

ARMY HISTORY

Spring 2015

PB 20-15-2 (No. 95) Washington, D.C.

IN THIS ISSUE

“Gone Blooey”
Pershing’s System for
Addressing Officer
Incompetence and
Inefficiency

By Richard S. Faulkner

6

Lee at Antietam
Strategic Imperatives, the
Tyranny of Arithmetic, and
a Trap Not Sprung

By Steven W. Knott

32

U.S. Army Art Spotlight

26

ARMY HISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O'KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Acting Chief of Military History
Richard W. Stewart, Ph.D.

Managing Editor
Bryan J. Hockensmith

Editor
Diane Sedore Arms

Layout and Design
Michael R. Gill

Consulting Historian
Brian F. Newmann
Mark L. Bradley

The U.S. Army Center of Military History publishes *Army History* (ISSN 1546-5330) quarterly for the professional development of Army historians and as Army educational and training literature. The bulletin is available at no cost to interested Army officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers, and civilian employees, as well as to individuals and offices that directly support Army historical work or Army educational and training programs.

Correspondence, including requests to be added to the distribution of free copies or to submit articles, should be addressed to Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Ave., Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319-5060, or sent by e-mail to usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

Those individuals and institutions that do not qualify for free copies may opt for paid subscriptions from the U.S. Government Printing Office. The cost of a subscription is \$20 per year. Order by title and enter List ID as ARHIS. To order online, go to <http://bookstore.gpo.gov>. To order by phone, call toll free 866-512-1800, or in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, 202-512-1800; by fax, 202-512-2104; or by e-mail, contactcenter@gpo.gov. Send mail orders to U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 979050, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000.

The opinions expressed in *Army History* are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its constituent elements. The bulletin's contents do not necessarily reflect official Army positions and do not supersede information in other official Army publications or Army regulations. The bulletin is approved for official dissemination of material to keep the Army knowledgeable of developments in Army history and to enhance professional development. The Department of the Army approved the use of funds for printing this publication on 7 September 1983.

The reproduction of images not obtained from federal sources is prohibited.

Front Cover Image: Samuel Johnson Woolf, *Battle Scene*, oil on canvas, 1918

Back Cover Image: Samuel Johnson Woolf, *A Trench Ambulance on the Firing Line*, oil on canvas, 1918

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In this Spring 2015 issue of *Army History*, we feature two excellent articles covering very different topics. The first article, by award-winning World War I historian Richard S. Faulkner, examines the officer reclassification and removal system instituted by General John J. Pershing to deal with the problem of inefficient and incompetent leaders in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). Part of the rapid growth of the U.S. Army as it entered World War I was a massive influx of officers from the National Guard, National Army, and the newly established Officer Training Camp system. Many of these officers arrived without the suitable, or realistic, training they would need to face the challenges of the Western Front. By scrutinizing those sent before these reclassification boards and why, Faulkner hopes to illuminate exactly what was expected from these wartime junior officers by their Regular Army counterparts and to expose the command climate these boards created within the AEF.

The second article, by retired Navy officer Steven W. Knott, argues that General Robert E. Lee's decision to fight at the Battle of Antietam was part of his plan to draw the Army of the Potomac into a trap and destroy it in a battle of annihilation, much like Napoleon at the Battle of Austerlitz against the combined Austrian and Russian armies. Knott studies the deployment of Lee's forces on the first day of the battle and shows how the alignment of the Confederate forces was meant to funnel Union forces into Lee's waiting ambush. However, the numbers were not on Lee's side as the troops detailed to spring the intended trap were instead required as reinforcements simply to hold the Confederate line.


This issue also includes an Army Art Spotlight on the World War I paintings of Samuel Johnson Woolf, many of which are published here for the first time. Additionally, there are comments from the chief of military history on the state of the Center of Military History, and a number of excellent book reviews.

I invite our readers to continue to submit articles on the history of the Army, and land warfare in general, and welcome comments and opinions about this publication and its contents.


Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor



Spring 2015



Features




- 4 **Chief's Corner**
- 26 **U.S. Army Art Spotlight**
- 41 **Book Reviews**
- 51 **News Notes**

Articles

6

**"GONE BLOOEY"
PERSHING'S SYSTEM FOR
ADDRESSING OFFICER
INCOMPETENCE AND
INEFFICIENCY**


By RICHARD S. FAULKNER



32

**LEE AT
ANTIETAM
STRATEGIC
IMPERATIVES,
THE TYRANNY OF
ARITHMETIC, AND A
TRAP NOT SPRUNG**

By STEVEN W. KNOTT





THE CHIEF'S CORNER

DR. RICHARD W. STEWART

The State of the Center

Every year the President of the United States appears before a joint session of Congress to report on the State of the Union. (As I write this President Obama has just completed his penultimate such presentation.) The report follows certain customs including a ceremonial entrance, the shaking of the hands down the aisle, the regular and extravagant applause during the speech from the President's own party and the stony silence of the opposition, the impossible policy initiatives, the shout-outs to carefully placed exemplars of virtue in the audience, and the subsequent denunciation by an opposition spokesman of everything said. All very ritualized and mostly lacking in substance.

Well, this Chief's Corner on the State of the Center of Military History (CMH) is almost completely different. There is no wild applause, no ceremony, and certainly no chance for an opposition spokesman to denounce the contents! What is the same is the attempt to summarize the achievements of 2014 and chart, however vaguely, prospects for the year ahead. Much of the latter was covered in my last Chief's Corner, so I would like to concentrate on the accomplishments of the Center of Military History during this past year so that we can all take stock of what we have done for our Army lately. It is always good, in the press of current taskings and operations, to reflect occasionally on all that we have achieved, often despite insufficient resources. It helps keep one focused and positive. We *are* making a difference and while the Center of Military History is not the entire Army History Program, it is the central pillar of the Army's program to learn from its past and chronicle its activities.

To provide the bottom line up front in the best Army fashion, we have had a truly outstanding year here at CMH. In part, this was because of what didn't happen. We did *not* take severe personnel cuts as a result of the Focused Area Review Group (or FARG), which was a subset of the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Transformation initiative of the past two years. We also did *not* get moved out of HQDA and assigned lower down the food chain. Both of these facts are important to accomplish our

missions. We need sufficiently talented people to achieve our goals, and we need to be placed properly in the Army hierarchy so that we can set policy and offer guidance to the entire Army History Program (AHP). That would be highly problematic if we were no longer an HQDA Field Operating Agency. So because of what did *not* happen, we continued to fulfill our responsibilities of producing Army histories, keeping the Army's lineage and honors, providing information papers on Army issues to help Army decision makers, designing exhibits, running museums, and furnishing essential policy guidance for the AHP. Despite this almost ceaseless transformation and reorganization confusion at HQDA, we have continued to excel in our missions.

The following are just a few of the major accomplishments of the past year:

We managed to reinstate the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Subcommittee (now a subcommittee to the Army Education Advisory Committee) or DAHASC. This was a multiyear effort that will continue to bring this important group of Army historians and civilian scholars annually to the Center to supply an objective outside view of our publications and programs.

Career Program 61's initial operating year was a strong one. We have offered our first orientation course for all historians, archivists, and museum professionals. We have also held a basic and an advanced museum course as well as provided several competitive developmental assignments. We hired our first two Presidential Management Fellows this year and laid the groundwork for bringing in four new career interns for eventual placement throughout the Army. I expect more professional development opportunities in the year ahead with an expanded budget and a revised Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS) to guide us.

Our Field Programs and Historical Services Division (FP) had a terrific year in a number of ways. First, it provided close and continuous support to Army leaders as they made force management decisions, inactivated units, reflagged units, and determined which lineages and honors

go with which units. FP historians have also tried their best to preserve the integrity of the regimental system to ensure that the rules of Army lineage are maintained to the extent possible in order to provide a firm basis for future decisions. Along the way they helped coordinate the important addition of a streamer for Operation RESTORE HOPE, the 1990s intervention in the famine and political chaos of Somalia, to the flag of the U.S. Army as a named Army expedition. A mission that involved thousands of troops and consisted of major humanitarian and combat missions, which included the award of the first Medals of Honor since Vietnam, deserved no less.

Second, FP also spent a great deal of time and money collecting Army operational records on recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has been no secret that for the past decade the Army records management system has not operated as intended and let thousands of documents disappear to the long-term detriment of veterans of those operations, historians who will require that material to write the histories, and the American people. Grasping the nettle, FP responded diligently to a directive from the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) and the Secretary of the Army to locate as many of those documents as possible, organize them, and prepare them for transfer to Army records managers and, eventually, to the National Archives. Even though records management has never been our responsibility, CMH, spear-headed by FP, has done yeoman's work to find almost 100 additional terabytes of operational documents (our Military History Detachments had captured dozens of terabytes on their own) and develop the software and hardware systems to organize and make the collection searchable. Our Army, our nation, and the entire historical community owe the archivists and historians of FP a great debt of gratitude for their work.

Histories Division (HD) has also had an excellent year, not just with the continuing success of *Army History* magazine (which gets better with every issue), but also with the publication of a series of highly regarded commemorative pamphlets on the campaigns of the Civil War and the War of 1812. The sesquicentennial and bicentennial, respectively, of these two major events in American history demanded quality short publications with great maps, consistent formats, and clear narratives. And that is what HD delivered. We hope that similar high-quality pamphlets are produced for the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the Vietnam War, for the centennial of World War I, and, eventually, for every campaign streamer on the Army flag. We are well on the way! HD accomplished this feat while writing the official histories of the Army, providing top-notch information papers to Army leaders on a variety of subjects, and playing host to a major CSA initiative to prepare an interim study of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM within the next two years.

Museum Division (MD) has perhaps been the busiest division of all. First, the Museum Support Center (MSC) has garnered outstanding publicity lately, and the word is out about what a great facility it is. Requests to visit it have expanded exponentially. In addition, several new collections of historical art and artifacts have begun arriving at the MSC,

including twenty-three truly unique World War I paintings by artist Samuel J. Woolf. MD has also managed to establish a close relationship with the Program Executive Office–Soldier and thus arrange for recent equipment prototypes, and other research and development materials, to be transferred to the museum system on a regular basis. This, plus a new proposal to institute a systematic way to retire soldier uniforms and equipment from operational theaters, will go a long way to ensure that our museum collection captures current uniforms and equipment for future exhibits.

Most important, MD has stepped up to the plate and begun, thanks to a huge influx of end-of-year funds courtesy of the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, to execute a host of contracts to plan for new exhibits for the warfighter (former U.S. Army Forces Command) museums. With only a handful of exhibit experts, MD is working with contactors on design and fabrication to bring the displays of many of our museums into the twenty-first century with contemporary lighting, fresh mountings, and modern cases. These renovations are long overdue and will allow our museums to highlight their valuable artifacts while ensuring they are better preserved for future generations. There are already plans afoot to expand this program by building museum support facilities at major artifact centers and to supply funding for even more museums to upgrade their exhibits.

Finally, as the year came to a close, we began receiving news of a new and exciting proposal by the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) to become more actively engaged with the Army Historical Foundation and commit itself, as an organization, with its tremendous assets, to build the National Museum of the U.S. Army. This long-awaited project has been on the back burner in recent years due to challenges in raising the necessary private funds to start construction. All this will now change with AUSA's pledge to open the National Museum by 2019. The Army history community stands ready to support this ambitious plan, and this time, if I may be so bold as to make a prediction (historians being generally reluctant to do so), I believe this will actually happen. We will have a National Museum, sooner rather than later.


So, it has been a great year for the Center of Military History, and I have to report that overall the "State of the Center" is solid. I expect this will continue to be the case despite regular challenges of budget and manpower cuts along with the perpetual and often quite bizarre HQDA re-organizational schemes. So, regardless of the issues, we will maintain production of top-quality histories and provide the best historical and museum services to the U.S. Army in 2015. Go ahead and take a moment to savor our successes and the other triumphs throughout the AHP. Okay? Are we done? So, now the moment is over. Let's all get back to work!

As always, I can be reached at richard.w.stewart2.civ@mail.mil.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Richard S. Faulkner teaches military history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He spent twenty-three years in the Army as an armor officer. During his time in service, he commanded a tank company during Operation DESERT STORM and taught American history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He received a Ph.D. in American history from Kansas State University. He is the author of *The School of Hard Knocks: Combat Leadership in the American Expeditionary Forces* (College Station, Tex., 2012), which was the recipient of the Society for Military History's 2013 Distinguished Book Award.



General Pershing



"Gone Blooey"

Pershing's System for Addressing Officer Incompetence and Inefficiency

BY RICHARD S. FAULKNER

John J. Pershing was a hard man, not predisposed to suffer fools lightly. He was exacting in his expectations of efficiency and discipline and strictly weighed the ability of his subordinates to achieve results on and off the battlefield. Maj. Gen. Robert Bullard noted that when Pershing arrived at the front, he was often "good-humored" and "agreeable" but "underneath his easy manner was inexorable ruin to the commander who did not have things right. He shows the least personal feeling of all the commanders that I have ever known, and never spares the incompetent."¹ Like many of the American officers of their generation, Pershing and Bullard had been imbued with the professionalizing ethic that had slowly but steadily emerged within the Regular

Army from the 1870s to 1916. As they embraced the reforms and thoughts of Emory Upton, J. Franklin Bell, and Arthur L. Wagner, Pershing and his peers became increasingly intolerant of the amateurism that they believed had hobbled American military endeavors over the course of the republic's history. This drive was also reinforced by the Army's lackluster performance during the Spanish-American War and the Mexican Punitive Expedition. Upon taking command of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), Pershing understood the grave challenges that he faced in transforming America's small constabulary army into a force able to wage a massive and modern attritional war. Given the stakes involved, Pershing simply had no patience for any officer, no matter

what rank, who failed to live up to his rigorous standards of conduct, leadership, and know-how.

Unfortunately, Pershing's suspicions were quickly confirmed that getting the officer cadre that he wanted was not going to be an easy task. Soon after the United States entered World War I, military planners estimated that the Army would need over 200,000 officers to lead its draftee legions. However, in April 1917, the Regular Army had only 5,791 officers on its active rolls and could call on merely 3,199 additional officers from the National Guard.² The Army's solution to this shortfall was to establish a series of three-month-long Officer Training Camps (OTCs) to train and commission suitable candidates. Due to the ad hoc and haphazard nature of the American mobilization



Library of Congress

Robert Bullard, shown here as a lieutenant general, c. late 1918

and the Army's own lack of preparedness for waging a large-scale war, all too often the OTCs lacked the time, resources, and doctrinal focus to give candidates the realistic training they needed to face the challenges of the Western Front. The imperfect OTC system ultimately provided over 74 percent of the officers commissioned during the war and two-thirds of the Army's line officers.³

As the AEF entered combat in the winter and spring of 1918, the shortcuts that the Army had taken to produce its officer corps became glaringly obvious to Pershing and his senior commanders. Not only had a number of the OTC "90-Day Wonders" failed to live up to the AEF's expectations, but some Regular Army and National Guard officers had also stumbled when exercising their wartime duties and responsibilities. Faced with the looming challenge of assuming its own sector of the front, the AEF had to establish a method for identifying and weeding-out those officers it deemed unfit,

unsuited, or incompetent to perform the duties assigned.

On 16 November 1917, Pershing issued General Orders 62 directing commanders at the division level and higher to establish local boards for the "examination of officers who have demonstrated their unfitness." The order instructed that "commanders will observe closely the suitability and fitness of provisional and temporary officers under their commands and will report promptly . . . any officer who is not satisfactory for continuance in the service."⁴ However, the senior headquarters staffs soon reported that these improvised boards were burdensome to the senior officers appointed to serve at the hearings and were too much of a distraction from their units' training and operations. Furthermore, the early boards were limited to only recommending that either the officer be retained in his present rank and position or that he be returned to the United States for discharge. Given the Army's overall shortage of officers, it made little sense to deprive the AEF of men who, while failing as combat leaders, could serve well as officers in ever-expanding staff positions and the Services of Supply (SOS).

To address the worst of these problems, Pershing established standing reclassification and efficiency boards as part of the Casual Officers' Depot at Blois, France, in March 1918. These boards operated under the guidance of the existing AEF General Orders 62, as well as new guidelines established on 25 March 1918 in AEF General Orders 45.⁵ On 11 April 1918 the AEF's adjutant general, Brig. Gen. Benjamin Alvord, further authorized that, "when it is apparent that an officer, who has been ordered discharged, can be of use as a commissioned officer with [the] S.O.S. you are authorized to suspend the actual discharge." In addition to assigning the officer to the SOS, the boards could now also recommend that he be returned to a combat assignment in another unit, be sent to an AEF school or depot detachment for additional training, or be demoted to a grade more commensurate with his level of experience and performance. However, if the board determined that the officer's "value to the service in any grade or capacity was



Library of Congress

Benjamin Alvord, shown here as a colonel, c. 1920

questionable," he could then be sent back to the United States for discharge.⁶

Although the Army had held boards to weed out unfit and surplus officers after the Civil War and the Philippine Insurrection, the establishment of a standing wartime process to judge the fitness of officers was a novel idea for the United States Army in World War I. This departure reflected both the realities of an unprecedented mass mobilization as well as the coming of age of American military professionalism. More than ever before, the Army insisted on the need to police its own ranks of those members of the officer corps who failed (or appeared to fail) to meet its standards of conduct and performance. By studying which officers the AEF's senior commanders sent before reclassification boards and the reasons the suspect officers were boarded, an appreciation can be gained of some of the overall impediments the AEF faced during the war, as well as insights into the skills, abilities, and character that Pershing and his generals expected their subordinate



leaders to possess. An examination of the reclassification system also provides a window into the AEF's overall command culture and climate.

While it was clear that the AEF took the issue of officer incompetence seriously, it is somewhat difficult to establish the exact number of officers that were sent for reclassification. There are discrepancies between the number the AEF "officially" recorded as having

appeared before reclassification or efficiency boards and the actual number of officers that it boarded. According to the final report of the reclassification center published by the deputy chief of staff for the SOS on 15 May 1919, 1,351 officers appeared before reclassification or efficiency boards at Blois due to questionable conduct or performance.⁷ But this figure does not match the number of records at


the National Archives for the individual boards conducted at Blois, and thus the real number of officers sent for reclassification was much higher than this "official" number. For example, while there are records for 50 African American infantry officers in the grades of major through second lieutenant in the case files of the Blois Reclassification Depot, only 31 of these officers are listed (and thus counted)

A wartime photo of Blois, France, which shows part of the AEF Base Hospital No. 43 in the foreground.

in the May 1919 final report. Furthermore, the National Archives holds a file of “proposed eliminations for inefficiency” that contains the record briefs for an additional 349 officers. Of the 349 officers who appeared before these boards, only 46 had case files in the Blois records or were listed in the Casual Officers’ Depot final report.⁸

Furthermore, on 18 December 1918, the AEF General Headquarters (GHQ) established an additional officers’ reclassification depot at Gondrecourt. This new depot was only to process cases of combat officers needing to be reassigned or reclassified, while Blois would hold boards just for officers in the SOS and staff agencies. By the time the Combat Officers’ Depot at Gondrecourt closed on 30 April 1919, it had received 3,500 officers for reclassification. Unfortunately, it is unclear from the available records if these officers were boarded due to incompetence, physical disability, or merely administrative reasons. Based on the Blois experience, it is safe to assume that many of those appearing before the Gondrecourt boards were there because of some failing. Due to the backlog and the unsettled state of affairs after the Armistice, Gondrecourt only reclassified 161 officers.⁹

By gathering data from the known cases in the Blois final report, the “proposed eliminations for inefficiency” list, the individual case records from Blois, and the completed boards from Gondrecourt, a conservative estimate of the number of officers sent to AEF efficiency boards is 1,870. In the larger scheme of things, this number of officers is rather small. Col. John P. McAdams, the SOS deputy chief of staff, calculated that roughly 82,000 officers served in the AEF from 1917 through May 1919.¹⁰ Based on the estimate of 1,870, only 2 percent of the AEF’s commissioned ranks were boarded during the war. However, as will be seen, these miniscule numbers did not accurately represent the pow-



erful influence that the reclassification system had over the officer corps and the command climate in the AEF.

So what kind of officer was likely to be sent to Blois? Using 82,000 as the number of officers who served in the AEF, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions as to whether any group within the Army was more prone to be reclassified than others. *Table 1* illustrates the number and percentage of officers sent to Blois by rank and their source of commission. Because roughly 74 percent of line officers were graduates of wartime OTCs, it seems that this group was underrepresented in the reclassification boards. On 7 August 1918, the Army adjutant general estimated that there were approximately 17,000 National Guard officers in federal service. Even if every guardsman was serving in the AEF, which was never the case, the Guard still would have constituted only 20 percent of Pershing’s officer corps. Thus, National Guard officers in the rank of major, captain, and first lieutenant were sent to Blois at a rate greater than their overall numbers in the AEF would merit. McAdams further computed that 5,000 regular officers (including those with provisional regular commissions) served in the AEF.¹¹ This meant that regulars made up only 6.2 percent of Pershing’s officer corps and



Colonel McAdams, c. 1936

were thus slightly overrepresented in the Blois reclassifications.¹²

What accounted for the overrepresentation of National Guard and regular officers in the reclassifications? During and after the war, some guardsmen maintained that their Regular Army superiors had embarked on a wartime witch hunt of the citizen-soldiers. For example, Col. Frank Hume, the commander of the 103d Infantry, asserted that “the high command [was] never considered too friendly to National Guard officers” and looked for any reason to remove

TABLE 1: OFFICERS SENT TO BLOIS BY RANK AND SOURCE OF COMMISSION

Rank \ Commission Source	Regular Army	Regular Army (Provisional)*	National Guard	National Army (OTC, COTS, etc.)**
Brigadier General	10	0	2	0
Colonel	33	0	21	0
Lieutenant Colonel	23	0	24	4
Major	24	2	88	59
Captain	8	45	140	161
1st Lieutenant	0	27	130	237
2d Lieutenant	0	8	69	248
Total & Percent	98 (7.2%)	82 (6%)	474 (34.8%)	709 (52%)

*A regular officer with a provisional commission was generally someone who applied for entry into the regulars and was granted a conditional commission that would become permanent if the officer's performance was exemplary.

** Central Army Training Schools (COTS).

Note: This table does not include the seven Marine Corps officers and one Navy officer sent to Blois, nor are these men counted in the table's percentages.

Source: Rpt, Dep Ch of Staff, SOS, 15 May 1919, sub: The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. (Blois), table 1, box 2257, Entry 465, Reclassification System Combat Officers' Depot, Record Group (RG) 120, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. (NADC).

Guard officers from command.¹³ The 140th Infantry's Capt. Evan Edwards further complained,

We are told that no word should be spoken that criticizes the individual Regular Army officer. But the National Guard officer was criticized—stamped by an efficiency board as incompetent or not fully efficient, and the reasons named. Sometimes they were not even named.¹⁴

The figures from Blois give some credence to this view. While many National Guard officers certainly merited reclassification, the Blois case files do indicate that the attitudes of the regular officers who oversaw the board's proceedings were colored by deep-seated prejudices against the guardsmen.

The anti-National Guard bias among the regulars was evident by the comments that the Blois personnel adjutant annotated in the boarded officer's record brief. The adjutant was responsible for conducting interviews of officers prior to the boards to fill in information absent from the reclassification packets



Colonel Hume

and to provide the board members with a preview of the accused officer's side of the story. His comments demonstrate that he was far from a dispassionate observer when it came to citizen-soldiers. For example, he informed the board that 1st Lt. Montgomery Ridgely, was, "a typical N[at]ionall G[ua]rd Officer of the undesirable type, [who] lacks leadership and the power of discipline."¹⁵ The old regular opined that Ohio



Evan Edwards, shown here as a first lieutenant and chaplain, c. 1917

guardsman Capt. Arthur Wicks owed his position and "earning capacity" to being "a mixer" with political pull, and was "unwarranted as [a] Capt[ain] in [the] line."¹⁶ These remarks reflect some regulars' unshakable beliefs that the guardsmen were nothing more than military dilettantes who owed their positions to the dirty arts of political cronyism.

When examining who from the Regular Army was sent for reclassification, the case is a bit more complicated. While the reclassifications tended to fall heaviest on officers below the rank of lieutenant colonel for the National Army and National Guard, nearly 68 percent of the Regular Army officers sent to Blois were lieutenant colonels or higher. McAdams explained that this was due to the fact that “the differences in the standards of efficiency expected, naturally result[ed] in higher commanders being much more exacting in their requirements of regular officers than of temporary officers performing similar duties.”¹⁷

Although regulars in the more senior ranks were more likely than others to be reclassified, they did benefit from their status. It was rare for the Blois boards to recommend that an officer under investigation be returned to duty with a combat unit. Of the 1,363 officers that McAdams listed as boarded at Blois, the boards restored only 150 to combat duty. However, while merely 11 percent of the National Guard and National Army officers sent to Blois ever returned to combat units, nearly 25 percent of the boarded regular officers were posted back to combat assignments. While this action did represent the regulars’ desires to “take care of their own,” McAdams was correct in noting, “The fact that better material was not available to replace them had a great deal to do with the policy of giving an officer a second trial in another division.” He also maintained that those reprieved from dishonor at Blois profited by the experience and redoubled their efforts to correct their failings and pointed out that just 5 percent of the officers who rejoined combat units “were again found wanting.”¹⁸

If the efficiency boards sometimes favored Regular Army officers, other aspects of their operations also seemed to have questioned the fairness of the system. The efficiency boards often received incomplete packets or only vague descriptions of why the officers were being sent to Blois. Compounding this problem was the failure of the members of the relieved officer’s chain of command to inform him of

the reasons that he was being removed from his unit. The Gondrecourt depot commander noted that, in some cases, “officers appeared at the depot knowing that they were going before the boards, but not knowing the reason for their being relieved. In a few cases the officers did not know until they appeared before the board that their services had been unsatisfactory.”¹⁹ This was the case with 2d Lt. Robert Hay, who claimed that his relief came as a complete surprise because he “was informed by [his] captain and major that [his] work was satisfactory.”²⁰ In a similar vein, 1st Lt. Evan Lindsey asserted that not only did he not know why he was sent to Blois, but that the move astonished both his company and battalion commanders.²¹

In his June 1919 report on the reclassification system, Brig. Gen. Wilson Burt stated that “very few cases, if any, occurred where officers were relieved from command upon snap judgment, for pique, spite, or any other ulterior motive on the part of the superior whose order it was.”²² A number of the officers who went through the Blois mill would not have agreed with Burt’s assessment, and their case files reveal that they were cashiered for the all-too-human reasons of personality clashes or personal animus. Capt. Gordon Lawson of the 36th Division’s 143d Infantry maintained that he had testified against his colonel for being “yellow,” and after the colonel was exonerated of the charge, he knew that “it was only a matter of time before he would be canned.”²³ Capt. Edwin York asserted that he had long-standing problems with his superior dating back to an incident in Texas when York had been assigned to check the officer’s accounts and had reported them “confused.” The captain had also grown tired of always being “hounded” by his superior and had been seeking a transfer when he was ordered to Blois.²⁴ First Lt. Edward Dewey’s run-in with his commander was of an even more personal nature. Dewey claimed that his relief followed shortly after he “had the Colonel’s ‘lady friend’ out the night the Colonel had a date with her.” He insisted that his superior cashiered him to remove a

potential rival for the lady’s affection.²⁵

An analysis of the number of officers sent to Blois by division further illustrates that the removal of an officer was guided more by the individual commander’s idiosyncratic vision of “good and bad” leadership rather than any objective standard.²⁶ Although the 37th Division had the dubious distinction of sending the largest number of infantry officers for reclassification, its mobilization and training differed little from units that sent far fewer officers to Blois. As a point of comparison, the 82d Division, whose time and combat experience in France was greater than that of the 37th Division, sent only three officers to Blois during its time in France. The sad fact was that lacking a set expectation of officership some divisions and regiments simply “ate their young” at a greater rate than others.

Having examined the operation and some of the shortcomings of the reclassification system, the next question is who were commanders sending to Blois? Although the depot dealt with the cases of officers from all the various staff, command, and support positions across the AEF, officers from combat units made up the bulk of those who were boarded. In fact, only 83 officers were sent to Blois from the vast expanse of the SOS. Ultimately, infantrymen, artillerymen, and aviators alone accounted for three-quarters of all reclassifications. Nearly 44 percent of all the Blois boards involved infantry officers, and this branch made up the largest number of men sent by any single arm of service. Artillerymen were a distant second, comprising over 23 percent of all reclassifications.²⁷

Given the rising importance of technology in warfare, there was often a direct correlation between the specific expectations and demands of the officer’s branch of service (especially the more technical ones) and his reclassification. In April 1918, the AEF GHQ directed that officers who flunked out of AEF or allied schools would be considered unfit to serve in their respective branches and were to be sent to Blois for reclassification.²⁸ This school provision fell hardest on artillerymen and aviators. For example,

TABLE 2: SOURCE OF COMMISSION FOR NATIONAL GUARD AND NATIONAL ARMY RECLASSIFIED INFANTRY OFFICERS BY RANK

Source of Commission \ Rank	Major (Number and %)	Captain (Number and %)	1st Lieutenant (Number and %)	2d Lieutenant (Number and %)
National Guard	56 (72.7%)	97 (58.4%)	64 (42.3%)	35 (29%)
OTC	19* (24.7%)	68 (41%)	85* (56.3%)	83 (68.6%)
Direct Commission**	1 (1.3%)	0	1 (.7%)	1 (.8%)
Unknown	1 (1.3%)	1 (.6%)	1 (.7%)	2 (1.6%)

*Includes one National Guard officer who attended an OTC.

**All were former Regular Army noncommissioned officers promoted from the ranks.

Source: The information in this table came from the individual case reports of infantry officers at the rank of major through second lieutenant, in boxes 2286–2319, Entry 541, Reclassified Officers National Army and National Guard Blois (hereafter cited as Blois Case Files), RG 120, NADC.

of the 318 records for National Guard and National Army artillerymen in the ranks of major through second lieutenant in the Blois case files, over half were sent for reclassification due to their failure at the field artillery schools or after demonstrating that they could not master the technical and mathematical skills required of modern artillery service.

The Air Service also placed much emphasis on the technical proficiency of its officers. It had no place for officers who struggled with the requirements of its ground schools or flight tests. Although 1st Lt. Powhatan Clarke had twenty flying hours in the United States before arriving in France, he found that the Neuport fighter that he was assigned to fly “was too fast for him,” leading his trainer to state that he would “never make a successful pilot.”²⁹ In another case, 2d Lt. Burton Le Doux’s instructors believed that after two bad crashes in training the young man would never be able “to master the art of flying” and packed him off to Blois before he could do further damage to himself or the Air Service’s limited supply of aircraft.³⁰

The unique nature and stresses of flying also led to a number of pilots being sent to Blois. After failing in flight school, the next greatest reason that pilots were reclassified was for “air nervousness” or a fear of flying.



Courtesy of Saint Louis University

A prewar photo of Powhatan Clarke

For all of the romance and allure of flying, the reality of air warfare in World War I was routine discomfort and the prospect of a sudden terrifying death. Airmen faced a greater proportional number of reclassifications due to anxiety than any other branch. This failure of nerve could strike at any point in the pilot’s flying career. First Lts. Robert Cole and Fred Nicholson, veteran fliers with several months of combat experience, were both ordered to Blois after they found the constant stress of air combat too much for them.³¹

The largest group of officers sent to Blois was infantry majors, captains, and lieutenants, and these officers will be the focus of the remainder of the article. A study of the 515 case files for these National Guard and National Army officers gives insight into the tactical and leadership skills and abilities that Pershing and his commanders expected of their junior combat leaders. By examining which infantry officers were ordered to Blois and the reasons given for their reclassification, one also gains a greater appreciation of the Army’s systemic problems with wartime officer training and the general shortcomings of the AEF in the Great War.

The basic statistics of the reclassified infantry officers present a relatively complete portrait of what type of officers that commanders sent to the Blois boards. One of the more telling pieces of information was that 85 percent of the infantry officers ordered to Blois had occupied combat leadership positions at the time of their relief. The figures also reveal that a disproportionate number of National Guard majors and captains were reclassified (*Table 2*). In fact, it is only when one gets to second lieutenants that the OTC officers were represented in numbers approaching their overall density in the Army.

What accounted for the overrepresentation of National Guard infantry

captains and majors at Blois? First, there was the matter of age. The average age of the reclassified majors was slightly over 43 years old for guardsmen and nearly 40 for the National Army officers. These figures only tell part of the story because 11 percent of the overall Guard majors were over 50 years old, with nearly 39 percent of all the Guard majors boarded being over age 45 (as opposed to 3.5 percent over age 50 and 21 percent over age 45 for the OTC officers). Over 40 percent of the Guard captains sent to Blois were over 40 years of age (as opposed to 17 percent of the OTC officers). The National Guard majors and captains sent to Blois were on average older than the reclassified National Army officers and also older than the population for their grades as a whole.

The older Guard and OTC officers also accounted for the majority of officers reclassified due to being too unfit, slow, or hesitant for combat or for being identified by their superiors as lacking force or aggressiveness. Pershing certainly held a particular prejudice against officers who seemed too old or in poor physical condition. He and his acolytes rightly maintained that the violence, confusion, and unrelenting pace of continuous operations of the war made greater physical and mental demands on leaders at all levels than had heretofore been the case.³² As Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett noted, “There was a time in war when a company or platoon commander’s age mattered little,” but now, “only youth and physical prime can meet the full impact of modern war.”³³ The elder officers were simply unable to keep pace with the tempo and strenuousness of combat on the Western Front.

The boards not only found that older officers lacked the energy and fitness required of frontline combat officers, but also that they tended to be more set in their ways. One of the other factors that led to the reclassification of National Guard officers at a disproportionate rate was their alleged inability to adapt to the technical and tactical realities of the Western Front. Most of the National Guard majors and a large number of Guard captains had ten or more years experience serving in the Guard



Hunter Liggett, shown here as a brigadier general, c. 1914

prior to World War I. Given the overall state and focus of their prewar training, many of these older men had great difficulty in learning the new weapons and tactics of warfare. Maj. Edwin Markel of the 32d Division’s 128th Infantry was a case in point. Markel, age fifty-seven, had spent four years as an enlisted man and thirty-four years as an officer in the National Guard. He readily admitted that the complexity and volume of “pamphlets and training orders” that had flooded his unit left him befuddled and uncertain over how to proceed in the instruction of his unit.³⁴ In another case, Maj. Walter Abel an eighteen-year Guard veteran, was found unable to plan a trench raid or understand the basic employment of his unit’s Chauchat automatic rifles, rifle grenades, and machine guns.³⁵

As discussed earlier, the low regard with which some Regular Army

officers held their National Guard subordinates also contributed to the number of guardsmen ordered to Blois. A greater number of National Guard officers than Regular and National Army officers were singled out by their commanders for failures of leadership relating to discipline and their inability to control their units. The regulars had long believed that these faults were rife in the Guard and intended to beat them out of the AEF. For example, Maj. Albert Gray, a twenty-year veteran of the Massachusetts National Guard, was accused of being ill-disciplined for arguing with the orders of his superiors and of coddling his soldiers by “magnifying their troubles or fancied troubles.”³⁶ In another example, the 36th Division’s Capt. John DeGroot was removed from his company for his inability to “enforce strict discipline and obedience” on the Texans he commanded.³⁷ Pershing had made clear that the standard of discipline and obedience in the AEF was to mirror that of West Point, and his senior subordinates were quick to denounce the laxness in order and overfamiliarity between officers and soldiers that they believed characterized National Guard units.

Another statistical factor that stands out in the records of infantry officers from both the National Guard and the OTCs boarded at Blois was their education levels. The available information suggests that approximately 70 percent of American wartime officers had some college instruction upon commissioning.³⁸ The number of officers sent for reclassification who had any college courses was at least 10 to 20 percentage points lower than this average (*Table 3*). This is not to say that the better educated officers tended to be more competent leaders. In fact, a lack of basic schooling or mentality was cited as the reason that 4 percent of the officers were ordered to Blois. However, lack of education may have been one of the factors that tipped the scales against the borderline officers. Furthermore, officers deficient in the academic skills for quickly reading, reconciling, and digesting training and doctrinal material may have found themselves overwhelmed by the mass

TABLE 3: EDUCATION LEVELS OF RECLASSIFIED INFANTRY OFFICERS BY RANK

Rank Level of Education	Major (Number and %)	Captain (Number and %)	1st Lieutenant (Number and %)	2d Lieutenant (Number and %)
College Grad or Some College*	43 (55.8%)	76 (45.8%)	82 (54.3%)	67 (55.3%)
Correspondence School	2 (2.6%)	2 (1.2%)	3 (2%)	1 (.8%)
High School Grad or Some High School	13 (16.9%)	49 (29.6%)	28 (18.5%)	26 (21.5%)
Grammar or Common School	6 (7.8%)	12 (7.2%)	18 (12%)	6 (5%)
Trade School**	6 (7.8%)	15 (9%)	7 (4.6%)	6 (5%)
Unknown	7 (9.1%)	12 (7.2%)	13 (8.6%)	15 (12.4%)

* Includes attendance at business or normal colleges.

** Includes business skills or technical training of a vocational nature.

Source: The information in this table came from the individual case reports of infantry officers at the rank of major through second lieutenant, in boxes 2286–2319, Blois Case Files.

and density of Army publications that deluged their units.

Having studied who was sent to Blois, an examination of why the officers were boarded is next. The boards themselves shoehorned the men appearing before them into four broad categories: “misfit,” “temperamental,” “inefficient,” or “physical.” These groupings were subjective and rather ill-defined. In general, a “misfit” was an officer whose skills and abilities were ill-suited for the position, unit, or branch in which he served. The boards classified over 68 percent of all officers into this category. The officers in the next largest group were those that the boards classified as “temperamental.” These officers supposedly possessed personalities, quirks, or dispositions that made it difficult for them to work with others or that otherwise hindered their effectiveness as leaders or soldiers. These men accounted for 16 percent of all reclassifications. The “inefficient” category was the murkiest of an already nebulous system of classification. It appears to have been a catchall grouping for officers whose performance or general incompetence made them unfit to serve in their grade

or position. They made up 10.5 percent of those sent to Blois.³⁹

Last, were those officers classified in the “physical” category. The boards considered these men as physically unfit for combat assignments due to age, physical limitations, or their inability to take the mental strains of combat. This included a number of officers sent to Blois due to “shell shock.” The officers who received a “physical” designation from the reclassification board were those whom field commanders deemed unable to accomplish their duties due to their psychological or bodily infirmities. Only 5.5 percent of all reclassifications were due to physical inability.

Because the boards’ four categories failed to adequately explain the detailed reasons for the officers being reclassified, the infantry officers have been further sorted into an additional fourteen descriptive groupings. While this system suffers from some of the same subjectivity that marred the original boards’ approach, it is more specific. In many cases, the officers were sent to Blois for a multitude of grounds that often cut across the categories listed in *Table 4*. In these cases,

the officers were placed in the grouping that seemed to be most indicative of their alleged failing or was the most direct cause of their reclassification. Despite the inherent shortcomings of this system, it does provide a more nuanced view than those given by the original boards of the justifications for relieving the officers of their positions.

The various elements listed under the “reason for reclassification” heading in *Table 4* require some explanation. Officers who lacked force, energy, aggressiveness, initiative, or were too slow or hesitant for combat, reflect characterizations used by the senior officers in their original reports. These descriptions also denoted those leaders who lacked the personal presence to inspire soldiers as well as those unable to act independently of direct orders. This category is closely linked to “lacks leadership.” “Lacks leadership” signifies those officers who demonstrated an inability to train, control, or direct their soldiers to accomplish their tasks or missions. The category “temperamental” retains the original meaning as used at Blois.

“Personal moral failings” were those officers whose conduct was at

TABLE 4: REASONS FOR RECLASSIFICATION OF INFANTRY NATIONAL GUARD AND NATIONAL ARMY OFFICERS BY RANK

Reason for Reclassification	Major (Number and %)	Captain (Number and %)	1st Lieutenant (Number and %)	2d Lieutenant (Number and %)
Lacks Force, Energy, Initiative, or Aggressiveness	17 (22%)	34 (20.5%)	39 (25.8%)	33 (27.3%)
Lacks Leadership (Ability to Control, Train, or Discipline Troops)	12 (15.6%)	28 (16.9%)	27 (17.9%)	20 (16.5%)
Lacks Tactical Skills or Professional Knowledge	10 (13%)	11 (6.6%)	15 (9.9%)	13 (10.7%)
Too Old or Unfit for Combat	14 (18.2%)	10 (6%)	16 (10.6%)	5 (4.1%)
Temperamental, Argumentative, or Insubordinate	5 (6.5%)	9 (5.4%)	7 (4.6%)	3 (2.5%)
Lacks Basic Education or Mentality	3 (3.9%)	8 (4.8%)	8 (5.3%)	4 (3.3%)
Too Nervous or Lost Nerve in Combat	1 (1.3%)	14 (8.4%)	7 (4.6%)	3 (2.5%)
Personal Moral Failings	5 (6.5%)	8 (4.8%)	4 (2.7%)	10 (8.3%)
Poor Unit Administrator	1 (1.3%)	23 (13.9%)	15 (9.9%)	12 (9.9%)
Too Slow or Hesitant for Combat	2 (2.6%)	4 (2.4%)	4 (2.7%)	1 (.8%)
Poor Combat Performance	7 (9.1%)	14 (8.5%)	7 (4.6%)	10 (8.3%)
Suspected Disloyalty to United States	0	2 (1.2%)	1 (.7%)	0
Too Immature for Combat Duty	0	1 (.6%)	0	3 (2.5%)
Unknown	0	0	1 (.7%)	4 (3.3%)

odds with the Army's expectations of gentility, morality, temperance, or standards of behavior. It should be pointed out that the reclassification system was not linked directly to the system of military justice. If, during the course of their investigation, the board members found that the officer in question violated any of the Articles of War, they could

merely recommend he be sent before a courts-martial. While the AEF tried 1,093 officers from June 1917 to June 1919, most of those cases had nothing to do with the reclassification system.⁴⁰ The majority of the officers in the category of "moral failings" had a string of minor conduct or ethical infractions that never quite added up to a level requiring courts-martial.

In some cases, once an officer was cleared by courts-martial, his commander still sent him to Blois to be rid of him.⁴¹ The officers listed under "poor unit administrator" were deemed unsuccessful in the areas of battalion or company supply, personnel, and messing or in the additional noncombat duties that were a part of regimental life. Finally, officers

classified under “poor combat performance” were those whose relief from command was directly tied to their, or their units’, deficiency in action.

The reasons that the commanders gave for cashiering their Blois-bound officers offer a unique perspective into the major pitfalls that the AEF faced in combat leadership. It is significant that the largest percentage of officers, across all four ranks, were reclassified because they lacked force, initiative, and aggressiveness. The Great War witnessed the birth of modern conceptions of combat leadership and the junior officer and noncommissioned officer rose from being a mere file-closer to a semi-independent battlefield actor. The scale of the conflict, its deadlines, and the lag in the development of effective command and control measures meant that junior officers were required to exercise an unprecedented degree of initiative and master a vast array of new tactical and technical skills.

Unfortunately, many of the 90-Day Wonders that led these platoons were not up to the challenge. The hurried and ill-focused training in the OTCs did not provide candidates with the leadership, technical, and tactical skills that they so desperately needed. The case of 2d Lt. Owen Nalle, a platoon leader with the 110th Machine Gun Battalion, illustrates this point. The tactical employment of a machine gun battalion required its platoons to be widely dispersed and placed a premium on a young officer’s ability to make accurate snap decisions without the direct supervision of his superiors. Nalle’s commander believed that he lacked the training, experience, and leadership ability to handle a unit requiring such independent action.⁴² First Lt. Albert C. Pate, who admitted that “he knew nothing about drill,” was packed off to Blois after being in his battalion for less than a month and having been in command of his platoon for less than a week. The board’s investigation showed that Pate’s training in France had been limited to close order marching and bayonet training and that he had spent most of his time after arriving in France as a town mayor and regimental billeting officer.⁴³

Another officer, the 30th Division’s 2d Lt. Foster Marshall, was so cognizant of his sketchy training that he requested his own reclassification. Marshall was a 23-year-old college student in his third year at the University of South Carolina when he entered the service. He had enlisted in the National Guard in 1916 and attended OTC in April 1918. Shortly after his first tour in the trenches, Marshall approached his regimental commander and requested that his commission be revoked and that he be allowed to serve the remainder of the war as a private. The reason he gave for the request was that he did not believe that he had the training or the skills to command men in combat.⁴⁴ Although it is obvious that these officers all needed to be removed, it is equally clear that the Army systemically failed them during both their precommissioning and their unit training.

The fact that deficient leadership was the second most frequent justification given by commanders for the relief of their subordinates points to another flaw in the Army’s training and officer development. Despite its drive for professionalization in the

late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Army still maintained an apprenticeship approach to leadership going into World War I. As Maj. Gen. David C. Shanks noted in 1917, “Before our entry into the present war . . . a second lieutenant was assigned to a company, and he had the benefit of learning by observation and experience. His captain was generally an officer who had received a certain amount of seasoning. The green subaltern had abundant opportunity to become acquainted with his profession gradually.” Unfortunately, this system was unworkable in World War I. Shanks warned that “the weakest point in the training of our young officers is their lack of knowledge and experience in the handling and management of their men.” He sadly noted that the Army still expected an officer to learn leadership “by intuition and observation . . . feeling his way along, profiting only by the mistakes he may make.”⁴⁵

Despite the fact that the Army had no coherent plan for teaching young officers how to be leaders, the records of Blois show that it could be unforgiving to those who failed to acquire these skills on their own. Some were unsuccessful because the job was simply too big for their levels of training and ability. When given 250 infantrymen to command, Capt. James Archer’s superiors discovered that he was unable to “handle a large company under the existing conditions” of the front.⁴⁶ In other instances, the officers seemed to be at a loss to know what to do as leaders. For example, Capt. Wilbur N. Farson, a company commander in the 135th Machine Gun Battalion, was relieved of command on 6 September 1918 because he failed to exercise even basic leadership while his unit was occupying trenches in a quiet sector. He never visited his platoon’s firing positions and “did not make platoon commander[s] properly instruct [their] men,” and as a result, “an inspection disclosed men in both platoons almost wholly ignorant of their duties.”⁴⁷ Although personal limitations and character traits certainly played a large role in the removals of officers such as Archer and Farson, it must be admitted that they had also


General Shanks



been ill-served by the Army's chaotic training system.

Closely tied to both leadership and initiative was the need for the officer to be a sound administrator. Part of the social contract that exists in all military organizations is the soldier's expectations that his leaders will look out for his general welfare and provide for his basic needs in return for his military service. Officers who did not live up to their side of the bargain by failing to supply the basic food, clothing, shelter, medical, and personnel support to their men were detrimental to their unit's cohesion and combat effectiveness. Officers who were unsuccessful in these tasks constituted approximately 10 percent of those sent to Blois. Capt. Joseph E. Mirandon took so little interest in the "care and feeding of his men" that his regimental commander was forced to "devote his personal attention to the matter several times."⁴⁸ In another case, the commander of the 813th Pioneer Infantry noted that Capt. Raymond E. Copeland had "tried to do everything himself" and, as a consequence, "succeeded in doing almost nothing." The colonel found that Copeland was hopelessly inept at accomplishing the routine administrative tasks of running a company and had reported two men as being absent without leave for three days when, in fact, they had been on a kitchen detail.⁴⁹ While Mirandon and Copeland represent the worst cases, their problems were tied to a larger issue within the AEF of junior leaders having only a sketchy grasp of logistics. Basic logistical planning and execution were not stressed in the OTCs or in the unit training plan in the United States or France. Subsequently, few junior officers understood the logistical process, and the AEF often found its tactical operations dogged by difficulty in executing routine supply and administrative duties.

It is interesting that relatively few officers were sent to Blois for reasons that were directly related to their failures in combat. Perhaps the Great War battlefield was so unforgiving that those who made the greatest blunders never survived to be boarded. The fact that few of the officers sent to Blois



General Farnsworth

had been wounded in action may also point to a reticence on the part of commanders to sully the reputations of men who had nobly sacrificed for the cause (and with luck, would not return to their units). Another possibility was that the units had managed to weed out their least competent officers prior to combat. A case in point was the experience of the 37th Division. During its time in France, the division commander, Maj. Gen. Charles Farnsworth, ordered 9 majors, 14 captains, and 31 lieutenants to Blois. Farnsworth sent the bulk of those officers (4 majors, 8 captains, and 20 lieutenants) for reclassification while the 37th Division was training behind the lines or occupying trenches in quiet sectors of the front from July to September 1918. Although much of the precombat training that AEF units received in France was hurried and incomplete, it at least allowed commanders to identify and remove some of their commissioned deadwood.

The Blois case files also disclose much about the AEF and the times in which it served. For example, the officers ordered to Blois for their personal moral failings illustrate the code of conduct that the AEF expected of its officers and the taboos or morays that it was unwilling to have trans-

gressed. In some cases, the officer's transgressions attacked the social contract between the leaders and the led as well as the barrier between officers and their men. Capt. Augustine P. DeZavala was sacked for lending money to his soldiers while charging "usurious" interest rates.⁵⁰ The board viewed 2d Lt. Ewart G. Abner as unfit for holding a commission for having bought thirty-two pounds of chewing tobacco from the Quartermaster Sales Commissary with the intent of reselling the item to his soldiers for profit.⁵¹ The senior officers involved in these cases rightly saw the actions of these officers as detrimental to the discipline and morale of the units.

Other moral failings dealt more with the temptations of sex and demon rum. Despite the moral standards of Progressive Era America, the Army was not quite as puritanical in its outlook as the larger society. Drinking was fine, as long as it was not allowed to influence a soldier's performance or harm the image of the Army or its officer corps. The officers who could not live within these limits quickly made themselves unwelcome in their units. Second Lt. Thomas Hazzard was sent to Blois after twice exhibiting conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. He was involved in a drunken brawl with another officer after he "goosed" the lady the other man was escorting.⁵²

The AEF's view of cases involving sexual misconduct generally reflected similar attitudes as alcohol. The U.S. Army in the Great War instituted the first widespread efforts to provide sex education in the nation's history. While the Army encouraged the Young Men's Christian Association representatives to pass out booklets pushing sexual abstinence, it also established a large system of prophylaxis stations across France. However, if a soldier still contracted a venereal disease (VD), the AEF's judicial and reclassification systems showed him little compassion. As 2d Lt. Earnest W. Chase found out, this was doubly true for officers. By contracting VD, Chase had basically "damaged government property" by rendering himself unable to carry out his duties. Upon ordering

him to Blois, his commander moralistically announced that he hoped that Chase's replacement would be "an officer whose mind is on his work and whose determination is to render adequate service to his country without selfish concern for himself."⁵³

When it came to an officer needing to satisfy his sexual desires, the Army tended to turn a blind eye unless the man's conduct interfered with his duty or brought the service's image and standing, or that of its officer corps, into question.⁵⁴ The case of 2d Lt. Arthur Fortinberry provides an illustration. Just before leaving the United States, Fortinberry met and married a woman whom he had known only a short time. Shortly afterward, some of the soldiers in his unit informed him that his new wife had been working as a prostitute when he met her. An investigation by Fortinberry's commander verified the suspicions about the officer's wife and that the young officer had become an object of ridicule within the unit. The board concluded that due to this fact, Fortinberry's "influence and usefulness as an officer is at an end."⁵⁵

The one sexual matter that the AEF had absolutely no tolerance for was instances of homosexuality. The Blois files contain at least two cases where officers were accused of homosexual conduct. Second Lt. John W. Royer of the 29th Division's 111th Machine Gun Battalion was sent before a general court-martial in August 1918 for violations of the 96th Article of War. Royer was accused of making "advances and invitations of an unnatural and immoral nature" to three of his soldiers while on board the ship to France and of committing sodomy on one of his privates on numerous occasions in June and July. Although the court-martial found him not guilty of the charges, his commander had no further use of his services and hurriedly sent him to Blois.⁵⁶ The other case involved Maj. L. H. English, a doctor assigned to the 60th Coast Artillery. After his "inappropriate" actions, the board gave English the option of resigning for the "good of the service" or face court-martial.⁵⁷

The board's treatment of officers sent for reclassification due to physical and mental breakdown, including those suffering from shell shock or combat fatigue, was much more sympathetic and enlightened. Second Lt. Morris Oppenheim was a case in point. Oppenheim enlisted in the Pennsylvania National Guard in 1916 and had served on the Mexican border. His sterling record as an enlisted man, solid performance in combat during the Second Battle of the Marne in July 1918, and demonstrated skill with machine guns had led his previous commander to send him to the AEF's officer candidate school. Upon his commissioning in September, the Army assigned him as a machine gun platoon leader in the 30th Division. He seemed to have all of the best characteristics the Army sought in its junior leaders. In fact, during his hearing one of his squad leaders noted that "in the advance he had acted so bravely that I thought, well we have a Liut. [*sic*] that will stick to us no matter what happened." But despite this courage, he broke under the strain of shell fire during his unit's attack in the Argonne on 17 October 1918, straggled from the lines, and was apprehended by military police in Paris seven days later. Although Oppenheim could easily have been charged with desertion or even misconduct in the face of the enemy, his commander and the board members appreciated the strain that combat had put on him and agreed that both he and the Army would be best served by finding him a suitable noncombat billet.⁵⁸

One last group of officers sent to Blois is worth examining for what the category reveals about American society during the Great War. At least three infantry officers were sent to the depot for their alleged pro-German or anti-American statements or actions. During the war, the United States was racked by a propaganda-driven wave of war hysteria. The xenophobic "100 percent Americanism" and a popular anti-German ground swell all contributed to a toxic domestic environment that encouraged the American people to support a massive curtailment of civil liberties and to play the informant

against any neighbor who seemed at odds with the spirit of the times.

The three cases of suspected disloyalty illustrate that the domestic phobias and fantasies were also played out in the U.S. Army. For example, 1st Lt. Arthur T. Guston ended up in Blois because, on the passage to France on the SS *Baltic*, he stated that German submarines would be "justifiable in sinking this ship." His fellow officers believed that his comments failed to show "a proper spirit of loyalty" and promptly informed the AEF Intelligence Section of Guston's pro-German sympathies.⁵⁹ In August 1918, Capt. Louis J. Lampke was removed from a company command in the 80th Division because the AEF's G-2 (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence) had discovered that his brother had ties to German steamship companies. The captain had also raised doubts by being "very desirous of securing large scale maps displaying the trench system" and seeking to have certain men with "distinct German names" detailed to his unit.⁶⁰ In the last case, Capt. Felix Campuzano was cashiered after admitting to his battalion commander that during a recent attack "it was very hard for him mentally to . . . fight against a people whom he had been taught to love and revere" by his German mother.⁶¹ These three officers were not the only American leaders to come under suspicion of disloyalty during the war. The files of the AEF Military Intelligence Section reveal that it investigated at least sixty-five other officers, to include Capt. Walter Krueger, the future commander of the 6th U.S. Army in World War II, for various allegations or suppositions of holding pro-German sympathies or other opinions that were un-American.⁶²

Although Pershing was certainly justified in establishing a system in the AEF for removing incompetent officers, the fear that the system fostered in the officer corps and the vast power that it gave senior commanders created a negative command climate that influenced the AEF's operations and left a lasting legacy far surpassing the limited number of men who went through Blois. Maj. Gen.



Library of Congress

General Harbord

James Harbord, the chief of the SOS, asserted that Blois was a “Human Salvage Plant” that reclaimed “human beings to an untold and incalculable value.”⁶³ Those sent for reclassification did not see it in this same positive light. Going for reclassification was a humiliation for the officers involved. Brig. Gen. L. M. Nuttman, commander of the Combat Officers’ Depot, recalled that the officers awaiting judgment “arrived in various states of mind which ranged from extreme anger, through a feeling of injury and a passive acceptance of fate, to an entire loss of self respect.”⁶⁴

To Regular Army officers, being reclassified was the shipwreck of their military careers and left the lasting taint that they had been unsuccessful in the highest trial of their profession. For National Guard officers, being removed from their units meant the embarrassment of returning to local communities with their reputations sullied by failure. To the many young National Army officer who had so eagerly filled wartime Officer Training Camps, reporting to Blois indicated that they had not succeeded in the era’s ultimate test of manhood and the “strenuous life,” as exemplified by Theodore Roosevelt. This point became clear to 1st Lt. Harvey Harris after a chance encounter with a group of cap-



National Archives

General Nuttman, c. 1930

tains who were en route to their new assignments after their reclassification boards. They told Harris that they had been treated as “privates in every sense” at the depot, and one stated that “he would have [to work] for 5 years to get his self respect back.”⁶⁵ As these officers could attest, Blois was the bogeyman that haunted the psyche of the American officer.

The stigma of Blois was hard to shake. In fact, the reputation of Blois grew so fearsome that the terms “blooeyed” or “gone blooey” entered the American lexicon as slang for a failure or a colossal malfunction. Even though 882 of the 891 officers assigned to the SOS after their Blois boards later “made good” in their new positions, they never truly shook off the impres-

Captain Krueger



Library of Congress

Lieutenant Harris



U.S. Army




Captain Chastaine

sion that they were somehow “damaged goods.”⁶⁶ Soon after becoming the commander of the SOS, General Harbord complained,

All officers who fail at the front are sent back to be utilized in the myriad activities of the Services of Supply where something can be found for one of almost any profession or trade. This record of failure had had a depressing effect on the spirit of the important work of the S.O.S.⁶⁷

Thus, while he could gush of Blois being a Human Salvage Plant, in his more honest moments, even Harbord admitted that for an officer to be reclassified at Blois was the AEF’s version of wearing the scarlet letter.


Given the dread that American officers had of being “blooeyed,” the threat of being sent to Blois was a cudgel that commanders could use to keep their subordinate officers in line. Capt. John Castles recalled that the commander of his infantry regiment launched a tirade against his officers and warned that those “who didn’t attend to business (i.e. do what suited him) would soon go back to the United States ‘with his tail between his legs.’”⁶⁸ Another officer remembered the fear that a division commander inspired by threatening to send one of



General Hutchings

his brigade commanders “to Blois in disgrace” after a failed attack during the Soissons offensive of July 1918.⁶⁹ An artillery officer reported that a steady winnowing of new officers began soon after his unit landed in France in June 1918. He noted the trepidation created by the removal of these officers and lamented that many of his comrades “will see Front only via movies.”⁷⁰ Thus, while the actual number of officers sent to Blois for reclassification was rather small, the fear that the removals caused rippled through the AEF and created a “zero defect” command climate that influenced the behavior of American officers throughout the war.

One of the greatest ironies of the reclassification system was that, while officers were being sent to Blois because of their lack of aggressiveness and initiative, the anxiety that the depot inspired actually worked against encouraging these attributes within the AEF’s junior leaders. The dread of being blooeyed motivated many commanders to keep their subordinates firmly in line by limiting any of their actions or activities that might reflect badly on their commands. General Liggett remarked that “the failure of more than one unit,” in the AEF “could be traced directly to the inability of the officer in command to



General Smith, c. 1919

delegate authority.” He also noted the sad reality when senior commanders tried to “do a sergeant major’s, lieutenant’s, or an adjutant’s” job rather than focusing on their own.⁷¹ One reason for this, an officer in the Inspector General’s Office later noted, was that “officers commenced to exhibit a degree of fear and apprehension lest some unavoidable event, something which they could not control, might operate to ruin their careers.”⁷² Some officers went as far as to prevent their more talented junior leaders from attending needed technical schools because of “the danger to themselves of being relieved of command for some error made by the less efficient officers.”⁷³ With the specter of Blois never far from their minds, regimental and higher commanders seldom allowed their subordinates the latitude to make or to learn from their mistakes prior to going into combat.

Many, if not most, of the officers sent to Blois certainly deserved to be removed from combat units. However, the long shadow of Blois, and Pershing’s intolerance of failure, created a climate where some commanders sacrificed officers to Blois to place the blame for their units’ deficiencies on others or at least to show that they were being proactive in correcting their units’ shortcomings. It is not

surprising that the number of officers relieved from the 37th, 79th, and 92d Divisions spiked after their units' lackluster performances in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign.⁷⁴

Certain division or regimental commanders sought to demonstrate their toughness to their superiors, while also dealing with problem officers in their ranks. The 36th Division appears to have had an overabundance of these cases. One of the division's officers, Capt. Ben Chastaine, recalled that soon after arriving in France, the division's staff was reorganized and a general resifting of the unit's senior officers occurred. He noted that the first act of the new chief of staff was to go after those officers within the division that he and his staff officers deemed "unfit for service." It made a great impression on Chastaine that in a matter of days the commander of the 71st Infantry Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry Hutchings; 2 colonels; 2 lieutenant colonels; 5 majors; and a number of captains and lieutenants were relieved of duty and sent to Blois.⁷⁵ As the division got settled in, more removals followed. One of the purged officers, 2d Lt. Mancel Coghlan, claimed that he was sent to Blois merely to fill his battalion's quota for reclassifications. He maintained that his division commander, Maj. Gen. William R. Smith, "made a statement he was going to have a board, and if it were necessary to have a man before the board, the officer would go back to the States whether or not he was inefficient."⁷⁶

At times, the worry of reclassification also drove senior officers to push their subordinates to continue attacks beyond the demands of military necessity or common sense. In one of the more egregious cases, 1st Lt. Glen Gardiner of the 5th Division's 60th Infantry was sent packing to Blois after he delayed attacking Juvigny on the night of 10 November 1918. Gardiner claimed that the assault lacked the artillery support needed to succeed and that two companies he commanded were "short of ammunition and had no grenades" and had been without proper rations for days. The officer's delay ensured that that objective was

not captured prior to the time that the Armistice went into effect at 1100 on 11 November.⁷⁷

The fate of officers such as Gardiner was not lost on other junior leaders. On 7 November 1918, the commander of the 79th Division directed that each of his infantry company commanders send out a sixteen-man patrol to locate machine gun nests and bring back German prisoners. Capt. Arthur Joel, a company commander in the 314th Infantry, recalled, "One's first opinion naturally was that there must be some mistakes in the orders. To send a patrol across the lines in broad daylight . . . seemed like suicide!" Despite great reservations and the gnawing feeling that the instructions were a mistake, Joel philosophically shrugged that "orders were orders" and sent the men out. As he had predicted, the patrol was shot to pieces by machine-gun and artillery fire.⁷⁸

The AEF's officer reclassification system, and the command climate that it helped to foster, cast a long shadow over the post-World War I United States Army, especially in its influence on Col. George C. Marshall, one of the AEF's brightest lights. The reputation he gained in the Great War ultimately helped to propel him to the position of chief of staff of the Army during World War II. Despite his organizational brilliance, Marshall also brought a darker legacy from World War I to his subsequent military endeavors. Historian Daniel P. Bolger has noted that as the assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Marshall inculcated a generation of the school's students with his own rigid ideas of tactics, discipline, and leadership. When students such as Omar Bradley, Courtney Hodges, and J. Lawton Collins later rose to senior command during World War II, they placed Marshall's doctrinal views into practice. As such, the operations of Bradley's First Army were characterized by a cautious set-piece approach to warfare and a tendency of Hodges and Collins to micromanage and dampen the initiative of their subordinates.⁷⁹


Bolger maintained that the stern and forbidding Marshall also passed



National Archives

Colonel Marshall

on to his Fort Benning disciples a rather harsh view of how to deal with subordinates who failed to perform in combat. Those who faltered had to be cut out of the unit like a cancer. As the First Army and 12th Army Group commander in 1944 and 1945, Bradley placed this merciless vision into practice by relieving two corps commanders, eight division commanders, and numerous brigade and regimental commanders. Recently, author Thomas E. Ricks has argued that some of the deficiencies of today's officer corps stem from a lack of a similar eagerness to sack incompetent leaders. Because the mistakes of leaders result in the deaths of soldiers, the question of the relief of incapable



Colonel Marshall and General Pershing, c. 1919

officers is an important one. Ricks asserts that George Marshall's "system" of eliminations in World War II "tended to create an incentive system that encouraged prudent risk taking." The point that Ricks seemed to miss is that overzealousness in removing officers had the unintended effect of creating a cadre of "company men" whose fear of their bosses not only sapped "prudent risk taking," but also led to battlefield decisions that sometimes ended in unnecessary American losses.⁸⁰ As Bolger noted, the head-hunting propensity of Marshall's acolytes created a "zero defect"

command climate in the First Army that left its subordinate commanders worried and unwilling to question the decisions of their superiors.

What Bolger did not discuss was that this willingness to relieve officers at the drop of a hat, and the poor command climate this practice created, was a legacy of World War I. It is sometime said that children who are abused grow up to be abusers themselves as adults. As a senior AEF staff officer, Marshall saw firsthand Pershing's ruthlessness in ridding himself of those who failed to live up to his expectations. This experience left an indelible impres-

sion on Marshall; one that he later passed on to his Benning students. One passage in *Infantry in Battle*, a publication prepared under Marshall's direction by the military history and publications section of the Infantry School, advises commanders to never hesitate "to relieve all unreliable junior officers."⁸¹ Similar to Marshall, Bradley and other senior commanders sacked subordinates with pitiless abandon, the ghost of Blois stalked in the shadows.

In the final analysis, the operations of the AEF's reclassification centers illuminate much about the officer corps and the command climate set by senior leaders. Given the frenetic pace under which the U.S. Army was cobbled together and the numerous shortcuts that characterized the American mobilization, it was incumbent upon Pershing to identify and weed out those leaders whose training and abilities made them unfit to perform their combat roles. Most of the officers sent to Blois probably deserved their fate, but they were merely the worst (or the most unlucky) of an overall corps of leaders whose training and experience had not adequately prepared them for the crucible into which they were thrown. However, in seeking perfection in the leadership of the AEF, Pershing had also encouraged the creation of a command climate based on the fear of being relieved of command. While this environment rightfully pushed commanders to accomplish their missions, it also encouraged them to micromanage their units, reduce the initiative of their subordinates, stifle the development of their junior officers, and needlessly push attacks after it was clear that such efforts were not worth the cost of the gain. The reclassification system offers interesting insights into the AEF's grave challenges and illustrates how seemingly innocuous and prudent personnel policies can have unintended and lasting consequences.

NOTES

1. Robert L. Bullard, *Personalities and Reminiscences of the War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1925), p. 267.

2. *War Department Annual Report, 1916* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916), p. 242; Leonard P. Ayres, *The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), pp. 16–21.

3. Ayres, *The War with Germany*, pp. 22, 30.

4. *United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919*, vol. 16, *General Orders, GHQ, AEF* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), p. 112.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 257–58; Rpt, Dep Ch of Staff, Services of Supply (SOS), 15 May 1919, sub: The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. (Blois), pp. 1–5, box 2257, Entry 465, Reclassification System Combat Officers' Depot, Record Group (RG) 120, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. (NADC).

6. Rpt, Dep Ch of Staff, SOS, 15 May 1919, sub: The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. (Blois), pp. 6, 20–21.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.

8. These records are found in box 2254, Entry 465, RG 120, NADC. The “proposed eliminations for inefficiency” contained a brief summary of the findings of the board, but the date, location, and circumstances of these boards are a mystery. Internal evidence in the files in the form of memorandums and marginal notations dealing with the cases shows that the boards met from as early as March 1918 to as late as March 1919, with most being held in the summer and fall of 1918.

9. Rpt, Commanding General (CG), Combat Officers' Depot, to Adj Gen, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), 22 May 1919, sub: Reclassification of officers, p. 1, The Reclassification System at Gondrecourt file, box 2254, Entry 465, RG 120, NADC.

10. Rpt, Dep Ch of Staff, SOS, 15 May 1919, sub: The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. (Blois), p. 22.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *War Department Annual Report, 1919*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 498.

13. Colby L. McIntyre, *The Old Man of the 103rd: The Biography of Frank M. Hume* (Houlton, Maine: Aroostock Print Shop, 1940), p. 53.

14. Evan Alexander Edwards, *From Doniphan to Verdun: The Official History of the*

140th Infantry (Lawrence, Kans.: The World Company, 1920), p. 13.

15. 1st Lt Montgomery Ridgely, in box 2312, Entry 541, Reclassified Officers National Army and National Guard Blois (hereafter cited as Blois Case Files), RG 120, NADC.

16. Capt Arthur H. Wicks, in box 2318, Blois Case Files.

17. Rpt, Dep Ch of Staff, SOS, 15 May 1919, sub: The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. (Blois), p. 22. McAdams classified both National Guard and National Army officers as “temporary officers.”

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 18–23, table 4.

19. Rpt, CG, Combat Officers' Depot, to Adj Gen, AEF, 22 May 1919, sub: Re-classification of officers, p. 3.

20. 2d Lt Robert Hay, in box 2300, Blois Case Files.

21. 1st Lt Evan Lindsey, in box 2305, Blois Case Files. For those infantry officers whose reaction to their relief was captured by the personnel adjutant, approximately 20 to 30 percent stated that they were surprised by the action or did not know the cause. For example, see Capt Clayton MacNab, in box 2305, Blois Case Files.

22. Rpt, Brig Gen W. B. Burt to Commander in Chief (CINC), AEF, 12 Jun 1919, sub: Report upon Relief of Duty of Officers of the Combat Forces, box 2254, Entry 465, RG 120, NADC.

23. Capt Gordon Lawson, in box 2304, Blois Case Files.

24. Capt Edwin R. York, in box 2319, Blois Case Files. Capt. William L. Thompson also claimed that he was only sent to Blois because he had requested a transfer to the Air Service. Capt William L. Thompson, in box 2316, Blois Case Files.

25. 1st Lt Edward R. Dewey, in box 2294, Blois Case Files. Dewey was not alone in having his career hindered by matters of the heart. First Lt. Lewis Graves stated that his long-running problems with his unit adjutant came to a head after both officers began courting the same girl. Graves stated that the adjutant “threatened that if he did not stop calling on the girl, he would have him shipped out.” In a rare show of sympathy, the board sent Graves to a replacement depot for reassignment to a combat unit. Perhaps, all is fair in love and war after all. 1st Lt Lewis E. Graves, in box 2298, Blois Case Files.

26. Richard S. Faulkner, “The School of Hard Knocks: Combat Leadership in the American Expeditionary Forces” (Ph.D. diss., Kansas State University, 2008), an. B.

27. Rpt, Dep Ch of Staff, SOS, 15 May 1919, sub: The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. (Blois), tables 1, 2.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

29. 1st Lt Powhatan H. Clarke, in box 2292, Blois Case Files.

30. 2d Lt Burton Le Doux, in box 2304, Blois Case Files.

31. 1st Lt Robert L. Cole, in box 2293; 1st Lt Fred W. Nicholason, in box 2309. Both in Blois Case Files.

32. John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*, vol. II (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1931), pp. 115–16.

33. Hunter Liggett, *A.E.F.: Ten Years Ago in France* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1927), p. 257.

34. Maj Edwin T. Markel, in box 2305, Blois Case Files.

35. Maj Walter Abel, in box 2286, Blois Case Files.

36. Maj Albert Gray, in box 2299, Blois Case Files.

37. Capt John L. DeGroot, in box 2294, Blois Case Files.

38. See Chs. 3 and 4, Faulkner, “The School of Hard Knocks.”

39. Rpt, Dep Ch of Staff, SOS, 15 May 1919, sub: The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. (Blois), p. 6, table 2.

40. *War Department Annual Report, 1919*, vol. 1, p. 676.

41. For an example of this, see Capt Thomas Sunny, in box 2315, Blois Case Files.

42. 2d Lt Owen Nalle, in box 2308, Blois Case Files.

43. 1st Lt Albert C. Pate, in box 2310, Blois Case Files.

44. 2d Lt Foster Marshall, in box 2305, Blois Case Files. The Blois board honored Marshall's request and discharged him as an officer on 26 September 1918. True to his word, he immediately reenlisted as a private.

45. David C. Shanks, *Management of the American Soldier* (New York: Thomas F. Ryan, 1918), pp. 4–5, 20.

46. Capt James Archer, in box 2286, Blois Case Files.

47. Capt Wilbur N. Farson, in box 2296, Blois Case Files.

48. Capt Joseph E. Mirandon, in box 2307, Blois Case Files.

49. Capt Raymond E. Copeland, in box 2293, Blois Case Files.

50. Capt Augustine P. DeZavala, in box 2294, Blois Case Files.

51. 2d Lt Ewart G. Abner, in box 2286, Blois Case Files.

52. 2d Lt Thomas Hazzard, in box 2300, Blois Case Files.

53. 2d Lt Earnest W. Chase, in box 2292, Blois Case Files.

54. While some commanders were shocked that their subordinates visited prostitutes, the Blois records suggest that the men in question were only relieved for these actions if they were carried out in the open, became a scandal among the soldiers, or were added to the officer's failings in other areas. For example, see 1st Lt Arthur Bettes, in box 2288, Blois Case Files.

55. This case was found in the "mystery list," in box 2254, Entry 465, RG 120, NADC. In the file, along with the "proposed eliminations for inefficiency" sheet that detailed Fortinberry's case, was a memorandum from AEF Deputy Chief of Staff LeRoy Eltinge, 2 January 1919, that discussed the case.

56. 2d Lt John W. Royer, in box 2313, Blois Case Files.

57. Maj L. H. English, in box 2296, Blois Case Files.

58. 2d Lt Morris Oppenheim, in box 2309, Blois Case Files.

59. 1st Lt Arthur T. Guston, in box 2298, Blois Case Files.

60. Capt Louis J. Lampke, in box 2304, Blois Case Files. See also Memo, Asst Ch of Staff, G-2, 80th Div, for 2d Section General Staff, G-2, General Headquarters (GHQ), 28 Jul 1918, sub: Captain Louis J. Lampke, 314th Machine Gun Battalion, box 6218, Correspondence Relating to American Officers Suspected

of Pro-German Sympathies, Entry 186, RG 120, NADC.

61. Capt Felix R. Campuzano, in box 2291, Blois Case Files.

62. Memo, Ch, Mil Intel Br, for Col Dennis E. Nolan, Intelligence Officer (IO), 10 May 1918, sub: Captain J. W. Krueger, box 6218, Entry 186, RG 120, NADC.

63. James G. Harbord, *Leaves From a War Diary* (New York: Dodd, Meade, 1925), p. 426.

64. Rpt, CG, Combat Officers' Depot, to Adj Gen, AEF, 22 May 1919, sub: Re-classification of officers, p. 6.

65. Harvey L. Harris, *The War as I Saw It: 1918 Letters of a Tank Corps Lieutenant* (St. Paul, Minn.: Pogo Press, 1998), p. 57.

66. Rpt, Dep Ch of Staff, SOS, 15 May 1919, sub: The Reclassification System of the A.E.F. (Blois), table 4.

67. Harbord, *Leaves From a War Diary*, pp. 343-44.

68. Ms, John W. Castles, "War Diary of John W. Castles," p. 22, Castles Papers, U.S. Military Academy Library Archives, West Point, New York.

69. Quote from Henry Berry, *Make the Kaiser Dance* (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 60.

70. Anonymous, *Wine, Women and War: A Diary of Disillusionment* (New York: J. H. Sears, 1926), p. 108.

71. Liggett, *A.E.F. Ten Years Ago in France*, pp. 261, 259.

72. Col M. G. Spinks, "Major Problems of the Inspector General, AEF, and Their Solution" (Lecture, Army War College, 9 Oct 1933), p. 9,

File AWC 401-A-5, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

73. *United States Army in the World War*, vol. 14, *Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, Staff Sections and Services* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991), p. 401.

74. See Faulkner, "The School of Hard Knocks," apps. A, B.

75. Ben H. Chastaine, *Story of the 36th: The Experiences of the 36th Division in the World War* (Oklahoma City, Okla.: Harlow, 1920), p. 47.

76. 2d Lt Mancel Coghlan, in box 2292, Blois Case Files.

77. 1st Lt Glen Gardiner, box 2298, Blois Case Files.

78. Arthur H. Joel, *Under the Lorraine Cross* (Charlotte, Mich.: Charlotte Tribune, 1921), pp. 54-55.

79. Daniel P. Bolger, "Zero Defects: Command Climate in the First U.S. Army, 1944-1945," *Military Review* 71 (May 1991): 61-73.

80. Thomas E. Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), pp. 32-39, 116-18. Ricks later noted that Russell Weigley and Martin Blumenson argued that the U.S. Army's leadership in World War II was somewhat uninspired, cautious, and unimaginative. Ricks made no effort to reconcile his earlier contentions about the success of the "Marshall System" with these opposing views.

81. *Infantry in Battle* (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal, 1939), p. 199.

ARMY HISTORY OnLine

The Center of Military History makes all issues of *Army History* available to the public on its Web site. Each new publication will appear shortly after the issue is printed. Issues may be viewed or downloaded at no cost in Adobe® PDF format. An index page of the issues may be found at www.history.army.mil/armyhistory.

U.S. ARMY ART SPOTLIGHT

ART IN THE TRENCHES THE WORLD WAR I PAINTINGS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON WOOLF

By Sarah Forgey

The Army Art Collection recently acquired a number of pieces of important eyewitness artwork from World War I. An artist-correspondent, Samuel Johnson Woolf worked for *Collier's Weekly* and spent four months embedded with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France, sketching in the trenches along the front and behind the lines. Upon his return to New York, Woolf immediately began a series of paintings based on his experiences, which were exhibited at the Milch Galleries in New York City and the Memorial Art Gallery in Rochester, gaining him acclaim as a war artist.

Woolf's paintings present a record of war unlike any seen before: a gritty and realistic portrayal of life in the trenches that cannot be confused with propaganda artwork. The artist does not shy from depicting a horrifying existence in which the viewer can almost smell the smoke, feel the cold, and hear the explosions. Woolf's loose and spontaneous artistic style is consistent with the hurried and often chaotic events that he paints, conveying an immediacy often lacking in studio pieces. He does not self-censor; even his medical scenes display extreme realism, showing the graphic details of horrifying injuries. Some works are very bleak, and others underscore dramatic moments of heroism among the chaos.

A skilled portrait artist, Woolf applied his talent to the doughboys whom he met during his time in France. Rather than focusing on the impersonal technological advances that changed the face of warfare forever, Woolf often concentrated on the human element. His paintings do not highlight the mechanized and anonymous carnage, fixating instead on the personal stories that he witnessed. Woolf's sobering authenticity transported his American audience right to the heart of the conflict, as if they too were part of the harrowing events portrayed.

According to a 7 July 1918 *New York Times* article about Woolf's time in France, his experience was not limited to sketching from a safe vantage point. Describing his first visit to no-man's-land, Woolf said, "A vast feeling of desolation came over me. It was oppressing, terrible. I made a few sketches and went back. Everyone seemed to think me insane to have gone out, but it wasn't fear that had interfered with my work." The next time he went into the field, he was wounded by a flying shell fragment. Explaining his first few days in the trenches, Woolf said, "You may 'go in' thinking you will set to work at once, but so full of strange emotions does your life become that painting is out of the question." He assisted with the wounded, drove an ambulance, pitched in with cooking when the cook was gassed, and even attempted to rescue some paintings from a local church before it was shelled.¹ Woolf's immersion in his subject matter brings an intimate and vivid mood to his finished pieces.

Woolf's twenty-three paintings are an important addition to the Army Art Collection, which contains very few eyewitness pieces from World War I. While there were officially eight War Department artists documenting the AEF, their work is under the care of the Smithsonian Institution. Woolf's paintings fill a gap in the Army's pictorial record of its history. Along with the rest of the Army Art Collection, these works are preserved at the Army's Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.



Sarah Forgey is the curator of the U.S. Army Art Collection.

Note

1. Nina Carter Marbourg, "An American Artist Under Fire: S. J. Woolf's Perilous Sketching in No Man's Land—Germans Wrecked Church While He Tried to Save Paintings," *New York Times*, 7 Jul 1918.



A Night March, oil on canvas, 1918



Observation Point Near Verdun, oil on canvas, 1918



Carry On, oil on canvas, 1918



First Aid Station at Seicheprey, oil on canvas, 1918



Battle Scene with Barbed Wire, oil on canvas, 1918



The Intelligence Section, A.E.F., Menil la Tour, oil on canvas, 1918



Soldiers in a Bombed Out Town, oil on canvas, 1918




Military Procession at Mailly le Camp, oil on canvas, 1918



Soldier Smoking, oil on canvas, 1920

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Steven W. Knott retired from the U.S. Navy as a captain in 2012 and currently serves as the advancement officer for the U.S. Army War College located at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. A former instructor and academic chair holder at the War College, he taught strategy formulation, leadership, and history to senior military officers and civilian government executives. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Hampden-Sydney College and a master's degree in strategic studies from the Army War College. As a naval aviator, he commanded Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 8, based in Norfolk, Virginia. His many deployments include duty in the Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, Arabian Gulf, and Somalia. He also led helicopter support for wreckage recovery from the crash of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 in waters off Long Island, New York, in 1996.



General Lee



LEE AT ANTIETAM

Strategic Imperatives, the Tyranny of Arithmetic, and a Trap Not Sprung

BY STEVEN W. KNOTT


Perhaps no facet of Robert E. Lee's generalship has received more professional and academic scrutiny than his decision to fight the Battle of Antietam with the Potomac River at his back. The battle necessitated extreme risk for the Confederates; defeat would have probably resulted in the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia. The defensive fight so skillfully waged by Lee at Sharpsburg succeeded only by the narrowest of margins—yet still proved unable to prevent the failure of his campaign. Even partisan biographer Douglas Southall Freeman acknowledged that many historians will find fault with Lee's actions at Antietam, recognizing an “infirmity of judgment he disclosed at no other time.”¹ Brig. Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, respected contemporary artilleryman turned objective army chronicler, phrased it more bluntly, “And this, I think, will be pronounced by military critics to be the greatest military blunder that General Lee ever made.”² Such criticism, however, has neglected

to address adequately the political-strategic imperatives that influenced Lee's behavior at Antietam, while also assuming that Lee *sought* a purely defensive battle in which he could, at best, break even. Lee, throughout his tenure as army commander, repeatedly chose to accept significant tactical risk in the dogged pursuit of strategic, war-winning effect. Given this observation, let us review Lee's strategic goals and then examine why he may have had other plans for Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac along the banks of Antietam Creek on 17 September 1862.


War is a violent act with a political purpose.³ The Confederate policy objective during the Civil War was the attainment of independence and sovereign autonomy from the United States. Southern military strategy and power were directed exclusively toward this end. Recognizing the disparity in resources, however, Lee understood that the Confederacy could not achieve a traditional military victory.⁴ Consequently, he viewed the best strategy

to obtain Southern independence was through undermining the Union's popular will to continue the war. Lee's intent, as articulated by his military secretary, Charles Marshall, was “to impress upon the minds of the Northern people the conviction that they must prepare for a protracted struggle, great sacrifices in life and treasure, with the possibility that all might at last be of no avail; . . . The credit [strength] of the Federal Government did not depend upon its actual [military and economic] resources more than it depended upon moral causes [popular will].”⁵ Southern victory and political independence would result when the Northern people quit the contest, manifested in the overthrow of President Abraham Lincoln's administration and the Republican Party, in favor of the “Peace Democrats,” at the polls.


Lee expressed precisely these views to Confederate President Jefferson Davis in 1862, asserting that Northern voters will “determine at their coming elections whether they will support those who favor a prolongation of the war, or those who wish to bring it to



Edward Porter Alexander, shown here as a colonel, c. 1863



General McClellan



Charles Marshall, shown here as a lieutenant colonel, c. 1864

a termination.” He again emphasized this point more succinctly in 1863 to his wife, “The Republicans will be destroyed and I think the friends of peace will become so strong as that the next administration will go in on that basis.”⁶


The traditional design employed by a weak nation against a significantly stronger adversary is a strategy of exhaustion, whereby the protagonist leverages time with continued, persistent resistance in order to undermine the enemy’s political and popular will. General George Washington skillfully utilized such a strategy against British land forces during the American Revolution to sustain the cause in the long years prior to French intervention.⁷ Lee, however, rejected the strategy of Washington because—given the depth of Northern resources and ubiquitous Federal access to Southern coastal and border regions—insufficient time would be available to withstand Union military and economic power adequately to extinguish Northern will. Moreover, the domestic and political climate of the Confederacy would not permit Southern generals to yield significant territory to preserve their armies in the manner employed by

Washington; optimistic Confederate political leaders and impatient state populaces demanded aggressive action and battlefield results. Likewise, given the pronounced disparity between Northern and Southern manufacturing, financial, and manpower resources, Lee also dismissed the adoption of a protracted war of attrition as a feasible strategic option.⁸

Having rejected strategies of exhaustion and attrition, Lee tied Confederate fortunes to the pursuit of a decisive battle of annihilation. He adamantly believed that only the utter destruction of the Army of the Potomac—the most politically significant Union force—would produce the psychological blow required to collapse Northern will. Moreover, such a decisive battlefield triumph was the only means of producing a war-winning strategic effect within the constrained timeframe before the Union achieved inevitable victory with its superior resources.⁹ Accomplishing the ruin of an opposing army in a battle of annihilation is a daunting challenge, achieved only rarely, and perhaps best exemplified by Napoleon’s victories at Austerlitz (1805) and Jena-Auerstädt (1806) in which he decimated the

Austro-Russian and Prussian armies, respectively. Given the long odds entailed in orchestrating a victory of this magnitude, skeptical historians will likely always regard Lee’s quest as a flawed quixotic enterprise. However, preeminent American military historian Russell F. Weigley admitted a change in his thinking regarding Lee’s strategic vision. Critical of the Confederate general in his landmark book, *The American Way of War*, Weigley’s subsequent appraisal fully endorsed Lee in seeking the destruction of the Army of the Potomac as “the only real chance he had to win the war—though it was still a very long shot.”¹⁰


Lee’s steadfast commitment to a strategy of annihilation is best illustrated by his unconcealed disappointment in the wake of three of his greatest victories: the Seven Days Battles, and the Battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Although he saved Richmond following a week of sustained action during the Seven Days in June and July 1862, Lee’s official report revealed his frustration: “Under ordinary circumstances the Federal Army should have been destroyed.”¹¹ More blatantly, and despite inflicting a catastrophic defeat on the Army of



General Walker

the Potomac at Fredericksburg on 13 December 1862, Lee admitted, “I was much depressed,” and asserted that he “had really accomplished nothing” because the Federals had escaped destruction.¹² In an uncharacteristic display of temper, the general verbally chastised his subordinates following his most famous triumph at Chancellorsville in May 1863. Angered that the Union army was allowed to disengage unmolested, Lee exclaimed, “You allow those people to get away. I tell you what to do, but you won’t do it! Go after them and damage them all you can!”¹³ He clearly understood that tactical victories lacking strategic effect gained nothing—and expended finite resources in manpower: “The lives of our soldiers are too precious to be sacrificed in the attainment of successes that inflict no loss upon the enemy beyond the actual loss in battle.”¹⁴ Simply put, Lee could only achieve strategic effect if he destroyed the Army of the Potomac, and every battle he fought that failed to do so made his army weaker and the task more difficult. Time, therefore, ticked inexorably against him.


Given Lee’s determination to annihilate the Army of the Potomac, coupled with his realization that any battle failing to achieve this goal was a



Brig. Gen. David R. Jones

wasted expenditure of army capital, it remains unlikely that he would *choose* to fight a purely defensive action in which destruction of his adversary was impossible. If one accepts this hypothesis, then Lee’s intentions at Antietam must be reevaluated. Unfortunately for the historian, Lee left no written or verbal record of his original plan of battle, and his official report provides only a summary of events after the fact.¹⁵ Perhaps, however, initial Confederate tactical deployments on the field—as well as other clues—can offer a window into Lee’s mind and reveal his real aim at Antietam: to stand not simply on the defense, but instead to set a trap for McClellan in which a significant portion of the Federal army would be isolated and destroyed.

The battlefield, wedged between Antietam Creek and the Potomac River, is dominated by a north-south ridgeline that follows the general route of the Harpers Ferry Road south of Sharpsburg and the Hagerstown Turnpike north of town. Lee positioned the right flank of his army—consisting of the divisions of Brig. Gens. John G. Walker and David R. Jones—along this ridge south of Sharpsburg and blocking the east end of the town. In the center, Lee deployed Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill’s division along the




General Hill




General Lawton

east face of the ridge, stretching north from the Boonsboro Turnpike along the Sunken Road and ending with an isolated brigade placed east of the Dunker church. The Confederate left wing included the divisions of Brig. Gens. Alexander R. Lawton and John R. Jones. Lawton posted two brigades between the Mumma Farm and the Hagerstown Turnpike on the east face



A postwar photo of John R. Jones, c. 1870

of the north-south ridge, while his other two brigades remained west of the turnpike and the ridge; likewise, John R. Jones' entire division was west of the road and the ridge. North of Sharpsburg, Lee placed the division of Maj. Gen. John B. Hood in immediate reserve behind the left flank. He retained in reserve just north of the



General McLaws


Shepherdstown Road near his headquarters the divisions of Maj. Gens. Lafayette McLaws and Richard H. Anderson—following their tardy arrival early on the morning of the battle.¹⁶

Analysis of Lee's deployment reveals significant tactical nuance. The right wing, commanded by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, was positioned to "defend




General Longstreet


forward" in relative close proximity to Antietam Creek, including a point defense of the Lower Bridge. The left wing, under the command of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, instead occupied a line created to "defend back," thereby forfeiting any means to contest a Federal crossing of the Upper Bridge or Pry's Ford. Lee's



General Hood



General Anderson




General Jackson

decision on the placement of Jackson's forces yielded Union access to open ground east of the Hagerstown Turnpike and provided a ready avenue of approach for McClellan to assail the Confederate left center (portions of Lawton's and D. H. Hill's divisions). Notably, yet obviously by design, Lee's line of battle contained numerous gaps; his willingness to accept risk in abandoning a conventional contiguous defense freed an unusually large force—three divisions—for his reserve. Moreover, Lee assigned his most offensively minded chief subordinate, Jackson, to the left, and detailed his best defensive general, Longstreet, to direct the right wing. The best two attack divisions in the army, those of John R. Jones and Hood, were also posted on the left with Jackson.¹⁷ And John R. Jones' division, rather than arrayed in a defensive posture, stood poised and ready to strike in a well-practiced Confederate assault formation: two brigades forward and two back.¹⁸


Significantly, only three and a half of Lee's divisions (of eight on the field) were visible to McClellan; all three Confederate reserve divisions (Hood, McLaws, and Anderson), John R. Jones' division, and two of Lawton's brigades were hidden west of the north-south ridgeline. McClellan observed that from Federal positions east of Antietam Creek it was impossible to see Confederate forces "concealed behind the opposite heights." Ezra Carmen, in his landmark study of the 1862 Maryland Campaign, echoed this point, "From the heights east of the Antietam, the eye could trace the [Confederate] right and center, but the extreme left could not be definitely located, nor was the character of the country on that flank known."¹⁹

What can be discerned from Lee's arrangements? Did Lee, a dangerous tactical virtuoso by any objective measure, craft a scheme of maneuver—a trap—in which he hoped to separate and destroy two or three of McClellan's six corps? The logic of his deployment offers a compelling possibility: By giving up a bridge and a ford, as well as excellent space for maneuver opposite his left center, Lee sought to




bait McClellan into crossing part of his army to the Confederate side of Antietam Creek so as to assail Lee's seemingly vulnerable flank. Once Federal forces were engaged and fixed in position, Lee would put his plan in motion with Jackson leading four reinforced divisions (John R. Jones,

Hood, McLaws, Anderson, and two of Lawton's brigades) from concealed locations behind the north-south ridge system to envelope and crush the attacking Union corps. If successfully executed, the balance of McClellan's army east of the creek would remain powerless to stop the devastation of



General Stuart



A postwar photo of William Blackford, c. 1885

the isolated Federal forces. The Confederate right wing, under Longstreet's able guidance and enjoying very advantageous defensive terrain, could easily resist any Federal pressure along that front. The trap sprung, Lee would achieve a decisive victory with significant political-strategic effect, thereby undermining Northern popular will to




Bodies of Confederate artillerymen near the Dunker church, September 1862

continue the struggle and perhaps enticing foreign recognition from Britain or France. This was not an unfamiliar formula. Lee's initial plans of maneuver during the Seven Days Battles attempted, unsuccessfully, to envelope and destroy a portion of McClellan's army separated by a water barrier.²⁰

A related vignette offers further insight into Lee's thinking. On 16 September 1862, the eve of battle, Lee instructed his cavalry chief, Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, to respond to Union probes toward his left flank. Stuart's staff engineer, Lt. Col. William W. Blackford, reported that "General Lee ordered Stuart to discover and unmask their [Federal] intentions and if necessary for this purpose to attack them with his whole cavalry force."²¹ One modern historian characterizes this mission as a "cavalry reconnaissance in force" with the aim of securing "routes to the north and northwest" in anticipation of Lee marching on Hagerstown, Maryland, to salvage his campaign and to seek battle on more favorable ground.²² It seems unlikely Lee would hazard his forces with such a risky move in the presence of the Northern army. Rather, given Blackford's description, Stuart's assignment appears to be a cavalry screen rather than a reconnaissance. The objective of such a screen would be to prevent Federal forces from crossing the

Hagerstown Turnpike and accessing ground west of the north-south ridge-line. Union occupation of this area would render a surprise Confederate counterstroke problematic; Stuart's mission, therefore, was probably designed to prevent this by funneling the Federal advance along an avenue of approach east of the turnpike, and into Lee's trap. Lee deemed success in this endeavor important enough that he instructed Stuart to use his entire force if necessary.

If, indeed, Lee's intention was to isolate and destroy a portion of McClellan's army at Antietam, then why did he not proceed with his plan? Though McClellan obliged Lee by dividing his army and sending three corps across the creek, Confederate designs were undone by the simple fact that the Army of Northern Virginia was too small on the day of battle. Lee's army—normally over 60,000 strong—fought at Sharpsburg with barely 40,000 soldiers on the field. In fact, some sources place Confederate strength as low as 30,000.²³ Consequently, divisions were the size of brigades and brigades the size of regiments. John R. Jones' division numbered less than 1,600 soldiers, while Lawton's division mustered barely 3,900; individually, these commands should have fielded well over 7,000 combatants under normal circumstances.²⁴



expend his tactical reserve piecemeal simply to hold the line. The striking divisions of Hood, McLaws, and Anderson were all committed before noon to redeem Confederate fortunes on the battlefield and prevent catastrophe. As such, Lee possessed no force to execute the decisive counterstroke he envisioned.

The bane of Lee during the Maryland Campaign was straggling, and this manpower hemorrhaging remains the primary cause for the army's atrophied state at Antietam. Significantly, once across the Potomac River, Lee admitted frankly to Davis on 13 September that "one great embarrassment is the reduction of our ranks by straggling, which it seems impossible to prevent. . . . Our ranks are very much diminished, I fear from a third to a half of the original numbers." Writing later in his official report, he attributed the straggling to "the arduous service in which our troops had been engaged, their great privations of rest and food, and the long marches without shoes over mountain roads," though he was quick to add that many abandoned the ranks for "unworthy motives."²⁶ The paucity of replacements for casualties sustained in the Seven Days Battles and the Second Bull Run Campaign also exacerbated Lee's manpower challenges, as well as the principled, though naïve, rejection of many Confederate soldiers to participate in armed aggression against Maryland and states north of the Mason-Dixon Line.²⁷

A final observation is germane. Though Lee found himself in a desperate fight at Antietam to hold his position and save his army, he still refused to abandon plans for a counterstroke. At midday, he instructed Jackson to prepare an attack to envelope the Union right flank and assail its rear. A sobering reconnaissance revealed Northern reinforcements arriving in strength opposite Jackson's mixed and paltry assault force of infantry and cavalry; consequently, even the aggressive Jackson demurred.²⁸ This order, despite constituting little more than a forlorn hope, reveals clearly Lee's dogged desire to strike the Federal army and achieve decisive offensive results.

Lee lamented in a postbattle letter to Davis that two of the brigades in David R. Jones' division numbered a paltry 120 and 100 men under arms. Likewise, dismal Confederate regimental strength at Antietam is exemplified by the experience of the 8th Virginia Infantry, 8th South Carolina Infantry,

and the 56th Virginia Infantry; these units mustered 34, 45, and 80 personnel, respectively, well below the nominal regimental strength of 350 to 400 men.²⁵ This tyranny of arithmetic forced Lee's hand at Antietam. Overwhelming Union pressure on his weakened divisions compelled him to



Battle of Antietam, by Thure de Thulstrup, 1887

The conventional view of Lee at Antietam fails to consider the strategic imperatives influencing the Confederate general's behavior, instead offering a myopic assessment confined within a tactical vacuum. To understand Lee's actions on any battlefield—at least through the Wilderness (5–6 May 1864)—two considerations prevail. First, he is there to destroy the Army of the Potomac, and second, he knows time is running out. Lee's operational and tactical designs consistently pursued political-strategic effect in their attempt to undermine or collapse Northern popular will and corresponding support for the war. He believed the psychological fallout resulting from the devastation of the Army of the Potomac would accomplish this end. Moreover, his chances were not endless. Every battle he fought that failed to achieve this objective served to weaken his vaunted army, the only instrument capable of achieving a victory of annihilation over his equally skilled adversary. For Lee, the obvious corollary of this calculus dictated that purely defensive battles only expended precious capital while affording scant opportunity to achieve strategic effect. Therefore, it seems logical to assume that while standing on the hills of Sharpsburg and contemplating the gathering Union host on the eve of battle, Lee had other plans in mind than merely standing passively, and unimaginatively, on the defensive. After all, he

was not on the field to win a battle; he was there to win the war.




NOTES

1. Douglas S. Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography, Volume II* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), pp. 409–10.
2. Edward Porter Alexander, *Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 145.
3. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 87.
4. Joseph L. Harsh, *Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861–1862* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1998), pp. 56–57.
5. Charles Marshall, *An Aide-de-Camp of Lee, Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall, Sometime Aide-de-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862–1865*, ed. Frederick Maurice (Boston: Little, Brown, 1927), pp. 74, 146.
6. Robert E. Lee, *The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee*, ed. Clifford Dowdey and Louis H. Manarin (New York: Bramhall House, 1961), pp. 301, 438.
7. Dialogue, Russell F. Weigley with Advanced Strategic Art Program students, 4 Feb 2004, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.
8. Harsh, *Confederate Tide Rising*, pp. 58–73.

9. Ibid.
10. Dialogue, Weigley with Advanced Strategic Art Program students, 4 Feb 2004.
11. Lee, *The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee*, p. 221.
12. Gary W. Gallagher, "The Yanks Have Had a Terrible Whipping: Confederates Evaluate the Battle of Fredericksburg," in *The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the Rappahannock*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), p. 131.
13. Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography, Volume II*, p. 557.
14. Lee, *The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee*, p. 389.
15. Ibid., pp. 312–24.
16. Charles H. Ourand, Map of the Battlefield of Antietam (surveyed by E. B. Cope), in *Atlas of the Battlefield of Antietam* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), maps 1, 2.
17. Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography, Volume II*, p. 387.
18. Ourand, Map of the Battlefield of Antietam, in *Atlas of the Battlefield of Antietam*, map 1.
19. Ezra A. Carman, *The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Ezra A. Carman's Definitive Study of the Union and Confederate Armies at Antietam*, ed. Joseph Pierro (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 203.
20. Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography, Volume II*, p. 110.
21. William W. Blackford, *War Years with JEB Stuart* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), p. 148.
22. Joseph L. Harsh, *Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1999), pp. 332–33.
23. Robert K. Krick, "The Army of Northern Virginia in September 1862: Its Circumstances, Its Opportunities, and Why It Should Not Have Been at Sharpsburg," in *Antietam: Essays on the 1862 Maryland Campaign*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), p. 39.
24. Carman, *The Maryland Campaign of September 1862*, p. 463.
25. Krick, "The Army of Northern Virginia in September 1862," pp. 44–45.
26. Lee, *The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee*, pp. 307, 322.
27. Stephen W. Sears, *Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1983), p. 71.
28. Ibid., pp. 274–75.

BOOKREVIEWS

Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War



By Douglas Porch
Cambridge University Press, 2013
(pbk. ed.)
Pp. xiii, 434. \$27.99

Review by Andrew J. Birtle

Douglas Porch, a professor at the U.S. Navy's Naval Postgraduate School, says he wrote this book because some of his students had returned from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

not only unsettled by their experiences in those countries, but also persuaded that the hearts and minds counterinsurgency doctrines they were dispatched to apply from 2007 were idealistic, when not naïve, impracticable, unworkable, and perhaps institutionally fraudulent. In short, they had been sent on a murderous errand equipped with a counterfeit doctrine that became the rage in 2007 following the publication of *FM* [Field Manual] 3–24: *Counterinsurgency* as prologue to the surge commanded by General David Petraeus in Iraq (p. xi).

The result is a relentless 400-page assault on contemporary U.S. counterin-

surgency doctrine. It is dense reading spiked at times with emotional, over-the-top language, but at the end of the day the book is worth examining. One may disagree with the author, but his work—based on an extensive reading of the literature and of the most recent scholarship in particular—cannot be dismissed.

Porch begins his attack on current doctrine not in the twenty-first century, but in the eighteenth, with an extensive review of French, British, and, to a much lesser extent, American experience with insurgency and counterinsurgency. The book takes the reader on a grand journey, from uprisings in France in the late eighteenth century, through various colonial ventures in Africa and Asia in the nineteenth, and into guerrilla, resistance, and revolutionary wars of the twentieth century in such diverse settings as Morocco, occupied France, Algeria, Latin America, Indochina, Vietnam, Malaya, Cyprus, Palestine, Kenya, and Ireland. The trip is not simple sightseeing because the U.S. Army claims that FM 3–24, *Counterinsurgency*, is based on a study of many of these conflicts, encapsulating what it believes are the timeless “best practices” of successful counterinsurgents such as Frenchman David Galula and Briton Sir Robert Thompson. Indeed, highly unusual for an Army manual, FM 3–24 includes a three-page bibliography of academic histories, theoretical musings, and participant accounts on the subjects of insurgency and counterinsurgency. By challenging the historical underpinnings on which U.S. counterinsurgency theory rests, Porch hopes to bring down the entire doctrinal house.

The author draws several conclusions from his review of past counterinsurgencies that contradict notions enshrined in current doctrine. First,

counterinsurgency is not a phenomenon apart from war—it *is* war and is ruled by the same principles that govern all human conflict. Second, conventional soldiers have been just as adept (or inept) as so-called specialists in counterinsurgency. He convincingly refutes the proposition put forward by John Nagl that the British became experts at counterinsurgency in the twentieth century while most Americans were slow learners. Since specialized doctrine and personnel have not proved to be a key ingredient of success, Porch questions the value of having a distinct doctrine, organization, and training for counterinsurgency. As a corollary, he also doubts the worth of Special Operations Forces, which he believes rarely have had much strategic impact.

Third, the author demonstrates that violence and coercion, not “winning hearts and minds,” have historically played center stage in counterinsurgency. He challenges Thomas Mockaitis’ assertion that the United Kingdom successfully practiced a distinctly enlightened approach built on the principles of “minimum force” and “the rule of law.” Citing recent scholarship, Porch shows that not only did the British rely on force extensively, but that to remain within the boundary of the law, they redefined the law so as to permit practices that no American would associate with the norms of a peacetime civil society. The author likewise questions the facts on which the U.S. Army based its canonization of David Galula as its patron saint of counterinsurgency. Galula, it appears, was not as successful as he and his American disciples have claimed.

Lastly, Porch’s review of history leads him to conclude that attempts to defeat insurgents through programs of modernization, development, civic action, reform, and nation building

have sometimes been counterproductive, have usually been naive and ethnocentric, and have nearly always failed to obtain the results desired. The problems are too difficult, the subject societies too complex, and the would-be social engineers too ignorant to have much success. The most practical achievement of such activities in Porch's mind is that they help sugarcoat what would otherwise be unpalatable conflicts by demonstrating for the public at home the nobility and goodness of the counterinsurgent's cause.

Having spent about three-quarters of the book questioning the historical legitimacy of contemporary doctrine, the author turns his sights on events since 11 September 2001. He makes a blistering attack on FM 3-24 and exposes what he believes are the myths surrounding the success of the 2007 troop surge in Iraq. He then concludes with a robust summary of why contemporary counterinsurgency theory is, in his mind, bogus.


The book has several shortcomings. Its coverage of American counterinsurgency experience is comparatively sparse, and the volume does not examine the war in Afghanistan in any detail. Of course, it is already lengthy, so publishing considerations may have come into play here. Porch also employs a sarcastic and condescending tone, particularly when discussing recent people and events, which do not serve him well. There will certainly be those who question some of his facts and interpretations, just as he has challenged the interpretations of others. Although I believe the author is largely correct in pointing to the practical failings of the hearts-and-minds school, he is too dismissive of the positive role that civil endeavors can play.

The author says the keys to success in counterinsurgency lie in politics and strategy. He makes a good point, and many of his criticisms of contemporary doctrine seem sound. But having torn down General Petraeus' doctrinal house of cards, I think Porch needs to propose an alternative. We cannot simply wish away counterinsurgencies. Given the current national climate, it may be some time before the United States enters another counter-

insurgency situation, just as several decades separated the Vietnam War from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But sooner or later the government will again call on soldiers to intervene in the internal conflicts of a foreign country, and when it does America's soldiers will need some form of doctrine to advise them. Not to have it would be as much a crime as having unrealistic doctrine of the type Porch claims FM 3-24 to be. Now is the time to develop such guidance. The Army possesses thousands of veterans who can help craft it based not on theories of political scientists or the interpretations of historians, but on their own firsthand experience. To be fruitful, the exercise must be brutally honest and devoid of the posturing, theoretical constructs, wishful thinking, and political correctness that has tainted the hearts-and-minds brand of counterinsurgency. Most importantly, the doctrine must jettison the righteous determinism of dogma.

The chief of staff of the Army has opened the door for the type of free-wheeling discourse that is necessary for the formulation of improved doctrine by placing Porch's provocative book on his reading list. I hope that the Army will build on the discussion to craft the kind of educational and doctrinal foundation that will best serve the nation when the government once again calls—as it surely will—on its soldiers to conduct internal wars and occupations in foreign lands.

Dr. Andrew J. Birtle is the chief of the Military Operations Branch at the U.S. Army Center of Military History where he oversees the writing of the official history of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. He has written two books about the history of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine. He is currently writing a book about U.S. Army activities in South Vietnam between 1961 and 1965.



Review by John R. Maass

Steven E. Siry's collection of brief Revolutionary War biographies focuses on those general officers in American service who were killed or mortally wounded in action during the struggle for independence (1775–1783). The author provides overviews of the lives of these generals, both militia and Continental, foreign and native born, in a “study of generalship, valor and death” (p. xi). Each chapter covers an individual general, and each is divided into three sections: “an overview of the military events leading to the final campaign” of each officer; background information on the officer; and an account of the general's final battle and demise. While some readers may find this structure too formulaic, it does offer a useful consistency for each short biography.


Ten generals paid the ultimate price while serving the American cause in the Revolution, some well known and some obscure. Two men were foreigners, Casimir Pulaski and Johann de Kalb, and died fighting the British in the South. Joseph Warren, Nathaniel Woodhull, and Nicholas Herkimer were generals of militia or state troops, while Richard Montgomery, Hugh Mercer, David Wooster, Francis Nash, and William L. Davidson were all Continental Army officers (as were de Kalb and Pulaski), although at the time of

his death at the Battle of Cowan's Ford in 1781 Davidson was in the militia service of North Carolina. With the exception of Woodhull, these officers were all killed or fatally wounded in the thick of heavy fighting, actively leading troops in positions of extreme danger. For most of the generals discussed, Siry includes detailed accounts of their deaths, which in several cases came only after days of intense suffering. For example, at the Battle of Princeton (1777) British troops surrounded Hugh Mercer after he was thrown from his horse, "clubbed him on the head with a musket," bayoneted him "numerous times, and left him for dead" (p. 47). An aide carried him to a nearby house, but shortly thereafter Mercer was captured by British troops. Although cared for by a British Army doctor, he died nine days after receiving his wounds.

Many of these generals had seen military duty prior to the Revolutionary War, including Montgomery, who had been a veteran British regular officer. Woodhull, Mercer, Wooster, and Herkimer had all served with colonial forces during the French and Indian War (1754–1763), while Nash had been active in the service of the Crown during the North Carolina Regulation (1766–1771) and fought at the Battle of Alamance Creek. Pulaski had a limited military background in Poland, while de Kalb had been in uniform in Europe since the early 1740s. Warren and Davidson had no military experience before the Revolutionary War, as both were too young to participate in the French and Indian War.

Siry has pieced together ten biographical sketches of generals, about whom little has been written in the past few decades, particularly regarding Woodhull, Wooster, Nash, and de Kalb. The author, however, expresses no opinions on the officers he describes, their experiences, or their leadership styles. Siry has no interpretive angle and draws no conclusions—in fact he does not even summarize the information he has provided the reader. In this sense, perhaps this slim volume will be most valuable as an introductory reference work.

Dr. John R. Maass is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Washington and Lee University and a Ph.D. in early U.S. history from the Ohio State University. He is the author of the first pamphlet in the Center of Military History's Campaigns of the War of 1812 series, titled *Defending a New Nation, 1783–1811* (Washington, D.C., 2013).



Review by Alan M. Anderson

Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, Prince von Wahlstatt and Prussian field marshal, usually is remembered as the general who hated Napoleon and the French with a passion and who would have chased them to the ends of the earth. Known by the sobriquet "Marshal Forward," Blücher often is portrayed as a general who did not understand strategy, who could barely read a map, and who could hardly write or speak proper German. The popular image of him is that of the risk-taking hussar who was always attacking (often without success). He was dismissed from the Prussian Army and once claimed he was pregnant with an elephant. Yet he returned to help the Duke of Wellington finally defeat Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo.

In *Blücher: Scourge of Napoleon*, Michael V. Leggiere successfully reveals a clearer, more nuanced picture of the Prussian field marshal. The author, who teaches history at the University of North Texas, corrects many long-held misunderstandings and further establishes Blücher as one of the great military leaders of the Napoleonic era. *Blücher* has two primary goals. First, it seeks to correct misperceptions regarding Blücher's abilities as a general and leader of men, particularly by analyzing his performance during the years 1807–1812. This analysis shows that his chief of staff, August von Gneisenau, was not the real commander of the forces assigned to Blücher as has often been claimed, but rather the two men worked together as a team—a very successful one. Second, the book seeks "to evaluate the effect of Blücher's operations on Napoleon" and "explain how the Prussian played the most decisive role in the campaigns of 1813, 1814, and 1815" (p. xvi). To achieve these goals, Leggiere principally uses Blücher's own words to "capture his essence" (p. xvii). The end result is a portrait of a man who was a tough-as-nails leader, who cared deeply for his men and was in turn beloved by them (especially the Russian troops under his command), and who hated war and its effects. At the same time, Blücher was a devoted family man, husband, father, and landowner who made great efforts to support his family and even his former soldiers.

The early years of Blücher's military career were inauspicious, to say the least. He joined a Swedish hussar cavalry regiment at the age of fifteen during the Seven Years' War. Captured a little more than two years later by Prussian forces, within a month Blücher had changed sides—a common practice at the time—and received an appointment in the Belling Hussars, known for their colorful uniform, "total death" emblem, and "victory or death" motto. But by the age of thirty, in 1773, Blücher had been dishonorably discharged from the army by Frederick the Great. He spent the next fourteen years begging and pleading to be reinstated, before finally achieving that goal in 1787.

During the Wars of the First, Second, and Third Coalitions against France,

Blücher proved his prowess in battle, slowly rising through the ranks to that of general. But he also revealed his lack of tact, often writing with extreme candor to his king. After the Battle of Austerlitz in December 1805, Blücher urged King Frederick William III to return to war against France. Blücher got his wish in the War of the Fourth Coalition. He commanded the Prussian advance guard at the Battle of Auerstedt, a disastrous defeat that ultimately resulted in Blücher having to surrender what remained of his two corps after several months of retreat. However, it was in this defeat that his hatred of the French and especially Napoleon was born. Formally exchanged for a French general following his surrender, after learning of the onerous terms of the Treaty of Tilsit, “Blücher left Swedish Pomerania with a burning hatred for Napoleon, a personal vendetta the likes of which the emperor might have encountered on his native Corsica” (p. 112).

Prussia was reduced to a second-rate power and virtual vassal of France. Over the next five years Blücher’s correspondence reveals both someone who suffered bouts of depression and illness, and a true patriot who was willing to disobey his monarch by writing poorly considered letters urging defiance of France. Reprimanded by Frederick William on more than one occasion, Blücher alternated between despair and agitating for a return to action against the accursed French. Despite being over sixty years of age, Blücher yearned for battle. After Prussia’s army corps, which had been forced to invade Russia as an ally of France in 1812, agreed to become neutral, King Frederick William finally decided to act. He assigned Blücher the command of an army corps in February 1813 for the campaign to free Prussia from France.

As Leggiere establishes, Blücher’s actions during the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 disclose a more nuanced view of his generalship. He often acted with restraint, contrary to the popular perception of the headstrong hussar. Moreover, inconsistent with his *nom de guerre* of Marshal Forward, in the fall of 1813 Blücher retreated four times rather than do battle with Napoleon on unfavorable terms. His actions created the conditions

that resulted in Napoleon’s devastating defeat at the Battle of Leipzig on 16 October 1813, a battle in which Blücher played a critical role. Promoted to field marshal for his victories, he ruthlessly pursued Napoleon’s defeated army to the Rhine, freeing Prussia from France.


Although given a smaller role in the 1814 campaign, Blücher again followed the demands of coalition warfare and subordinated his plans to those of the allied leaders. He did not rush forward heedlessly. He “learned important lessons about coalition warfare that shaped his attitude in 1815” (p. 434). As the author shows, although Blücher made operational errors that culminated in the disaster of Napoleon’s Six Days Campaign, these mistakes resulted to a great extent from the demands of the allied forces and the failure of the allied armies to properly coordinate their actions. “Careful assessment suggests that sound reasoning based on Napoleonic (or what contemporaries called ‘modern’) warfare instead of revenge and hatred guided Blücher’s actions during the 1814 campaign” (p. 442).

Following Napoleon’s defeat and first abdication, Blücher was feted far and wide and looked forward to a quiet retirement. But Napoleon had other ideas. Recalled in 1815, Blücher’s actions at Ligny on 16 June 1815 demonstrate that, like Napoleon, he understood the need to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield. Blücher moved toward the sound of the guns at Waterloo on 18 June because he respected Wellington as a battlefield commander and wanted to defeat Napoleon. Although Wellington later minimized the significance of Blücher’s arrival against Napoleon’s flank and rear at Waterloo, it was the timely arrival of Blücher’s forces that routed the French Army. Blücher’s “stand at Ligny and his march to Waterloo do not represent the rash, irrational actions of Marshal Forward, but instead were decisions based on experience and reality” (p. 446).

Leggiere’s book represents an insightful and interesting analysis of one of the leading military commanders of the Napoleonic wars. A far different picture of Field Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher than the traditional one emerges as a result of the author’s efforts to let

Blücher tell his story in his own words to the greatest extent possible. *Blücher* should be of interest to those seeking a better understanding of the man and the military leader and of the development and execution of his operations in defeating Napoleon.

Alan M. Anderson is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, who expects to complete his degree in 2015. He received his J.D. degree from Cornell University and a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University. He was awarded the 2013–2014 Rear Admiral John D. Hayes Pre-doctoral Fellowship by the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command and the 2009–2010 Edward S. Miller Research Fellowship in Naval History by the U.S. Naval War College.



Review by Mark L. Bradley

Pvt. George A. Hitchcock kept a diary from the time he enlisted in the 21st Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry on 7 August 1862 until his discharge 2½ years later. A raw youth of

eighteen when he entered the Union Army, Hitchcock—like so many other soldiers who survived the war—left the service a much older man than his years suggested. What separates Hitchcock from other enlisted men was the meticulous record he kept of his experiences while in uniform, even during the harrowing months he spent as a prisoner of war at notorious Andersonville and other Confederate prisons.

Hitchcock actually left two versions of his diary, and both were edited by Ronald G. Watson. The later version dates from 1890 and was published in 1997 under the title *From Ashby to Andersonville: The Civil War Diary and Reminiscences of Private George A. Hitchcock, 21st Massachusetts Infantry*. As the title indicates, Hitchcock fashioned a hybrid work in which the wartime diary and the postwar reminiscences were merged into a seamless narrative. While this harmonious blending enhances readability, it tends to make recognizing where the one picks up and the other leaves off difficult at best—that is, until the recent publication of the original diary minus the later commentary. Fortunately for posterity, Hitchcock's great-great-granddaughter had the diary in her possession and made it available to Watson.

The editor makes skillful use of introductions to place each chapter of the diary in its proper context, and his explanatory notes are full yet unobtrusive. Here and there Watson inserts brief passages from Hitchcock's postwar reminiscences to enhance certain diary entries. A paginated list of maps and illustrations at the front of the book would have been helpful, but that is a minor omission in an otherwise well-organized and handsome volume.

Hitchcock traveled extensively during his years of service. In the latter part of 1862, he participated in the Maryland and Fredericksburg campaigns in the Eastern Theater before his regiment—and the rest of the IX Corps—was sent West by rail in March 1863. For Hitchcock and his comrades, danger seemed to lurk

in the most unlikely places. During a stop at Columbus, Ohio, some of the troops clashed with the provost guard, resulting in several fatalities. Over the next year, Hitchcock served in central Kentucky and eastern Tennessee, taking part in Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside's successful Knoxville Campaign. After a lengthy hospital stay and a furlough, Hitchcock rejoined the 21st Massachusetts Infantry—which had since returned to Virginia—in time to participate in the Overland Campaign of 1864. Just a few weeks later, Hitchcock was captured and spent the next six months as an inmate at Libby Prison (Richmond, Virginia), Camp Sumter (Andersonville, Georgia), Camp Lawton (Millen, Georgia), and Florence (South Carolina).

Hitchcock's powers of description are considerable. On 14 September 1862, he underwent his baptism of fire at Fox's Gap. "As we cross the deep cut," he writes, "we see the road literally packed with dead and dying rebels . . . , and here the horrors of war are revealed as we saw the heavy ammunition wagons come tearing up right over the dead and dying, mangling many in their terrible course, while the shrieks were perfectly heart-rending" (p. 27). Hitchcock survived his first battle and soon developed into a proficient soldier whose scorn for incompetent officers surfaced in comments such as these:

With the usual slim judgment of our leader the regiment, which has become tender and unfit for campaigning after a few months of quiet and ease, is started off at a very quick step, almost double-quick, for its march of thirty-six miles. Presuming he has never attended horse-racing or any other human race, we give him proper credit, feeling that simply common sense would teach anything but a grown-up baby that the best way to get over the road in good condition would be to begin "easy" and work into a livelier step afterward (p. 95).

The grueling, all-night march left the disgusted Hitchcock with numerous

blisters on his feet, compelling him to hitch a ride on a baggage wagon.

Sloppy generalship caused Hitchcock's capture in the Battle of Bethesda Church on 2 June 1864. After discovering that the Confederates had outflanked his brigade and cut off his line of retreat, Hitchcock decided to surrender rather than risk being shot down. For the next six months he was a prisoner of war. His descriptions of life at Andersonville detail a desperate struggle for survival under appalling conditions. In addition to trigger-happy prison guards, sickness, and starvation, Hitchcock and his fellow inmates had to beware of outlaws known as the Raiders, who preyed on the weak and the infirm. Hitchcock reports that with the aid of the Confederate prison authorities, the prisoners formed an ad hoc police force. Armed with clubs, the police quite literally broke up the gang of robbers and restored order in the camp.

On 8 December 1864, a Confederate surgeon at the Florence prison told an amazed Hitchcock, "You may go." After spending Christmas in New York, he returned home to Ashby, Massachusetts, in time to bring in the New Year with his family. He did not return to the Union Army and was discharged on 26 January 1865. Although Hitchcock's long incarceration had left him in poor health, he lived until 1913. No less surprising, his diary is virtually free of bitterness. Scholars and other interested readers will appreciate a diary from an enlisted man who experienced so much of the Civil War and who wrote about it with such astuteness and eloquence.

Dr. Mark L. Bradley is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is the author of *Bluecoats and Tar Heels: Soldiers and Civilians in Reconstruction North Carolina* (Lexington, Ky., 2009).



A Brave Soldier & Honest Gentleman: Lt. James E. H. Foster in the West, 1873–1881

A BRAVE SOLDIER & HONEST GENTLEMAN
LT. JAMES E. H. FOSTER IN THE WEST, 1873–1881
BY THOMAS R. BUECKER



By Thomas R. Buecker
Nebraska State Historical Society,
2013
Pp. xi, 210. \$29.95

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

In October 1873, James E. H. Foster was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Regular Army. He spent most of the next decade as a cavalry officer, until his untimely death from “consumption” (tuberculosis) in May 1883. Foster left an illustrated journal covering some of the events of his military service, and in the early 1990s that journal was donated to the Museum of Nebraska Art, in Kearney. Thomas R. Buecker, a curator at the Nebraska State Historical Society’s Nebraska History Museum, in Lincoln, has been able to reconstruct a fairly detailed biography of Lieutenant Foster, relying on that journal as well as many other documents that he was able to access in the National Archives, in Washington, D.C.

James Foster was born in Pittsburgh in June 1848. During the Civil War, he enlisted for one hundred days of service in the First Battalion Pennsylvania Light Artillery, although he was only fifteen years of age. His battery helped to man the defenses of Washington, D.C., and he came under fire when a 14,000-man Confederate force under Lt. Gen. Jubal Early attacked the outskirts of Washington in the summer of 1864. In 1865, Foster had three more months of military duty with the

155th Pennsylvania Infantry, which uniformed itself in gaudy Zouave attire. In May, he proudly marched with the victorious Army of the Potomac during its Grand Review down Washington’s Pennsylvania Avenue, and in June he mustered out of the Union Army.

Back home in Pittsburgh, Foster decided to enlist in the 18th Regiment of the Pennsylvania National Guard—the “Duquesne Greys.” He rose to be a first lieutenant and adjutant in that regiment, which was then primarily a social organization. In late 1872, Foster decided that he missed the profession of arms, so he began applying for a commission in the Regular Army. Most officers came from the United States Military Academy, but there were provisions for awarding shoulder straps to qualified active-duty noncommissioned officers and also for talented civilians (especially Civil War veterans) to request direct commissions. After appearing before a board of officers and passing an examination, Foster was commissioned in the 3d U.S. Cavalry (his second choice of regiment), which was then stationed in the Army’s Department of the Platte (Iowa, Nebraska, northern Utah, and Wyoming).

In November 1873, Lieutenant Foster arrived at Fort McPherson, on the Platte River in central Nebraska. The post was home to the regimental headquarters and five of the 3d Cavalry’s twelve lettered companies—about 270 officers and men. Foster was assigned to Company I and found that he was the only officer present. In fact, he spent nearly two years in that unit before he even met his company captain. He had no time to feel overwhelmed, however, because on 4 December he left the fort on a routine 15-day scout of 291 miles into the Dismal and Loup Rivers country. In his journal entries on the “Dismal River Scout,” Foster commented on the swearing abilities of “Limber Jim,” a civilian teamster: “Jim was a scientific rotary of profanity. He could swear more in the same breath than any living man west of the Missouri and it is fair to presume could beat the world in that line” (p. 44).

Lieutenant Foster participated in other relatively short scouts, and in 1875 he was a member of the Jenney Expedition, a major scientific mission sponsored by the U.S. Geological Survey to explore and map the Black Hills in the Dakota Territory. After taking nearly five months to cover almost 800 miles, the expedition ended at Fort Laramie in October.


The next year, Foster saw action during the Great Sioux War and handled himself well. After the 17 June Battle of the Rosebud, in southeastern Montana, his company commander, Capt. William H. Andrews, reported, “I desire to mention the distinguished gallantry of 2d Lieut [*sic*] J. E. H. Foster who acted throughout the whole affair in the most efficient manner, displaying courage and bravery of a very high-order” (p. 125). The author maintains that Foster anonymously wrote an account of the battle by “Z” that appeared in the *New York Graphic* a few weeks later.

In October 1876, Foster’s company was transferred to Fort Fetterman, in eastern Wyoming. Located on a plateau above the North Platte River, the fort was a desolate duty station where “high winds and low temperatures” prevailed during the winter (p. 155). These harsh weather conditions aggravated respiratory problems that had plagued Foster since his first winter at Fort McPherson, and he spent much of the time from 1879 until 1883 on leave, including several months in Nassau, in the Bahamas, trying to restore his health. In fact, of his nine years and eight months on active duty, he was on leave of absence, sick in quarters, absent sick, or on sick leave for a total of four years and nine months—almost half of his time in the Army. Sadly, Foster’s tuberculosis worsened, and he died at his family’s home in Pittsburgh.

A Brave Soldier & Honest Gentleman offers a fascinating look at the rigors of military service on the American frontier during the first decades after the Civil War. The author has done a commendable job of piecing together Lieutenant Foster’s career, and the color reproductions of the illustrations and maps from his journal greatly enhance the text. This oversized volume

is very fairly priced and would make an excellent addition to any library covering the Indian-fighting Army.

Roger D. Cunningham graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1972 and retired from the U.S. Army in 1994. He is the author of *The Black Citizen-Soldiers of Kansas, 1864–1901* (Columbia, Mo., 2008), as well as numerous articles and book reviews, many of which have appeared in this journal.



Review by Mark Klobas

World War I is usually portrayed in historical literature as a transformative event that defined the twentieth century. Numerous volumes have been written that detail the changes the conflict brought to warfare, domestic politics, and society and culture in the nations and regions involved. In this book, William Mulligan extends this dynamic to international politics as well by positing that the conflict established a new paradigm of peace, which “was imagined and constructed in new ways that had an enduring legacy in twentieth-century international rela-

tions” (p. 4). While not discounting the standard justifications for the war as one of national defense, he argues that the war was presented by its participants as one from which a better world would emerge, one based not on national military power but founded on international law and multinational institutions.

Adopting the argument of the French politician Stephen Pinchon, Mulligan sees the origin of the war not with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, or indeed in any conflict within Europe, but within the Second Moroccan Crisis and Italy’s invasion of the Ottoman Empire’s North African provinces in 1911. The two events in combination undermined the system by which the European powers had restrained rivalries and managed political change since the 1870s. Italy’s victory weakened the Ottoman Empire, opening the way for the Balkan states to carve up the empire’s European territory in the First Balkan War. Though the European powers attempted to stabilize the situation through a renewed Concert of Europe, the same national ambitions that were at play in 1911 thwarted the effort, reemerging once again in the aftermath of the archduke’s assassination to bring about war in 1914.

Yet even as Europe went to war to fight for national interests, the belligerents justified their involvement by invoking broader moral concerns. The author treats this rhetoric as more than just propaganda, seeing it as establishing expectations for what results the warring populaces could expect from the conflict. Often it served as cover for the territorial ambitions of participants such as Japan; yet even in those cases, it reflected the belief that a different world order would come from the contest, one rooted in a new set of principles. Mulligan sees such language as reflecting both “the emerging normative environment of the new international order” and the effort to appeal to the constituencies within their own countries to justify continuing the struggle (p. 218).

Prominent among the peace initiatives were those of American President

Woodrow Wilson. His proposals appealed to the Germans more and more in the autumn of 1918 as the population began to recognize Germany’s impending defeat. The subsequent peace conference in Paris, however, demonstrated the limits of the new paradigm in defining the settlement. Nonetheless, the author argues that the conference represented the first step in establishing the new paradigm, as “the negotiations and debates created new states, new institutions, and new norms that constituted the basis of the international order” (p. 267). Even critics of the resulting treaty, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, reflected the changes that had taken place by drawing on the rhetoric of international cooperation and peace to justify their opposition to the agreement. Though hobbled as the Versailles Treaty was by national interests, Mulligan sees the treaty and its attendant agreements as providing the foundation for the peacemaking efforts that followed, with the wartime belligerents and the postwar authoritarian regimes of Italy and the Soviet Union all gradually “socialized into the international order” as equal participants (p. 338). The conferences at Washington in 1921–1922 and at Locarno, Switzerland, in 1925 served as the culmination of this new international order, as both supplied the framework for managing tensions in East Asia and Europe, though one that would ultimately prove less enduring than its participants had hoped.


For this book, the author has drawn from much of the recent scholarly literature about World War I to offer a thought-provoking interpretation of its legacy for the international political order. Yet it suffers from two flaws. The first is that, in his effort to explain the context of the war, the author often gets lost in a general political history of the conflict. Often pages will go by in which his thesis is subsumed into a general description of the political changes brought about by the war, one which does not come across as especially relevant. The other is the failure to extend his analysis past the apparent triumph of the new international order in the mid-1920s to address both its failings in the 1930s and its reestablish-

ment after World War II. While this would certainly have complicated the argument he is making, it would also have helped to explain why such an approach endured, especially after its drastic failure to stem the expansionist aggressions of the Axis powers, which were the exact sort of threat the new system was created to address. Perhaps Mulligan will follow up this book with a successor volume, one that will elaborate further on his line of reasoning and provide a provocative new way of considering how World War I shaped the world in which we live today.

Mark Klobas teaches history at Scottsdale Community College in Scottsdale, Arizona. A graduate of Texas A&M University, he is the author of several book reviews and is currently at work on a biography of the twentieth-century British newspaper editor James Louis Garvin.



Going for Broke: Japanese American Soldiers in the War Against Nazi Germany



By James M. McCaffrey
University of Oklahoma Press, 2013
Pp. xv, 408. \$34.95

Review by James C. McNaughton

This popular history has little new to offer about two well-known units, the 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate) and the 442d Regimental Combat

Team (RCT). Previous books have told the story of these segregated Japanese American units with better insight and deeper understanding. Although the author, James M. McCaffrey, has produced several works that focus on American soldiers during a broad time span, *Going for Broke* is his first venture into the field of the Japanese American military experience.

Writing about these units is more challenging than for most other U.S. Army units during World War II. First, they were created at a time of deep prejudice against Americans of Japanese ancestry. Second, the second-generation (*Nisei*) soldiers differed from typical GIs in some important respects, although they amply proved their valor and loyalty. Third, each unit initially followed a different trajectory until they were combined in August 1944. The 100th Battalion was composed of *Nisei* from Hawaii who had been drafted before the Pearl Harbor attack. The Hawaiian Department shipped the draftees to the mainland in June 1942, and the battalion went into combat in southern Italy in September 1943. In contrast, the War Department formed the 442d RCT in March 1943 from *Nisei* volunteers from Hawaii and the War Relocation Authority camps on the mainland, with an admixture of *Nisei* soldiers and Caucasian junior officers stationed on Army posts elsewhere in the continental United States. The 100th Battalion battled from Salerno to Cassino and Anzio with the 34th Infantry Division and then was combined with the 442d RCT during the Rome-Arno Campaign. The 442d RCT, now including the 100th Battalion, fought in the Vosges Mountains in France in October–November 1944 with the 36th Infantry Division, guarded the Franco-Italian border in the Maritime Alps during the winter of 1944–1945, and engaged in the culminating operations in northern Italy in April–May 1945 while attached to the 92d Infantry Division, a segregated African American unit. The *Nisei* soldiers saw some of the toughest sustained ground combat that American infantrymen experienced anywhere during the entire war. During the final campaign, the combat team's organic artillery, the 522d Field

Artillery Battalion, was retained by the Seventh Army for the attack into southern Germany, where it helped liberate a subcamp near Dachau. These complexities make the story hard to tell.

McCaffrey emphasizes the *Nisei*'s similarities to other American soldiers. To this end, he provides copious details on their training, rations, and weapons for readers who might be unfamiliar with the daily life of American soldiers in that era. In this he is not wrong, but that is only part of the story. He tries to personalize the tale by singling out one particular *Nisei* soldier, Carl K. Morita, who served with Headquarters Battery, 522d Field Artillery Battalion. But this plot device is ultimately unsuccessful. Morita was hardly a typical *Nisei* soldier, and his surviving letters shed little fresh light on the issues at hand. Drafted from Colorado before the war, neither Morita nor his family was subject to evacuation and internment. His letters are bland and unrevealing. For example, they say nothing about the tough fighting in the Vosges or the liberation of Dachau. McCaffrey supplements Morita's letters with quotations from oral histories available online but seems reluctant to mention other *Nisei* by name in the narrative, even when they were awarded the Medal of Honor, such as Pfc. Sadao Munemori.

When describing tactical actions, McCaffrey seldom goes beyond the usual sources, including the outstanding regimental history by Orville C. Shirey, *Americans: The Story of the 442d Combat Team* (Washington, D.C., 1946), and the still valuable work by Thomas D. Murphy, *Ambassadors in Arms: The Story of Hawaii's 100th Battalion* (Honolulu, Hawaii, 1954). He supplements these accounts with unit operational reports that veterans have expanded and posted to the Internet in recent years. The absence of maps makes following combat actions difficult. His bibliography is thorough, but he appears to have conducted little research into unit records or contemporary newspapers. Neither does he use the documentary films about *Nisei* soldiers that have appeared since the 1980s, nor the Hollywood film, *Go for Broke!* (MGM, 1951), a dramatization of Shirey's regimental history that was

produced with the assistance of many Nisei veterans and that popularized the slogan that gives McCaffrey his title.

McCaffrey does not adequately situate these soldiers in the context of Japanese American history. For example, he says little about what it was like to grow up Nisei in prewar America and the prejudice they faced after Pearl Harbor, even though this is what makes their story unique. He passes quickly over the registration crisis of early 1943, when Nisei men in the internment camps were asked to volunteer while they and their families were made to complete a controversial loyalty questionnaire. He does not mention the awards ceremony at the conclusion of fighting in the Vosges, when, to the ire of many Nisei, the division commander failed to adequately acknowledge the regiment's heavy sacrifices. This perceived insult often appears in stories about the unit, and the author uses a photograph from the ceremony as the cover of his book. He presents little about the Japanese American Citizens League or War Relocation Authority, both of which publicized the exploits of the Nisei soldiers for their own purposes.

Instead, we get frequent digressions about generic topics such as basic training ("the proper way to stand at attention") (p. 11), rations (C-rations included "ten different entrees") (p. 109), daily hygiene aboard a Liberty ship ("problematic") (p. 182), pack mules ("sometimes fractious and hard to work with") (p. 278), and the brothels of Naples, Leghorn, the Riviera, Paris, and Bavaria (pp. 216–17, 290, 324–25, 329). S. Sgt. Carl Morita, after seeing "the general run" of women in France, wrote to his family, "Me—I'll stick to American women" (p. 290).


In conclusion, I cannot recommend this work as an introduction. Instead, I would steer newcomers toward the basic sources cited above, as well as later accounts better informed by veterans, such as Chester Tanaka, *Go for Broke: A Pictorial History of the Japanese American 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team* (Richmond, Calif., 1982); Masayo Umezawa Duus, *Unlikely Liberators: The Men of the 100th and the 442nd*

(Honolulu, Hawaii, 1987); Lyn Crost, *Honor by Fire: Japanese Americans at War in Europe and the Pacific* (Novato, Calif., 1994); and Robert Asahina, *Just Americans: How Japanese Americans Won a War at Home and Abroad* (New York, 2006). Today's soldiers and scholars have much to learn from the story of the Nisei troops, but they would profit little from this flawed retelling.

Dr. James C. McNaughton, a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, is attending the U.S. Army War College as a civilian student. He received his bachelor's degree from Middlebury College, Vermont, and his master's and doctorate degrees in history from the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland. He is the author of *Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II* (Washington, D.C., 2006) and *The Army in the Pacific: A Century of Engagement* (Washington, D.C., 2012).



No Silent Night: The Christmas Battle for Bastogne



By Leo Barron and Don Cygan
NAL Caliber, 2012
Pp. xv, 414. \$26.95

Review by Mark W. Johnson

Although the attack and defense of the town of Bastogne, Belgium, during December 1944 and January 1945 looms large in the overall story of the Battle of the Bulge, one of the last ma-

ior German offensives on the Western Front in World War II, until recently only a few dated book-length narratives have been devoted to this topic, such as S. L. A. Marshall's *Bastogne: The First Eight Days* (Washington, D.C., 1946) and Fred MacKenzie's *The Men of Bastogne* (New York, 1968). With 2014–2015 being the seventieth anniversary of the battle, a spate of new books on Bastogne have become available.

No Silent Night: The Christmas Battle for Bastogne does not tell the complete story of the struggle for Bastogne, but it delves deeply into what turned out to be the strongest German attack on the American defensive perimeter: the Christmas Day offensive by elements of the 26th Volksgrenadier and 15th Panzergrenadier Divisions, the "climactic event of the Bastogne saga" (p. 5). Leo Barron and Don Cygan do well in setting the stage, relating the start of the Ardennes offensive from the point of view of Col. Heinz Kokott, commander of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, and then describing the hasty deployment of the 101st Airborne Division from its camp at Mourmelon-le-Grand, France, to Bastogne. The initial contacts on the northwest portion of the American lines during the week prior to Christmas are also covered in great detail.

The 25 December attack took place in an area that straddled the regimental boundary between the 502d Parachute Infantry and the 327th Glider Infantry. Although the authors meticulously describe small-unit actions involving numerous German and American units, two American leaders dominate the narrative: Lt. Col. Steven A. Chappius, commander of the 502d, and Lt. Col. Ray C. Allen, who led the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry (attached to the 327th). These commanders and their staffs were in the thick of the fighting, with Chappius' headquarters nearly overrun and Allen's briefly captured. Chappius and Allen were adept at making decisions under fire, and the leadership they provided was a key factor in the success of American arms that day. The performance of Allen and his battalion is particularly noteworthy since

this unit had been involved in heavy combat in the days leading up to the Christmas Day attack.

The authors tell more than just the story of the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne. Two lesser-known American units, the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 463d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, also receive their due. Neither of these outfits were organic elements of the 101st, and it was only through a combination of fortunate events that they ended up as part of the Bastogne defenses. Indeed, the ultimate defeat of the Christmas attack came about in large measure because of the firepower these units provided to the lightly armed paratroopers and glider infantrymen of the 101st. In highlighting the contributions of these different commands and also the critical role played by American airpower, *No Silent Night* underscores the fact that by late 1944 the U.S. Army in Europe fielded an integrated combined-arms team that was often the tactical master of its German adversary.

Barron and Cygan did their homework in terms of research, consulting the vast holdings of unit records and captured German documents in the National Archives. They also

interviewed a number of veterans—German, American, and local civilian—and spent time on the ground in Belgium to get familiar with the terrain. Their grasp of the conflict's environs is evident in the book's excellent cartography; the series of eight maps focus on tactical actions and add welcome clarity to the text.

There is little to criticize in *No Silent Night*. The authors incorrectly label one of the major German formations in the Battle of the Bulge as the Sixth SS Panzer Army (although that army contained a number of SS units, the SS descriptor was not an official part of the Sixth Panzer Army's title in December 1944), and on a couple of occasions refer to units of the U.S. Army Air Forces by the designation Army Air Corps. These are trifles, however. The only element of the narrative that gave me reason to pause was Barron and Cygan's statement that they "took the liberty of creating conversations or thought processes based on transcripts, notes, or accounts of what was said or done—particularly during command briefings" (pp. xi–xii). Their intent in doing so was to present events as a lively narrative instead of a "dry and boring account of what

was said." This technique does make for entertaining reading at times, but the numerous descriptions of facial expressions, hand gestures, and unspoken thoughts—few of which are probably substantiated in historical records—detract from the high scholarly standards the authors otherwise maintain.

No Silent Night: The Christmas Battle for Bastogne is a welcome addition to the recent stable of books that is shedding new light on the struggle for Bastogne.

Dr. Mark W. Johnson graduated from West Point in 1986 and retired from the Army in 2012. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the University at Albany, State University of New York, and is the author of *That Body of Brave Men: The U.S. Regular Infantry and the Civil War in the West* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003). He currently serves as the branch historian of the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.



ARMY HISTORY

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

A *Army History* welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army's history extends to the present day, and *Army History* seeks accounts of the Army's actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, preferably embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. Preferably, a manuscript should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and artworks to enable *Army History* to obtain permission to reproduce the images.

Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images by mail to Bryan Hockensmith, Managing Editor, *Army History*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5060.

NEWSNOTES

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY RELEASES NEW PUBLICATION

The Center of Military History recently published the final brochure in its U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812 series, *The Gulf Theater, 1813–1815*. This booklet tells the story of the climactic military operations of the War of 1812. Although the Gulf Coast was relegated as a minor theater for much of the conflict, British commanders focused attention on the region and the city of New Orleans after the twin defeats in September 1814 at Plattsburgh, New York, and Baltimore, Maryland. After Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson secured present-day Alabama and took the offensive into Florida, the main U.S. effort then shifted to the defense of New Orleans and maintaining control of the Lower Mississippi River.

The British invasion began with the 14 December 1814 naval battle of Lake Borgne and was followed by four land engagements. The narrative includes descriptions of these smaller actions before the decisive Battle of New Orleans on 8 January. The author explains that the Battle of New Orleans was neither the “last battle” nor was it fought “after the war ended,” which challenges two of the many myths associated with the conflict. The brochure’s conclusion analyzes the significance of the War of 1812 and the lessons it holds for today’s Army. This publication has been issued as CMH Pub 74–7 and is available for purchase from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.

EIGHTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOCIETY FOR MILITARY HISTORY

The Society for Military History (SMH) will hold its eighty-second annual meeting on 9–12 April 2015 at the Renaissance Montgomery Hotel & Spa at the Convention Center in Montgomery, Alabama. The conference is being hosted by the Air University Foundation. The theme is “Conflict and Commemoration: The Influence

of War on Society.” For more information, please visit the SMH 2015 Annual Meeting Web site: <http://www.smh-hq.org/2015/2015annualmeeting.html>.

NEW PUBLICATIONS FROM COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE PRESS

The international mobilization to save the Republic of Korea in June 1950 brought the Canadian Army into its first major sustained contact with the U.S. Army. The experience proved generally positive and laid the foundation for cooperation for hemispheric and European defense during the Cold War. The relationship of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group in Korea, and its rear echelon in Japan, to the U.S. Army was occasionally strained, however. In *Allies of a Kind: Canadian Army–US Army Relations and the Korean War, 1950–1953*, historian Allan R. Millett looks closely at how Canadian

forces prepared for combat in Korea and operated with their U.S. allies.

The Canadian Theater of the War of 1812 is often cited as an example of national unpreparedness because it led to a series of military defeats and a failure to accomplish national goals. The conflict also saw the transformation of the U.S. Army from a frontier constabulary into the tactical equal of the British Army in Canada. The *Staff Ride Handbook for the Niagara Campaigns, 1812–1814*, by Richard V. Barbuto, provides the framework for staff rides that can impart insights relevant to the modern military professional. This volume includes two innovations: it addresses three distinct and successive campaigns, and it does not use strip maps for direction.

PDF versions of both publications are available for download from the Combat Studies Institute’s Web site: <http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/lde/csi/pubs#new>.





ARMYHISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History