- 9 may have a hearing if you file within 180 days. It
- 10 doesn't say what happens if you don't. It's open, the
- 11 language.
- 12 And the -- the subject matter is not a
- 13 court. The subject matter is a rather technical agency
- 14 review board. And normally, I would think, you would
- 15 think, and members of Congress would think that the
- 16 agency knows best as to how to run its own operation
- 17 and -- and don't interfere too much in details, and this
- 18 is a sort of detail.
- 19 So those are the things against you, it
- 20 seems to me, though the thing you cite is certainly for
- 21 you.
- 22 MR. MANNING: Quite -- quite right, Your
- 23 Honor. And -- and typically, an agency has discretion
- 24 to set its own procedures, as the government argues.
- 25 And -- and the government is quite right to cite Vermont

- 1 Yankee. And I would add Chevron, that -- that the
- 2 government promulgated its regulation in a
- 3 Chevron-eligible format. But Chevron only applies if
- 4 the statute is not clear, and here, we say that Congress
- 5 addressed the precise question in issue.
- 6 It's very difficult when one reads the
- 7 beneficiary provisions and provider provisions, which
- 8 are quite different. One provides discretion, and one
- 9 doesn't. And what Respondents would have --
- 10 JUSTICE BREYER: One was passed long, long
- 11 ago and was part of the Social Security Act or
- 12 something, the one you're talking about, and was passed
- many years before the second one was passed.
- 14 And when they're sitting in Congress
- 15 writing -- you know, they don't know everything that was
- 16 passed in history.
- 17 MR. MANNING: You're exactly right, Justice
- 18 Breyer. But Congress, in Section 2990 of the 1972 Act,
- 19 that enacted -- that created the PRRB, amended and
- 20 reenacted the provision from the 1965 legislation that
- 21 prescribed the -- the beneficiary review provisions. It
- 22 incorporated, by reference, provisions that gave the
- 23 Secretary express discretion to extend those deadlines.
- And so, in the same statute, what Congress
- 25 did was it set up two systems, one for beneficiaries and

- one for providers. One prescribed discretion, one
- 2 didn't.
- 3 What the Respondents are asking this Court
- 4 to do is to read these two sets of provisions, which are
- 5 worded very differently, to mean the same thing, to mean
- 6 that the Secretary has discretion whether Congress gives
- 7 it or doesn't.
- 8 And I submit that that's a good reason to
- 9 treat this as a step one case. The Secretary does not
- 10 merit deference in this case because the statute is
- 11 clear. And to return to Justice Sotomayor's question
- 12 about the phrase -- and your question about the
- 13 phraseology of Subsection (a), this Court held in Bowles
- 14 v. Russell that Section 2107 is jurisdiction
- 15 notwithstanding that it --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That was, in part, the
- 17 point I raised earlier, which is we look at what the
- 18 history is to help inform our use of labels. The
- 19 history here -- you can't ignore it -- is that, from its
- 20 inception, whether it's trying to disclaim it now or
- 21 not, the agency has not treated it as jurisdictional.
- 22 It's used the word --
- MR. MANNING: Well --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- but it's treated it
- 25 as a claim processing rule by creating these exceptions.

1 MR.	MANNING:	Well,	you're	right,
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- 2 Justice Sotomayor. But my question -- the question that
- 3 that raises is this: From the very beginning, this
- 4 agency has -- all three of the agencies -- the
- 5 Secretary, CMS, and the board -- have all described this
- 6 provision as jurisdictional and non-waivable. At the
- 7 same time, they have tried to create this exception.
- 8 In the -- in the 2008 regulations that
- 9 narrowed the good cause exception, the Secretary
- 10 acknowledged that there was a question about whether the
- 11 good cause exception was consistent with the
- 12 characterization of the time limitation as
- 13 jurisdictional, acknowledged that there was a split of
- 14 authority on that, and suggested that the courts would
- 15 have to resolve it. This is not --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: There is -- there is a
- 17 lot of discussion and confusion between jurisdiction,
- 18 mandatory claim processing rules, nonmandatory claim
- 19 processing rules. I could go on and on about the
- 20 labels.
- 21 But let's go back to the point Justice Kagan
- 22 made earlier, which is, assuming we were to treat this
- 23 as a mandatory claim processing rule, where does that
- 24 get you?
- Now, the agency says that means no equitable

- 1 tolling. Assuming I'm willing to accept that, is
- 2 equitable tolling the same as fraudulent concealment,
- 3 which has been treated in the law, not as a -- as a
- 4 necessary part of equitable tolling, which has to do
- 5 with what the plaintiff could have done or not done, but
- 6 with what a defendant has done or not done?
- 7 MR. MANNING: Justice Sotomayor, this Court
- 8 has said that, if a time limitation is jurisdictional,
- 9 that limitation is absolute. That includes no equitable
- 10 tolling.
- 11 In Irwin, this Court included among the
- 12 grounds for equitable tolling the intentional
- 13 concealment of information that was necessary to --
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why don't you -- why
- don't you take another minute to finish your answer?
- MR. MANNING: Certainly.
- 17 So if it's jurisdictional,
- 18 Justice Sotomayor, then even if the -- even if the CMS
- 19 intentionally withheld this information, the time limit
- 20 would be absolute and would not be extendable.
- 21 On the other hand, I believe that if the --
- 22 the statute is not jurisdictional, it's subject to
- 23 equitable tolling; under Irwin, the presumption of
- 24 equitable tolling applies. And, it's very difficult to
- 25 see how the Secretary is warranted in narrowing

- 1 equitable tolling beyond the traditional grounds on
- 2 which equitable tolling would be available.
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- 4 MR. MANNING: Thank you.
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Roth.
- 6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF ROBERT L. ROTH
- 7 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
- 8 MR. ROTH: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
- 9 please the Court.
- 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you agree with that
- 11 last statement?
- MR. ROTH: Well, I --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you think an agency
- is not permitted to have mandatory claim processing
- 15 rules?
- MR. ROTH: Excuse me, Your Honor?
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you believe an agency
- 18 is not capable of having mandatory claim processing
- 19 rules, that it limits the application of equitable
- 20 principles?
- 21 MR. ROTH: The -- the agency could have
- 22 mandatory claims processing rules to the extent -- with
- 23 the leeway that was provided by Congress.
- Here, the leeway ends when you have -- when
- 25 you have issues, like Your Honor was talking about, with

- 1 intentional concealment, when you have actions by the
- 2 Secretary, misconduct by the Secretary, that caused the
- 3 statute of limitations time to be missed.
- 4 One would have to assume that the -- that
- 5 the Congress has -- has delegated to the fox to
- 6 determine who is in charge of the henhouse. So there is
- 7 a limitation, Your Honor, on how far the agency can go,
- 8 and it cannot go as far as to shield itself from
- 9 judicial review of its own misconduct.
- 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Would our review be an
- 11 APA review, whether the -- the rule is arbitrary or
- 12 capricious?
- 13 MR. ROTH: Well, I think that -- that the
- 14 APA review would start under -- under step one. And we
- 15 believe that the statute is clear on this point, that
- 16 under step one of Chevron, that this has not been
- 17 delegated to the agency to determine what the judicial
- 18 review should be available in the context of agency
- 19 misconduct, Your Honor.
- 20 And, in fact, Your Honor, there is -- 139500
- 21 provides no support for the government's proposition
- that Congress intends undetectable and undisclosed
- 23 agency misconduct to deprive hospitals of the payments
- 24 Congress promised --
- 25 JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course, nobody -- nobody

- 1 intends that when they -- when they adopt an absolute
- 2 rule. I mean, you -- you can create a horrible with
- 3 respect to any absolute jurisdictional rule. That's
- 4 easy to do. So the mere fact that -- that a horrible
- 5 could occur does -- does not at all persuade me that --
- 6 that a rule is not absolute.
- 7 MR. ROTH: Well, the horrible that we're
- 8 talking about here, Your Honor, is agency misconduct.
- 9 And it's been a longstanding principle of law that
- 10 defendants should not benefit from their own misconduct.
- 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And why -- why do you say
- 12 that? I mean, the record that we have says that the CMS
- 13 failed to use the best available data. It doesn't say
- 14 anything about deliberate concealment.
- 15 MR. ROTH: Your Honor, the -- this case
- 16 arises on -- comes to this Court after a motion to
- 17 dismiss was granted, and so that the -- that the -- the
- 18 Court would have to take as true the allegations in the
- 19 complaint.
- 20 And the allegations in our complaint in
- 21 paragraph -- in paragraph 30 -- 38, Your Honor, raise
- 22 this question. And that can be found -- let's see -- do
- 23 you have -- in the Joint Appendix --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, in -- in any event,
- 25 the Baystate case, which is what revealed all of this,

- 1 in -- in that case, the district judge there didn't
- 2 say -- he said they didn't use the best available data.
- 3 He didn't find any deliberate concealment.
- 4 MR. ROTH: That's correct, Your Honor, and
- 5 because the -- that issue was not before the court and
- 6 it was not necessary for the court to make that finding
- 7 for purposes of addressing that case.
- 8 I'm at the Joint Appendix at 2829, which is
- 9 paragraph 38 of our complaint. And paragraph 38 in our
- 10 complaint presented one aspect of this concealment,
- 11 which was a misleading aspect of the agency's actions
- 12 here, where the agency said that matching on the basis
- of Social Security numbers was the best way to deal with
- 14 this -- this matching of the data that my colleague from
- 15 the government was -- was discussing.
- And it ends up that the -- that it turns out
- 17 years later that, in fact, the Secretary didn't match on
- 18 the basis of Social Security numbers. And that made an
- 19 enormous difference with respect to how that -- how the
- 20 disproportionate share hospital benefit would be
- 21 calculated.
- So -- so the reason the district court in
- 23 the Baystate case didn't have to make findings about
- 24 fraud or similar fault or delve that much into the
- 25 agency action was because that case came to the court

- 1 through the traditional appeals process without
- 2 having -- and so a finding as to the actions of the
- 3 Secretary and -- and characterizing those actions, as
- 4 whether they're misconduct or not was, not necessary to
- 5 addressing the case as it was before the district court
- 6 in that -- at that time.
- 7 The -- but -- but we are talking -- while we
- 8 are talking about the disproportionate share hospital
- 9 payment, Your Honor, let me simply -- let me simply
- 10 mention that what we are talking about here are safety
- 11 net hospitals. We are talking about those hospitals
- 12 that provide services to -- to a high percentage of poor
- 13 people, and -- and Congress had found that those
- 14 patients are more expensive to treat.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: But, Mr. Roth, on -- on the
- 16 legal question here, I think Justice Breyer is right,
- 17 that this all comes down to congressional intent, how we
- 18 read this statute. If you -- one response to reading
- 19 the briefs in this case is that you and Mr. Manning
- 20 present opposite views of the statute, and -- and both
- 21 of you say the statute is clear as to your opposite
- 22 view.
- 23 In other words, Mr. Manning says the statute
- 24 clearly prohibits equitable tolling, and you say the
- 25 statute clearly requires equitable tolling. And both of

- 1 you have kind of decent arguments.
- 2 And one response to that might be to say,
- 3 Mr. Kneedler is right, that the statute is just
- 4 ambiguous and that it can be read a bunch of different
- 5 ways, and both of you have presented good arguments, but
- 6 in the end, it really all goes to show that there is a
- 7 lack of clarity here, and then it's up to the agency to
- 8 decide.
- 9 MR. ROTH: Well, of course, Your Honor,
- 10 the -- the statute is clear and equitable tolling is
- 11 permitted.
- 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course -- of course, one
- 13 can always make an argument on the other side, and the
- 14 mere fact that an argument is made on the other side
- 15 does not prove that it's not clear. That's what lawyers
- 16 do. They make arguments on the other side.
- 17 MR. ROTH: But here, Your Honor, the -- when
- 18 you look at the factors that underpin the government's
- 19 position here that somehow the government can decide
- 20 that it can preclude this Court from reviewing agency
- 21 misconduct -- you heard the government talk about the
- 22 need for finality. Well, the need for finality is not
- 23 something that's articulated in the -- in the Medicare
- 24 Act except to the extent in a statute that's protective
- 25 of providers. There is not a --

- 1 JUSTICE BREYER: Are there examples? I
- 2 mean, it seems to me that, even if you lose this -- I
- 3 mean, I mentioned the three arguments against you, the
- 4 other -- the ambiguity of the language and so forth. So
- 5 if it ends up, even though it's not just a lawyer's
- 6 argument, it isn't really that clear, and they do have
- 7 some authority, you then have the second string, which
- 8 is you say their rule is unreasonable because it has an
- 9 absolute 3-year cutoff, instead of a little flexibility
- 10 there for fraudulent concealment.
- So -- so do you have statutes, are there
- 12 statutes that say 3 -- or are there cases that say 3
- 13 years is not enough, that -- that you have to have more
- 14 than 3 years? I thought 3 years is a pretty long time.
- 15 I mean, I guess they can't go back to fraudulent
- 16 concealment pre-Civil War -- you know, I mean, there's
- 17 some period that must be reasonable to cut everything
- 18 off, and what is that period? What do the cases say?
- 19 If it isn't 3 years, what is it?
- MR. ROTH: Well, Your Honor, the Secretary
- 21 has addressed this question in the context of -- of
- 22 fraud or similar fault by providers, and they said there
- 23 should be no time limit at all.
- JUSTICE BREYER: That's their view there,
- 25 and their view here, which is a different kind of thing,

- 1 is that 3 years is enough. The question is, is that
- 2 reasonable? And do you have any authority that says
- 3 it's unreasonable?
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought the 3 years
- 5 provision applied only to the Secretary, that she gives
- 6 herself 3 years to go back and sort things out, but only
- 7 gives you 180 days; is that right?
- 8 MR. ROTH: The Secretary -- well, depends
- 9 what sort -- if the "sort it out" means recovering
- 10 overpayments, the Secretary has an unlimited amount of
- 11 time to recover overpayments that are the fault or
- 12 similar -- fraud or similar fault on a provider.
- 13 If it is not fraud or similar fault on a
- 14 provider, the reason the Secretary can't go back more
- than 3-plus years is because the statute permits it. 42
- 16 U.S. Code 1395gg, which is not cited in the government's
- 17 brief, that says that, at the end of the third year
- 18 after payment, that the payment becomes final, as long
- 19 as the provider and the beneficiary was without fault
- 20 with respect to the payment.
- 21 So that 3-year limitation that the
- 22 government touts in 1885 was not a subject of an
- 23 administrative determination that they made. That was
- 24 simply they were -- they were following a statute. And
- 25 when you look in the Medicare Act for evidence of a

- 1 statute that -- that should limit -- impose finality in
- 2 some way, that statute is the only one, and it's
- 3 protective of providers.
- 4 And what the Secretary has done here is it
- 5 enacted -- it promulgated a regulation, and the
- 6 regulation provides for an unlimited time period to
- 7 recover in the face of --
- 8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But Justice Scalia was
- 9 not correct in what he just said. The 3 years is for
- 10 the provider. The 3 -- under the Secretary's
- 11 regulations, the provider gets an additional 3 years,
- 12 but no more; isn't that right?
- MR. ROTH: Well, the 3-year is both -- it --
- 14 it goes both ways, Your Honor, that -- that, under the
- 15 reopening rule, that providers have up to 3 years to
- 16 come in to ask for relief.
- 17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes. But it's not 180
- 18 days for them. It's 180 days, plus an extension up to 3
- 19 years.
- MR. ROTH: It's -- well, but after the --
- 21 after the 180-day period there is no right to judicial
- 22 review. With the reopening -- if there would be a
- 23 denial of the reopening request, that denial of the
- 24 reopening request, as this Court said in Your Home,
- 25 would not be subject to judicial review.

1	So the extension of time there, Your Honor,
2	it would would be available, but would not have
3	recourse; and without recourse to judicial review, when
4	you have an issue here like Secretarial misconduct, that
5	means there will be no review at all, because
6	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Are you challenging I
7	mean, there is a rule that says that there is a
8	regulation that, for fraud, it's the time is
9	unlimited. But that that regulation, the government
LO	says, applies only to the provider, not to the the
L1	government.
L2	Are you challenging the agency's reading of
L3	the word "party" in that regulation?
L 4	MR. ROTH: Well, we again, this came to
L5	the Court on a motion to dismiss, but we think that
L6	the the Secretary's interpretation of that ruling has
L7	changed from when it was when it was promulgated in
L8	1974, when during the rulemaking process, they
L9	specifically changed that rule to get to eliminate
20	the reference only to a provider, and it's to any party.
21	And so that rule ought to be applied in a
22	way that provides equilibrium, that it would apply both
23	against Secretarial misconduct
24	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Did you did you make
25	that argument in this case? I wasn't aware that you had

- 1 challenged the interpretation of -- of the fraud
- 2 regulation.
- 3 MR. ROTH: We -- we speak at some length in
- 4 the brief, under this -- under this rubric of the
- 5 one-way ratchet. This is the one-way ratchet that we
- 6 were talking about, Your Honor, in that, with respect to
- 7 the reopening rule, the -- the Secretary has provided an
- 8 unlimited amount of time. So finality is not an issue
- 9 with respect to correcting -- correcting these payments
- 10 that arise from the fraud -- fraud or similar fault of
- 11 the provider.
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, I'm about 5
- 13 minutes behind. The gg provision that you said the
- 14 government didn't cite -- you mentioned a provision that
- 15 ended, anyway, with gg.
- MR. ROTH: Yes, Your Honor.
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is that in your
- 18 brief?
- MR. ROTH: No. No. That is --
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is that in the
- 21 amici's brief?
- MR. ROTH: It is not cited in any of the
- 23 briefs, Your Honor.
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is it anywhere that
- 25 I can find, other than -- I mean, is it in the appendix

- 1 to any brief?
- MR. ROTH: No. Sorry, Your Honor. We do
- 3 not have -- this is not before the Court.
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It's a little bit
- 5 much to chide the Solicitor General for not citing it
- 6 when nobody cited it.
- 7 MR. ROTH: That is true, Your Honor, and
- 8 that -- that is correct. But in citing 405.1885 and the
- 9 reason that we're bringing it up, Your Honor, for the
- 10 first time on rebuttal is that in the -- in the
- 11 government's reply brief, they went out of their way to
- 12 try to characterize the reasonableness of the Secretary,
- 13 you can trust the Secretary here because the Secretary
- 14 has said, look, after 3 years, we consider there to be
- 15 finality, and we don't go back after the -- after the --
- 16 after the providers -- you know, except for fraud or
- 17 similar fault, as if this had been a gift, an
- 18 interpretation from the Secretary.
- 19 It wasn't, Your Honor. That's why we are
- 20 raising it here, Your Honor, because, under the 1395gg
- 21 provision, they can't go back, and that's why they have
- 22 their reopening regulation and that reopening regulation
- is an order from Congress.
- And what we have here, Your Honor, is that
- 25 you have this concept at least arising from Congress;

- 1 when you look at the 1395gg, you look at the appeals
- 2 statute in 139500, is that you have an expectation from
- 3 Congress that the providers within their 180 days will
- 4 be able to know exactly what happened and why they were
- 5 underpaid. And here, of course, that underpayment was
- 6 concealed.
- 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is that reopening -- is
- 8 that reopening provision, the mysterious gg, is -- is
- 9 that subject to equitable tolling, too?
- MR. ROTH: The -- well, the --
- 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: And if not, why not?
- MR. ROTH: Well, 1395gg simply says that
- 13 a -- that a -- that a provider and a beneficiary will
- 14 not be subject to overpayment recoveries, if they were
- 15 without fault.
- 16 And what we -- and whether it would be
- 17 susceptible for equitable tolling is not before the
- 18 Court at this point, but that rule at least is applied
- 19 equally on both sides.
- 20 In other words, if -- if the -- if a
- 21 provider was underpaid because of its own fault, this
- 22 case isn't about any -- any relaxation of that rule.
- 23 Providers are on the hook for that.
- On the other hand, where a provider is
- 25 underpaid because of the secretive conduct, the

- 1 undisclosed and undetectable conduct of the Secretary,
- 2 that is the -- that's an area where we would find that
- 3 the very concept of equitable tolling is inherent in
- 4 139500.
- 5 Remember, the trigger point in 139500 is
- 6 notice. That is -- and, again, that goes against this
- 7 concept that it is jurisdictional. It's a claims
- 8 processing statute. And here, Your Honor, the notice
- 9 was defective. When they issued --
- 10 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Roth, I'm not certain
- 11 about the extent of your argument, so let me -- let me
- 12 try something.
- Now, are you saying that any time Congress
- 14 passes a statute saying -- you know, there is 30 days to
- do this, there is 60 days to do this, in the agency
- 16 context now, as to administrative process, that Congress
- 17 necessarily means that equitable tolling applies and
- 18 that the agency cannot limit that equitable tolling?
- MR. ROTH: Yes, Your Honor, that, if the
- 20 issue is the -- is the agency's own misconduct, that
- 21 Congress would -- to -- to read that Congress intended
- 22 in a situation under the -- like this under the Medicare
- 23 Act, where we're talking about a procedural right to
- 24 that -- to enforce a substantive right.
- In other words, we have here providers who

- 1 have provided services. And under their agreement with
- 2 the Secretary, they provide services, and they get paid
- 3 for those services.
- 4 If there were an attempt to limit that
- 5 payment, to cut off that payment because of some agency
- 6 misconduct, because of the expiration of a -- of a
- 7 statute of limitations, we don't believe Congress ever
- 8 intended that its payments would be cut off because of
- 9 agency misconduct that caused a provider to miss -- to
- 10 miss a deadline that caused the expiration of a statute
- 11 of limitations.
- 12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I'm not sure how we can
- 13 limit this to agency misconduct. Suppose there is a
- 14 computer glitch in a program, completely good faith, and
- 15 the computer just spits out the -- the wrong
- 16 information, and nobody knows about it. That's not
- 17 misconduct.
- 18 MR. ROTH: That's not misconduct.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: And -- but --
- MR. ROTH: We would agree, Your Honor.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: But you would say no
- 22 equitable tolling in that case?
- 23 MR. ROTH: Well, that's not -- that -- this
- 24 case -- that -- that is a mistake. That's an error.
- 25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, that would be good

- 1 cause. It seems to me that would be good cause under
- 2 the -- under the Secretary's rules.
- 3 MR. ROTH: That has never been good cause
- 4 under Secretary's ruling, but -- potentially. But that
- 5 is not what -- that would be the level -- that would not
- 6 be misconduct. That would not trigger equitable
- 7 tolling, as opposed to the facts of this case.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I don't know -- I
- 9 don't know why it wouldn't.
- MR. ROTH: What's that?
- 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: You mean to say that if
- 12 that happened, under the Secretary's rule, the Secretary
- would abuse its discretion in extending the time for 3
- 14 years?
- MR. ROTH: For -- excuse me? For
- 16 recovering -- for the --
- 17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Yes.
- 18 MR. ROTH: -- for a provider to make an
- 19 appeal?
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Yes.
- MR. ROTH: Well, they don't have to extend
- 22 the time, Your Honor. They can simply provide by
- 23 administrative payment to -- to fix the problem. They
- 24 don't have to circle it through -- through an appeals
- 25 process, if the government found out. And, in fact,

- 1 Your Honor, there is another regulation. It's
- 2 unfortunately --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I just find it
- 4 hard -- hard to see why this is -- you're saying that
- 5 the equitable tolling rule -- the agency does have the
- 6 3-year rule.
- 7 MR. ROTH: Right.
- 8 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It is limited to
- 9 misconduct?
- 10 MR. ROTH: Yes, Your Honor. But the facts
- 11 that you're talking about --
- 12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So you're arquing for --
- in a way, for a narrower rule than what the
- 14 government --
- MR. ROTH: Well, Your Honor, let me say that
- 16 the facts that you're talking about are addressed
- 17 explicitly in 42 CFR 405.980. And what the government
- 18 has said in that regulation is that, when there has been
- 19 clerical error, claims can be reopened indefinitely.
- 20 That's another indefinite time period.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, suppose it's just
- 22 what the Baystate court said it is. It isn't deliberate
- 23 concealment, but it is failure to use the best available
- 24 data.
- 25 And I think the argument you just presented

- 1 is equitable tolling is tied to misconduct. So just
- 2 failure to use the best available data, not deliberate
- 3 concealment, wouldn't make it.
- 4 MR. ROTH: Well, in this case, Your Honor --
- 5 well, simply, if it was knowing use of bad data, in
- 6 other words, if the government, as in this case, was
- 7 aware that there was better data to be had, that would
- 8 rise to the level of the kind of conduct that could be
- 9 subject to equitable tolling; whereas, simple mistakes
- 10 are already addressed with the Secretary's
- 11 regulations --
- 12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So what -- what
- 13 circumstances trigger equitable tolling, in your view?
- MR. ROTH: Well, equitable tolling is
- 15 certainly triggered under the circumstances of this
- 16 case, Your Honor, because --
- 17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes, but suppose that the
- 18 fact-finding turns out that the -- that there is no
- 19 deliberate concealment, but there is merely a failure to
- 20 use the best available data.
- 21 MR. ROTH: Well, if we don't -- if we don't
- 22 have that extra level of -- of that -- of that level of
- 23 concealment, Your Honor, I don't think that we would
- 24 have the misconduct that this Court has cited in the --
- 25 in the Bowen case, and before that, in -- in Irwin and

- 1 footnote 4 in the -- in the Gluss case that would rise
- 2 to the level of which -- at which equitable tolling
- 3 would apply.
- 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So you would have to
- 5 prove that before we know whether there is equitable
- 6 tolling.
- 7 MR. ROTH: We -- we -- well, we've made that
- 8 allegation in our complaint, Your Honor. And we believe
- 9 that -- that assuming those allegations to be true for
- 10 purposes of this hearing, which --
- 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes, but I'm asking you,
- 12 if you get past that hurdle, then we never -- we won't
- 13 know that there is equitable tolling until we have tried
- 14 out the question of the character of --
- MR. ROTH: Absolutely, Your Honor. If we --
- 16 if we get past this -- this -- and there would
- 17 be a remand, it would -- the burden then would be on the
- 18 hospitals at that time to, in fact, show that equitable
- 19 tolling could apply.
- 20 The issue in this Court is whether it should
- 21 foreclose permanently the availability of equitable
- 22 tolling, even in the face of allegations of agency
- 23 misconduct -- excuse me --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: I guess I'm not sure I
- 25 understand this, Mr. Roth. Are you saying that, in all

- of our cases about the presumption in favor of equitable
- 2 tolling, when we talk about equitable tolling, we are
- 3 only talking about misconduct or fraud cases -- you
- 4 know, as opposed to the case where it's just a person
- 5 cannot possibly know the -- the information that would
- 6 back up a claim and that we regard that as a good
- 7 excuse?
- 8 MR. ROTH: No, Your Honor. Whether it was
- 9 Henderson or -- or other cases, those cases recognize --
- 10 those cases have focused on what happened to the
- 11 claimant, and the claimant missed a deadline. Holland,
- 12 it was a deadline that was missed. There wasn't
- 13 misconduct on the other side.
- 14 JUSTICE KAGAN: Right.
- MR. ROTH: And those were subject to
- 16 equitable tolling.
- 17 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, most of your argument
- 18 was built on the presumption in favor of equitable
- 19 tolling that we've recognized in those cases --
- MR. ROTH: Correct.
- 21 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- and whether it applied to
- 22 the agency context. But now, you're saying that in the
- 23 agency context, it's -- it's a different kind of
- 24 equitable tolling that we are talking about, a more
- 25 limited kind?

- 1 MR. ROTH: Well, the -- what -- the
- 2 equitable tolling rule that the Court has found in those
- 3 other cases would certainly come into play. This case
- 4 goes farther. This case even goes farther than Bowen v.
- 5 City of New York because it has affirmative misconduct
- 6 by the Secretary.
- 7 JUSTICE BREYER: So what about -- then let's
- 8 get back to the question I really meant to ask before --
- 9 you know, assuming they have some authority here to
- 10 write a rule, you want to say a 3-year absolute rule is
- 11 not reasonable in this situation. So what is?
- MR. ROTH: Well --
- JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, you want to go back
- 14 to the Civil War? I mean, let's imagine you really have
- 15 the strongest possible case. All the records burned up,
- 16 and it took 5 years for scientists to reproduce the
- 17 records by putting charred pieces of paper together.
- 18 Okay? So you couldn't possibly bring your claim until
- 19 they finished. That's a pretty equitable claim. 5
- 20 years okay? 10? What is the -- 100? I mean, what?
- MR. ROTH: Well, Your Honor, in this
- 22 instance, the -- the question of how to limit a
- 23 circumstance where a provider is not getting paid --
- 24 gotten paid the amount promised by Congress, one way
- 25 to -- to limit that is by time.

1 But recall here, Your Honor, that

- 2 Secretary could eliminate this issue entirely by simply
- 3 being more transparent. This issue arises --
- 4 JUSTICE BREYER: But what I hear you saying
- 5 is go back to the Revolutionary War. If it took 100
- 6 years to put the papers together, you're saying no time
- 7 limit at all is -- is the only reasonable solution
- 8 because there are too many weird cases or unusual cases
- 9 or misconduct cases. You've got to have some exception
- 10 in there forever.
- MR. ROTH: Well, if --
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: Is that right? If that is
- 13 your position, I just want to know.
- MR. ROTH: That is -- that is the position
- 15 because, in order to -- to prevail in equitable tolling,
- 16 we would have to show that the providers here were
- 17 diligent, and that's a self-limiting factor.
- 18 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. And by the way, do
- 19 we -- are you supposed to, in such circumstances, give
- the agency's own determination some weight?
- 21 MR. ROTH: The agency's own determination?
- JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. They'll come in and
- 23 say, I don't care what the cause is, there isn't cause
- 24 here because we weren't that awful. And now, does the
- 25 judge give them some weight?

- 1 MR. ROTH: If the Secretary here decided to
- 2 attack head-on this concept of equitable tolling and
- 3 deal with this question of finality straight up and
- 4 say -- you know, here -- here is how we think that --
- 5 that finality should be -- should be handled, even in
- 6 the -- even in the context of secretarial misconduct,
- 7 by, for example, saying within the 3-year period any
- 8 provider who feels that we've misrepresented data, come
- 9 in, you can come in and look at our data, but after 3
- 10 years, the time limit is over, I think that's a rule
- 11 that could exist, Your Honor.
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, subject to
- 13 arbitrary and capricious review under Chevron?
- MR. ROTH: It -- subject, of course, to
- 15 arbitrary and capricious review on that. But the
- 16 point --
- 17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why in your case, even
- 18 assuming that there might be equitable tolling, here, is
- 19 it -- is it 10 years later? And there was this Baystate
- 20 case going on. You -- you didn't file immediately after
- 21 that litigation was instituted. You waited until those
- 22 plaintiffs won their case.
- 23 You waited till there was a decision of the
- lower court. So it seems to me you -- you said there's
- 25 a requirement of diligence. Why -- why didn't you have

- 1 to file when you were first on notice, which you would
- 2 have been from the complaint filed in the Baystate case?
- 3 MR. ROTH: Well, the complaint was filed,
- 4 Your Honor, in Baystate after we brought our
- 5 administrative appeal. We brought our administrative
- 6 appeal soon after the board -- the administrative board
- 7 rendered its decision. That was the first public
- 8 pronouncement that there were flaws with the data.
- 9 There were some providers who had an inkling
- 10 that some days might have been missed here or there, but
- 11 there was no sense in the provider community that that
- 12 arose from a systematic effort by the government to
- 13 miscount and then fail to disclose that it, in fact,
- 14 miscounted and had misrepresented how it had counted the
- 15 days.
- So, Your Honor, diligence, of course, will
- 17 be an issue if we -- on remand if we get -- if we get
- 18 that opportunity. But this -- but the -- but the case
- 19 here arose after the board issued its decision in the
- 20 Baystate -- in the Baystate case.
- 21 And there was a -- and there was a
- 22 discussion earlier about whether the board has viewed
- 23 its own jurisdiction as limited in some way. And the --
- 24 the fact of the matter is that -- that the board here --
- 25 and I focus on the Bradford case in particular. In the

- 1 Bradford case, the board itself made a determination
- 2 that equitable tolling should apply in another time
- 3 limit within the -- within the Medicare Act.
- 4 That case then goes up to appeal in the
- 5 Western District of Pennsylvania, and the -- and the
- 6 court says, you know what, we think equitable tolling
- 7 should apply, reversing the Secretary, who had reversed
- 8 the board's finding that equitable tolling should apply.
- 9 And in that case, the -- the Secretary didn't leave it
- 10 there.
- 11 They petitioned for -- for the court to
- 12 revisit its determination, which the court did and
- 13 affirmed its decision with respect to the application of
- 14 equitable tolling.
- 15 At that point, the Secretary abandoned -- it
- 16 didn't seek an appeal. It allowed the case to go back
- 17 to the board, and it -- and it allowed the
- 18 case to go forward, with that deadline having been
- 19 equitable tolled. So when the government portrays this
- 20 as somehow some kind of consistent view, it's not.
- This board has engaged in equitable
- 22 determinations going back for those 37 years that the
- 23 good cause regulation has been in place because it is
- 24 that good cause regulation that -- that forced the --
- 25 the board to have to deal with these equitable questions

- 1 about whether -- whether or not the -- whether or not
- 2 the -- the claim should be considered timely, even
- 3 though the deadline had to be -- had to be extended.
- 4 The -- the facts that we have here, Your
- 5 Honor, is that this is really an unprecedented case.
- 6 This is an unprecedented case in Medicare, that we have
- 7 the agency that says it was doing one thing in a Federal
- 8 Register document and actually did something different,
- 9 that then spent years trying to avoid, as was laid out
- in the Southwest Consulting amicus brief, avoid having
- 11 those facts come to -- come to -- come to the attention
- 12 of the providers.
- There will not be floodgates that result
- 14 from this, either at the board or at the Federal court
- 15 level, because there are -- there will always be, in
- 16 Medicare, a lead case. This is what we saw in the Cape
- 17 Cod case. There, you had a case that resulted in what
- 18 looked to be billions of dollars of payments to every
- 19 single hospital in the country as a result of one
- 20 district court decision and one court of appeals
- 21 decision.
- 22 So allowing equitable tolling to address the
- 23 misconduct of the Secretary in this kind of case will
- 24 not -- will not -- will not flood the judiciary or the
- 25 agency, and it will not -- it will not require an

- 1 expenditure of money --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: How many -- how many
- 3 cases are there like this pending, either at the agency
- 4 level or in court now?
- 5 MR. ROTH: Well, I think that, when the
- 6 government says there are 80 cases that are pending
- 7 involving 4,000 cost years and 450 hospitals, those
- 8 probably mostly, if not entirely, or for the most part
- 9 relate to -- to this case. And depending on how this
- 10 case unfolds, those cases will all presumably fall into
- 11 line, just as in the Cape Cod case.
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Excuse me. Is the
- 13 miscalculation still going on? I mean, this involved --
- MR. ROTH: Well, there was a change --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- claims 12 years ago.
- MR. ROTH: Right.
- 17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But did they continue
- 18 from that time forward to the present?
- MR. ROTH: Well, there was a change in the
- 20 law in 2004 that now give providers access to the data,
- 21 so they can look at the underlying access to the data
- 22 instead of -- instead of the government presenting --
- 23 preventing them from being able to get access.
- Thank you, Your Honor.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

1	Mr. Kneedler, you have 4 minutes remaining.
2	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
3	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
4	MR. KNEEDLER: Thank you, Mr
5	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Kneedler, just for
6	point of clarification, the 3-year good cause extension
7	that's permitted under the government's regulations,
8	would that include would good cause or could a
9	claim be raised that fraud by the agency is the good
10	cause?
11	MR. KNEEDLER: I I think that's unclear
12	under the current regulation. The current regulation is
13	written in terms of good cause for something that
14	prevents the actual filing of the appeal, like a fire or
15	destruction of records or something.
16	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Okay. So it's not as if
17	the government is saying
18	MR. KNEEDLER: No, no. But that hasn't been
19	tested as to whether it could. But that's not the only
20	avenue. In fact, the predominant avenue for raising
21	claims of of new and material evidence, which at
22	bottom this is, evidence that that there was not the
23	best evidence used in this match, is the reopening
24	regulation, and that's the regulation that was addressed
25	by this Court in the Your Home case. There, the Court

- 1 made clear that it was a matter of grace, not statutory
- 2 compulsion, that the Secretary allowed for any reopening
- 3 at all of past cost reports.
- 4 This sort of claim of new evidence, for
- 5 whatever reason it wasn't available, could be raised
- 6 under that. But this Court held in -- in Your Home,
- 7 that a denial of a reopening was not even appealable to
- 8 the board at all or subject to judicial review for
- 9 reasons of finality and certainty, that, at some point,
- 10 the cost years have to be closed.
- 11 And the Court specifically pointed out that
- 12 to allow administrative and judicial review of a denial
- of reopening would circumvent the very 180-day
- 14 limitation that we have at issue here.
- What Respondents are trying to do is to come
- 16 up with another way of circumventing that 180-day
- 17 limitation by superimposing, for the first time in 40
- 18 years, an open-ended equitable tolling regime in this
- 19 situation. The Respondents here are seeking to
- 20 recalculate payment years back to 1987. The only reason
- 21 it goes back no further is that's when the DSH payments
- 22 began.
- DSH payments, by the way, go to 80 percent
- 24 of hospitals. It's not some limited category. And what
- 25 is being claimed here is -- is a mismatch of a

- 1 legislative type. It's not some concealment from an
- 2 individual provider.
- 3 With respect to the allegations in the
- 4 complaint, I'm not in a position to spend time refuting
- 5 them here. We have a footnote in our reply brief that
- 6 refers to the government's summary judgment motion in
- 7 which the allegations of misconduct are -- are
- 8 addressed.
- 9 I would like to say that -- that whatever
- 10 label one attaches, jurisdiction, claims processing,
- 11 mandating, it's absolutely clear that, from the outset
- of this program, the Secretary understood and
- implemented the 180-day time limit as limiting the
- 14 board's authority. It says an appeal shall be dismissed
- 15 if it's not filed within 180 days. No extension shall
- 16 be granted if requested after -- after 3 years.
- 17 That 3 years -- Respondent has conceded a
- 18 regulation that provides for coming in within 3 years to
- 19 address matters of fraud or anything else would be
- 20 valid. That's what this regulation does. And we think
- 21 there is no plausible argument at this late date in the
- 22 Medicare program to suggest that a 3-year limitation
- 23 on -- on revisiting of closed cost reports is arbitrary
- 24 and capricious under -- under this Court's decisions.
- 25 And if we're wrong, as I said, about the

- 1 validity of the Secretary's narrow good cause
- 2 regulation, which simply parallels what's in
- 3 jurisdictional provisions -- for example, notices of
- 4 appeal -- if the Secretary has no authority to do even
- 5 that, then the result is the same, there is no broad
- 6 equitable tolling.
- 7 Just one side comment on this Bradford
- 8 opinion, that did not involve the 180-day limitation.
- 9 That involved a regulatory provision. The Secretary's
- 10 consistent position has been, as we cite in the brief,
- 11 that the 180-day limitation is not subject to any
- 12 equitable extensions at all because the board is not an
- 13 equitable body. And the Medicare program, like the tax
- 14 program in Brockamp, is not one in which equities are
- 15 taken into account. You need absolute rules.
- 16 Allegations of fraud or concealment are easy
- 17 to make, but they can -- they can lead to widespread
- 18 delayed litigation, as the Baystate litigation shows,
- 19 requiring calling of witnesses -- in this case, 20 years
- 20 ago -- what happened 15 or 20 years ago. You would have
- 21 a hospital-by-hospital determination of when did the
- 22 hospital know or have reason to know what happened.
- 23 And we think that that's -- could be chaotic
- 24 in a program like this.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

Τ	Mr. Manning, you argued and briefed this
2	case as an amicus curiae at the invitation of the Court
3	and you have ably discharged your responsibility, for
4	which the Court is grateful.
5	The case is submitted.
6	(Whereupon, at 11:09 a.m., the case in the
7	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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