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ARMY HISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O'KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Acting Chief of Military History
Richard W. Stewart, Ph.D.

Managing Editor
Bryan J. Hockensmith

Editor
Diane Sedore Arms

Layout and Design
Michael R. Gill

Consulting Historians
Mark L. Bradley
Donald A. Carter

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Cover Image: Detail from *The Battle of San Pasqual* by Col. Charles H. Waterhouse/Courtesy of the Command Museum, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego

Back Cover Image: *Battle of Spottsylvania*, by Thure de Thulstrup/Library of Congress

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

The Winter 2015 issue of *Army History* presents two intriguing articles, one that examines operations during the Mexican War at the strategic level and the other analyzes campaigns of the American Civil War at the tactical level. The first article, by Cory S. Hollon, an Air Force lieutenant colonel, follows Brig. Gen. Stephen Watts Kearny and his Army of the West in 1846 as they traveled west. They had orders to secure the Mexican-held territories of New Mexico and Upper California and, in the words of Secretary of War William L. Marcy, "render them friendly to the United States." Kearny's arduous trek, the many setbacks faced along the way, and the arrival in California culminating in the Battle of San Pasqual are all detailed. Hollon highlights the logistical difficulties, the vague nature of Kearny's orders, the many personality conflicts, and the problems associated with conducting an early example of what we now call a joint service operation.

The second article, by Army Lt. Col. Charles W. Morrison, studies the fight for the Mule Shoe salient (or Bloody Angle) at the Battle of Spottsylvania Court House in May 1864. Morrison draws particular attention to Col. Emory Upton's initial assault of 10 May on the Mule Shoe and goes on to show how many lessons from this action were not implemented in the larger attack on the same position on 12 May.

This issue's Artifact Spotlight looks at the Shoe Pacs worn by U.S. soldiers in World War II, particularly during the frigid fighting in the Ardennes forest from December 1944 to January 1945.

The new acting chief of military history introduces himself and discusses the many actions and activities that will take place in the coming months involving the Center of Military History and members of the Army history community.

This issue also includes a number of interesting book reviews and an update about Career Program 61 training opportunities.

I invite our readers to continue to submit articles and commentaries on the history of the Army, and, as always, I welcome your comments on our publication and its recent contributions.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor



THE CHIEF'S CORNER

DR. RICHARD W. STEWART

The Way Ahead

Since this is my first column as the Acting Director of the Center of Military History (CMH) and as your Acting Chief of Military History, I wanted to cover just a few topics that I would like the Army history community to think about in the months ahead. It purports to be a busy time here at the Center as I fill those roles, while continuing to serve as Chief Historian, so I will ask your indulgence in advance as I get pulled in many directions. We have said farewell to Mr. Robert Dalessandro, our Chief of Military History for the past three-plus years, and it may be some time before a permanent replacement is chosen. (The Senior Executive Service recruitment process is torturous and time-consuming, to put it mildly.) So until a selection is made, I will do my best to fill in and provide the central guidance and policy direction for Army history.

First, let me tell you how proud I am to lead the Center and the Army History Program for however long that may be. Over the many years that I have spent as an Army historian, first as the historian for the Center for Army Lessons Learned in 1987, I have had many chances to assess our program and get a good sense of its strengths and weaknesses. Our main strength has always been the almost universal commitment of our people to our mission: providing the best historical products and services to the Army. With few exceptions, our historians, museum professionals, and archivists are professional, hard working, dedicated, and skilled. It is not going too far to say that, as a result, the Army Historical Program is the “Gold Standard” for all the service history programs and, in my mind, for *all* the federal history programs. With our outstanding official historical publications, quality of historical instruction, operation (often on a shoestring) of over sixty museums, careful preservation of our priceless artifacts, maintenance of a superb lineage and honors program, and timely historical support to commanders and staffs at all levels of the Army, we all have a right to be proud of what we do every day. I am deeply gratified to lead this extraordinary effort.

The Center is going to be very busy over the next few months, and our actions will affect many members of the Army history community writ large. We will be finalizing

both our Strategic Plan for the Center and the Army and completing a revised Army Regulation 870-5, *Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures*. This newest version of the regulation will provide general policy guidance and direction for the program as a whole but will not be prescriptive in nature for the historical programs in the Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units. That is, the regulation will not attempt to name or codify specific programs or dictate any specific organizational structures or names to those historical entities. That responsibility will rest solely in the purview of the commands that oversee those programs. This reflects the reality of how the Army History Program is structured. It may well provide each program less “top-cover” than before, but that is the guidance that was given to the Center after the most recent Army Headquarters Transformation process ended. We will all have to live with the consequences.

Another major development at the Center is the re-institution of the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Subcommittee (DAHASC). As you may recall, the DAHASC (generally called the DAHAC—its older title), was abolished in 2012 when the Department of Defense Historical Advisory Committee (DoDHAC) was disestablished by DoD. We have been fighting for the past two years to re-create that entity, and it was finally approved as a subcommittee of the Army Education Advisory Committee in July of this year. The DAHASC consists of representatives from academia and the Army’s main historical program elements (Training and Doctrine Command, Army War College, Command and General Staff College, U.S. Military Academy, and CMH) and is tasked with providing an impartial view of the Center’s historical products to ensure CMH’s continued commitment to objectivity. The DAHASC is further charged with reviewing the entire Army Historical Program to make certain that it is both manned and structured to furnish quality historical support to the Army. It is also a very useful body of distinguished academic historians who can provide timely moral and practical support to the Center and the Army History Program when

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
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**“A LEAP IN
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THE CAMPAIGN TO
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
By CORY S. HOLLON



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**“AT
WHATEVER
THE COST”**
THE FIGHT FOR
THE MULE SHOE AT
SPOTSYLVANIA COURT
HOUSE, 12 MAY 1864

By CHARLES W. MORRISON



NEWSNOTES

NEW PUBLICATIONS FROM THE CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

As part of its ongoing activities to commemorate the War of 1812 and the Civil War, the Center of Military History (CMH) has recently released three new campaign brochures.

The first of these, *The Creek War, 1813–1814*, by Richard D. Blackmon, highlights what is considered part of the Southern Theater of the War of 1812. The Creek War grew out of a civil war that pitted Creek Indians striving to maintain their traditional culture, called Red Sticks, against those Creeks who sought to assimilate with United States society. With an almost complete dearth of Regular U.S. Army units, the militias from the Mississippi Territory, Tennessee, and Georgia, as well as Choctaw and Cherokee allies, all invaded the Creek Nation to attack the Red Stick Creeks. Initially, the strikes were uncoordinated, but, despite abysmal supply systems, the U.S. forces eventually overwhelmed the Red Sticks. Their defeat at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend forced them into the treaty of Fort Jackson in August 1814, at which they ceded some 23 million acres in what are now the states of Alabama and Georgia. The brochure has been issued as CMH Pub 74–4.

The next two brochures cover different theaters of the Civil War. *Campaigns in Mississippi and Tennessee, February–December 1864*, by Derek W. Frisby, begins with an examination of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's Meridian Expedition, often called a dress rehearsal for the more famous March to the Sea. He then follows with an account of the operations of Confederate cavalry commander Maj. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest, including the notorious Fort Pillow Massacre and the brilliantly executed Battle of



Brice's Crossroads. Frisby concludes his excellent study with a narrative of the pivotal Battles of Franklin and Nashville. This brochure has been issued as CMH Pub 75–15.

In *The Atlanta and Savannah Campaigns, 1864*, author J. Britt McCarley covers the military operations in northern Georgia involving the Union army group led by Maj. Gen. William

T. Sherman and the Confederate Army of Tennessee commanded by Generals Joseph E. Johnston and John Bell Hood. The Atlanta Campaign consisted of numerous engagements, including the Battles of Resaca, Kennesaw Mountain, Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, Ezra Church, and Jonesboro. The campaign ended with Sherman's capture of Atlanta, Georgia, the Confederacy's largest
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**ABOUT
THE
AUTHOR**

Lt. Col. Cory S. Hollon is the director of operations for the 336th Fighter Squadron at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina. He is a senior weapon systems officer in the F-15E Strike Eagle, a 2004 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Weapons School, and a 2013 graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies. He has master's degrees in history, military operational arts and sciences, and operational arts and science.



The American Soldier, 1847, by Hugh Charles McBarron Jr.

"A LEAP IN THE DARK"



The Campaign to Conquer New Mexico and California, 1846–1847

By CORY S. HOLLON

INTRODUCTION

On 7 December 1846, the “day dawned on the most tattered and ill-fed detachment of men that ever the United States mustered under her colors.” The day prior, Brig. Gen. Stephen Watts Kearny’s Army of the West had engaged in its first battle against Mexican forces at San Pasqual, California, near present-day San Diego. While Kearny claimed a victory because the enemy left the field, the engagement had cost him 18 killed and 13 wounded from a force of fewer than 160. Kearny himself was wounded so severely that he temporarily transferred command to a captain of dragoons. The Army of the West, which had marched in June 1846 from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in pursuit of the strategic objective of annexing New Mexico and California to the United States, was now encircled on a small hill just west of San Pasqual. New Mexico had capitulated to Kearny

without a shot fired, but initial reports claiming the absence of any resistance to American rule in distant California proved highly inaccurate. It appeared that, despite having completed the longest march in United States military history, Kearny’s force would fall short of its ultimate goal. Kearny noted, “Our provisions were exhausted, our horses dead, our mules on their last legs, and our men, now reduced to one third of their number, were worn down by fatigue and emaciated.”¹


These setbacks notwithstanding, the campaign to secure New Mexico and California was ultimately successful. On 8 December 1846, Commodore Robert F. Stockton sent 180 sailors and marines from San Diego to reinforce Kearny’s beleaguered force and escort it back to San Diego. From there, after replenishment and refit, Kearny led his force north and won a series of engagements in which the Army of

the West defeated the armed forces of California and in January 1847 established an American civil government in the province. General Kearny had achieved the stated political objectives of the United States nearly two months before Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott landed at Vera Cruz, Mexico.

STRATEGIC SETTING

On 24 April 1846, Mexican and United States forces clashed near the Rio Bravo del Norte resulting in the death of sixteen U.S. soldiers. Word reached President James K. Polk on 11 May. Two days later, while Secretary of War William L. Marcy was drafting orders for Kearny, a colonel at the time, to take command of volunteers and secure New Mexico and California, President Polk signed the declaration of war against Mexico.


Secretary Marcy outlined four broad objectives and a timeline in the orders



President Polk, c. 1849

he sent Kearny. The initial order of business was to seize control of Santa Fe, New Mexico.² Mexico had all but abandoned New Mexico because of the prevalence of raiding Native American tribes that had mostly isolated the province, its proximity to the rebellious Texas, and its distance from the Mexican capital city.³ However, the first real purpose of the expedition was the capture of California, preferably by the autumn of 1846. Marcy refrained from making the timeline explicit but mentioned the president's "cherished hope" that Kearny "should take military possession of that country as soon as it can be safely done." Further, Kearny was to travel to California without the 1,000 Missouri volunteers that Marcy had authorized. Second, after gaining military possession of the territories, Marcy directed Kearny to "establish temporary civil governments therein; abolishing all arbitrary restrictions that may exist, so far as it may be done with safety." Kearny was not only to occupy the land, but he was also to provide the framework for governments that would bring these conquered provinces into the Union. Third, while he was accomplishing these two positive aims, Marcy specifically directed Kearny not to disrupt trade between U.S. citizens and the Mexican provinces. Finally, while fulfilling the positive and negative objectives of the government, Kearny was to "act in such a manner as best to conciliate the inhabitants, and render them friendly to the United States."⁴

It would take substantial effort to accomplish these missions, but fortu-




Secretary Marcy, c. 1855

nately Kearny understood the overall environment in which he was working. In addition to expeditions to Colorado and Wyoming as a young officer, Kearny traveled the Oregon Trail in 1845 and returned to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, via Bent's Fort, in present-day Colorado, and the Santa Fe Trail. Additionally, Fort Leavenworth's position just north of the Santa Fe Trail allowed Kearny to gain reports of the trail conditions from travelers. Kearny knew the terrain, habits of the indigenous populations, and available resources in the region, and this "amply qualified him to act the pioneer and commanding officer of the expedition which he so successfully conducted to Santa Fe."⁵

Perhaps the most daunting element for Kearny's force to overcome was the distance between its base and the objective. The straight-line distance from Fort Leavenworth to Bent's Fort to Santa Fe to San Diego, California, is


A drawing of General Kearny, c. 1847



William H. Emory, shown here as a major general, c. 1865

just over 1,350 miles. However, Kearny had to utilize what trails existed, so his task would be to move an army capable of imposing U.S. sovereignty a distance of approximately 1,910 miles. Further, the topography of the land would make the journey extraordinarily difficult. Lt. William H. Emory, a topographical engineer and later adjutant to General Kearny, described the country as rolling prairie, giving way to high desert with limited vegetation as it approached Santa Fe. Santa Fe had so little in the way of vegetation or arable land that General Kearny remarked most of his mounted cavalry would become foot soldiers because of their inability to feed their horses.⁶ Between Santa Fe and San Diego, there were at least two routes from which Kearny could choose. The northern route would not be available if his forces started later than early October because of the danger from winter weather. The southern route was extremely rugged, but it was passable throughout the year and offered more forage for the horses.

At the beginning of the march, Kearny drew troops from three different sources. First, he had the Regular Army forces made up primarily of the First Regiment of Dragoons (hereafter referred to as the 1st Dragoons). The forerunners of the cavalry, dragoons were highly mobile, horse-mounted troops whose decisive action was a charge against the enemy, followed by the pursuit of a retreating force. Each man carried a rifled Hall carbine, a brace of pistols, a cavalry saber, a bedroll with eating utensils, a blouse,




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Meriwether Lewis Clark Sr., c. 1850



State Historical Society of Iowa

A postwar photo of James M. Allen



Library of Congress

A postwar photo of Robert F. Stockton

dismounted. The Army of the West also mustered two companies of light artillery from the Missouri volunteers with twelve 6-pound cannons and four 12-pound mountain howitzers, forming the Missouri Artillery Battalion under Maj. Meriwether Lewis Clark Sr. Missouri volunteers also constituted the only infantry, in the form of two companies, to march with Kearny to Santa Fe.⁸

The final source of troops for the Army of the West was the Mormon Battalion. Pursued and persecuted because of their religious beliefs, the Mormons found themselves in western Iowa at the outbreak of war with Mexico. An emissary to President Polk convinced him to allow some of the Mormons to enlist in the Army as an expedient to move them out of the country and gain an occupation force in the process. Capt. James M. Allen of the 1st Dragoons was responsible for mustering them into service and capitalized on the Mormons' desire to relocate to the West to persuade men to volunteer. Secretary Marcy authorized Kearny to "muster into service such as can be induced to volunteer; not, however, to a number exceeding one-third of your entire force."⁹ Ultimately, 400 Mormons formed the Mormon Battalion and marched from Fort Leavenworth to San Diego.

Upon arrival in California, Kearny expected to work closely with the Navy and take charge of the U.S. Army personnel who were there. Commodore John D. Sloat was in

command of naval and marine forces initially, but Commodore Stockton relieved him in July 1846. Together with Capt. John C. Frémont, a brevet captain of topographical engineers in the U.S. Army, Stockton would head the troops that Kearny anticipated to direct upon his arrival in California. Marcy's instructions to Kearny drove this expectation by stating that "the naval forces of the United States . . . will be in possession of all the towns on the sea coast, and *will co-operate with you* in the conquest of California."¹⁰ However, because of the sometimes difficult and often personality-driven nature of what today is called a joint operation, Kearny had to cooperate with and influence the naval forces rather than assume command and control. While the size of these units was unknown at the start of the march, Kearny expected additional men being present upon his arrival in the terri-

tory, sufficient at least to secure the ports in California.

Kearny could only speculate as to the character of the enemy force while he was planning his campaign. He had information from sources in and around Santa Fe that Mexican Governor Manuel Armijo could field approximately 5,000 men for the defense of New Mexico. The composition and experience of that force was unknown, but there was a rumor that General Jose de Urrea was coming from Mexico with even more troops. Contrary to these rumors were indications that "a year before, the Mexican government had virtually abandoned northern New Mexico."¹¹ In either case, Kearny understood that he would be facing primarily volunteer infantry

Portrait of Commodore Sloat



Library of Congress



Albuquerque Museum

An undated portrait of Governor Armijo



Texas State Library and Archives

General Urrea, c. 1845

with minimal combat training or experience. In California, because of the assurances of Secretary Marcy, Kearny anticipated minimal resistance, but there was no evidence to support this presumption.

Kearny faced a monumental problem. He needed to plan a way to conquer and subdue the vast expanses of New Mexico and Alta California while maintaining trade and peaceful relations with the population in order to fulfill the strategic objectives of the war and minimize the potential for future conflict. He had the Army of the West, which included five companies of the 1st Dragoons and the 1st Missouri Mounted Rifles, with the 2d Missouri Mounted Rifles and the Mormon Battalion as follow-on forces. However, he would confront an unknown number of enemy troops with assumed limited skill and a potentially hostile native populace. The strategic leaders, while not making it an order, strongly desired the acquisition of the territories to be completed before the end of the year, which gave Kearny only six months with which to march over 1,910 miles. Through all of this, Kearny had to pay careful attention to the terrain and distances in front of him, the impact his decisions would have on his mostly unseasoned troops, and the relationships he would have to create and maintain with the local population.

FROM FORT LEAVENWORTH TO SANTA FE

When Kearny received orders from Secretary Marcy, he was the commander of the 1st Dragoons at Fort Leavenworth. His immediate concern



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A sketch titled "The Volunteer" that appeared in *Doniphan's Expedition* (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1847) by John Taylor Hughes

was twofold: consolidate his Regular Army troops at Fort Leavenworth and train the new volunteers for service in the Army of the West. Kearny had begun the merger several days before the explicit instructions from the War Department arrived. In addition to the three companies of dragoons stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kearny recalled his dragoons from Forts Atkinson and Crawford in what are now Iowa and Wisconsin, respectively. The Mexican War, while not popular in some parts of the country, caused mass volunteerism in Missouri. Kearny knew that he needed his regulars present at Fort Leavenworth as soon as possible

to help organize, train, and equip the new soldiers. The volunteers who reported first became the 1st Regiment of Missouri Volunteer Cavalry and elected Alexander Doniphan as their colonel.¹² The initial accumulation of combat forces went well; however, unfortunately for Kearny, events would not allow the continued buildup to proceed smoothly.

Kearny faced several problems while mobilizing at Fort Leavenworth and

mustering the volunteers. He received orders to intercept a shipment of arms and ammunition that was on the Santa Fe Trail bound for Governor Armijo. On 5 June 1846, Kearny dispatched Captain Moore with Companies C and G of the 1st Dragoons to overtake the caravan and detain all people and supplies traveling with it until he arrived.¹³ He sent follow-on instructions demanding speed from Moore because an informant, a long-time resident of Santa Fe, “is further of the Opinion, from his knowledge of the Governor’s character, that if we can secure that property, we hold the governor as our friend and ally.” While not explicit in the directive to Moore, it is reasonable to assume that Kearny considered the possibility of turning the entire Mexican provincial government of New Mexico, as it currently stood, to the side of the United States through means other than overt military force.



National Park Service

An etching of Philip St. George Cooke, shown here as a lieutenant colonel, that appeared in *Harper's* magazine in 1858

This would have more than fulfilled Secretary Marcy’s order to secure the territory without disrupting trade or inciting popular revolt.¹⁴

In case the advanced party could not intercept the caravan, or the loss of the arms and ammunition did not bring Armijo to the United States’ side, Kearny would need to have an armed force ready to face the New Mexico governor. Therefore, Kearny arranged for the armament and provisions for the army he was training. As noted before, Kearny also ordered arms and ammunition for the volunteer forces, but he was also concerned about feeding and clothing them. He drafted supply wagons and teamsters to aid in driving the 1,556 wagons, 459 horses, 3,658 draft mules, and 516 pack mules used to transport the Army of the West to Santa Fe.¹⁵ The journey to Santa Fe would be difficult, but Kearny made sure that his logistics would not unduly limit his operational reach.

In addition to the logistical arrangements for the march, Kearny made two decisions at Fort Leavenworth re-




garding the composition of his forces that had far-reaching effects. First, he secured the services of an interpreter.¹⁶ Even though the orders from Marcy indicated that he would supply Kearny with a proclamation in Spanish for the people of New Mexico, no such document ever reached him. Instead, Kearny had to carefully construct the proclamation himself and then rely on his interpreter to translate it for him. The document served as the opening gambit in the peaceful occupation and acquisition of the territory. Second, Kearny understood that the infantry needed to conduct the majority of the work involved in establishing a civil government in New Mexico. Kearny viewed “infantry, with their bayonets, as the main pillar and strength of an Army.” On two different occasions, he solicited more infantry for the Army of the West.¹⁷ In the second request, he lamented the number of mounted riflemen he was taking with him because the scarcity of forage for the animals around Santa Fe would likely result in most of these troops becoming infantry as their mounts died.

Kearny’s final important decision at Fort Leavenworth concerned the path that his forces would take to California. Three different routes composed the Santa Fe Trail: the lower, middle, and upper crossings. Where they intersected the Arkansas River distinguished each from the others, but all the avenues eventually came together on the Cimarron River near Lower Cimarron Spring.¹⁸ Kearny chose to follow the upper crossing, also known

as the Mountain Pass, because of the scarcity of resources on the other routes. As Capt. Philip St. George Cooke noted, “There is a shorter route to Santa Fe which passes no mountain, or very bad road; but this one by Bent’s Fort was selected as better meeting the needs of the expedition. The other, the ‘Cimarrone Route,’ is much more deficient in fuel and has a dreaded *jornada*; while that by Bent’s Fort has in the fort on the frontier a *quasi* base.”¹⁹ The upper crossing route had the advantage of Bent’s Fort, which could serve as a forward base and an intermediate staging base for the troops. Additionally, because Kearny’s forces needed to march at intervals that precluded mutual support, the upper crossing route offered added distance from hostile forces.²⁰ Even though the crowding of the upper crossing strained the available fodder along the way, this route provided distinct advantages in logistics, protection, and potential basing locations.

By 30 June 1846, the Army of the West had assembled most of its forces, so Kearny, now a brigadier general, began the march toward Santa Fe and California. The journey from Fort Leavenworth to Santa Fe allowed Kearny to pursue the training and discipline of the volunteers while safe from enemy attacks. The march was difficult on the volunteers, who learned how hard they could push themselves and their mounts after extended periods of deprivation. Lieutenant Emory took time “to speak of the excellent understanding which prevailed throughout between regulars




State Historical Society of Missouri

William Bent, c. 1850

and volunteers, and the cheerfulness with which they came to each others assistance whenever the privations and hardships of the march called for the interchange of kindly offices among them.”²¹ Kearny’s force completed the 529-mile march to Bent’s Fort in twenty-nine days and suffered two dead. As Kearny’s biographer Dwight L. Clarke noted, “Grueling lessons were being learned daily that would make soldiers out of these recruits.”²² In the end, Kearny built a cohesive and disciplined team out of a hodgepodge of men.

At Bent’s Fort, Kearny consolidated his army, secured the forward base of operations, and took a significant risk. Because the line of operations extended along the upper crossing, Bent’s Fort became a decisive point in the campaign for Santa Fe. Even though it was outside of New Mexico, control of Bent’s Fort gave the Army of the West a place to regroup, reorganize, and recuperate from the long march. The two companies under the command of Captain Moore that had failed to intercept the enemy ammunition wagons bound for Santa Fe rejoined the Army, and the men repaired equipment and wagons, consolidated food stores, and allowed the horses and mules to graze. Additionally, Kearny sent some wagons back to Fort Leavenworth in order to begin resupply efforts for follow-on operations.²³ He gave every indication that Bent’s Fort was to become an intermediate base to facilitate the continued march toward Santa Fe.

An undated sketch of Bent’s Fort



Library of Congress

During the three days the army spent at Bent's Fort, Captain Moore's men brought three captured Mexicans to meet with Kearny. Two of the men were spies, and the third, while probably also a spy, claimed to be looking for his wife who had been taken by Comanches and sold to a William Bent. Kearny could have ordered the execution of the spies and kept the size and composition of his force secret; however, he chose an alternate, and more dangerous, course of action. Capt. Henry Smith Turner, Kearny's adjutant, related that, "after holding conversation with the Colonel and being permitted to walk through the whole camp, that our strength might be made known to them, they are liberated with permission to return to New Mexico, where doubtless they will make a full report of our strength and operations."²⁴ The spies lamented the fate of their republic upon their departure from Bent's Fort and filled Santa Fe with exaggerated stories about the number and might of the U.S. forces. To help capitalize on the appearance of overwhelming strength, Kearny wrote a letter to Governor Armijo, stating, "I come to this part of the United States with a strong military force and a yet stronger one is now following as a reinforcement to us. We have many more troops than sufficient to put down any opposition that you can possibly bring against us, and I therefore for the sake of humanity call upon you to submit to fate."²⁵ Kearny weighed and accepted the risk of the enemy learning the size and composition of his forces in order to capitalize on the opportunity that the Mexican government and population, realizing the futility of resistance in the face of such massed combat power, would peacefully submit.

After the beneficial and productive time spent at Bent's Fort, Kearny's Army of the West began its march toward Santa Fe on 2 August 1846. The route took the force through a series of small towns and villages that, according to the instructions from Secretary Marcy, were to be subdued and "conciliate[d] . . . and render them friendly to the United States." Each town, therefore, became a decisive

point in the operation. Kearny could not leave a potential enemy in his rear; however, he did not have sufficient forces to occupy every village along the way without risking being in a diminished state when meeting Governor Armijo's reported forces. Kearny's solution was ingenious. He marched into villages at the front of his army and asked for a meeting with the *alcalde* or mayor. While giving a strong show of force, Kearny would explain the benefits of annexation and his intention to leave the *alcalde* in power provided he swore an oath to the United States. After the *alcalde* took the oath, Kearny installed him in his office and pronounced all the people citizens of the United States.²⁶ The solution demonstrated significant flexibility and adaptability in meeting the objective of pacifying the population while annexing the territory. Additionally, he understood the utility of violence and, more importantly, the threat of violence. There was no need to do more than show sufficient force in order to coerce the villagers into allegiance to the United States. Further, this took advantage of the limited allegiance the people had to Mexico because of their distance from

the capital and the lack of support from that government. However, the oaths taken were of questionable legitimacy as nothing had really changed in the day-to-day lives of the villagers. Nevertheless, Kearny was able to seize Tecelote, San Miguel, and Las Vegas on the way to Santa Fe without expending valuable combat power in either their acquisition or retention.

By 15 August, Kearny's force had arrived at Las Vegas, New Mexico, and received an intelligence report that Armijo had assembled a force of 2,000 men in a canyon on the approach to Santa Fe. Armijo had placed an army in a nearly impregnable defensive position approximately six miles south of Las Vegas. However, the Mexicans' resolve quickly faded. By the time Kearny formed his men into a line of battle and advanced toward the canyon, the entire Mexican force had dispersed. Armijo and the other leaders were quarreling over command of the army, and "since the common people were peaceably disposed toward the invaders, they had used this squabble as a pretext for deserting, and Armijo was thus left without soldiers."²⁷ Armijo fled south toward El Paso, Texas, and was no longer a factor in New Mexico's defense. Captain Cooke hinted at the prevalent strain of racism, which may have played a role in the later stages of the campaign, by noting that the New Mexicans "became panic-stricken at once on the approach of such an imposing array of horsemen of a superior race, and, it appeared, over-estimated our numbers, which the reports of ignorance and fear had vastly magnified." Regardless, there were no enemy forces between Kearny and Santa Fe. He seized the city without firing a shot and proclaimed all of New Mexico annexed to the United States on 22 August 1846.²⁸ The first phase of the campaign was over.

The seizure of Santa Fe only completed half of Kearny's objectives for the area; he still needed to establish a civil government. In order to transition to the next phase of his operation, Kearny had to provide for the sustenance and protection of the force he would leave behind and set up a legal system for civilian governance. He

A late nineteenth-century etching titled *The Capture of Santa Fe, 1846*



accomplished all of this in a period of six weeks.²⁹

Kearny's first order of business was to consolidate the recent gains and ensure the army's ability to hold the territory by establishing a fort. Kearny's engineers selected a low hilltop northeast of Santa Fe on which to build. The hill commanded the city but was beyond the range of small arms from the hills surrounding the town. Within a week more than a hundred people were working on what Kearny christened as Fort Marcy. On 19 September, Kearny reported Fort Marcy completed and capable of accommodating a garrison of 1,000 soldiers. In addition, Kearny also visited several towns to the south of Santa Fe in order to secure the peaceful transition of sovereignty from Mexico to the United States. Kearny took the same approach with the towns north of Santa Fe. While there were some issues with the volunteers, Kearny's trip during 2–11 September demonstrated his skillful use of diplomacy and the efficacy of not using lethal force in subduing a population.³⁰

Kearny established a civil-military government by drawing on the talents of Colonel Doniphan to draft a code of laws and by installing government



Governor Bent House and Museum

An undated portrait of Governor Bent


officials to carry on the work once Kearny and his men had left. Kearny charged Doniphan, an attorney from Missouri in civilian life, with studying the current laws of New Mexico and making suggestions on how they could be modified to conform to the American system and the U.S. Constitution. Doniphan and another lawyer, Pvt. Willard P. Hall, worked together and submitted their suggestions. Kearny proclaimed the laws to be in effect on 22 September 1846.³¹ Also on that day, Kearny appointed Charles Bent as the territorial governor as well as installed a secretary, a U.S. marshal, a district

attorney, a treasurer, an auditor, and three superior court justices.³² With these positions filled, Kearny reported "everything is peaceful and the future commander of U.S. troops here should only concern himself with protection of the people from Indians."


From the moment that Kearny arrived in Santa Fe, he began preparing for his follow-on march to California. He first assigned the route selection to his aide, Capt. Abraham Robinson Johnston. The northern route, also known as the Spanish Route, and the one recommended by Secretary Marcy, presented problems in terms of force sustainability and weather. Johnston knew that the route was subject to harsh snows and, although it was easily traversed by wagons, offered little for the mounts or pack animals to eat. The southern route, which went along the Gila River, was too rocky for wagons, but contained better vegetation.³³ Therefore, the selection of the route depended heavily on logistics and the date of departure from Santa Fe.

Sustainment quickly became the primary concern. On the march to Santa Fe, a lack of food for the horses forced the men to help pull many of the supply wagons up the mountain


A drawing by John Mix Stanley showing Kearny's column passing through San Felipe, New Mexico




University of Texas at Austin



Sterling Price, c. 1847



John E. Wool, shown here as a major general, 1862



Christopher H. "Kit" Carson, c. 1860

trails; moreover, the logistical difficulties often forced the men to live on half rations. Kearny had begun sending supplies from Fort Leavenworth to Santa Fe before the main body had departed, but the supply train was not always reliable, which led to much grumbling from the volunteers.³⁴ In Santa Fe, conditions did not improve much because the quartermaster could not secure fresh mounts and the commissary was limited to Taos flour and salt pork, which "required a good appetite to relish." Not only were the men in poor shape, but also most of the 1st Dragoons now rode mules or recently acquired horses. If not as

highly regarded as horses for proper cavalry mounts, at least mules ate less than horses, were more sure-footed, and were more aware of events around them, which would be beneficial on the rocky trail west.³⁵ Kearny favored the southern route because his mounts could eat even though the trail was inaccessible to wagons.

Nevertheless, the final determining factor for selecting the route was the timing of the march. As late as 16 September, Kearny reported that he did not know when the Mormon Battalion would arrive in Santa Fe. His orders were to proceed, if at all possible, and take California in the fall. The northern

route presented an additional danger of inclement weather, which could delay Kearny from reaching California until the spring.³⁶ Ultimately, Kearny was willing to accept the risk of exposing the troops and their mounts to the environment as well as the uncertainty of the terrain on the southern route in order to complete the mission by the fall.

With the route chosen, Kearny now needed to decide which elements of his forces would accompany him to California. He assumed that California would be mostly subdued and in the hands of the Navy, in accordance with the instructions he had received in May from Secretary Marcy.³⁷ There-

A drawing of Kearny's column by John Mix Stanley titled *The Last Day with the Wagons*



fore, he would not require his entire force to make the march, but rather they could stay in New Mexico to further secure the peace. An additional force of 1,000 volunteers under Col. Sterling Price was en route to Santa Fe, having left Fort Leavenworth several weeks behind Kearny. Kearny decided to take the 1st Dragoons and leave for California on 25 September.³⁸

Kearny's eagerness to get to California may explain why he sent Colonel Doniphan's regiment to Mexico to join with Brig. Gen. John E. Wool, although other reasons could have influenced his decision. First, New Mexico appeared to be pacified, so Colonel Price's troops, only a few weeks away from Santa Fe, would be sufficient to maintain the peace. Second, Kearny knew that the trail to California was difficult and lacked good forage for the horses, but spacing out the column as he did on the way to Bent's Fort was not possible because of the threat from hostile Native Americans. Furthermore, a large body of troops would be inherently slower and entail more risk. Third, Kearny assumed that the operation in California would be similar to that in New Mexico since the Navy would be in control of the ports and seaside cities. Even if that assumption proved false, the Mormon Battalion would arrive shortly after Kearny, and there were other forces scheduled to be in California to support Kearny early in the next year.³⁹ Fourth, there was some friction between Kearny and the volunteers. Although the new recruits held up well under the strains of the march to Santa Fe, this portion of the campaign would be much longer, with more difficult terrain, and a scarcity of food and water. In addition, some of the volunteers were rankled by Kearny's discipline, and he may not have wanted to place them in a position to grow more resentful of their service. Finally, Kearny's sense of American racial superiority might have led him to dismiss the ability of the enemy to put up a strong resistance in the face of American military might. Regardless of the reasoning, Kearny left Santa Fe on the morning of the twenty-fifth with 300 dragoons, 2 mountain howitzers, and a handful of officers. Captain Cooke noted that "tomorrow

three hundred wilderness-worn dragoons, in shabby and patched clothing, who have long been on short allowance of food, set forth to conquer or 'annex' a Pacific empire."⁴⁰

THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA

Leaving Santa Fe, Kearny traveled south along the Rio del Norte (Rio

Grande) and began the third phase of his operation. The first part of the route was familiar to the troops as they had traveled south to Tomé less than a month earlier. Their trek paralleled the river for approximately 225 miles and then deviated from the river heading west. Their route crossed the Continental Divide and joined the



Son Diego History Center

Gila River after about 150 miles. After a 500-mile trek along the Gila, the dragoons stayed near the waters of the Colorado River for another 40 miles before facing a 60-mile trip across the desert of California. San Diego, which Kearny assumed the U.S. naval forces controlled, was only another 90 miles from there. He was close to completing the journey some viewed as “the leap in the dark of a thousand miles of wild plains and mountains, only known in vague reports as unwatered [*sic*], and with several deserts of two and three marches where a camel might starve if not perish of thirst.”⁴¹

The trip itself would be rigorous as well as monotonous. As author Dwight L. Clarke points out, “Only the details differed from mile to mile: rough, rocky trail, scant grass of poor quality, frequent dusty stretches in the powdery soil resembling cold ashes rather than earth.”⁴² During the trek the column would be forced to transition from wagons to pack mules due to the terrain.

On 6 October 1846, Kearny met Christopher Houston “Kit” Carson near Socorro, New Mexico, on the Rio del Norte. Carson was returning from California with correspondence from Commodore Stockton that reported the conquest of California after a ten-day fight with Mexican forces.⁴³ Because of this new intelligence, Kearny had to decide whether to continue with his original plan or alter it. A problem with the Navajo tribe appeared to be escalating in New Mexico, and he was taking his best cavalry toward what was now a conquered territory. Further-



National Archives

An undated photo of Archibald Gillespie


more, a smaller party could move faster and required less sustinment. Kearny decided he should change the plan, so he sent 200 of the 1st Dragoons back to Santa Fe. Carson had garnered a commission as a lieutenant of U.S. Mounted Volunteers, so he had no recourse when Kearny ordered him, despite his objection, to join Kearny’s troops and serve as a guide on the trail. The remaining troops were to be no more than an escort for General Kearny to get to California and fulfill his orders.⁴⁴

Four days after Carson joined the dragoons heading west, Kearny decided to abandon the wagons and switch to pack mules. Carson had been complaining about the slow pace caused by the wagons. The route had been extraordinarily difficult on the men and equipment, and reports were that conditions worsened farther on the trail. Kearny ordered the march to halt and wait for pack animals. The

only wheeled vehicles that Kearny kept were the gun carriages mounting two mountain howitzers.⁴⁵ Interestingly, Kearny’s aide, Captain Turner, assumed that the howitzers were going back with the rest of the wagons. At some point, though, the decision was made to bring the howitzers along despite the difficulties the wagons had already faced. Author William Perkins argued that “the backbreaking toil and the expenditure of mules involved in getting these guns down the Gila River sealed the fate of the 1st Dragoons and contributed heavily to their losses at San Pasqual.”⁴⁶ While it is impossible to judge how much transporting the mountain howitzers contributed to the forthcoming casualties at San Pasqual, it can be concluded that the extra effort expended to get them there took a toll on an already exhausted unit.

It took nearly two months for Kearny and his escort to get to California; he encountered a significantly different environment than he expected once he arrived. During the march, there were various encounters with Indians, traders, and Mexicans. The recurrent theme of these events was Kearny’s attempt to get fresh mounts for his troops. On 22 November, Lieutenant Emory reported that most of the men in the column were on foot, and even General Kearny resorted to use of his mule because his horse could no longer stand. Additionally, news was reaching Kearny from California that the declaration of a peaceful annexation might have been premature.⁴⁷

Governor Pío Pico, c. 1858



Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley

An undated portrait of General Castro, c. 1840



Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley

General Andrés Pico, c. 1850



Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County, California



Courtesy of the Command Museum, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego

The Battle of San Pasqual by Col. Charles H. Waterhouse

Commodore Stockton had accomplished the initial conquest of California easily because the governor of *Alta California* (Upper California), Pío Pico, and the military commander of Mexican forces, General José Castro, decided they could not mount a successful defense. However, Stockton's brief administration of the territory was inept and cruel, and the people rose in revolt against the American occupation within a few weeks. Ironically, the *Californios* (native Californians of Mexican descent) forced the Americans out of Los Angeles the same week that Kearny left Santa Fe. When Kearny reached Warner's Ranch, northeast of San Diego, on 2 December and requested that Stockton send a party to open up communication with him, he learned that the American forces only held the ports of San Diego, Monterey, and San Francisco. Kearny remained at Warner's Ranch for a day to rest his forces then resumed the march to San Diego on 4 December.⁴⁸

On 5 December, in the midst of a driving rain, Kearny's men made contact with Capt. Archibald Gillespie of the United States Marine Corps.

Gillespie was still a lieutenant in the Marine Corps, but Stockton had commissioned him a captain in the California Battalion. On that day, he was commanding a party of thirty-five men and one 4-pound artillery piece. While the additional men were a welcome sight, Gillespie brought much-needed intelligence about the operating environment into which Kearny now entered. The *Californios* had a force of approximately 150 troops about nine miles from Kearny's present location. In a letter, Stockton urged Kearny, "If you see fit, endeavor to surprise them." Subsequently, Kearny sent out a scouting party that found the enemy; however, the enemy also discovered Kearny's forces and went on the alert.⁴⁹ Upon the scouts return around 0200 on 6 December, Kearny decided to attack.

After saddling up at 0200, the 1st Dragoons traveled the nine miles toward the enemy camp.⁵⁰ Kearny stopped at the top of San Pasqual Hill, which was about a mile and a half south of the *Californios'* camp. It had been raining for several days, and a fog covered the valley in the predawn

hours. Captain Johnston was in the lead with twelve dragoons on the best horses available. Kearny followed in the second line with about fifty dragoons under the command of Captain Moore. These men were on the mules that had survived the journey from Santa Fe. Behind that second line of dragoons, Captain Gillespie led his troops. Kearny placed the two mountain howitzers and the gun crews next, deploying his entire command in depth. The remainder of the men and the baggage stayed in the rear. Kearny and his men could see the *Californios*, commanded by General Andrés Pico, mounted and prepared to receive a charge.⁵¹ Nevertheless, Kearny ordered an advance.

After descending the hill, the riders deployed into combat formation and began their approach. When the dragoons reached about a mile away from the camp, they encountered two forward guards of *Californios*. Here, the historical record becomes less clear. Some reports claim that Kearny ordered a trot, but Captain Johnston misunderstood and directed a charge. The *Cavalry Tactics* manual of 1841

cites very specific instructions on how to execute a charge. About 180 paces from the enemy, the commander gives the order to trot, followed 60 paces later by the direction to gallop, and the command to charge is given after another 80 paces. In the end, the commander's instructions to charge occurred after two previous, incremental increases in the rate of advance and then only 40 paces from the enemy. The manual clearly states that "the charge in line . . . should be as short as possible, so as to arrive in good order, and without fatiguing the horses."⁵²

Others argue that Johnston initiated the charge in response to the enemy's advance guard retreating to alert its commander. This seems nonsensical because tactics at the time directed "as soon as any confusion is observed, it is necessary to have and recommence the movement."⁵³ Johnston's decision violated tactical practice without sufficient justification to do so. Regardless of motivation, the first line of the U.S. force began a charge approximately one mile from the enemy.

The advance line of dragoons arrived well ahead of its support and on tired horses. Further, the *Californios* carried lances, which had a significant reach advantage over the cavalry saber carried by the dragoons. The U.S. forces suffered heavy casualties but were able to drive the enemy fighters from the field after the 4-pound artillery piece fired canister into them. After collecting the U.S. dead and wounded, which numbered nearly a third of the total force and included a severely wounded General Kearny, the rem-

nants of the Army of the West camped near the battlefield. On 7 December, the dragoons fought in a minor skirmish against the *Californios* with no American casualties. After taking a hill south of San Pasqual, Kearny had to transition to the defense because of the state of his weakened force and the wounded, who were in no condition to travel. On the night of 10 December, after three days deployed in the defense of Mule Hill, 200 troops from San Diego relieved Kearny. The Battle of San Pasqual ended early the next day when the *Californios*, realizing the Americans had received reinforcements, withdrew, and Kearny led his forces into San Diego.

While the issue about the tactics used in the battle continues to inspire debate among historians, the decision to engage the enemy in the first place raises interesting questions. Kearny's determination to attack makes sense in light of his original orders. Secretary Marcy had directed Kearny "to conquer and take possession of . . . Upper California."⁵⁴ The defeat of General Andrés Pico and his men would aid substantially in achieving that objective. Moreover, Stockton's letter advising assault also encouraged him to make quick work of the *Californios*. Additionally, the defeat of the enemy formation would prove to be a decisive point in the campaign. The force of *Californios* represented a major source of strength for the enemy both materially and psychologically. If Kearny could beat them at the end of a rigorous march from Santa Fe, he would have gained a significant advantage in

reducing the size of his opposition and bolstering his reputation. By choosing to face the enemy at San Pasqual, Kearny could dictate the tempo of the campaign, rather than waiting for the enemy to move forward and set the pace of battle. For some time he had been in search of better mounts for his troops. With the possibility in front of him that he could obtain the enemy's horses, Kearny reasoned that attacking presented the best opportunity.⁵⁵ Finally, Kearny may have believed that seizing the initiative would allow him to disguise how weak his forces really were. A successful fight could decrease the risk of having to face larger forces in the coming days. Given the aforementioned reasons Kearny had for engaging the *Californios*, it may appear that bad luck, or a misinterpretation of battlefield orders, caused the 1st Dragoons' misfortune; however, a further examination of the situation reveals that Kearny could have anticipated, with greater accuracy, the outcome and consequences of the battle.

Some of the reasoning Kearny presented in his report operates from the assumption that the battle was unavoidable. A map of the area drawn by Lieutenant Emory showed only one road between the American forces and San Diego. However, Emory also noted that "we were now on the main road to San Diego, all the 'by-ways' being in our rear."⁵⁶ Kearny might have retraced his steps and sought a detour around Pico's force, but that would have risked leaving the enemy behind him. Moreover, now that Kearny was in hostile territory, obtaining fresh and able mounts

A sketch by John Mix Stanley of San Diego as it looked upon Kearny's arrival



became a key objective for his force. Although Dwight Clarke dismisses the possibility, it may have been that Kearny was also eager to engage in a battle after a long march, and both Kit Carson's and his own experience in New Mexico reinforced his low estimation of the enemy.⁵⁷ Ultimately, Kearny may have been able to avoid the fight, but given his tendencies, training, and interpretation of his orders, his pursuance of combat was the obvious course.

Kearny's decisions, and subsequent events, demonstrated some errors of judgment in his tactical arrangements and their place in his pursuit of strategic objectives. His poor situational awareness regarding events in California compounded Kearny's erroneous estimation of the fluid strategic context during his campaign. His misjudgments resulted in nearly disastrous consequences for the Army of the West and put the United States' plans for conquest and empire in peril. First, as seen above, the battle was arguably unnecessary. Second, the operating environment disadvantaged Kearny. The wet weather of the past several days rendered the army's carbines nearly useless because water had fouled the cartridges. The carbine was not the primary weapon during a horse charge, but Kearny was also attacking before the sun had come up over unfamiliar terrain without any prior reconnaissance, which gave the advantage to the enemy. Third, he was unaware, or possibly misinformed, about the character of the threat. The *Californios* were on fine horses and were skilled riders.⁵⁸ Further, they carried lances that had significantly greater reach than his cavalry sabers. Also, the element of surprise was lost because Pico's men were already mounted and prepared. Fourth, Kearny overestimated or misused his friendly forces. Unfamiliar with Captain Gillespie and his men, Kearny chose to employ them as flank protection in the fourth line of his attacking force. In addition, he did not utilize his artillery to prepare the battlefield and attempt to scatter the enemy before his charge. Moreover, the march had exhausted Kearny's men and their mounts. Finally, Kearny culminated at San Pasqual because he



Portrait of John C. Frémont, as a major, by George Peter Alexander Healy

had overextended his supply chain. Two weeks after he left Santa Fe, supply wagons crowded the streets of the city. Had Kearny waited to start the journey, he might have been in better shape when he transitioned from wagons to pack animals. His prioritization of speed resulted in a poorly prepared force facing an underestimated enemy in a disadvantageous operational environment.

General Kearny arrived in San Diego on 12 December 1846, but fulfilling his orders would not be a simple task. The first problem Kearny encountered was a question of command authority. Stockton was the commander of the naval and Marine forces in California. There were no provisions for what today would be considered a joint operation as the Navy and Army recognized different chains of command. Collaboration and

cooperation between Navy and Army forces tended to depend greatly on the personalities of the commanders, and Stockton was flamboyant, cavalier, and self-serving. Kearny refused the command Stockton offered him upon his arrival but soon afterward would regret that judgment as Stockton made some questionable planning decisions for the reconquest of California. Correspondence between the two became heated, with Kearny sending Stockton copies of his orders that showed his authority to assume military command and governorship of the territory.⁵⁹ Stockton argued that, because Kearny's orders read "should you conquer" California, his authority to become military commander and governor was nullified when Stockton conquered it. The subsequent loss of all of California except three cities was merely a minor setback that had no bearing on the matter.⁶⁰ The conflict between the two carried on for over a month. In the end, Kearny wrote to Stockton that to prevent trouble he would "remain silent for the present, leaving with you the great responsibility of doing that for which you have no authority and preventing me from complying with the President's order." Fortunately, the march to Los Angeles went extremely well, although it suffered from a confusing command structure with Kearny as leader of the expedition and Stockton as the commander in chief.⁶¹

Los Angeles, as the capital of California, was the objective of the campaign

A colored sketch of a mounted *Californio* with lance



for two reasons. First, it was a decisive point in the conquest of the territory because it served as the base for the enemy forces under General José María Flores. Second, Capt. John C. Frémont was in command of a force of Californian volunteers somewhere to the north of Los Angeles, and they were making their way southward toward the city. Neither Kearny nor Stockton knew the size or location of Frémont's forces; therefore, Flores in Los Angeles represented a threat to Frémont unless Kearny could rendezvous with him.⁶² To effect this concentration of forces, Kearny would have to move against Los Angeles.

On 28 December 1846, Kearny assembled his troops to begin the march to Los Angeles. Kearny reported that he "left San Diego with about five hundred men, consisting of sixty dismounted Dragoons under Captain Turner, fifty California Volunteers and the remainder of Marines and Sailors, with a Battery of Artillery." The trek was about 135 miles and would cross several rivers on the way. General Flores calculated that his best chance to stop the Americans would be during one of the river crossings.⁶³ The first opportunity for an engagement came eleven days after Kearny left San Diego on 8 January 1847.

Kearny faced a portion of the San Gabriel River that ran roughly north to south. The *Californios* organized their forces on the west side of the river with "a bank fifty feet high, ranged parallel with the river, at point blank cannon distance, upon which he posted his artillery."⁶⁴ Kearny formed his men into a line of battle and, despite artillery fire, crossed the river. The American artillery battery traversed the river and silenced the *Californios'* artillery rather quickly.⁶⁵ While the artillery dueled, the infantry crossed the river and then charged the enemy's position. Almost simultaneously, the *Californios* struck the American left flank, but the sailors and marines repelled them easily. As the enemy retreated, Kearny was unable to pursue because he lacked cavalry. The two forces then camped within sight of each other, but Flores eventually withdrew under the cover of darkness.



General Kearny's dragoon officer's dress coat

The next morning, Kearny resumed his advance. Because the *Californios* had the advantage of mobility with their cavalry, Kearny arranged his forces essentially in a square, which the sailors and marines called a "Yankee corral," with the front and rear ranks in line of battle, the two wings in column, and the baggage and wagons in the middle. Leaving the San Gabriel River, the troops pushed across a wide mesa toward the Los Angeles River. After five to six miles, Flores' troops, which were on a hill to the north and west of the direction of march, opened artillery fire on the Americans. Kearny directed his forces to "incline a little to the left to avoid giving Flores the advantage of the ground to post his artillery."⁶⁶ The fire had little effect on Kearny's men. The *Californios* mounted an attack on the American left flank, but several shots from American artillery dispersed the charge. Lieutenant Emory noted that the enemy made an orderly retreat, which gave the indication that the resistance would continue. However, the next morning, representatives of the city came forth with an offer of surrender. General Flores fled to the north but turned his command over to General Andrés Pico, who negotiated a peace on

13 January 1847 with Captain Frémont in the Treaty of Campo de Cahuenga.

The Mexican defeats at the Battles of Rio San Gabriel and La Mesa signaled the conclusion of organized resistance to the American occupation of California. Kearny's march ended in victory with the annexation of California and the achievement of his objectives. With the exception of San Pasqual, Kearny had arranged his tactical actions in pursuit of the strategic directives articulated by Secretary of War Marcy. Kearny would have a much publicized feud with Frémont and Stockton, but this was a minor distraction from his governing of the new territory. Less than five months later, Kearny began the long trip back to Fort Leavenworth with a small party, which included Captain Frémont, who was on the way to his court-martial trial for mutiny against Kearny.

CONCLUSION

Kearny had led the Army of the West from Fort Leavenworth to Santa Fe and finally to San Diego, annexed New Mexico without firing a shot, and gained the territory of California for the United States. During the seven months of the campaign, Kearny commanded formations ranging in size from several thousand to only a hundred. The first battle of the war for Kearny was a Pyrrhic victory at San Pasqual, but Kearny recovered and led a large force in a successful operation against a prepared enemy force.

Kearny's expedition acted directly against the enemy strongpoints, or centers of gravity, while shaping the operational environment through non-combat actions and providing for the sustainment of his troops. He arranged tactical actions on the approach to Santa Fe and California while integrating with the other U.S. armed service forces in order to apply the correct level of lethality for the annexation and pacification of the territories. His army advanced on a single line of operation and managed not to deplete or overstretch the logistical capabilities of the Santa Fe Trail between Leavenworth and Bent's Fort. After concentrating there, Kearny pacified the towns on the way to Santa Fe with minimal force while leaving the administrators in office. Governor Armijo

and his men chose to flee rather than fight, and Kearny was able to complete the annexation of New Mexico without confrontation. After establishing a friendly civil government in the territory, Kearny split his force. He sent 1,000 volunteers under Colonel Doniphan south to Chihuahua to support General Wool, ordered another 1,000 volunteers under Colonel Price to remain in New Mexico as an occupation force, and led 300 regulars toward California. As he gained intelligence about the situation in California and in New Mexico, Kearny sent two-thirds of his regular force back to Santa Fe and proceeded to California with only a hundred men. On arriving in California, Kearny fought an extremely costly battle at San Pasqual and required troops from the Navy to supplement his force. He then reconstituted, integrated his troops with the naval land forces, led a joint force in two more battles, and defeated the enemy in California. Kearny understood the end state and conditions required by his directives and visualized the decisive points of local governments along his approach route. Additionally, his actions demonstrated a consideration of his problem of operational reach and acceptance of certain risks. The combat losses at the Battle of San Pasqual often overshadow the success of the overall campaign. While Kearny made a poor decision to engage the *Californios* at San Pasqual, the operations on either side of the battle revealed a brilliant military mind coordinating complex actions across the expanse of a continent.



EDITOR'S NOTE

The managing editor would like to thank the staff of the Command Museum, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, for providing the image of the painting *The Battle of San Pasqual* by Col. Charles H. Waterhouse.

NOTES

1. Quotes from William H. Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports: A Reprint of Lieutenant W. H. Emory's Notes of a Military Reconnaissance* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1951), pp. 171 and 170, respectively, and see also p. 169.

2. Marcy sent the original orders to Kearny on 13 May, but the operational focus of the campaign was stated in the orders dated 3 June 1846. Instructions from the War Department to Colonel S. W. Kearny (hereafter cited as Marcy to Kearny), 3 Jun 1846, in Dwight L. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny: Soldier of the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), pp. 394–95. Marcy assumed that control of Santa Fe meant control of all of New Mexico.

3. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 105.

4. Quotes from Marcy to Kearny, 3 Jun 1846, in Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, pp. 394–98. Additionally, Kearny was advised that he could leave some of his regulars in Santa Fe if he thought it necessary.

5. William H. Wroth, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, accessed 12 February 2013, <http://www.newmexicohistory.org/filedetails.php?fileID=550>; Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 105; Hans Von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger, *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book, 1846–1847* (Boonville, Mich.: Pekitancui Publications, 1998), p. 85. Quote from James Madison Cutts, *The Conquest of California and New Mexico, by the Forces of the United States, in the Years 1846 & 1847* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Carey & Hart, 1847), p. 35.

6. Henry Smith Turner, *The Original Journals of Henry Smith Turner with Stephen Watts Kearny to New Mexico and California, 1846–1847*, ed. Dwight L. Clarke (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), pp. 76, 124. By way of comparison, this is roughly the same distance one covers on today's interstates going from New York City to St. Louis and back again. Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports*, pp. 26–29; Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 156.

7. War Dept, *Cavalry Tactics*, 3 vols. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1862), 3:121; Interv, author with George R. Moore, Curator, Frontier Army History Museum, 7 Oct 2012, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., in author's files; Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 115.

8. Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, pp. 151–53; Moore interview; William Elsey Connelley, *Doniphan's Expedition and the Conquest of New Mexico and California* (Topeka, Kans.: William Elsey Connelley, 1907), p. 134. See also California Pioneer Heritage Foundation, A Unit of Kearny's Army of the West, accessed 8 November 2012, <http://californiapioneer.org/for-history-buffs/mormon-battalion/15-a-unit-of-kearny%E2%80%99s-army-of-the-west>.

9. Philip St. George Cooke, *The Conquest of New Mexico and California in 1846–1848*

(Chicago: Rio Grande Press, 1878), p. vi. Quote from Marcy to Kearny, 3 Jun 1846, in Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 395. Kearny appointed Allen to be the commander and, after Allen died en route to Santa Fe, gave command to Capt. Philip St. George Cooke.

10. Marcy to Kearny, 3 Jun 1846, in Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 396. Italics added.

11. Quote from Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 105, and see also pp. 111–12. Kearny's sources were primarily the travelers along the Santa Fe trail who passed near Fort Leavenworth, so their veracity may have been in doubt. The truth of the situation was that Armijo and Mexico City were late to recognize the possibility of invasion and did not start discussing methods of defense until after Kearny had left Fort Leavenworth.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 106; Ltr, Kearny to Brig Gen G. M. Brooke, 31 May 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 134. For a complete history of Doniphan and the 1st Missouri Volunteers, see Joseph G. Dawson III, *Doniphan's Epic March: The 1st Missouri Volunteers in the Mexican War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).

13. Ltr, Kearny to Moore, 5 Jun 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 139.

14. Quote from Ltr, Kearny to Moore, 6 Jun 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 140. Marcy to Kearny, 3 Jun 1846, in Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, pp. 395–97.

15. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 108.

16. Ltr, Kearny to Robidoux, 4 Jun 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, pp. 136–37.

17. Quote from Ltr, Kearny to Edwards, 16 Jun 1846, p. 145. Ltr, Kearny to Edwards, 2 Jul 1846, p. 156. Both in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*.

18. Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 83; Robert Duffus, *The Santa Fe Trail* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1972), p. 93.

19. Cooke, *The Conquest of New Mexico and California*, p. 13. The “Cimarrone” route was the middle route. *Jornada de trabajo* means “working day” in Spanish, whereas *jornada* translates into “a full day's travel across a desert without a stop for taking on water.”

20. Ltr, Kearny to Brig Gen R. Jones, 17 Jul 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 157. This letter indicates that there were three main concentrations of forces, each separated by thirty miles. The distance between these groups would prohibit any kind of rapid support because the mounted forces could go no more than thirty miles in a day; fighting at

the end of such a ride would result in severely limited performance.

21. Altenburg and Gabinger, *Winning the West*, p. 120. Emory also noted that “horses occasionally fed on grain become very weak feeding on grass alone, and should never in that condition be subjected to quick work. A violation of this precept has cost my volunteers their horses, and entailed trouble without end on many inexperienced travellers ‘westward bound.’” Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports*, p. 27, and quote from p. 31.

22. Turner, *Original Journals*, pp. 61, 67. Quote from Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 117.

23. Glenn D. Bradley, *Winning the Southwest: A Story of Conquest* (Chicago: A. C. McClurg, 1912), p. 150; Turner, *Original Journals*, pp. 65–66; Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 123. Clarke relates a story of the horses being turned out to graze on Colonel Doniphan’s orders and then stampeding. This event was costly in time and manpower required to deal with it; however, it is not mentioned in any other account of the Army’s time at Bent’s Fort, which makes the account suspect as to veracity or significance.

24. Turner, *Original Journals*, p. 66.

25. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 124. Quote from Ltr, Kearny to Armijo, 1 Aug 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 158.

26. The terrain continued to be difficult throughout this portion of the march; however, for the purposes of the present inquiry, the engineering and technical skill demonstrated in overcoming these obstacles is secondary to the seizure of the villages and defeat of the enemy armed forces. Quote from Marcy to Kearny, 3 Jun 1846, in Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 397. Cooke, *The Conquest of New Mexico and California*, p. 34. The mayor of San Miguel flatly refused to take an oath even after the local priest urged him to do so. Kearny decided to make the *alcalde* go through “the form and semblance of swearing allegiance,” and then he proceeded as he had in previous towns.

27. Quote from Bradley, *Winning the Southwest*, p. 152 and see also p. 153.

28. Quote from Cooke, *The Conquest of New Mexico and California*, pp. 37–38. Proclamation, Kearny to Citizens of New Mexico, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 159.

29. In a strictly legal sense, Kearny did not have the authority to annex New Mexico (only the U.S. Congress could approve annexation), nor the right to declare its inhabitants U.S. citizens. By doing so, Kearny created logistical problems

for his army. It could no longer seize personal property for military use with the simple issuance of a chit for government repayment because the people it would be taking property from were now American citizens. Had Kearny waited, his men might have fared better in regards to provisions.

30. The trouble with the volunteers is recounted in Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, pp. 154–55, and see also pp. 146–47, 156–57. Bradley, *Winning the Southwest*, pp. 164–65. For the timing of the excursion, see Turner, *Original Journals*, pp. 75–76; Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports*, p. 74, and see also pp. 57, 63–73, 75.

31. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, pp. 148–49. The Kearny code is still in effect as the basis of the New Mexico Bill of Rights.

32. Cooke, *The Conquest of New Mexico and California*, p. 66.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

34. Bradley, *Winning the Southwest*, p. 158; George Rutledge Gibson, *Journal of Soldier Under Kearny and Doniphan: 1846–1847* (Glendale, Calif.: Arthur H. Clark, 1935), pp. 40–41.

35. Quote from Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 157. There were fine mules in Santa Fe, but they were too expensive for the quartermaster to purchase and, because Kearny had proclaimed all the population to be U.S. citizens, the army could not seize them. Homer D. Wilkes, *Kearny on the Gila* (Scottsdale, Ariz.: Homer D. Wilkes, 1990), p. 19.

36. Ltr, Kearny to Brig Gen R. Jones, 16 Sep 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 165; Cooke, *The Conquest of New Mexico and California*, p. 62. Cooke actually claims that the northern route was not an option because of the late arrival of the Mormons.

37. Marcy to Kearny, 3 Jun 1846, in Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 396.

38. Colonel Doniphan’s regiment, stationed south of Albuquerque, would march south to join Brig. Gen. John E. Wool in Chihuahua after Colonel Price’s regiment of Missourians relieved it. The battalion of artillery would remain in Santa Fe and, along with Colonel Price, would provide protection for the new government from the threat of Navajo violence and serve as an occupation force until the resumption of peace. The Mormon Battalion, which had been under its own leadership since Captain Allen died from illness in the first days of the expedition, would have the new leadership of Captain Cooke and follow Kearny on the southern route. Ltr, Kearny to Brig Gen R. Jones, 16 Sep 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 165; Cutts, *The Conquest of California and New Mexico*, p.

66; Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports*, p. 77; Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 165.

39. Kearny was not satisfied with Price as the latter had not kept him informed of his progress from Fort Leavenworth other than to plead for supplies once. The march and subsequent occupation of New Mexico had trained and disciplined Doniphan’s troops. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 161. A regiment of New York volunteers and a company of regular artillery were en route to California already. Valentine Mott Porter, *General Stephen W. Kearny and the Conquest of California (1846–7)* (Los Angeles, Calif.: Historical Society of Southern California, 1911), p. 11.

40. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 155. Clarke dismisses claims that Kearny was a disciplinarian and argues that the complaints written about Kearny were either normal soldierly gripes or an isolated incident not representative of the general mood of the volunteers. Quote from Cooke, *The Conquest of New Mexico and California*, p. 69.

41. The present-day Rio Grande was referred to in journals and letters as the Rio del Norte. Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports*, pp. 78, 86–102. Tomé is approximately twenty-five miles south of present-day Albuquerque. Turner, *Original Journals*, pp. 77–87; Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, pp. 180–84; Rpt, Kearny to War Dept (hereafter cited as Kearny Rpt), 12 Dec 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 167. Quote from Cooke, *The Conquest of New Mexico and California*, p. 69.

42. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 184. Kit Carson had joined the expedition by this point and was the epitome of cheerfulness as he reminded these weary soldiers that the terrain ahead was worse and “every party which made the trip through the Gila’s canyons had emerged in a starving condition.”

43. Kearny Rpt, 12 Dec 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 175; Wilkes, *Kearny on the Gila*, p. 3; Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, pp. 166–68. Clarke asserts that “few chance meetings in history have proved more fateful.” Wilkes contends that this was the “greatest surprise” in the lives of the men. While these claims may be exaggerations, there is little doubt that the meeting between Carson and Kearny had significant effects on the campaign, specifically the political wrangling that was to happen between Kearny, Stockton, and Frémont.

44. Turner, *Original Journals*, p. 80; Kearny Rpt, 12 Dec 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 176; Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, pp. 167, 169. Clarke also recounts the later criticism of Kearny for reading the dispatches of

Carson and not turning back to Santa Fe once he had done so. The critique is that Stockton had accomplished Kearny's mission, so there was no reason for him to go there. This is nonsensical because Kearny's orders were to first go to California, then subdue it, and then establish a civil government. He could not disobey the first part of the order simply because the next step appeared to be *fiat accompli*. Clarke essentially makes the same argument.

45. Turner, *Original Journals*, pp. 80–81; Wilkes, *Kearny on the Gila*, pp. 1–4; Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports*, p. 90; Kearny Rpt, 12 Dec 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 172; William L. Perkins, "Those Accursed Howitzers," *Journal of San Diego History* 10, no. 3 (July 1964), accessed 8 December 2012, <http://www.sandiegohistory.org/journal/64july/howitzers.htm>.

46. Ltr, Turner to Sumner, 9 Oct 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 172. Quote from Perkins, "Those Accursed Howitzers."

47. Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports*, pp. 91–164; Turner, *Original Journals*, pp. 82–124. Both of these first-person accounts of the trip are interesting reads. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, pp. 187–88.

48. Sally Cavell Johns, "¡Viva[n] Los Californios!: The Battle of San Pasqual," *Journal of San Diego History* 19, no. 4 (Fall 1973), accessed 14 December 2012, <http://www.sandiegohistory.org/journal/73fall/sanpasqual.htm>; Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 190. Also Kearny heard a rumor that a band of Mexican horses and mules was nearby. He sent his weary dragoons to obtain them, but they were unsuccessful. Turner, *Original Journals*, p. 124. Turner reports Lieutenant Davidson had captured about seventy-five mules and mares, but only thirty were usable for the dragoons. This provides further evidence of Kearny's fixation on properly equipping his soldiers.

49. Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports*, p. 168; Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 192. Turner's journals do not contain any entries between 4 December and the return trip in May 1847. Additionally, it is worth noting that Gillespie was the incompetent commander of the garrison force at Los Angeles, and his absurd and abusive policies were principally responsible for the revolt there. See Johns, "¡Viva[n] Los Californios!" Quote from Ltr, Stockton to Kearny, in Porter, *General Stephen W. Kearny and the Conquest of California*, pp. 12–13.

50. This account is a distillation of the following sources: Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports*, pp. 169–73; Clarke, *Stephen Watts*

Kearny, pp. 195–232; Rpt of General Kearny on Battle of San Pasqual, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, pp. 177–79; Cutts, *The Conquest of California and New Mexico*, pp. 197–202; George Hruby, Account of the Battle of San Pasqual, accessed 16 December 2012, <http://www.sanpasqual.org/battleaccount.html>; Owen C. Coy, *The Battle of San Pasqual: A Report of the California Historical Survey Commission with Special Reference to Its Location* (Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1921), pp. 7–12; George Walcott Ames Jr. and John S. Griffin, "A Doctor Comes to California: The Diary of John S. Griffin, Assistant Surgeon with Kearny's Dragoons, 1846–47 (Continued)," *California Historical Society Quarterly* 21, no. 4 (December 1942): 333–38.

51. Andrés was the brother of Governor Pio Pico.

52. Quote from *Cavalry Tactics*, 2:247, and see also 2:188–89.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

54. Marcy to Kearny, 3 Jun 1846, in Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 396.

55. Kearny Rpt, in Cutts, *The Conquest of California and New Mexico*, p. 199.

56. *Ibid.*; Cutts, *The Conquest of California and New Mexico*, p. 197. Quote from Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports*, p. 168, and see also p. 169.

57. Clarke makes the argument that Kearny intended to bypass the *Californios*, but Carson and Gillespie persuaded him to attack on the premises that the enemy could not withstand an attack, and fresh horses were available. The horses would give Kearny a decided advantage in the fight ahead. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, pp. 204–06.

58. Kearny Rpt, in Cutts, *The Conquest of California and New Mexico*, p. 199. It is odd that Kearny included this in his report inasmuch as it seems he ignored it in formulating his battle plan.

59. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, pp. 236–41, 262; Ltr, Kearny to Stockton, 16 Dec 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, pp. 181–82.

60. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, pp. 259–61.

61. Quote from Ltr, Kearny to Stockton, 17 Jan 1847, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 182. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 240. The command chain was even more muddled because Kearny outranked Stockton, Stockton had transferred command of the marines and sailors in San Diego to Kearny, and both of them were present on the march. Little

is known about the confusion of couriers and others looking for the man in charge.

62. Ames and Griffin, "A Doctor Comes to California," p. 344; David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, *The Mexican War*, Greenwood Guides to Historic Events, 1500–1900 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), p. 102. In correspondence, the objective is alternately referred to as Los Angeles and the Pueblos. The full name of the settlement was *el Pueblo de Nuestra Señora la Reina de los Ángeles*, but it will be called Los Angeles for ease of identification in this article. Ltr, Kearny to Stockton, 22 Dec 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 180; Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 239.

63. Quote from Kearny Rpt, 12 Dec 1846, in Altenburg and Gabiger, *Winning the West*, p. 181. Heidler and Heidler, *The Mexican War*, p. 104.

64. The present-day Rio Hondo was called the Rio San Gabriel in 1847. Clarke notes "only one certain landmark remains: the steep bluffs along the westerly bank of the present Rio Hondo. Undoubtedly these are the heights up which the Americans charged at the Battle of the San Gabriel." Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 245. Quote from Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports*, p. 185.

65. In addition to the sources for the Battle of San Pasqual, the following has been used to reconstruct the next engagements. Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of California, Volume 5* (San Francisco, Calif.: History Publishers, 1886). The episode with the artillery battery is one instance where the confusing chain of command almost cost the American force dearly. Kearny ordered the guns unlimbered on the left bank, but Stockton countermanded this directive and told the artillery to cross. Halfway across the river, the guns began to sink into the quicksand. Kearny sent word to Stockton of this, and the latter came to the scene and personally led a team of artillerymen and mules in dragging the gun out of the river. All of this under fire from the enemy. The *Californios'* poor powder and shot prevented them from making the most of this opportunity, and Stockton was convinced he made the correct decision after the first shot blew apart the carriage of the enemy's largest gun. Kearny watched this wordlessly until the guns were in position. Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, p. 246.

66. Emory calls it the San Fernando River, but, on modern maps, it is the Los Angeles River. Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports*, pp. 186–87.



CMH STAFF RIDES

The U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) develops and leads staff rides for U.S. Army groups, with priority going to the Headquarters, Department of the Army, staff. The Center also provides staff rides for other official government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense, the U.S. Congress, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as international visitors and guests of the U.S. government.

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
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NEWSNOTES

Continued from page 5

transportation and manufacturing center in the Deep South. McCarley's superb account concludes with an examination of the Savannah Campaign, more popularly known as Sherman's March to the Sea. CMH has issued this brochure as CMH Pub 75-13.

CMH has also recently published a new volume titled *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Operation JUST CAUSE, December 1989–January 1990*, by Lawrence A. Yates. On 20 December 1989, the United States launched Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama. Over the course of the next few days, U.S. forces handily defeated the Panamanian military, toppled the brutal and corrupt dictatorship of Manuel Antonio Noriega, and helped return democracy and stability to the troubled isthmus. The book tells this story by reviewing U.S. contingency planning for the possible use of armed force in Panama and then by recounting the execution of those plans. The companion to this volume, *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, Planning, and Crisis Management, June 1987–December 1989*, also written by Yates, was published by CMH in 2008. The new book has been issued as CMH Pub 55-3 (cloth) and 55-3-1 (paper). All of the aforementioned publications will be available for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

ARMY HISTORICAL FOUNDATION 2014 DISTINGUISHED BOOK AWARDS

The Army Historical Foundation has announced the opening of nominations for its 2014 Distinguished Book Awards program. Candidates may nominate any number of books that fall under one of the following categories: Biography; Journals, Memoirs, and Letters; Operational/Battle History; Institutional/Functional History; Reference; and Reprints. To nominate a book, please send two copies to the Army Histori-



cal Foundation, Attention: Awards Committee, 2425 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22201. Nominated books must be received by 15 January 2015. Any questions should be sent to Matthew J. Seelinger at matt.seelinger@armyhistory.org.

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE PRESS RELEASES NEW PUBLICATION

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press has issued a new monograph by Kevin M. Hymel titled *Strykers in Afghanistan: 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment in Kandahar Province 2009*. This book is the fourth volume in CSI's Vanguard of Valor series. With the Taliban threatening Kandahar City in the summer of 2009, the soldiers of the

1st Battalion, 17th Infantry—part of the first Stryker brigade combat team to deploy to Afghanistan—mounted a series of actions to destroy insurgent power in the region. *Strykers in Afghanistan* tells the story of the battalion's initial operations, focusing on the difficult fight for control of the Arghandab River Valley, a Taliban safe haven in which the terrain proved as challenging as the enemy. This publication is available as a free PDF download from CSI's Web site: <http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/lde/csi/pubs>. Hard copies can also be requested at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/PubRequest.asp>.



U.S. ARMY ARTIFACT SPOTLIGHT

SHOE PACS A WARM WELCOME IN THE ARDENNES

By Dieter Stenger

The most iconic images of the Ardennes counteroffensive, which Adolf Hitler launched on 16 December 1944, are of soldiers fighting in freezing, snowy conditions. Despite high morale among the well-equipped and experienced frontline German troops leading the attack, clearing weather, Allied air supremacy, and tenacious American resistance on the ground ultimately resulted in the defeat of Germany's last major thrust of the war in the west.

The number of American casualties from 16 December 1944 through 2 January 1945 totaled 41,315. Less serious but more numerous, 46,107 were noncombat, cold-weather injuries like hypothermia, frostbite, and trench foot. The latter accounted for half of all injuries from exposure. Trench foot is defined in a June 1945 Army report as a diagnostic term that describes long-term vulnerability to cold at just above freezing temperature. The document concludes that most cases resulted from prolonged exposure, in immobile circumstances, to cold and damp by soldiers who lacked the opportunity to change their wet socks and boots and who did not receive warm food or drink.¹

S. Sgt. Henry W. Mooseker of Company A, 347th Infantry, recalled that

at the start of our engagement with Jerry in the Bulge we all wore standard GI leather boots. These boots were wonderful in the U.S. but weren't worth a damn in December and January in the Battle of the Bulge. . . . My effort to keep my feet from freezing was to keep them as dry as possible. This was difficult. I changed socks as frequently as possible, one pair on my feet and another inside my long johns against my belly. I repeated this procedure whenever I could.²

Frontline soldiers were usually provided with rubber over boots and Shoe Pacs to endure winter weather. However, rubber over boots, which were worn over leather combat boots, were in short supply at the onset of winter in late 1944. Shoe Pacs, consisting of a rubber lower sole, a leather upper portion, and felt lining, offered the best protection against the elements. They were perfect for deep mud and slushy snow. Although in development since 1940, few units received them before January 1945.³

The U.S. Army Historical Collection at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, includes examples of the M1944 Shoe Pacs shown here, two other models developed by August 1943, and every other type of footwear worn by U.S. Army soldiers from 1775 to the present.



Dieter Stenger is currently serving at the Museum Support Center, at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, as the curator of firearms and edged weapons.

NOTES

1. General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Trench Foot (Cold Injury Ground Type), Study Number 94, pp. 4–5, U.S. Army Center of Military History Library, Washington, D.C.


2. Henry W. Mooseker, Christmas 1944, accessed 17 October 2014, <http://www.battleofthebulgememories.be/stories26/32-battle-of-the-bulge-us-army/679-christmas-1944.html>, originally published in the newsletter *Golden Acorn* of the 87th Infantry Division, December 2001.

3. William F. Ross and Charles F. Romanus, *The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1965), pp. 599–609.



The M1944 Shoe Pac offered the best protection against inclement weather during the Battle of the Bulge. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Museum

The Shoe Pac helped overcome the high incidence of trench foot among U.S. troops fighting in cold and extremely wet conditions. Source: U.S. Army



U.S. soldiers of the 290th Infantry fight in fresh snowfall near Amonines, Belgium. Source: U.S. Army

**ABOUT
THE
AUTHOR**

**Lt. Col. Charles
W. Morrison**
currently serves
as the executive
officer for the 30th
Armored Brigade
Combat Team,
North Carolina
Army National
Guard. He holds a
master's degree in
military studies from
American Military
University and is
currently a student
in the Department
of Distance
Education at the U.S.
Army War College.



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Detail from *Battle of Spottsylvania [sic]*, showing the attack on the Mule Shoe, by Thure de Thulstrup

AT WHATEVER THE

COST



THE FIGHT FOR THE MULE SHOE AT SPOTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, 12 MAY 1864

BY CHARLES W. MORRISON

In May 1864, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant launched his great campaign that was to be a coordinated effort of multiple Federal forces to ensure the Union's overwhelming might could be brought to bear against the forces of the Confederacy. His most trusted subordinate, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, and an unreliable politician-turned-soldier, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks, were to take on the Confederates in the west, while Grant and three armies in the east moved forward to isolate Confederate forces in Virginia. Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel would command an army going into the Shenandoah Valley to deny the Confederates use of the valuable supplies produced there. Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler, another politician and former congressman that Grant had doubts about, would lead the Army of the James toward Richmond along the James River to an area known as the Bermuda Hundred, keeping thousands of Confederates occupied there guarding the back door to their capital city.

Grant would travel with the main effort, Maj. Gen. George Meade's Army of the Potomac. It would cross the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers, pass quickly through the Wilderness, the scene of grisly fighting just one

year before, and try to force General Robert E. Lee and his Confederate Army of Northern Virginia into a fight on open ground east of the Wilderness by threatening the approaches to Richmond. Meade was to make the Army of Northern Virginia his main objective, not Richmond, unlike during past campaigns.¹

Lee moved quickly, however, and sought to offset Grant's overwhelming numbers and superior artillery by utilizing the dense terrain of the Wilderness. On 5 May, Lee attacked Grant by blocking the two avenues of approach that Grant was using to get through the Wilderness. As Confederate Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's Second Corps blocked the one path with a strong defensive position, Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill's Third Corps drove hard into Union Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock's II Corps along the Orange Plank Road. After initial success for the Confederates, the tide of battle swung back in favor of the Union, with an assault on Hill's victorious, but disorganized and exhausted, frontline divisions early on the morning of 6 May. Only Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's timely arrival with his First Corps saved the day for the Confederates. Longstreet's resulting attack was initially very successful but became mired in confusion that led to his severe wounding and a halt to the

Confederate advance. Late on 6 May, Brig. Gen. John Brown Gordon's force was able to push back the Union right flank in a successful drive that did not have enough daylight or support for a full exploitation. The Confederates felt they had won a great victory, at least tactically, which technically they had but at a great cost.


Grant, on the other hand, realized the indecisive nature of the contest in the Wilderness and set his sights southeast on a small vital crossroads called Spotsylvania Court House. Grant also assured President Abraham Lincoln that there would be "no turning back."² He would not retreat, as Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker had done a year before, and he would push by the left flank and keep Lee occupied so Butler could keep advancing toward Richmond. Lee would have to follow him to Spotsylvania in order to protect Richmond. By 0630 on 7 May, Grant had issued instructions to Meade for a movement to Spotsylvania.³

Thus the race was on between Confederate and Union cavalry to gain control of the small county seat of Spotsylvania Court House. Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan's troopers initially held the town but were driven out by elements of Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart's Confederate cavalry and




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General Grant at his headquarters in Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 1864




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General Lee



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General Meade



Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's Confederate First Corps. Anderson had been given command just the day before to replace the wounded Longstreet. The First Corps commander's next move showed strong initiative as he immediately started construction of solid defensive works to offset the Union's numerical superiority. Lee faced another crisis at the corps command level as General Hill became incapacitated by a recurring illness and had to be replaced by Maj. Gen. Jubal Early from Ewell's Second Corps. Now three corps of the Army of Northern Virginia would have to respond to Grant's new threat while dealing with command changes at the highest levels.

By Sunday, 8 May, Union cavalry under Sheridan and V Corps troops under Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren were heavily engaged with Confederate cavalry and Anderson's First Corps near Laurel Hill. Laurel Hill overlooked the Brock Road and effectively blocked the Union's advance into Spotsylvania. Meade, and thus Warren as the tactical commander on the scene, was determined to take the hill despite strong Confederate positions and clear fields of fire. What resulted was a bloody Sunday indeed for the V

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


General Sheridan

Corps. A combined V and VI Corps assault later in the day also failed as the VI Corps troops were not well supported by the demoralized troops of the V Corps.⁴

As these last Union attacks were concluding, the first elements of Ewell's Second Corps began to arrive on the


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General Stuart

field. The first in the order of march, Maj. Gen. Robert Rodes' division had little daylight with which to work during its effort to extend the Confederate right flank. However, Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's division would arrive the night of 8 May. Capt. William W. Old, Johnson's aide-de-

National Park Service



General Anderson

camp, remembered the night as so dark they had to place their hands in front of their faces to keep from being hit by tree branches. It was in this darkness that Johnson deployed his troops. He "deflected his line and followed the ridge" and soon the "division was placed in line and fortified it."⁵ Thus

National Park Service



General Rodes

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General Johnson

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
Edward Porter Alexander, shown here as a colonel, c. 1863

a U-shaped salient, dubbed the Mule Shoe, was created. In this pitch black, Johnson, most likely greatly fatigued, was forced to make positions that Brig. Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, chief of the Confederate artillery, would later recall as a “great mistake.”⁶


The salient of a defensive position, if not properly supported with artillery, could provide advantages for an attacker. Converging fires could not be massed on an assaulting infantry force, due to the deflection in the line, without friendly fire taking its toll. Johnson’s position was precarious, but one that he and his corps commander, General Ewell, felt he could hold with adequate artillery support. Ewell also knew that this high ground had to be held. If captured, the Union would possess a devastating artillery position with which to dominate the Confederate line. The Confederates also took the extra precautions of preparing a secondary or alternate line of works to the rear of the Mule Shoe, and the corps reserve, General Gordon’s division, was placed nearby.⁷ The vulnerability of this position without artillery support would be clear just three days later.

Monday, 9 May, proved to be quiet along the front. Ewell’s right was tied in now to a division from Early’s Third Corps, extending the Confederate position into a giant horseshoe protecting Spotsylvania Court House. However, late on 9 May and until 10 May, most of Early’s corps was detached to the Confederate left to meet a threat near the Po River by Hancock’s Union II Corps. By the morning of 10 May, Hancock was finding hard Confederate resistance from Maj. Gen. Henry Heth’s division. As Hancock reported this, Grant began to believe that Lee had weakened his center by countering the threat from Hancock. Deeming Hancock’s movement across the river too risky to continue, he ordered Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright, now commanding VI Corps (due to the death of its commander, Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick), and Warren’s V Corps to prepare for an assault the afternoon of 10 May under the operational command of General Hancock. They were to strike the Confederate center. Both Warren and Wright launched reconnaissances in force that enabled them to find covered avenues of approach from which to launch their attacks.


Perhaps the most promising of these was one recommended by an ambitious brigade commander in the VI Corps, Col. Emory Upton. His point of attack would be on the western face of the Mule Shoe in which Ewell had placed Rodes’ division. This part of the line was manned by a brigade from Georgia under Brig. Gen. George Doles. Upton was given command of twelve regiments and he formed them into columns on a dense forest path. He took the commanders of all the regiments to view the objective and terrain and then brought the formations forward. The jump-off point for the assault would be about 200 yards from the Confederate defensive works, with most of the approach over open ground. Upton instructed the officers to keep yelling the command “forward,” and required the lead elements to leave the percussion caps off their muskets to prevent them from firing and stopping short of the objective. The brigade commander had carefully planned which regiments had responsibility for exploiting trenches to the left and right of any breach made in the Confederate defenses.⁸ While Upton’s attack was very successful, Warren’s



General Ewell



General Early




General Heth



Horatio G. Wright, shown here as a major general, c. 1865



General Warren



George Doles, shown here as a colonel, c. 1862

effort proved unsuccessful, and Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott, commanding the 4th Division of II Corps, launched a feeble supporting effort meant to exploit any advantage gained by Upton. Upton's regiments fought gallantly until sundown but were eventually beaten back by Confederate counterattacks. The VI Corps units escaped under the cover of darkness. Grant, impressed with the young colonel, promoted Upton to brigadier general for his role in planning and executing the assault.

Upton's success, and a following reconnaissance made by Mott on 11 May, proved to Grant that the salient should be the focus of his most ambitious attack to date.⁹ What eluded Grant and his subordinates at the corps level was why Upton had been so successful. Yes, the salient was weak, but Upton had gone through careful planning with his regimental commanders, made a leaders' reconnaissance, and then followed through with speed and surprise in his execution. The column formations had given his force a narrow front when crossing the 200-yard open field, and Upton's orders not to shoot and keep moving minimized the time his soldiers were


exposed to converging Confederate fire before they closed with the enemy and massed their superior numbers at the penetration point. Most of these lessons from Upton's effort were not passed on to commanders so they could employ those concepts in the



Emory Upton, shown here as a newly promoted brigadier general, c. 1864

much larger strike on the Mule Shoe on 12 May. Understanding Upton's initial assault is key to how the 12 May attack was executed and what could have made it more effective.

By the afternoon of the eleventh, Grant was convinced that a new offensive should focus on the Mule Shoe and that Hancock's II Corps should be the main effort. This was an obvious choice since the II Corps and Hancock had been the most reliable and seen the toughest fighting of the Army of the Potomac's units since Hancock had commanded II Corps at Gettysburg. By 1600, Hancock was instructed to move the remaining three divisions of his corps (Mott's 4th Division already being on the left flank of the VI Corps) under the cover of darkness to the rear of the V and VI Corps and join the IX Corps for an assault against the Confederate line to his front. He had never seen the routes to his assembly area nor the ground over which he was to attack the next morning. The II Corps commander would later write in his report about his objective that "no very definite information was obtained."¹⁰ Hancock's division commanders showed considerable concern and agitation about the lack



An engraving titled *Upton's Brigade at the "Bloody Angle"*



of intelligence. No doubt the miserable conditions, consisting of heavy rain and little to no illumination that forced a muddy march in total darkness, also contributed to the fatigue accumulated from the heavy fighting of the past weeks. Brig. Gen. Francis Barlow, one of Hancock's best division commanders, was extremely upset about the deficiency and commented to a staff member that they should "at least face us in the right direction" and not "have to go round the world and come up in their [Confederate] rear."¹¹


The march was exhausting, most of the men not reaching their positions until well after midnight on 12 May. Many had made a three- to four-hour march in a driving rain and still their commanders knew nothing more than when they had departed the far left of the Union line. Hancock stated that most intelligence was obtained through Lt.

Col. Waldo Merriam of the 16th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry of Mott's 4th Division. Merriam had been the officer of the day and seems to have been the best source of information. Hancock further reported that a line of attack was "determined by a compass on the map from the Brown house toward a large white house known to be inside the enemy's works, near the point we wished to strike."¹² The white house mentioned was the McCoull house and served as Confederate General Johnson's division headquarters. Union commanders would make this assault with little knowledge about what was in front of them or what the enemy fortifications looked like. Additionally, because of this deficiency, there appeared to be no plan to exploit any breach that might be made in the Confederate defenses. At 0300, the prospects for success were not bright in the minds of the Union division commanders who would lead the assault, despite having almost 19,000 men ready to advance in the largest single attack ever mounted by the Army of the Potomac.¹³ However, they were unaware of developments on the Confederate side that would give the Union forces the upper hand.

On 11 May, Robert E. Lee became convinced that Grant was retreating toward Fredericksburg and that now would be the time to go on the offensive and strike the Federals when they were the most vulnerable. Hancock's movement away from the Confederate left helped persuade Lee of this. Foul weather had made the roads very muddy and difficult for artillery to pass, so during the afternoon and early evening, Lee issued a directive to his chief of artillery, Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton, to order the removal of those field pieces that would prove troublesome to maneuver if Confederate forces were to pursue the Federals toward Fredericksburg.¹⁴ Confederate tactical commanders were not informed of this directive and were surprised as they saw artillery battery commanders limber their pieces and ride away. When General Johnson in-



Francis Barlow, shown here as a major general, c. 1865



Colonel Merriam



Confederate entrenchments at Spotsylvania

An engraving titled *The Struggle for the Salient, near Spotsylvania [sic], Virginia. May 12, 1864*






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General Pendleton

quired as to the movement of his fire support, he was astonished to hear that they were following orders and a “general move of troops was being contemplated.”¹⁵ This redeployment by Lee has long been questioned and disputed by scholars. Other secondary works on this battle have claimed that the redistribution of his forces was not Lee’s intent. Perhaps so, but the Confederate commander

was often known for giving vague directives, trusting subordinates to execute at their level. In all probability, he would not have deliberately ordered the artillery pieces removed from Johnson’s position at the Mule Shoe, but this unfortunate interpretation of Lee’s command would lead to one of the Army of Northern Virginia’s most desperate days.

Hancock’s II Corps troops were forming by 0300, but Confederate pickets had been warning members of the Confederate command, including Brig. Gen. George H. Steuart, whose men held the eastern face of the salient, that a major Union force had been massing in front of them all evening. Efforts to request that the artillery return were confused and delayed, resulting in the batteries not being ordered back to the salient until approximately 0330.¹⁶ Weather conditions were still extremely poor, and a heavy ground fog accompanied the continuous rain and limited visibility to, by some accounts, less than fifty feet. The fog even stalled Hancock’s attack for a half hour. The II Corps stepped off at 0430 and advanced Barlow’s 1st Division on the left and Brig. Gen. David B. Birney’s 3d Division on the right. Mott’s 4th Division was in support of Birney, with Brig. Gen. John Gibbon’s 2d Division in reserve.¹⁷ Though the Confederates were alerted to the



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Gershom Mott, shown here as a major general, c. 1865

Union presence by this time, they generally had no targets as their field of fire was obscured by the fog. But the Confederates had another problem aside from the lack of artillery support—their powder was damp. Many of the soldiers could not fire their muskets, increasing the amount of time the assaulting Union troops had to overcome obstacles, such as abatis, unimperiled. Before the




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George H. Steuart, shown here as a colonel, c. 1861



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Confederate entrenchments with abatis at Spotsylvania



A postwar photo of James A. Walker

Confederates could effectively react, their positions were overwhelmed by pure numbers. The defenses of General Stuart's, Brig. Gen. James A. Walker's, and Col. William Witcher's brigades were broken, and many soldiers were taken prisoner or killed after bloody hand-to-hand fighting. Hancock informed Meade by 0515 that he had captured Stuart and his division commander, General Johnson, and some 2,000 Confederates. Later, twenty field pieces were reported taken, many of those being the same guns sent back to provide the much-needed Confederate fire support.¹⁸ For the most part, the artillery had arrived too late to be of any assistance.

Meanwhile, on the Union side, Hancock's formations had started to break up and blur the lines of command and control even before entering the Confederate defensive works.

As the Union attack progressed, the confusion increased. The 2d Division reinforcements sent in by General Gibbon only added to the chaos.¹⁹ The disarray that often accompanies a hasty victory and close-quarter battle was disorienting enough, but the almost total lack of planning and coordination between II Corps units only worsened matters. This command failure gave Confederates an opportunity to regroup and counterattack. Only through sheer will and intense fighting did the Southerners contain the breach in their lines. General Gordon, in command of Early's division, with men from Rodes' division on Johnson's left and the Confederate Third Corps on the right, reinforced the line and fought desperate battles all day. By many accounts, this was some of the most savage combat of the war, with the clashes on the western leg of the



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General Gordon



U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center

Major Walker

Mule Shoe earning the epithet “The Bloody Angle.” Hancock’s aide, Maj. Francis Walker, recalled,

The conflict now became the closest and fiercest of the war. The Confederates were determined to recover their entrenchments at whatever the cost. . . . They fired directly into each other’s faces; bayonet thrusts were given over the entrenchments; men even grappled their antagonists across the piles of logs and pulled them over. . . . Never before since the discovery of gunpowder, had such a mass of lead been hurled into a space so narrow.²⁰

By nightfall, the Confederates had bought enough time to fall back to new entrenchments 800 yards to the rear of the salient.²¹ Union troops retained their prize but had failed to drive a wedge into the Confederate center and split the Army of Northern Virginia in half. The opportunity to do so would not present itself again at Spotsylvania. An ill-advised Union attack on 18 May failed, and Grant decided by 23 May to move on, again by his left flank. The Union assault on the Mule Shoe was, initially, a success

and had proved to be the right point of concentration for the Union offensive. But the lessons to be learned from Upton’s earlier initiative on 10 May, that inspired the larger offensive on 12 May, were not fully explored, understood, or disseminated. Upton’s

formations of single regimental columns, his careful and detailed planning for exploiting a breach, and his preparations for the attack given the limited time were not mimicked or implemented by Union commanders. Grant was right to believe that increased strength and better coordination could and would capitalize on the kind of success that Upton had achieved. However, Union division commanders, the tactical leaders during the Civil War, were unclear of their objectives, of the terrain and defenses they faced, and of how to exploit a breach in the Confederate line should they succeed. The advantages granted by the weather and gained by Confederate mistakes were negated by poor Union planning and execution. The bloody clash at Spotsylvania took a heavy toll on both armies, as the combined number of casualties stood near 30,000. Though the battle was over, the war would continue for another full year, during which time 400,000 more would be killed, wounded, or missing.

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Dead Confederates at Spotsylvania

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A lithograph titled *Battle of Spotsylvania [sic]*, c. 1888



Coming Soon...



BOOKREVIEWS

The U.S. Army in Frontier Montana



By Ronald V. Rockwell
Sweetgrass Books, 2009
Pp. 504. \$ 29.95

Review by Michael Lee

The history of early Montana is inseparable from that of the nineteenth-century Army. From exploration and settlement through its campaigns against the Sioux and Nez Perce, the Army played an inestimable role in Montana's journey from unexplored territory to statehood. In *The U.S. Army in Frontier Montana*, Ronald V. Rockwell seeks to "tell the story of the U.S. Army's mission and its conduct of that mission in frontier Montana" (p. 11). Rockwell weaves official records, eyewitness accounts, and his own personal insights into a work that is both entertaining and informative. Although the volume lacks deeper scholarly appeal, it is a good introduction to the Army's frontier period for the general reader.

Rockwell begins his story in 1805, when Capt. Meriwether Lewis and Lt. William Clark, along with twenty-six other soldiers, became the first American troops to venture into present-day Montana. They were also the first

Americans to see many of the state's natural features that would become familiar sights to soldiers and settlers alike in years to come. A more ominous portent of the future would be a violent encounter with the Blackfoot Indian Nation, the first of many such confrontations between the Army and the tribes of the Northern Plains.

Clashes with the native inhabitants are a frequent feature of following chapters in which the author describes Montana's fur trading era and early settlement and highlights the Army's exploration and peacekeeping role. Rockwell also discusses Montana's major Native American tribes, though in a somewhat piecemeal fashion over several chapters. While consolidating the information in a single chapter would have provided more clarity, Rockwell's depiction of intertribal relations and Indian attitudes toward the growing number of white settlers furnishes a good background for subsequent events. Encroachment on Native American territory would lead to some of the frontier Army's greatest challenges.

One of these was Red Cloud's War, which resulted from the discovery of gold in Montana in the early 1860s. The Bozeman trail provided the most direct route to the gold fields but passed through Sioux territory. In the hope of obtaining safe passage peacefully, the government began negotiating with area tribes. Simultaneously, the Army deployed the 18th Infantry, commanded by Col. Henry B. Carrington, to build forts along the trail. Enraged that the Army did so before obtaining their consent, the Sioux and their allies, led by Red Cloud, proceeded to close the route to traffic and put Carrington's forts under a state of virtual siege. One result was the death in December 1866 of Capt. William J. Fetterman and eighty soldiers under his command near Fort Phil Kearny.

Carrington's superiors initially blamed him for the disaster, accusing him of mismanagement and poor leadership, though an inquiry cleared him of wrongdoing. Carrington spent the rest of his life attempting to restore his tarnished reputation. He maintained that Fetterman, impulsive and contemptuous of his foes, disregarded his orders to avoid crossing Lodge Trail Ridge, a crest northwest of the fort. The Sioux lured Fetterman's force across the forbidden ridge into the hands of overwhelming numbers of warriors lying in ambush.

Rockwell relies heavily on Carrington's version of the Fetterman Massacre. In his preface, the author states that he avoided the use of recent secondary works in his research because of latter-day bias. Unfortunately, this practice fails to consider possible prejudice in primary sources. Some recent scholarship has challenged Carrington's version of events, and Rockwell's account would have benefited from its inclusion.

The fear generated by the Fetterman Massacre helped spur the building of Forts Shaw and Ellis to provide security in Montana. Rockwell describes in minute detail the establishment of these and other early Montana installations. He uses post records, medical reports, and published memoirs to present an engrossing picture of the frontier soldier's daily life. Rockwell illustrates the trials of dealing with crude facilities, logistical difficulties, questionable sanitary practices, unappetizing rations, and, most prominently, violent encounters with hostile natives.

One of these encounters was Maj. Eugene M. Baker's punitive expedition against the Piegan Blackfeet in January 1870. Leading elements of the 2d Cavalry and 13th Infantry, Baker struck a Piegan camp in northwest Montana, killing 173 inhabitants, mostly noncombatants, at the cost of a single soldier's life. The


subsequent storm of protests in the press and Congress were a blow to the Army's attempt to gain control of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and to President Grant's Indian policy. Despite its significance, the Baker (or Marias) Massacre has generated little attention from scholars, and what it did receive has usually been unflattering toward Major Baker. Rockwell, however, offers a rather strong defense of Baker, questioning the veracity of some witnesses and defending him against charges of drunkenness that some past writers have made. To explain the disparity in casualties, the author makes a dubious comparison between the losses in Baker's attack and those in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Although some of Rockwell's points are questionable and certain to draw the ire of those who condemn Baker, they provide interesting points for debate.

The author devotes the bulk of his work to the best-known events in the military history of Montana, the campaigns against the Sioux and the Nez Perce. Rockwell draws mainly from primary sources, including the recollections of Native American participants. He furnishes a decent summary of the Battle of the Rosebud, though it would benefit from the addition of a map. The endless debate surrounding almost every aspect of the Sioux War of 1876 and the Battle of Little Bighorn means that no account will satisfy everyone. The author does a decent job, however, emphasizing the logistical difficulties involved in the campaign. Unfortunately, the sheer degree of detail that Rockwell provides bogs down the narrative at some points. He ends his work with a lengthy portrayal of the pursuit of the Nez Perce through Montana in 1877 and, finally, the surrender of Sitting Bull in 1881.

The U.S. Army in Frontier Montana suffers from some minor shortcomings besides those already noted. It refers to numerous locations in relation to present-day Montana highways and towns but fails to supply a map. There are some minor factual errors in the book. For example, Rockwell incorrectly states that Fetterman employed mounted infantry, confuses two similarly named Indian agents, and equates counting coup with scalping. He occasionally allows

extraneous details to cloud his story. Nonetheless, *The U.S. Army in Frontier Montana* is a worthwhile read. The author's love for his native state's history and the Army's part in it is obvious, and his many personal asides add to the book's appeal. Ronald Rockwell's work is a good starting point for anyone who wishes to learn the story of the Army's role in exploring and safeguarding the American West.

Michael Lee is an adjunct history instructor at the University of Louisiana at Monroe and Louisiana Delta Community College. He is a retired sergeant first class and a veteran of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. He completed his master's thesis on Maj. Eugene M. Baker's 1870 expedition against the Piegan Blackfoot Indians.



By Peter Hart
Oxford University Press, 2013
Pp. xxii, 522. \$34.95

Review by Mark Klobas

The centenary of World War I is already proving to be the occasion for the unleashing of a torrent of new titles on the conflict. Yet few of them are likely to rise to the standard of Peter Hart's latest book. An oral historian with

the Imperial War Museum, Hart has already written a number of histories about key battles and other aspects of the war, volumes that draw heavily on the personal accounts of the soldiers who fought in them. His latest is a broader study, a military history of the conflict in which the author sets out to explain "the nature of the immense problems encountered by the commanders who bore the ultimate responsibility in battle; the strategic imperatives that drove them into battle; and the tactics they devised to achieve success" (pp. xx–xxi). Because of this focus, politics is mentioned in passing only while the social and economic dimensions of the war are left out altogether. Such a choice deprives the developments he recounts of much of their context, but the trade-off is a narrative that explains more thoroughly how the combatants responded to the ever-evolving challenges they faced.

To describe the war, Hart opts for an approach that divides it into its various theaters and then chronicles year by year the major ones (the Western Front, the Eastern Front, and the naval war). While he includes encapsulations of secondary fronts such as Italy, Gallipoli, and Palestine in his account, Hart's coverage of them is more selective, with the fighting in the colonies in Africa and Asia left out altogether. This reflects his bias: the author is a confirmed "Westerner," a fact that comes as little surprise to readers of his previous books. Here it comes across both in the greater length of his chapters on the Western Front and in his judgments of the campaigns outside of France and Eastern Europe. Gallipoli is dismissed as "a foolish sideshow" (p. 186), Salonika is deemed "a truly forgettable campaign" (p. 195), the bulk of the Mesopotamia campaign is "vainglorious nonsense" (p. 294), and the conquest of Palestine is "a waste of resources" (p. 409)—judgments all the more bitter for the casualties incurred in fighting them.


Hart is far more forgiving of the decisions made on the Western Front by the generals on both sides. This is part of his overall depiction of the conflict as a constant learning curve, one established from the start of the fighting as prewar doctrines and strategies ran headlong into the practical realities of the war. The author challenges directly the stan-

dard “lions led by donkeys” stereotype, even going so far to describe such long-lambasted figures as Douglas Haig and Joseph-Jacques-Césaire Joffre as “great,” and states that many German generals enjoyed “sustained periods of brilliance in the field” (p. 475). This he demonstrates by explaining how the army and naval leaders generally responded to the operational issues they faced with careful planning and preparations for their campaigns, as well as the deployment of technological and tactical innovations as they were devised. Yet the success of their efforts invariably proved limited as offensives quickly encountered problems for which there were no solutions, such as extended lines of communications and advances beyond the range of the all-important artillery. Hart also highlights how the capability of the commanders on the defending side proved another obstacle, as they usually adapted quickly to the new weapons and tactics used by the attackers, minimizing or negating their effectiveness. In this respect the war was anything but static, with the stalemate that characterized the fighting on the Western Front, in particular, the result of the constant adjustments made by the combatants.

The attention the author devotes to the commanders and the problems they faced does not translate into a neglect of the men they commanded, however. Intermixed with his description of the challenges addressed by the generals is a representative sampling of accounts of the experiences of the ordinary soldiers on the battlefield, stories that are periodically quoted at length throughout the book. These are drawn from a wide range of sources, most already published but a few coming from the Imperial War Museum archives with which Hart is familiar. While he avoids using them to reconstruct the daily routine in the trenches, their inclusion brings the battles to life in a way that analysis of operational conundrums and the recitation of casualty statistics cannot. They convey effectively the hardships soldiers faced in combat in a variety of theaters, from the mud of the trenches in France to the mountains of the Alps and the deserts of Mesopotamia, as well as how the troops were affected by the constant grind of a war seemingly without end.

It is this combination of revisionist analysis and the individual experience of battle that makes this book such a worthwhile addition to the literature about World War I. While Hart offers little that is new, he synthesizes much of the recent reconsiderations about the war into an account that is readable and insightful, making this an excellent introduction to the conflict. Those who want a broader examination of the “total war” would be better served turning to David Stevenson’s *Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy* (New York, 2004), but for anyone seeking to learn about the war waged by the men in uniform, this is the book to read.

Mark Klobas teaches history at Scottsdale Community College in Scottsdale, Arizona. A graduate of Texas A&M University, he is the author of several book reviews and is currently at work on a biography of the twentieth-century British newspaper editor James Louis Garvin.



Review by Roger D. Cunningham

Over the years, Osprey Publishing, headquartered in the United Kingdom, has produced scores of

interesting volumes on the Great War (1914–1918), and now it adds the *World War I Companion* to that long list. It is not surprising that a British publisher would focus on the Great War, since that conflict had such a great impact on the citizens of the British Empire. The United Kingdom endured the war’s horrors for more than four years and suffered almost 900,000 war dead, while Americans were officially in the fight for only nineteen months and incurred less than 120,000 fatalities. When the British think of that war, they tend to focus on the stalemate on the Western Front—the line of trenches that eventually ran 500 miles from the North Sea across Belgium and France to the Vosges Mountains—and sadly recall 1 July 1916, the tragic first day of the Battle of the Somme, when 57,000 soldiers of the British Empire became casualties (including 19,000 fatalities). As this volume clearly underscores, however, there was a great deal more to the conflict than that infamous day of horrible losses.

The *World War I Companion* comprises thirteen essays, on various aspects of the conflict, written by a group of international scholars. Most of these essays describe the ground war, but there are separate chapters on both aviation and the global war at sea. Eleven essays look at the armies of the major Allied Powers (France, Russia, the British Empire, and the United States) and the major Central Powers (Austria-Hungary and Germany). The topics in the former category cover Allied senior leadership, French weaponry and tactics, the Imperial Russian Army and the Eastern Front, the expansion of the British Army, and the American Army on the Western Front. Two additional essays discuss the Arab Revolt in the Middle East, and the tactical effectiveness of ANZACs (soldiers of the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps) on the Western Front. Essays on the Central Powers include Austria-Hungary’s World War I experience, German operational thinking, German tactical doctrine on the Western Front, and the German occupation of the Ukraine in 1918.

In his essay, “Commanding Through Armageddon,” Michael S. Neiberg, a

professor of history at the U.S. Army War College, provides an excellent summary of Allied senior leadership during the war. Stressing the fact that there was almost no coordination between the various Allied armies until late in the war, Neiberg writes, "Throughout 1915, the British and French ran virtually separate wars, both from one another and from their other main allies, Italy and Russia" (p. 22). After David Lloyd George became the prime minister in late 1916, British attitudes began to change. Lloyd George hated Field Marshal Douglas Haig, the top British commander, and he was eager to reduce Haig's power and influence. He "was also more willing to see the war in far-reaching global terms" (p. 27). In November 1917, the Allies formed the Supreme War Council, but it was a political body better able to debate than to make decisions. Finally, in 1918, frightened by the tactical successes of Germany's spring offensives, a unified Allied command structure was created, and France's Marshal Ferdinand Foch was put in charge. The system was not perfect, but the Allies (including the Americans) agreed to abide by Foch's overall direction, and that worked well enough to turn the tide of the war by midsummer. Neiberg concludes, "Only the threat of an imminent defeat was sufficient to force Allied political and military leaders to take a step that all resisted, no matter how obvious its benefits" (p. 31).

An interesting essay by Austrian academic Lothar Hobelt discusses "The Rollercoaster of Austria-Hungary's World War I Experience." The Austro-Hungarian Empire was composed of eleven ethnic groups, and there were often communication problems between the officers (mostly of German extraction) and their soldiers. Germans comprised less than one-quarter of the population, and "some of the non-German regiments did indeed have a rather dubious fighting record" (p. 136). Combat troops were divided among the Russian, Balkan, and Italian fronts, with more than half of them opposing the Czar's forces. After Russia left the war, however, the Italian front claimed most of the

Austro-Hungarian troops, and by mid-1918 forty-six of sixty infantry divisions were fighting there.


Fans of General John J. Pershing and the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) will undoubtedly be displeased after they read "The Reluctant Pupil," the lone essay on the AEF, by Andrew Wiest, a professor of history at the University of Southern Mississippi. The author describes Pershing as "tactically incompetent" (p. 195), and he maintains that compared to the British and French, American forces fared poorly on the Western Front. He writes that General Pershing failed to learn from the previous tactical errors committed by the Allied Powers, and his stubborn emphasis on open warfare and insistence on the primacy of the rifle "led the United States into a tactical dead end and . . . resulted in needless losses and inefficiencies on the part of the AEF" (p. 209).

The essays included in the *World War I Companion* are well chosen and offer a solid introduction to the great diversity of the war. The book is illustrated with an appropriate number of maps, although the inclusion of some photographs would have livened up the essays. Appendixes listing the dates of the war's most significant events and a summation of each belligerent's casualties also would have been useful. The volume is nevertheless an excellent addition to the historiography of the Great War, and it is highly recommended to all those who want to look beyond the first day of the Somme and "understand the terrible conflict that consumed so many and marked the post-war lives of [the] survivors" (p. 17).

Roger D. Cunningham graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1972 and retired from the U.S. Army in 1994. He is the author of *The Black Citizen-Soldiers of Kansas, 1864-1901* (Columbia, Mo., 2008), as well as numerous articles and book reviews, many of which have appeared in this journal.



The Deserters: A Hidden History of World War II



By Charles Glass
Penguin Press, 2013
Pp. xx, 380. \$27.95

Review by Fred L. Borch III

The Deserters: A Hidden History of World War II has received acclaim from both the popular media and professional historians. A lengthy segment on National Public Radio featured author Charles Glass talking about the book, and the prestigious *Journal of Military History* published a glowing review of it. However, while the volume is a well-written and entertaining read, *The Deserters* will be of limited value to military historians generally and soldiers in particular. This is because it does not give the reader any "hidden history" much less examine in any comprehensive manner why nearly 50,000 Americans in uniform chose desertion over service in World War II. On the contrary, the book is simply the story of three men—two Americans and one Briton—who decided that they had had enough of soldiering and walked away from the front lines.

Glass was the chief Middle East correspondent for ABC News from 1983 to 1993 and is the author of the highly regarded *Americans in Paris: Life and Death Under the Nazi Occupation* (New York, 2010). Consequently, it comes as no surprise that he writes very well and has a gift for selecting words that not only accurately describe the experiences of three sol-

diers who saw hard combat in North Africa and Europe, but also convey the psychological hardships suffered by all frontline troops. Those readers looking for an entertaining read will want to pick up this book.

The Deserters focuses on the experiences of three soldiers: John Vernon Bain, a Scot who, unable to stomach the violence and death he saw firsthand, deserted three times from the British Army; Alfred T. Whitehead, a Tennessee farm boy who performed heroically in combat (he was decorated with the Silver Star) but who then deserted to become a gangster in liberated Paris; and Steven J. Weiss, a New Yorker who deserted as a result of psychological breakdown then called combat exhaustion, battle fatigue, or war shock.

Most likely because he was the only one of the three men still alive when Glass wrote his book, Glass devotes the greatest number of pages to the tale of Pfc. Steven J. Weiss. The circumstances of his case are worth repeating because Weiss' time as a teenager in uniform was both typical and atypical. He enlisted on Thanksgiving Day 1943. He was seventeen years old and hoped to serve in the Army's Psychological Warfare Branch. A year later, however, Weiss was in Italy with the 36th Infantry "Texas" Division, and, when the division sailed for France in August 1944, Weiss went with it. He hated being a "dog-face slogging infantry soldier" and he intensely disliked his company commander, who he thought was cold, aloof, and uncaring (p. 107). At this point, Weiss' experiences seemed to be fairly typical of an infantryman in World War II, and certainly his dislike for his company commander was not unusual; more than a few men and women who soldiered during World War II felt unkindly toward their superior commissioned officers.

Weiss' life as a teenaged soldier veered into the atypical when he and some of his fellow soldiers were separated from their regiment after a bitter firefight with the Germans near Valence, France. They were rescued from almost certain capture or death by members of the French Resistance. Weiss' life now took a new turn. Un-

able to rejoin the 36th Infantry Division because of its distance from their location, he and the others joined the Resistance "by default" (p. 170). When this French unit subsequently came into contact with an operational group from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Weiss returned to U.S. control, but only grudgingly. He had developed a close relationship with the French *maquis* commander, akin to that between a son and father, and wanted to stay with the Resistance. But Weiss was outvoted seven to one by his fellow Americans, who believed that, as American soldiers, they should return to an American unit (p. 178).

As Glass shows, Weiss was a valued member of the OSS operational group that he joined, and ultimately the OSS officially requested that Weiss be assigned to the group. However, the answer was no. The 36th Division had suffered horrendous casualties and "needed experienced infantrymen, especially a first scout like Weiss and it wanted him back in the front line immediately" (p. 189). Weiss, however, was depressed by this turn of events: the idea of serving under a company commander he disliked was abhorrent "and reliving the inhuman life of a combat infantryman overwhelmed him" (p. 194).

While Weiss returned to duty with his division, he "resented being treated 'just like ammunition, petrol or rations'" (p. 209). He "felt so alienated, so nonexistent." A few days later, when "German artillery pounded the American positions to an intensity that no human psyche was constituted to withstand" (p. 214), Weiss simply walked away from his unit. After wandering for several hours, he took up with a French armored unit located some distance away. A week later, Weiss returned to his company and the front lines. He was not court-martialed, although he most certainly could have been. Rather, as punishment for his six-day absence, Weiss was "ordered to dig a latrine in rocky, nearly frozen ground," which he considered to be "army 'chickenshit' at its worst" (p. 223).

Two days later, Weiss and two other soldiers could not take it any

longer and fled the front lines. They made their way to Lyon, France, but, after some soul-searching, decided to return to their unit. Weiss was subsequently court-martialed for misbehavior before the enemy, in that he "shamefully" abandoned his company "while it was engaged with the enemy" in order to "seek safety in the rear."

In November 1944, the panel of officers hearing the evidence against Weiss heard about his misbehavior in combat. But the court-martial members also heard about his superlative service with the French Resistance and OSS. At the end of the proceedings, however, when asked by the prosecutor if he was willing to "go back into your line company and fight," Weiss replied that he did not think he could. The panel subsequently found Weiss guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment. While the sentence was reduced by the convening authority to twenty years, it was still a shockingly harsh sentence for a nineteen-year-old soldier.

Weiss was confined in the Loire Disciplinary Training Center near LeMans, France. He was offered the chance to return to duty during the Battle of the Bulge when the Army needed every infantryman it could find, but Weiss refused. Later, however, Weiss apparently outsmarted the Army: when asked in June 1945, after the war in Europe had ended, if he would "fight in the Pacific," Weiss answered, "Yes, sir." Apparently, Weiss believed that this would never happen, since General Dwight D. Eisenhower had decreed that no soldier who had fought in two theaters of operations would fight in a third. Weiss, who had fought in the Mediterranean and European theaters, believed he was safe. Whether this was true or not will never be known, as the war ended in the Pacific in August 1945. Weiss was restored to active duty and was later honorably discharged. He was living in London and teaching at King's College when Glass wrote *The Deserters*.

In telling the story of Steve Weiss and the two other men who abandoned their posts, *The Deserters* does provide a welcome relief to the

“greatest generation” mythology so prevalent in popular culture today. As Glass notes in his introduction, some 50,000 Americans deserted from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps in World War II, and 38,000 soldiers were tried by general courts-martial “for seeking to evade hazardous duty by some dishonorable means” (p. xii). When one considers that there were eight million men and women in the Army and a total of sixteen million Americans in uniform, this is a relatively small number. But it is still important to realize that not everyone in the World War II generation merits the adjective ‘greatest’ and, if anything, those who soldiered were no different from those who served in the American Revolution, Civil War, World War I, or the Vietnam War. The book also is valuable in showing that World War II was a brutal, terrible, ugly experience for the ordinary infantry soldier and not the uplifting and heroic event that many want to believe it was.

A major problem with *The Deserters*—at least for those professional military historians and serving soldiers who are seeking an in-depth examination of why soldiers fled the front lines—is that it does not offer much in the way of answers. Other than Glass’ ten-page introduction, the book only focuses on three men and their very intimate and personal reasons for deserting. Although Glass does occasionally discuss the magnitude of desertion as a problem for the Army in World War II and provides some statistics on desertion rates, there is no “hidden history” here.

Perhaps more importantly, *The Deserters* fails to furnish much of a historical context for the three case studies contained in the book, much less an understanding of why the Army as an institution took a hard-line against desertion. A closer examination of Weiss’ case is illustrative. It is clear from Glass’ narrative that Weiss could soldier satisfactorily if he was doing something he liked (and believed was meaningful), as reflected by his time with the

French Resistance and the OSS. But the Army is not a democracy, and soldiers do not always get to do what they want to do. Moreover, anyone who has spent even a day in uniform in the Army (or any other service) has encountered poor leaders and uncaring supervisors. The existence of such men and women, however, does not excuse misbehavior before the enemy, much less desertion.

There is no doubt that Weiss suffered psychological trauma in combat and that he did not receive the sort of medical care that a soldier might receive for such an injury today. But the men who sat in judgment of Weiss at his general court-martial had experienced the horrors of combat as well. They no doubt had superiors whom they also disliked. Consequently, they took it *personally* when a soldier like Weiss fled the battlefield and then, when offered a chance to return to duty, refused to do so. They took it *personally* because they knew what every soldier in combat knows: for every man who deserts, another man must perform that deserter’s duty and perhaps suffer injury or even death as a result. This is why Weiss received a life sentence—courts-martial convened in France in 1944 were about discipline, and harsh sentences for desertion were the norm. After all, how else were men to be encouraged to do their duty? While thousands of young Americans were being killed or grievously wounded in combat in North Africa, Italy, and France, thousands of other young Americans were deserting simply because it was easier to hide out with civilians than do one’s duty on a battlefield. While soldiers like Weiss suffered greatly in combat and do deserve understanding and empathy, the fact remains that the Allies achieved victory in Europe precisely because their soldiers stayed on the front lines despite being surrounded by death and destruction.


The Deserters: A Hidden History of World War II is worth reading if one wants to learn about the experiences of three men who fled the front lines. But those looking for a balanced or

comprehensive analysis of desertion, or a “hidden history” of some kind, will not find it in this book.

Fred L. Borch III is the regimental historian and archivist for the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps. He earned history degrees from Davidson College and the University of Virginia and law degrees from the University of North Carolina, the University of Brussels (Belgium), and The Judge Advocate General’s School. He also has a master’s degree in national security studies from the Naval War College.



The Secret War for the Middle East: The Influence of Axis and Allied Intelligence Operations during World War II



By Youssef Aboul-Enein
and Basil Aboul-Enein
Naval Institute Press, 2013
Pp. xxiii, 263. \$49.95

Review by Thomas Boghardt

The authors of *The Secret War for the Middle East* are officers in the U.S. armed forces (one active, the other retired), with family roots in the Middle East. Their personal background and professional careers inform much of the narrative. On one level, *The Secret War for the Middle East* is a textbook aimed at U.S. officers studying, or deploying to, the Middle East, but the authors’ breadth of knowledge and

insightful understanding of the region make it much more than that.

The military and political history of the Middle East during the 1930s and 1940s set the book's narrative framework. Within these parameters, the authors examine Anglo-French colonial policies as well as Nazi German and Fascist Italian intelligence and propaganda operations in eight regional cases: Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Turkey, the Arabian peninsula, Afghanistan, and Egypt. While contemporary events and military operations are meticulously recounted and analyzed in their historical context, the book also seeks to determine the effect of World War II-era events on the modern Middle East and their implications for U.S. military forces operating in the region.

In the course of the story, the authors offer numerous fascinating facts and insights with which many readers will be unfamiliar. Examples include the extent and virulence of Nazi and Fascist propaganda operations in the Middle East, aimed at weakening the British role in the region; the large number of Muslim volunteers who served in various German paramilitary formations during the war (though only a small percentage were Arabs); and an account of the Soviet-British invasion of Iran during the war and its troubling political legacy during the early Cold War.

Many of the arguments developed by the authors are persuasive. British colonial rule understandably stoked resentment among many Arabs, and it should come as no surprise to the reader that Nazi Germany and, to a lesser extent, Fascist Italy opportunistically exploited these regional grievances for strategic purposes, especially where Nazi anti-Semitism and Arab concerns over Jewish settlements in Palestine seemed to offer both sides a joint platform. Likewise, it stands to reason that the constant meddling in Iraq's domestic politics by Ottoman Turks, British imperialists, and Nazi propagandists left the local population resentful and suspicious of outside intervention, a lesson that proved all too true for U.S. forces during the last decade.

Nevertheless, the authors may have overstated their central thesis.

Throughout the book, they argue that the inflammatory language of Arab nationalism and the toxic political culture of the Middle East are in large part the result of World War II-era Nazi propaganda and influence in the region. "The Arab nationalist movement amounted to nothing more than a shapeless, fragmented counter position to British imperialism, imported to the Arab East via Berlin and Rome via Nazi and Italian Fascist aspirations," they posit. In short, "Germany was to blame, along with the Allies, for the establishment of the modern political culture of the Middle East" (pp. xiv, xxi).

While Nazi propaganda undoubtedly had an appeal across the region, from Berlin's perspective the Middle East remained a sideshow. At all times, Adolf Hitler focused his expansionist-genocidal aspirations on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the resources channeled to areas outside Europe remained limited throughout the twelve-year existence of the Third Reich. Likewise, the Italians' heavy-handed colonial policies in Libya and Ethiopia damaged Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini's image. If Nazi and Fascist propaganda nevertheless has established such a long-lasting and deep hold on Arab nationalism, as the authors argue, it would be important to examine why the region appears to have been so susceptible to it. Especially in view of the authors' familiarity with the Middle East, their knowledge of Arabic, and their commendable inclusion of several publications in that language in their book, it would have been helpful if they had drawn on more contemporary sources from the Middle East. Such material might have shed more light on the genesis of Arab nationalism from within, rather than merely as a product of propaganda from without.


But this caveat should not diminish the fact that *The Secret War for the Middle East* is a fascinating read and offers an informed account of the Middle East during World War II as well as the implications for the region today. The authors know their subject well, and readers will undoubtedly learn much from the story they tell. Overall, this book makes a valuable contribution to

the study of a period that proved critical for the emergence of the modern Middle East.

Dr. Thomas Boghardt is a senior historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He received his Ph.D. in modern European history from the University of Oxford, was a visiting fellow at Georgetown University from 2002 to 2004, and served as the International Spy Museum historian from 2004 to 2010. Boghardt has published extensively on contemporary and historical aspects of intelligence and has received the CIA's Studies in Intelligence Award for his work on Soviet and East German intelligence operations during the Cold War. His two most recent books are *Spies of the Kaiser* (New York, 2005) and *The Zimmermann Telegram* (Annapolis, Md., 2012). He is currently working on an official history of U.S. Army intelligence operations in early Cold War Europe.



Defending Whose Country? Indigenous Soldiers in the Pacific War



By Noah Riseman
University of Nebraska Press, 2012
Pp. xiii, 304. \$50

Review by Alexios Alecou

An in-depth analysis of the history of warfare leads to the discovery of an inveterate characteristic, that major powers, and especially colonial ones, managed to persuade, force, or even inspire their colonial subjects to partake

in different roles during wars, either as manual workers or as vanguard soldiers. This aspect of warfare is a fairly contemporary discovery as scholars, only over the last few decades, have been debating why indigenous soldiers risked their lives and livelihoods to serve their colonial masters. This speculation has spurred numerous intricate and provocative questions such as: how the major powers achieved this phenomenon, why colonial subjects involved themselves in the war, how the major powers treated their subjects, and what were the ramifications of participation for the indigenous forces? In order to bridge these gaps in the existing literature and answer these questions, Noah Riseman delves into the roles played by native fighters from various colonies during the fight against Japan in World War II. In Australia, the author examines the aboriginal combatants from Arnhem Land, known as the Yolngu. In Papua New Guinea, he analyzes the role of new Papuans and New Guineans in the war, and, in the United States, the Navajo code talkers are spotlighted.

Riseman attempts to establish the way in which the roles of the three groups resembled or differed from each other based on specific theoretical premises (p. 4). One of the major factors is the oppressive activities and regulations of colonialists that did not revere or value the aboriginal society's customs or combat skills but used them all the same to make progress in the war against Japan. The author recognizes that undervaluing the roles and sacrifices played by aboriginal combatants by exemplifying their service as "exploitation" and "alliance" comes with various risks. Nonetheless, the premise of his work is that the involvement of these groups in World War II was mere exploitation when the interests of the colonial powers remained absolute to the detriment of the rights of the indigenous peoples (p. 27).

The myriad of reasons that colonial powers decided to use native combatants from Australia and the United States during World War II is noteworthy because the perception of colonial officials, pertaining to the aboriginal populations, was stained with negative racial overtones. Colonial attitudes

toward the natives were that they were intrinsically inferior, uncivilized, incapable of following orders, indecisive, and unintelligent. On the contrary, the advocates of using aboriginals as combatants argued that they had inherent military aptitudes such as exploration, tracking, and knowledge of the terrain, thus making them essential assets. The argument in the use of Papua New Guinea combatants was somewhat different because, in this case, the authorities perceived them as naive savages who should be used only as laborers.

Riseman also delves into the varied reasons that natives extensively supported their colonial powers during war. In some cases, the aboriginal combatants felt exploited and never wished to serve their colonial powers' interests. However, this was not the most prevalent perception held by indigenous fighters who served in the war. Most of them willingly participated and felt that, by so doing, they were safeguarding their homeland as well as their families. They also believed that their participation would cause the colonial powers to recognize the rights and liberties of their peoples, give them opportunities to earn income and receive formal military training, and display their significance to the war effort. The author asserts that colonial authorities failed to treat aboriginal combatants as equals (with the exception of the Navajo code talkers) and that the policies of the colonial government impeded the natives' efforts to achieve the benefits they wanted. A good example is when the contributions of native Papua New Guinea fighters were not recognized by the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit.

Riseman's book is thoughtfully put in order, with two chapters each for the three indigenous groups being covered. The book also has an informative introduction and a thought-provoking conclusion. It is also well researched, using both colonial government and aboriginal primary sources. However, there are a few issues that readers may find contentious. First, the author's assertion that the use of the term *soldier-warrior colonialism*, which he defines as the "active employment of colonized indigenous people by the military of a colonial power, for the benefit of the

colonial power, against a different imperial power, and with little or no consideration for the impact on indigenous societies" (p. 224). This argument might be viewed by some as suggesting that only native populations were negatively impacted by their roles in the fighting and that the governments' conscription and use of their home populations during the war did not carry the same negative societal consequences.

Second, the author's argument that the use of aboriginal combatants in the war was not primarily motivated by the colonial powers' appreciation of their culture and inherent skills is debatable (p. 5). Riseman contradicts this premise in his conclusion when he states that the Navajo code talkers were native experts who were used by the U.S. government to perform roles that required skills that were specific to their indigenous culture (p. 225). While the U.S. government may not have fully appreciated the use of the Navajo language, it was of immense value especially in the Pacific theater.


Last, Riseman asserts that the sacrifices of aboriginal combatants did not translate into improved conditions and acceptance of the native communities back home because of factors such as racism and bigotry, among others. While not completely inaccurate, this aspect is debatable. Even if the desired changes did not transpire overnight, most of the monumental reforms that happened in the decades following World War II can be partially attributed to the service and sacrifice of these groups.

Despite a few minor flaws, *Defending Whose Country?* is a welcome contribution to the existing body of literature and posits some interesting questions in this understudied area of military history.

Dr. Alexios Alecou is a visiting fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies of the University of London and teaches history at the Open University of Cyprus. He is the author of *1948: The Greek Civil War and Cyprus* (Nicosia, Cyprus, 2012).



*In Final Defense of the Reich:
The Destruction of the 6th SS
Mountain Division "Nord"*



By Stephen M. Rusiecki
Naval Institute Press, 2010
Pp. xviii, 439. \$42.95

Review by Chris Buckham

Stephen M. Rusiecki has written a fascinating and engaging book. By April 1945, the Third Reich was in its last days, and, with the passage of time, there is a pervading sense and assumption that the Allied forces (especially in the West) were merely conducting mop-up operations against a disorganized, demoralized, and broken German Army. While it is correct to say that indeed the German Army was rapidly losing cohesion at the strategic level, Rusiecki's book proves that this was not the case universally at the tactical and operational levels. His study describes the final struggle over 1–3 April 1945 between an elite Waffen SS unit, the 6th SS Mountain Division "Nord," and the U.S. 71st Infantry Division in the area of the Buedingen Forest, east of Frankfurt. Following constant fighting, the 6th SS was severely reduced from its full-time strength of 725 officers and 21,100 noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, complete with integral artillery and transport assets, to a rump of 2,000 officers and men. In contrast, the U.S. 71st Infantry Division (the "Red Circle" men, who derived the nickname from their shoulder sleeve insignia design) was composed of 14,000 well-trained but relatively untried U.S. officers and men.

Rusiecki sets the stage by providing a comprehensive history of the 6th SS and its wartime experiences leading up to its final confrontation with the 71st Infantry Division. Initially formed in March 1941, it saw extensive action alongside Finnish forces in the Northern Theater of Operations. Redesignated as a mountain division in 1943, it specialized in cold-weather and mountain operations, becoming one of the premier units of this type in the German military. With the collapse of the Northern Front in 1944 and a subsequent declaration of neutrality by the Finns in September, the 6th SS was forced to conduct, in conjunction with the rest of the German forces in Finland, a fighting retreat. Pitted against their former allies, the Germans spent about two months pushing over 300 miles back to the Norwegian border. Once there, stress on the Western Front resulted in the immediate redeployment of the division through Denmark to central Germany. The lack and disruption of existing transport resulted in the division being fed piecemeal into the fighting in this region, a lot of its movement having to be undertaken on foot. Thus, the remnants of this heavily experienced, but exhausted, division found themselves east of Frankfurt in March 1945, bypassed by fast-moving Allied units, and trying desperately to connect with any remaining organized German lines.

The author then looks at the 71st Infantry Division. It was raised initially in 1943 as a 9,000-man "light division" designed to be employable in either the European or Pacific Theater of Operations. Unfortunately, evaluations and efforts to adjust the focus of the unit to meet the unique requirements of each of the theaters proved too daunting and the light division concept was deemed to be a failure. In 1944, this resulted in the redesignation of the unit as a standard 14,000-man infantry division. As the war progressed and pressure for additional forces grew, the 71st Infantry Division received orders for deployment to the European theater and, in February 1945, it arrived on French soil. By mid-March, confident but untested, it took its place in the line facing the remnants of the once mighty German Wehrmacht.

Rusiecki then seamlessly flows from a macro to a micro rendition of events. Tracing the movements of the respective units to their eventual confluence, he gradually narrows the focus of his narrative to 1–3 April 1945, as the battle that is the central pillar of his book unfolds. Transitioning between operational, tactical, and individual experiences, he skillfully paints a picture of the desperation and dedication of the 6th SS to its failing cause and the resolve of the Americans to crush this last bastion of resistance. Of particular interest to the reader is the impact and degree of confusion resulting from the fog of war that remains the common theme of both sides throughout this engagement. This book highlights exceptionally well the effects that weather, communication breakdowns, poor (and conflicting) intelligence, and preconceived assumptions have on decision making in the execution of a battle. Even with the benefit of maps and a clear narrative, it still requires a high degree of concentration on the part of the reader to follow the machinations of the operation. The author closes his story with follow-on information regarding some of the major personalities from each side: where they ended up and how they adapted to a peacetime environment.

Rusiecki has provided military history with a commendable addition. His bibliography is extensive and draws on not only written accounts but also copious numbers of interviews with survivors from both sides. His narrative pulls no punches regarding the darker and lighter sides of the conflict, and he presents his findings in a very balanced and fair manner. Certainly, after years of war, neither side was completely free of controversy yet neither did they, as combatants and representatives of their countries, deviate extensively from the acceptable rules of war. Each side fought hard and conducted themselves honorably. Given the complexities of the operation regarding numbers of units and movements, it would have been nice to have had larger and more detailed maps. The author does have numerous maps throughout the book corresponding to each stage of the


conflict, and this observation is one of personal preference and is not a significant criticism of the book.

Rusiecki's work is an excellent complement to anyone's library, and, as an addition to professional military literature writ large, it is highly recommended.

Maj. Chris Buckham is a logistics officer in the Royal Canadian Air Force. He has experience working with many military elements, including special operations forces. A graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada, he holds a bachelor's degree in political science and a master's degree in international relations. He is presently employed with the multinational branch of the U.S. European Command's logistics directorate in Stuttgart, Germany.



*Armed with Abundance:
Consumerism and Soldiering in
the Vietnam War*



By Meredith H. Lair
University of North Carolina Press,
2011
Pp. xi, 295. \$34.95

Review by Brian Drohan

In American popular culture, exemplified by films such as *Platoon* (1986) and *We Were Soldiers* (2002) or books such as *A Rumor of War* (New York, 1977) by Philip Caputo, and *The Things They Carried* (New

York, 1998) by Tim O'Brien, the Vietnam War elicits images of long jungle patrols, deadly ambushes, and Spartan living conditions in isolated firebases. Yet only a small fraction of soldiers served in combat units and regularly faced these experiences. The majority—between 75 and 90 percent according to Meredith Lair in *Armed with Abundance*—served in noncombat positions or were only infrequently exposed to combat. These troops often inhabited large rear-area bases and performed duties as clerks, mechanics, or logisticians; at these bases, the military established shops, bars, volleyball courts, and other entertainment facilities in the midst of an active war zone. It is this world of consumption and comfort that Lair, an assistant professor of history at George Mason University, examines in her book.

First, Lair discusses the variety of experiences that soldiers encountered in Vietnam, especially the divide between frontline combat “grunts” and noncombat rear-echelon troops, who mostly stayed on large, fortified, and heavily defended semipermanent bases. Long Binh eventually housed over 60,000 troops who often found their experience at the base to be “mostly sedentary and routine, leaving plenty of downtime” (p. 32). The post soon came to reflect a stateside garrison more than a combat outpost. By 1972, the author writes, Long Binh's amenities included 81 basketball courts, 64 volleyball courts, 12 swimming pools, an amphitheater, a base newspaper, a go-cart track, and an open mess club system of 40 separate bars. Unlike many support troops, combat soldiers encountered these amenities transitionally, as they rotated in and out of theater or to and from the hospital. These experiential discrepancies generated tension between combat and noncombat troops. Grunts often resented the rear-area life in which noncombat troops received the same pay, a higher standard of living, access to recreational facilities, and lacked regular exposure to danger. For many support troops working

in offices or warehouses, service in Vietnam adopted a workaday feeling in which the war often seemed more of an abstraction than a reality.

This rear-area lifestyle contrasted sharply with soldiers' expectations. Shaped by popular culture, many rear-area soldiers perceived war as sacrifice and hardship. Instead, Lair writes, they were surprised to find that in Vietnam they could access many of the same goods and services that they had come to expect at home. Installations at places such as Bien Hoa and Long Binh offered excellent food choices, such as hamburgers, fresh fruit, and cake for dessert. In addition to abundant food, soldiers at the major bases often lived in permanent or semipermanent lodging facilities. Living spaces evolved from tents to barracks with showers, bunk beds, and bathrooms, contributing to a relatively comfortable war experience.

Comfort, however, often led to boredom. To fight this, the military provided recreational outlets, in what the author calls a “total war on boredom” (p. 108). Intended to relieve soldiers from the rigors of combat duty, the military's rest and recuperation (R&R) program also reduced the monotony of life on the big bases. Participating soldiers had the opportunity to travel to Bangkok, Taipei, or, at the program's height, Hawaii, Tokyo, and Sydney. According to Lair, by 1970, almost 17,000 soldiers were on R&R each month. In addition to the formal R&R program, the military organized Armed Forces Vietnam Network television and radio broadcasts, United Services Organization (USO) shows, and even education centers in which soldiers could enroll in college classes or earn a master's degree. The author also describes the dark side of entertainment, in which open mess clubs—which by 1969 numbered over 2,000—provided an outlet in which soldiers could eat, watch live entertainment, and drink their cares away with plentiful stores of alcohol. In Lair's view, open mess clubs spoke “to the desires and tastes of American servicemen in Vietnam: to

get drunk, eat hamburgers, listen to Western music, and ogle half-naked women” (p. 135).

The desire to furnish soldiers with comfortable surroundings and entertainment reflected the Vietnam War’s cultural context. The author writes that soldiers embodied American society, in which the post-World War II economic boom fueled a thriving consumer culture. In Vietnam, the military used this consumerism to its advantage, providing luxury goods to induce soldiers’ compliance during an unpopular war. In this sense, material abundance was meant to improve morale and, therefore, soldiers’ efficiency and effectiveness. The key aspect of this consumerism was the Post Exchange (PX) system. Vietnam marked the first time that PXs were physically located in an active combat zone. Some of these stores were as small as a shipping container; others, such as the PX at Long Binh, grew to 10,000 square feet of retail space. PXs sold everything from refrigerators, fans, radios, televisions, magazines, soft drinks, cameras, and movie projectors, and operated like a corporation. Managers maximized profits, promoted their products

through advertising, and sought to extend services to the more isolated fighting areas. Lair describes one “mobile PX” that traveled between Con Thien and Dong Ha once a week, selling merchandise along the way despite Viet Cong ambushes. To the author, soldiers’ service in Vietnam became a consumption opportunity that the troops embraced: PX sales, not including concessions, grew to over \$400 million in 1970 alone.

Comfort, consumption, and recreation—the elements of material abundance—served to insulate many soldiers from the war’s daily violence. Lair argues that the U.S. military authorized the creation of this combat zone consumer culture to improve soldiers’ morale, but for many soldiers this comfortable environment of isolation from danger contrasted so sharply with their expectations of sacrifice and hardship that they had trouble finding meaning in their experience. The author finds that “by 1970, life on the big bases was so distorted from what soldiers had expected to find in Vietnam that they referred to both the conflict and the pettiness of rearward life as ‘the Mickey Mouse war’”

(p. 100). In this respect, the war’s absurd and surreal aspects emerge through soldiers’ interactions with material abundance.

Although this affluence followed American soldiers to Vietnam—and to Afghanistan and Iraq, as Lair makes clear in her epilogue—scholars have largely neglected this aspect of the war. Fluidly written and exhaustively researched, *Armed with Abundance* fills this gap, placing comfort, consumerism, and recreation at the heart of the American experience in Vietnam. Readers interested in twentieth-century American cultural history or the Vietnam War will find that this book breaks new ground in both areas of scholarship.

Capt. Brian Drohan is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill and an instructor with the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy. He is also a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and served three overseas tours in the Middle East and South Asia.



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CAREER PROGRAM 61



PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Thanks to funds granted by the G-3/5/7, more training, education, and occupational development opportunities than ever before are available to Career Program (CP) 61 professionals. In fiscal year 2015, CP 61 is offering funds for travel, lodging, and per diem for four in-house training courses and four selected professional conferences. In addition, the program may be able to finance a few master's and even Ph.D. degrees in a job-related field. If you need additional professional credentials, then consider beginning the process to obtain your master's in history, museum studies, archival science, or even your Ph.D. If you are new to the Army history program, you should certainly apply for the New Historians, Archivists, and Museum Professionals (HAMPs) Orientation Course. You should also register to attend the Army Historians Training Symposium and the Society for Military History conference. *See the table for details of upcoming events.*

2015 DATES	TRAINING-EDUCATION-DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES	# OF STUDENTS
9–15 Feb.	New HAMPs Orientation Course	12
09–12 Apr.	Conference: Society for Military History (Montgomery)	4
13–17 Apr.	Basic Museum Training Course	20
26–29 Apr.	Conference: American Alliance of Museums (Atlanta)	4
15–19 Jun.	Advanced Museum Training Course	30
27–30 Jul.	Army Historians Training Symposium	50
16–22 Aug.	Conference: Society of American Archivists (Cleveland)	4
All Year Long	Campbell Center for Historic Preservation Studies	3
All Year Long	Professional Developmental Assignments TDY	5
All Year Long	Master's or Ph.D. degrees	2
		TOTAL: 134

Notices for courses and professional development temporary duty assignments (TDYs) will be released throughout the fiscal year. Applications for academic degrees are accepted at any time but require Office of the Secretary of the Army approval and a 60-day lead time. These degrees are serious commitments and have complicated application processes, so, if you are interested, start thinking about them now. Questions on how to apply for funding for all opportunities should be addressed to the CP 61 Program Manager, Mr. Ed Clarke, at edward.c.clarke.civ@mail.mil or 202-685-2798.

both are under attack by the ever-present bean counters and trimmers. You know they're out there!

Finally, with the institution of our new Career Program (CP 61 for all Historians, Archivists, and Museum Professionals (the subject of many of my past Chief Historian's Footnotes) we are seeing an ever-expanding world of professional development opportunities. These include chances to attend formal academic courses, travel to developmental assignments, and (gasp) perhaps even go to selected professional conferences again! These activities will only increase over the next few years as we gain additional funding and support. The only real limitation will be the imagination and drive of our career professionals and their supervisors and the inevitable administration and paperwork new programs and opportunities always seem to bring.

As part of the Army History Program's continued commitment to career development, I want to ensure that *all* Army historical professionals put the Army Historians Training Symposium (formerly the Conference of Army Historians) on their calendars for this year. We plan to meet here in D.C. the last week in July with panels, workshops, and other professional opportunities. We are working hard to arrange the venue for the symposium and attempting to gain extended funding so that more historians can attend it. It is the most important biennial professional development event in which Army historians can be involved, and I encourage your active participation. Mark it on your calendars today!

The Center and the Career Program are also committed to supporting the professional development of our museum

counterparts. Both the Basic and Advanced Museum Training Courses will be offered again this year, tentatively scheduled for April and June, so have your curator and museum specialist friends apply for that training when it is announced. And another Orientation Course is being planned for February for all our new members of the Career Program. Almost 20 percent of the CP 61 workforce participated in some form of professional development event or training last fiscal year, and I would like at least another 20 percent to take part this year. I urge you all to look upon these activities as long-term career-building opportunities and as a necessary functional complement to the important leadership training available from the Civilian Education System.

In closing, I am looking forward to working with each and every one of the members of the Army History Program over the next few months as your Chief of Military History. The Army will be going through some tough times in the near future as both money and personnel continue to be cut. Together we can make the Army realize that it needs us in these difficult times, now more than ever. Remember, we provide the Army a unique resource: a commitment and focus on the past to help guide the future. Let's all recommit ourselves to give the Army the best support we can, united by our love of the past and our love of the Army.

As always, I can be reached at richard.w.stewart2.civ@mail.mil.



ARMYHISTORY

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

Army History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army's history extends to the present day, and *Army History* seeks accounts of the Army's actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, preferably embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. Preferably, a manuscript should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and artworks to enable *Army History* to obtain permission to reproduce the images.

Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images by mail to Bryan Hockensmith, Managing Editor, *Army History*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5060.



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