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The Professional Bulletin of Army History

ARMY HISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

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
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Issue Cover: The crew of an M113 armored cavalry assault vehicle, belonging to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, takes a break while on patrol in Vietnam. /Courtesy of Jack Campione

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

The Spring 2016 issue of *Army History* offers two interesting pieces from talented historians. The first article examines armored combat in Vietnam in 1965–1966, and the second, a commentary, discusses the challenges military historians face as the way the Army goes to war, and how it records that process, changes in the digital age.

John Carland, formerly a historian at the Center of Military History (CMH), delivers a compelling narrative about the Army's use of armor during the early days of U.S. combat operations in Vietnam. Specifically, Carland highlights the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment as it moved into the country, established a permanent base, and began to engage the enemy. In 1965–1966, there were still many questions about the effectiveness of armor in the terrain and fighting environment of Vietnam. Changes to the unit's structure, armor complement, weaponry, and tactics were made in preparation for the perceived difficulties, but were as yet, untested elements.

In the commentary, Lt. Col. Francis J. H. Park, an active duty officer assigned to CMH as part of the Army Chief of Staff's Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Study Group, comments on the changes military historians will need to make in order to write relevant, and accurate, histories in an ever-shifting digital age. The way the Army organizes, goes to, and fights wars has changed dramatically from the previous century. So too has the method in which deployed units maintain their operational records. Moving forward, military historians will face a myriad of new challenges as they strive to document the Army's history.

This issue's Artifact Spotlight examines material culture associated with the 6th Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, and its involvement in the Baltimore Riots in April 1861.

CMH's new executive director and chief of military history, Charles Bowery Jr., introduces himself to the Army history community and provides a few updates on the Center's various lines of effort. The director of Histories Division, Dr. James McNaughton, also offers timely comments on the progress and status of CMH's work on the official histories of Army operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, as usual, we feature a crop of interesting book reviews.

As always, I invite our readers to continue to submit articles on the history of the Army and welcome comments about this publication.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor



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
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ARMOR GOES TO WAR

THE 11TH ARMORED
CAVALRY REGIMENT
AND THE VIETNAM
WAR, DECEMBER 1965
TO DECEMBER 1966


By JOHN M. CARLAND



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A TIME FOR DIGITAL TRUMPETS EMERGING CHANGES IN MILITARY HISTORICAL TRADECRAFT

By FRANCIS J. H. PARK





THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

Army Historians Educate, Inspire, and Preserve

In the tradition of many Civil War soldiers who wrote letters home, “I seat myself and take pen in hand to send you a few lines.” It is an honor and a pleasure to offer this first note as the new executive director of the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH). The welcome I have received from the entire community of Army historians, archivists, and museum and heraldry professionals has been gratifying, and it is sincerely appreciated. I would also like to bid a fond farewell to Dr. Richard Stewart, who retired late last year as our chief historian following thirty years of dedicated service to the Army, both in and out of uniform. He ably dual-hatted as the chief historian and acting director for over a year, sacrificing his personal plans for the good of the Center. I must also publicly recognize our deputy executive director, Col. Gregory A. Baker, for facilitating my transition into the director’s chair by keeping the Center moving forward in a number of areas.

In one of his earlier columns, Dr. Stewart described his vision of a unified Army Historical Program, composed of many diverse activities that combine to serve the force. That vision resonates with me, and I intend to continue emphasizing it. I view the Center’s role as that of a facilitator for the entire program, while also serving as the command history office for the Army Staff. The Army Historical Program is really an enterprise, a team of teams that serves as the Army’s institutional memory. First, through our published works, staff support, and command historical support, we document and Educate, providing critical perspective to both the operating force and the generating force, resulting in more effective leaders, soldiers, civilians, and formations. Second, we Inspire the force through our preservation of shared traditions and memory in multiple, tangible ways. Finally, we Preserve our Army’s material culture and showcase these touchstones of our profession in innovative ways, to soldiers, civilians, their families, and the public. All of these efforts link the Army to American society.

As the new Chief of Military History, I inherit an organization already moving out on several critical lines of effort. As I write this, we are working with the hundreds of museum professionals within the Army museum system to refine the command and control, logistical, and administrative functions of our fifty-seven active Army museums. From January through June, I will be traveling to visit every one of our museums to meet with staff members and garrison support agencies to explain the plan and hear their concerns. I also hope to visit with command historians and the units they support in order to better understand what we do for the force. Our Histories Division continues to work on volumes that will complete our Cold War and Vietnam War official histories. This summer, the Center will publish a guiding framework for the official histories of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, building on the interim studies that are nearing completion.

I also want to take this opportunity to welcome a new member of our team here at the Center. A recent reorganization of functions at the Army level brought to CMH The U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry (TIOH). Although only twenty-one strong, TIOH is truly a national asset, providing heraldry support to the executive branch, Department of Defense, and all federal agencies. The director, Charles Mugno, a retired colonel, and his team maintain critical, tangible pieces of our heritage and traditions; as such, what they do is inherently nested with the missions and goals of our enterprise. Check out their Web site at www.tioh.hqda.pentagon.mil to see some of their beautiful work. If you wear an Army uniform or work in an Army facility, chances are it is all around you.

It is my distinct honor to serve within the Army Historical Program at this pivotal time. We continue to Educate, Inspire, and Preserve!



NEWSNOTES

CMH HISTORIANS PUBLISH NEW BOOKS




The Center of Military History (CMH) is pleased to announce recent publications by two of its historians. *The Road to Yorktown: Jefferson, Lafayette and the British Invasion of Virginia*, by John R. Maass, examines the events leading up to the Battle of Yorktown during the Revolutionary War, from the British invasion in 1781 to the showdown of Marquis de Lafayette and Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown. Maass, a graduate of Washington & Lee University, the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, and the Ohio State University, is also the author of *Defending a New Nation, 1783–1811*, the first title in CMH's series The U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812. *The Road to Yorktown* is available from The History Press for \$21.99.

Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War against East Germany, by Nicholas J. Schlosser, discusses Radio in the American Sector (RAIS), an organization whose mission was to undermine the Com-

munist propaganda in East Germany. Using broadcast transcripts, internal memorandums, and listener letters, Schlosser examines RAIS' influence on the population and on how the German Democratic Republic communicated its message during the occupation of Berlin through the construction of the Berlin Wall. Schlosser is a graduate of Binghamton University and the University of Maryland, College Park. *Cold War on the Airwaves* is available for \$50 from the University of Illinois Press.

NEW iBOOK AVAILABLE FROM THE COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE PRESS


The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press released an enhanced electronic version of its well-known study *Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008*, originally published in 2010. In this monograph, CSI tells the story of the soldiers of Company C, 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, and what they endured on 13 July 2008 while fighting in the Wanat village in the Waygal Valley. Nine American soldiers died during four hours of intense combat against insurgents while defending Combat Outpost Kahler despite having the initial advantage of numerical superiority and tactical surprise. This study does not draw final conclusions on the actions taken or decisions made, but outlines the events of the day through the eyes of Task Force Rock. The interactive version of *Wanat* offers 3D terrain views, video from U.S. and insurgent perspectives, photographs, maps, and infographics. To access a free download of this interactive book for your Apple device, visit <https://itunes.apple.com/us/book/wanat/id1031728372?ls=1&mt=11>.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. John M. Carland holds a bachelor's degree in political science and history from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, a master's degree in political science from the City College of New York, and a doctorate in history from the University of Toronto.

At the U.S. Army Center of Military History (1985–2002), he wrote *Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965–October 1966*; and at the Historian's Office, Department of State, he compiled and edited two documentary histories, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. 8, Vietnam, January–October 1972*, and *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. 9, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973*. In 2015, as a contractor, he completed a third State Department documentary history titled *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. 42, The Henry A. Kissinger–Le Duc Tho Negotiations, August 1969–December 1973*, which will be published in early 2017.



A propaganda leaflet distributed by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment meant to deter the Viet Cong, the text reads "Viet-Cong Beware!!"

ARMOR GOES — TO — WAR



The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Vietnam War, December 1965 to December 1966

BY JOHN M. CARLAND

In 1965, the United States Government made a series of fateful decisions about the conflict in Southeast Asia, the result of which was to place American ground forces at the forefront of South Vietnam's war against main force units of indigenous Communist guerrillas, the Viet Cong, and infiltrated North Vietnamese soldiers belonging to units of the *People's Army of [North] Vietnam*. As senior American military officers from Washington to Saigon considered how to fight and win the war, they focused on many questions. One was the use of armor: should it be employed in the intensifying conflict in South Vietnam, and if so, how and under what conditions? The American commander in South Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, had mixed feelings when he learned in late 1965 that the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), known as the Blackhorse Regiment, had become available for service in Vietnam. On the one hand, he believed that the regiment, as constituted, was "too heavy

for RVN's [Republic of Vietnam] heavy rains, difficult terrain, and limited capacity bridges," and thus unsuited for missions other than the traditional one of route security.¹ On the other hand, if the regiment became lighter before deployment, he was certain that it could take on a variety of missions and materially contribute to the struggle against the enemy. Therefore, he proposed in a late December message to the Department of the Army that the regiment, at present configured for fighting in Europe from which it had returned in 1964, be reconfigured so that light tanks replaced medium ones in each tank troop, that two armored personnel carriers took the place of three medium tanks in each armored cavalry platoon, and that armored cars were substituted for tracked command and reconnaissance vehicles. So equipped, Westmoreland argued,

Each squadron would have a light tank troop for contingency missions and three composite troops with capabilities for escort and patrol duty and for light assault/reaction forces. In the composite troop, some

soldiers could be employed as utility crewmen, adding firepower and dismountable strength to either the wheeled or tracked vehicle sections as required for specific tasks.²

Westmoreland's message launched a bureaucratic wrangle not resolved until March 1966. In January, the Department of the Army rejected his initial arguments. Time spent modifying existing equipment and training personnel on the new gear would substantially delay the regiment's movement to Vietnam. Moreover, the unit, as then outfitted, appeared capable of performing a variety of tasks other than route security so Westmoreland should accept the regiment as it was. Next, the U.S. Army, Pacific Command, located in Honolulu weighed in on Washington's side. The command contended that the 11th ACR should be deployed as scheduled and as equipped so as to "increase COMUSMACV's [Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] combat power soonest and provide a strong capability for route security,



National Archives



General Westmoreland

convoy protection, and screening operations.” Westmoreland’s response was that of a poker player with a strong hand: he would not back down, and he would not accept an unmodified cavalry regiment. Indeed, he upped the ante by asserting that if the regiment could not be modified according to his needs, he wanted a mechanized brigade in its place. The Continental Army Command supported Westmoreland on this issue, recommending on 19 February that the 11th ACR be inactivated and that the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, in the process of activation, be converted to a mechanized brigade for Westmoreland. This two-front assault brought about a compromise. After reexamining the

question and back-pedaling, the Army went along with Westmoreland and decided that an armored cavalry regiment altered along the recommended lines could function successfully in South Vietnam. Therefore, it should be so modified, after which the Army could in good conscience recommend that the regiment, rather than a mechanized brigade, deploy to Vietnam.³

In the resolution of this conflict, Westmoreland obtained much of what he had asked for in December 1965. The Army agreed to eliminate each platoon’s three tanks, thus doing away with the tank squad, and to replace each tank with two armored personnel carriers, and additionally agreed to substitute the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) for the M114 Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV), then on the regiment’s inventory. The M113 had better overall reliability and cross-

country mobility than the M114, and was itself to be modified by adding two M60 machine guns with gunshields and hatch armor and a gunshield around the .50-caliber machine gun located in the commander’s hatch. When so altered, as they were before the unit deployed to Vietnam, they became known as armored cavalry assault vehicles (ACAVs), an advanced variant of the armored personnel carrier. The additional ACAVs became part of the platoon scout section, giving each platoon nine armored personnel carriers, eight of which were armored cavalry assault vehicles.⁴

At the same time, eighty-one medium tanks (three from each platoon, nine from each troop, and thus twenty-seven from each of the three squadrons) disappeared from the table of organization and equipment as fifty-four armored personnel carriers were added to it. However, the fifty-one M48A3 Patton medium tanks, seventeen in each of the three tank companies (one to a squadron), all remained. Westmoreland had not been permitted to substitute light tanks for them. Nor was he able to persuade the Department of the Army to send armored cars in place of a number of the regiment’s tracked vehicles.

What did this all add up to? By increasing the number of authorized armored personnel carriers by fifty-four (six in each troop, eighteen in each squadron, and, therefore, fifty-four in the regiment) the newly reconfigured unit had, or was authorized to have, 287 APCs, a figure raised in May to 302. Of that number, 243 were in the armored cavalry squadrons and the remainder were scattered throughout the regiment. The outward sign of the end of this bureaucratic fracas was receipt by the Blackhorse Regiment on 12 March 1966 of a warning order from the Department of the Army for movement to Vietnam.⁵ As a practical matter, Westmoreland had essentially achieved the regiment he wanted for the expanding war in South Vietnam.

By late 1965, despite the absence of orders to deploy to Vietnam, the regiment’s commander, Col. William W. Cobb, assumed it likely that the regiment would soon be Vietnam bound.




A South Vietnamese crew member in an M113 armored personnel carrier (APC) fires a .50-caliber machine gun.



U.S. Army

U.S. Army



Above: An M113 armored cavalry assault vehicle (ACAV) from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) prepares to escort a truck convoy.

Below: M113 ACAVs and an M48A3 Patton tank form a defensive perimeter.


U.S. Army



Therefore, he did what he could to advance the regiment to an acceptable state of readiness. That the regiment had suffered personnel levies from mid-summer 1965 on, whereby other units going to Vietnam appropriated numerous soldiers from the regiment, dramatically undercut this effort. Consequently, Colonel Cobb and his staff needed “to stem the outflow of enlisted personnel and the attendant turbulence . . . [which rendered] the regiment incapable of satisfactorily training fillers.” Some of those departing the regiment were in critical categories—noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and skilled specialists—and were replaced by less experienced personnel. Regimental authorities attempted to obtain relief from such levies, and their efforts eventually bore fruit. In December 1965, in anticipation of a decision to deploy to South Vietnam, the Department of the Army began to send junior officers to the regiment to fill the void created by the earlier personnel outflow. Additionally, in January and February 1966 almost a thousand recent graduates of basic combat training arrived.⁶

Regimental and Continental Army Command planners established 18 April 1966 as the date on which the regiment should have all personnel on hand. This date turned out to be overly optimistic and it was not until 21 May, when the regiment had received 1,700 new troopers, that the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment had, at least on paper, sufficient numbers to deploy to Vietnam. Hundreds of these men had their advanced infantry training shortened by one week, and many of the new NCOs only arrived in mid-May, reducing to just a few days the time they had to train and become acquainted with the soldiers under their command.⁷

For the troops on hand, and those who arrived in these early months, training began in earnest in late February and continued through 10 August 1966. In advanced infantry training, carried out within the regiment for almost 1,000 troopers between 22 February and 17 April 1966, instruction emphasized physical conditioning, patrolling, night movements,



development of individual military occupation specialties, and orientation to Vietnam. Additionally, officers and NCOs received special instruction in the capabilities, limitations, and organizations of the various elements of an armored cavalry regiment. In basic unit training, which began on 25 April and continued for eight weeks, parts of the regiments trained at Camps Pickett and A.P. Hill, Virginia, as well as at Fort Meade, Maryland. In this phase, both classroom instruction and tactical field exercises stressed counterinsurgency and civic action operations in underdeveloped areas. All of the regiment received a 23-hour program of instruction on Vietnam. Training also emphasized ambush and counterambush techniques. Regimental planners developed a crew proficiency course for those assigned to the ACAVs, which included live-fire exercises. Finally, at various times during the general training, a number of the troopers received special instruction at different Army schools or at Fort Meade. All of this activity aimed at achieving a personnel readiness date of 15 August.⁸

Meanwhile, the regiment intended to achieve equipment readiness by 1 August. As the deadline approached, practically all of the vehicles—tracked and wheeled—necessary for combat operations, and all of the equipment necessary to keep the regiment functioning in a combat environment, had been placed in the regimental



inventory. The Army's inspector general conducted a special review of the regiment and its attached units at Fort Meade and confirmed that all elements were "Ready" or "Ready Provided." The latter designation represented conditional achievement of readiness status—final acceptance dependent on whatever equipment currently being worked on or sought after having been completed or obtained before the regiment left the United States.⁹

Securing personnel, training them, and obtaining the necessary equipment, occurred parallel to the regi-


ment's preparation for actual deployment. June and July saw two small groups from the 11th ACR travel to Vietnam to help plan the regiment's deployment.

In early June, a liaison party of three—the regiment's executive officer plus the intelligence and logistics officers—visited Vietnam to "discuss the reception and location of the regiment and problem areas likely to be encountered." While this group went at the regiment's initiative, the next one did so at the invitation of the Headquarters, United States Army

Vietnam, the Army component command within the subunified command of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Consisting of five officers and four enlisted men, this team's purpose was to establish lines of communication with higher and same level headquarters—and in particular to develop a working relationship with the 1st Infantry Division—the unit that would help the armored cavalry regiment adjust to the operational environment in South Vietnam.¹⁰

As to its mission, General Westmoreland had decided by mid-April that the regiment's initial role would be to provide security for an extensive but poorly maintained road network and adjacent terrain in the southern portion of III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) southeast of Saigon near Xuan Loc in Phuoc Tuy Province.¹¹

In July, General Westmoreland and the II Field Force, Vietnam, commander, Maj. Gen. Jonathan O. Seaman, momentarily considered a complex repositioning and moving of various U.S. units in South Vietnam. If carried out, it would have placed the 11th ACR temporarily at Bear Cat south of Bien Hoa along Highway 15.¹² Seaman argued against the change



of destination on three grounds: (1) a strong American unit in the Xuan Loc area would provide “much needed motivation” for the marginally effective 10th South Vietnamese Division operating there; (2) the continuous patrolling of roads in the region would restrain enemy freedom of movement and limit its illicit tax collection program in the northeast portion of the III CTZ; and (3) Seaman planned to place an artillery unit near Xuan Loc

“to give maximum support to both the 11th ACR and ARVN, or Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam, operations” in the area. Without the cavalry regiment there to protect the artillery, its disposition within the CTZ would have to be reconsidered. In the face of Seaman's arguments, Westmoreland relented. His earlier decision, to locate the regiment on Highway 1 east of Xuan Loc, past a rock quarry and before the highway turned north toward the town of Gia Ray, would stand.¹³

Meanwhile, an advance group of planners flew to South Vietnam to prepare a temporary staging area for the regiment near II Field Force, Vietnam, headquarters at Long Binh. Consisting of 68 officers and 221 enlisted men from the regiment and from the 919th Armored Engineer Company, all those in the advance party had arrived in Vietnam by 16 August. Two days later heavy equipment followed. Over the next three weeks, the cavalrymen and engineers established a physical perimeter for a temporary camp; constructed firing positions, roads, latrines, mess tables, and showers; and procured tents, kitchen equipment, cots, and other necessary items.¹⁴



Below: General Abrams (left) being escorted by Colonel Cobb at Long Binh

Right: Sgt. Maj. Arthur Hawthorne (left), Colonel Cobb (center), and Lt. Col. Martin Howell (right) talk aboard the USNS *Sultan* at the docks of the Oakland Army Terminal.



On 23 July, shortly before the departure of the first of the regiment's units to Vietnam, the Army vice chief of staff, General Creighton W. Abrams, visited the regiment. Abrams, who had made his name as a tank commander in World War II, addressed the troopers, emphasizing the importance of the noncommissioned officer in the war in Vietnam and stressing the need for independent action by the small-unit leader. The regiment bore "tremendous responsibility" because it was "the first major Armor command employed in Vietnam."¹⁵

As the advance group feverishly strove to make the staging area habitable, the regiment's weapons, equipment, and supplies started to move from the United States to the war zone. Ships carrying the cargo departed from Baltimore and Norfolk in the east, Mobile and Beaumont on the Gulf, and Long Beach and Oakland in the west. The first of twelve cargo ships sailed from the United States on 7 August and the last arrived at Saigon on 27 October. At the same time, Colonel Cobb and the troops began their own deployment to South Vietnam. First flying from Baltimore, Maryland, to Oakland, California, officers and men then embarked on three ships—USNS *Sultan*, USNS *Upshur*, and USNS *Barrett*—on the 19, 20, and 23 August, respectively. Each ship carried an armored cavalry squadron, and one, the *Sultan*, also carried support units. As soon as the three ships cleared Oakland, Colonel Cobb, the regimental sergeant major, and a few other staff officers flew directly to South Vietnam, arriving a couple of weeks before the rest of the regiment.¹⁶

On the three troopships, Cobb's subordinate commanders continued what they hoped would be helpful instruction in patrolling, ambush, and counterambush techniques, as well as reporting intelligence information, maintaining visual and radio security, and handling prisoners and captured documents. Still, some soldiers had yet to be trained in their assigned specialty. In the case of cooks, the regimental authorities handled the problem in a practical manner but with potentially unfortunate results; they put the untrained cooks to work preparing

the daily meals for the soldiers on board ship. But the journey eventually ended, and the ships arrived at Vung Tau, South Vietnam, on 6, 7, and 11 September. By 12 September, all of the troops had debarked and moved to the temporary base camp near Long Binh.¹⁷

As the regiment began its duty in South Vietnam, its assigned strength totaled over 3,900 men, representing almost 97 percent of its authorized strength (*Tables 1 and 2*).

With the exception of the air cavalry all of the regiment's units were now in Vietnam. That troop deployed later than the regiment proper because of a shortage of helicopter pilots, but its 176 men had arrived in South Vietnam by December, although their aircraft did not appear until January.¹⁸ In the interim, the air cavalry troops flew missions with other aviation units and assisted the regiment's aviation platoon, gaining valuable experience.¹⁹

As their equipment arrived at Long Binh, the men of the 11th ACR prepared to become operational. They checked all individual and crew-served weapons, made sure all

equipment worked, established communication networks, utilized range facilities at the ARVN Infantry School at Thu Duc and the ARVN Armor School at Ho Nai to test fire and zero weapons, and constructed ranges locally to test and familiarize personnel with the M132 armored flamethrower. Commanders at all levels and key staff personnel visited armor and mechanized units in the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions to study techniques and methods successfully employed in previous operations. Regimental aviators conducted joint exercises with division and separate aviation units to gain valuable combat experience. Soldiers from the squadrons also participated in patrols, ambushes, and search and clear operations with their counterparts in these divisions.²⁰

After a few weeks at Long Binh, parts of the regiment conducted their first operations. On 27–29 September, the 1st Squadron escorted an engineer convoy carrying heavy equipment from Long Binh to Xuan Loc. In the following week, from 1 to 5 October, the squadron also participated in a

TABLE 1—STRENGTH OF REGIMENT AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1966

	OFFICERS	WARRANT OFFICERS	ENLISTED PERSONNEL	TOTAL
Authorized	197	31	3705	3,933
Assigned	221	18	3,706	3,945
Present for Duty	218	17	3,580	3,815

TABLE 2—STRENGTH OF ATTACHED UNITS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1966

	OFFICERS	WARRANT OFFICERS	ENLISTED PERSONNEL	TOTAL
Authorized	31	2	373	406
Assigned	30	2	363	395
Present for Duty	29	2	357	389

Source: Tables 1 and 2 are from Monthly Evaluation Rpt, 11th ACR, Sep 66, 7 Oct 66, tab B—Personnel, RG 338-82-1515, box 1, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP).



static security operation around Bien Hoa code-named UNIONTOWN, and the 2d Squadron replaced the 1st in the operation from 6 through 19 October. The 3d Squadron, on 7 October, initiated its first search and destroy operation, called Operation HICKORY, in Nhon Trach District, encountering local force units in estimated squad and platoon sizes and becoming the first regimental unit to engage and inflict casualties on the Viet Cong. Especially reassuring to commanders was the ease with which the squadron's tracked vehicles operated in the rough terrain. On HICKORY's completion on 15 October, the squadron became a reaction force for the 173d Airborne Brigade during UNIONTOWN.²¹

After this early period of acclimation, it was time to build and move to a more permanent camp. Colonel Cobb's first step was to examine the location selected by Seaman and Westmoreland. Scrutinizing the site from his command helicopter, he later commented, "I could see water and I said, yeah, I think this is kind of swampy for us." Cobb immediately sought out the commander of the 1st Infantry Division, his regiment's sponsoring unit, and asked for advice.²² The commander, Maj. Gen. William E. DePuy, simply told Cobb to tell Seaman that he did not want the location. Cobb's response (a colonel's response to a major general one might add) was—"Can I do that?"—and underscored his uncertainty as to how he should proceed. DePuy replied, perhaps a bit impatiently: "Sure, just go up and tell General Seaman that you don't want that area." Cobb—who later admitted that he had wanted to say to DePuy "Can you give me a little help?"—knew he had to act. However, to make doubly sure of his decision to ask Seaman to approve a change of location, Cobb reconnoitered the proposed site once more. After a local ARVN force had secured the position so that he could walk it, he confirmed that the swampy nature did indeed make it difficult if not impossible for armored personnel carriers and tanks to maneuver there. In consequence Cobb, with some trepidation, asked

An M132 armored flamethrower in action





U.S. Army



An 11th ACR convoy from the Blackhorse base passes a row of rubber trees.

for a change. Seaman's anticlimactic reply was "Fine, go out and find . . . an area that's better."²³


Cobb's staff then conducted a map study of the Xuan Loc area, which generated a promising location situated twelve or thirteen kilometers south of Xuan Loc and immediately west of Interprovincial Highway 2. Later called Long Giao and, as well, Blackhorse, the area seemed to satisfy the regiment's needs. However, having almost been burned once, Cobb wanted to walk the ground before definitively recommending the location to Seaman. While elements of the South Vietnamese 10th Division secured the area, Cobb flew by helicopter to the northern edge of the site and then drove through it in a South

Vietnamese M113. Concluding that the site was on "good solid ground," Cobb recommended, and Seaman accepted, that the 11th ACR establish its permanent base at Long Giao.²⁴

To protect those building the camp, the regiment mounted its first major operation, ATLANTA, which began on 20 October. At 0230, elements of the 1st Squadron, escorting a platoon from the 919th Engineer Company (Armored), departed the regimental staging area at Long Binh. Traveling east on Highway 1 to Xuan Loc and then turning south, the troopers established a combat base about four kilometers north of where the permanent base camp was to be. They quickly organized a protective perimeter around the base camp site so that the engineers could begin and continue their work. During the day the squadron conducted search and

clear missions and at night mounted ambush patrols to deter enemy action. Meanwhile, the 2d Squadron remained at Long Binh preparing for its entry into the area of operation.²⁵

On 23 October, a single troop and advance party from 2d Squadron began movement to the Long Giao area. Upon arrival at the Ong Que Rubber Plantation, about five kilometers west-northwest of the base camp under construction, the soldiers erected temporary barriers and billets and established a small combat base. On the twenty-fourth, the main body of the squadron arrived at Ong Que. For the next few weeks, from the combat base camp at the plantation, the squadron provided close and immediate protection for the base camp area at Long Giao as construction progressed.



U.S. Army




General DePuy



U.S. Army



An M48A3 Patton tank bulldozes brush at the Long Gao camp site.




By 31 October, the rest of the engineer company had arrived at Long Giao. The engineers quickly constructed defensive positions and living areas and, using precut materials, began to build permanent bunkers.²⁶

While construction continued, maneuver and support elements of the regiment moved to the new site. The 2d Squadron, entering Operation ATLANTA on 23–24 October, assumed the 1st Squadron's mission of protect-

ing the camp, freeing the 1st to clear areas farther from the camp site, and, eventually, to clear highways to the north, east, and south. At the same time, the 3d Squadron carried out various tasks but mainly provided security for the regiment at Long Binh, a job which became less and less necessary as more of the 11th ACR moved to Long Giao.²⁷


October turned into November and the camp grew as frequent convoys

moved personnel and equipment from Long Binh to Long Giao. Between 31 October and 3 November, the camp, though far from finished, was sufficiently built to allow Colonel Cobb and his staff to relocate to Long Giao, a move that represented a turning point in the history of the regiment in Vietnam. From this time on, Cobb could run his regiment, which would carry out its mission from this permanent camp.²⁸



A convoy of ACAVs lined up at the Blackhorse base, which is still under construction

Blackhorse Base Camp



With its 302 armored personnel carriers and 51 medium tanks, the regiment intended to use the new Long Giao site as a base of operations “to clear and secure highways and lines of communications” in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.²⁹ For example, on 27 October the 1st Squadron carried out a zone reconnaissance south of the camp and on 2 November cleared a portion of Highway 1 and Interprovincial Highway 333 in the direction of Gia Ray. However, the squadron’s role changed dramatically, albeit temporarily, on 8 November when it received orders to move west toward Saigon and then northwest to Tay Ninh to support Operation ATTLEBORO. The squadron moved 1,000 men in over 200 vehicles approximately 200 kilometers to Lai Khe in less than six hours, remaining part of ATTLEBORO until 20 November. During this time, the other two squadrons executed mostly security roles—the 3d Squadron protected the old regimental staging area at Long Binh, while the 2d Squadron did the same for the new base at Long Giao. The squadrons did not carry out the security role passively, but implemented a mobile defense. That is, they not only carried out active programs of operations in the vicinity of their respective camps to keep the enemy off balance, but they also kept major highways open.³⁰


During November, the engineers brought the base closer to completion. This was no easy task given the five-sided camp’s size (500 meters on the north, 2,000 on the east, 1,300 on the south, 1,100 on the west, and 500 on the northwest).

Numerous convoys brought troops and materiel from Long Binh in ever-increasing amounts.³¹ To be sure, each convoy presented a target and an opportunity to the enemy, a prospect not lost on Colonel Cobb, who earlier had made reacting quickly and effectively to an ambush an important part of unit training. That instruction paid off in two instances, two battles, one in November and the other in December.

The first occurred on the mid-morning of 21 November. A large convoy containing as many as eighty

vehicles escorted by a platoon-sized armored cavalry unit from Troop C, 1st Squadron, made up of nine ACAVs, departed from Long Binh.³² The convoy commander, 1st Lt. Neil Keltner, placed two ACAVs, at the front of the column, two at the rear, and two equidistant from both the front and rear pair in the column itself. His ACAV accompanied the second pair. When less than twenty kilometers from Xuan Loc and about two kilometers short of the hamlet of Hung Nghia, Keltner received a message indicating that a Viet Cong force was thought to be near Hung Nghia. Requesting more information, his headquarters replied that it had none.³³

Keltner next radioed the other ACAVs in the convoy and informed them of the intelligence. At approximately 1025, the lead ACAV began to receive small arms and automatic weapons fire. It was too late to stop the convoy entering the ambush zone. In keeping with earlier training, Keltner hurried as much of the convoy, about half, through the killing zone as fast as possible, and then Keltner's and another ACAV reentered the ambush area with all guns firing to the south, where most of the enemy fire seemed to originate. He then ordered the rest to do the same. Meanwhile, enemy fire scored hits on American vehicles, stopping several of them and bringing



the remainder of the convoy to a halt, turning the American vehicles into sitting targets. By this time enemy fire was coming from both sides of the road.

The enemy force, later identified as elements of the *1st and 2d Battalions, 274th People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) Regiment*, the formal name of the Viet Cong regiment, stepped up the attack, using mortars


and recoilless rifles, as the American soldiers returned fire at a rapid rate. Estimates of the size of the enemy force ranged from 500 to over a 1,000, clearly outnumbering the 45 troopers in the convoy.³⁴ Arriving no more than five minutes after the first shots had been fired, two armed helicopters provided fire support. The helicopters made four runs firing forty-two 2.75-inch rockets and 50,000 small arms rounds. Almost immediately after the helicopters struck came two air strikes by fixed-wing aircraft, the first appearing fourteen minutes and the second twenty minutes after the enemy sprang the ambush. Altogether they dropped two cluster bombs, eight 500-pound bombs, eight 750-pound napalm bombs, and fired 7,200 20-mm. rounds. The cumulative effect of the air strikes and the aggressive response of those in the ACAVs apparently forced the Viet Cong troops to break off contact around 1100.³⁵

At this time, reinforcements ordered by 1st Squadron commander, Lt. Col. Martin D. Howell, circling in his command helicopter, arrived in the battle area to engage or pursue the Viet Cong. Advancing in three columns from different directions, the American force included the rest



An 11th ACR UH-1 Iroquois helicopter with attached rocket pod





of Troop C, as well as Troop B and Company D (the tank company).³⁶ At approximately 1120, one of the relief columns briefly encountered a small enemy unit, possibly a rearguard force.³⁷ However, no other contact occurred and Howell's squadron gave up the search for the enemy about 1600.³⁸

In the engagement, the Americans confirmed thirty enemy soldiers killed, estimated that they had killed another seventy-five to one hundred, and captured one recoilless rifle and one assault rifle. Seven American soldiers lost their lives to Viet Cong fire, which also destroyed two ACAVs and four trucks.³⁹ The Americans believed that they had emerged victorious from the ambush. Furthermore, a participant later wrote, "the ACAV—new to the men of the Dong Nai Regiment [i.e., the 274th], who had never seen a vehicle quite like



Photograph of the 21 November ambush showing a burning truck and trailer on the left. Partially concealed enemy troops are just visible in undergrowth on the far side of the road.

U.S. Army



it—poured more fire into the Viet Cong ranks than any other ‘personnel carrier’ they had met,”⁴⁰ thus, establishing the validity of armored cavalry warfare in Vietnam when “the main fighting vehicle of the Regiment,” as the operations officer called it, was the modified M113, the ACAV.⁴¹

The second ambush occurred in early December. During the three days prior to the encounter, the men of the 1st Squadron searched for the enemy between the base camp and the rock quarry near Gia Ray, about thirty kilometers northeast of the camp. On 2 December, a resupply convoy prepared to return from Long Giao to the Gia Ray rock quarry. Earlier in the day, soldiers in the convoy had made the trip to Long Giao without incident and planned to use the same route back—north on Interprovincial Route 2, west on Highway 1, then briefly north on Interprovincial Route 333—to the rock quarry. The convoy consisted of seven vehicles in the following order: tank, ACAV, ACAV, truck, truck, ACAV, tank. As the vehicles left Long Giao, the convoy commander, 1st Lt. Wilbert Radosевич, occupied the lead tank. Twenty-five kilometers into the trip, the convoy entered the hamlet of Suoi Cat, soldiers in the vehicles noticing “an absence of children and an unusual stillness.”⁴²

As it turned out, an enemy force, made up of elements of the 275th Regiment, 5th PLAF Division, and a local force unit, had prepared an ambush immediately east of Suoi Cat on Highway 1. In the ambush zone, chest-high elephant grass flanked both sides of the highway out to about sixty meters beyond which heavy secondary growth prevailed. Soldiers of the Viet Cong regiment had deployed on the south, southeast, and east side of the highway as it curved northeast and then north from its easterly direction, while the smaller local force unit positioned itself on the opposite side. With a variety of weapons—small arms, heavy and light machine guns, 60-mm. mortars, and at least one 75-mm. recoilless rifle—the enemy awaited the order to initiate the attack as the American column entered the kill zone at approximately 1640.⁴³


From his tank commander’s hatch, Lieutenant Radosевич continuously scanned to the left and right of the highway as the column passed through Suoi Cat. In one of these left-right movements, he accidentally tripped the turret control handle causing the turret to move suddenly to the right. Interpreting this move as evidence that the Americans had become aware of danger, the Viet Cong set off a command-detonated mine about ten meters ahead of Radosевич’s tank, the signal for enemy troops up and down the line of ambush to commence firing. In response, Radosевич rushed the trucks through the killing zone and, “reacting violently to the attack,” returned leading his tanks and ACAVs to “immediately rake the entire killing zone with 90mm canister, 50 cal, and 7.63 machinegun fire, grenades and M-16 fire.”⁴⁴

American reinforcements responded quickly. Troop B, just a few kilometers to the north securing the rock quarry, arrived at the ambush site in minutes, “moving right into the killing zone smothering the Viet Cong positions, many of which were only off the shoulder of the road, with withering fire.”⁴⁵ At the same time the squadron commander, Colonel Howell, arrived in his helicopter to coordinate fire sup-

port. With support from both artillery and aircraft available, he declared the road to be the fire coordination line: artillery would fire to the north and west while tactical aircraft struck to the east and south of the road.⁴⁶

Other elements of the squadron, at the Long Giao base camp, also answered calls for assistance. Company D (-), the tank unit, made its way to the scene in less than half an hour, moving through the ambush zone, according to a later report, “raking one side of the highway while Troop B worked over the other side.” Troop C followed close behind Company D, moving into the ambush zone firing everything it had.⁴⁷ After the initial run through the kill zone, Colonel Howell ordered the squadron to assume positions on Highway 1 beyond Interprovincial Highway 333 to seal off enemy routes of withdrawal.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, Air Force fighter-bombers began to arrive to drop their ordnance, and in the night an AC-47 gunship would stay on station to provide illumination and to suppress fires on request, as well as taking advantage of targets of opportunity as they appeared.⁴⁹

Troop A, relieved of its duty to secure the squadron’s sector of the base camp perimeter, rushed to Suoi Cat, arriving about forty-five minutes after the en-





U.S. Army



ACAVs force their way through the thick brush. Note the rocket-propelled grenade screens mounted on the front of the hulls.

gagement began. Some enemy troops reemerged and began firing on the Americans moving east, the ones that had gone past them. Thus positioned the enemy soldiers found themselves, when Troop A arrived, caught in a crossfire

between the troop and the tanks. After about ten minutes of this “Charlie began to lose his taste for combat with the Troopers of the Blackhorse,” and seventy minutes after the initial attack, began withdrawing to the south.⁵⁰

As it soon became clear that the engagement was over, Colonel Howell positioned his units for the night: he placed Troop B in the middle of what had been the ambush zone on Highway 1 with Troop A to its west; he put Company D’s tanks immediately beyond Troop B as Highway 1 turned north and then east again; and Troop C remained almost where it had stopped after its charge through the ambush zone, moving only a bit more along the highway to the southeast. All units were on or near to the highway. To do what he could to seal off possible escape/withdrawal routes, Colonel Howell placed air strikes and artillery fire south of the ambush zone throughout the night.⁵¹

The following morning, Colonel Cobb established a forward command post at the ambush site to facilitate a hunt for the enemy. At the same time, Colonel Howell sent dismounted 1st Squadron patrols 200 meters off the road, where his men found trails leading into the jungle on which, somewhat surprisingly, tracked vehicles could travel. Cobb also had the 3d Squadron come to the site that morning to assume blocking positions along the highway as the 1st Squadron units



An ACAV, an M132, and an M48A3 from the 3d Squadron, 11th ACR, in a defensive formation



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Above: Damage to an M113 after multiple hits by a Viet Cong 57-mm. recoilless rifle

Below: An ACAV prepares to ford a small creek.



U.S. Army

swept the area. Failing to find anyone to fight, the regimental command post and the 3d Squadron returned to base camp at day's end, leaving the 1st Squadron to clear the area, after which it returned to its normal duties on 4 December.⁵²

Colonel Cobb believed that during the battle “the enemy was decisively engaged and felt the full combat power of the Regiment with telling results.”⁵³ Those “telling results” were ninety-nine enemies killed plus an estimated 100–150 more killed but whose bodies were taken away, buried, or lost in the area. The Americans suffered one killed (from the 27th Engineer Battalion) and twenty-two wounded. The *PLAF* force destroyed one ACAV and seriously damaged a tank.⁵⁴

According to the 11th ACR's analysis, its success rested on three foundations. First was the convoy's ability to withstand the initial shock of the enemy attack and then to return fire so quickly and thus neutralize the enemy's advantage of surprise and position. When the ACAVs and tanks guided the trucks out of the ambush zone and charged against suspected enemy positions, they demonstrated, as Colonel Cobb's later wrote, that “when struck in ambush, Armor can absorb the initial blow and return effective fire immediately.”⁵⁵ Second was the rapid reaction of the reinforcements. Only a few minutes elapsed from the time the enemy detonated the first mine to the arrival of Troop B. Within a half an hour, Company D and Company C reached the ambush site and before forty-five minutes had passed, Company A was there. Third was the almost immediate establishment by Colonel Howell of a fire coordination line to ensure the maximum use of both air and artillery support.⁵⁶

In Operation ATLANTA, the 11th ACR had provided security for the work crews and opening the highways, but also had, in the judgment of a later commander, General Donn Starry, established the “standard procedure” for an armored cavalry unit to follow in countering ambushes. The procedure, he wrote in 1977, required that the element ambushed

to employ all its firepower to protect the escorted vehicles, to fight clear of and then return to the killing zone. All available reinforcements would be rushed to the scene as rapidly as possible to attack the flanks of the ambush as artillery and tactical air would be used to the maximum extent.⁵⁷ It was a particularly powerful manifestation of the American way of war.

In the last few anticlimactic days of Operation ATLANTA, maneuver units of the 11th ACR continued to escort and protect convoys, to secure the base camp construction crews, the rock quarry at Gia Ray, and to open, and keep open, highways in the area. They met no concerted opposition.

Engineer units continued to work on the 11th ACR base, advancing the project sufficiently so that by the end of November 1966 the entire regiment, except for a small residual force, had moved in at Long Giao. By 8 December, when ATLANTA ended, the engineers had completed 50 percent of the work on camp's roads and drainage ditches, had laid 60 percent of the perimeter wire, and had constructed the bunker system in its entirety.⁵⁸ Although there remained much to be

done, the regiment was ensconced in its new home and had made substantial progress on its way to becoming an experienced "war-without-fronts" oriented combat unit. Armor had indeed gone to war in Vietnam.



NOTES

1. Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Command History, 1966 (Saigon, Vietnam: Military History Branch, Office of the Secretary, MACV, 1966), pp. 70–71, Historians files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as MACV History, 1966).

2. Msg, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) MAC 45686 to Department of the Army (DA), 301127Z, Dec 1965, sub: Vehicles for Armored Cavalry, box 42, Troop Basis Files-1965, Record Group (RG) 334-69A-702, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP).

3. MACV History, 1966, pp. 70–72. Dates in this paragraph are derived from notes 11, 12, and 13, p. 205 in MACV History.

4. Operational Report—Lessons Learned (ORLL), 11 Mar–31 Oct 66, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), 7 Dec 66, p. 1, Historians files, CMH. See also MACV History, 1966, p. 72.

5. ORLL, 11 Mar–31 Oct 66, 11th ACR, 7 Dec 66, pp. 3, 9. See also chart 5, Track Vehicles, attached to Presentation of Major Hull, S1, 11th ACR, in Documents for the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 18–29 Oct 66, box 16, RG 334-70A782, NACP.

6. ORLL, 11 Mar–31 Oct 66, 11th ACR, 7 Dec 66, p. 4. Quoted words from p. 5.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–6.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 8–12.

10. Direct quotation is from *ibid.*, p. 12, as is general information in paragraph. For composition of the second group, see pp. 2–3. The nine in that group were Regimental Operations Officer, Regimental Liaison and Assistant Logistics Officer, 1st and 3d Squadron Intelligence Officers, 2d Squadron Operations Officer for Air, three supply noncommissioned officers, and one noncommissioned officer from the Headquarters Troop.

11. Msg, COMUSMACV MAC 12931 to Commanding General (CG), II Field Force, Vietnam (II FFORCEV), 141140Z, Apr 66, sub: 11th ACR TO&E Modifications, box 1, RG 334-69A-702, NACP.



Aerial view of the Blackhorse base, c. 1967



Courtesy of Craig Murken

12. Bear Cat, though sounding and appearing Vietnamese, was a name made up by Americans.

13. Msg, CG II FFORCEV AVXC 70141 to COMUSMACV, 081150z, Jul 66, sub: Positioning of 11th ACR, and Msg, COMUSMACV 23770 to CG II FFORCEV, 111105z, Jul 1966, sub: Positioning of 11th ACR. Both messages are in box 1, RG 334-69A-702, NACP. Quoted words from Message 70141. Interview (Intrv), George MacGarrigle with Maj Gen (Ret.) William Cobb, 26 May 1976, Historians files, CMH (hereafter cited as Cobb Intrv.)

14. Basic information about the movement to Vietnam comes from ORLL, 11 Mar–31 Oct 66, 11th ACR, 7 Dec 66, pp. 8, 12–16.

15. ORLL, 11 Mar–31 Oct 66, 11th ACR, 7 Dec 66, p. 3. General Creighton W. Abrams also visited the regiment on 18 October 1966 shortly after it arrived in Vietnam. See same report, p. 15.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 15.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 14.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 5; also see Encl 1, Task Organization. See chart 1 [Organizational Chart of Reconfigured] 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Documents for the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 18–29 Oct 66, box 16, RG 334-70A782, NACP.

19. ORLL [1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67], 11th ACR, n.d., p. 12, Vietnam Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

20. Cobb Intrv; ORLL, 11 Mar–31 Oct 66, 11th ACR, 7 Dec 66, p. 16.

21. Monthly Evaluation Rpt—Sep 66, 11th ACR, 7 Oct 66, p. 1; Monthly Evaluation Rpt—Oct 66, 11th ACR, 5 Nov 66, p. 1; and Monthly Evaluation Rpt—Oct 66, 3d Sqdn, 11th ACR, 3 Nov 66, p. 1, all in box 1, RG 338-82-1515, NACP; see also ORLL, 11 Mar–31 Oct 66, 11th ACR, 7 Dec 66, p. 15.

22. As more American units entered Vietnam, the process became more organized. One sign of this was that a unit already in Vietnam “sponsored” a new one. In this way incoming units could benefit from the experience of those already there.

23. Cobb Intrv.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Monthly Evaluation Rpt—Oct 66, 1st Sqdn, 11th ACR, 31 Oct 66, p. 1, box 1, RG 338-82-1515, NACP.

26. Monthly Evaluation Rpt—Oct 66, 2d Sqdn, 11th ACR, 1 Nov 66, p. 1, box 1, RG 338-82-1515, NACP; and After Action Rpt (AAR), Opn ATLANTA, 20 October – 8 December

1966, 11th ACR, n.d., p. 17. AAR is in United States Army Vietnam (USARV), 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment/Assistant Chief of Staff S-3, Entry P 1559: After Action Reports 10/1966 – 12/1970, Rcds of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, 1950–1975, box 24, RG 472, NACP.

27. AAR, Opn ATLANTA, 11th ACR, p. 17. USARV, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment/Assistant Chief of Staff S-3, Entry P 1559: After Action Reports 10/1966 – 12/1970, box 24, RG 472, NACP.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 1. Specifically, this meant Highway 1 from Bien Hoa to Gia Ray; Interprovincial Route 2 from Xuan Loc south to the boundary of the 1st Australian Task Force’s area of responsibility in Phouc Tuy Province; Highway 20 from its junction at Highway 1 to the boundary of III Corps Tactical Zone; Highway 1 from its junction near Gia Ray to the III Corps Tactical Zone boundary; Interprovincial Route 333 from Gia Ray to Vo Dat; and Highway 15 from Bien Hoa to Ba Ria in Phuoc Tuy Province.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

31. *Ibid.*, an. B (Narrative of the Ambush of 2 December 1966), n.d., p. 1.

32. The precise size of the convoy is difficult to determine. One source says that the nine armored cavalry vehicles (ACAVs) escorted forty-one vehicles. See an. H (Attempted Ambush of an 11th ACR Convoy), n.d., attached to II FFORCEV, PERINTREP (Periodic Intelligence Report), No. 37. Report is in USARV, IIFFV/Assistant Chief of Staff for Intel (G-2), Entry P 358, Periodic Intelligence Reports 1 – 41, box 42, NACP. Another states that the convoy consisted of “a minimum of 80 vehicles not counting the nine ACAV’s in the escort platoon.” See John N. Albright, “Convoy Ambush: Blackhorse Regiment, 21 November 1966,” July 1967, p. 1. Report is in folder titled “AAR, Convoy Ambush, 21 March 1966,” in USRV, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment/Assistant Chief of Staff S-3, Entry P 1559: After Action Reports 10/1966 – 12/1970, box 24, NACP. Both documents in RG 472. Whatever the size, all agreed that the convoy was large.

33. John Albright, “Convoy Ambush on Highway 1, 21 November 1966,” in *Seven Firefights in Vietnam* by John A. Cash, John Albright, and Allan W. Sandstrum (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1985), p. 47, 48. Reprint of 1970 edition. Official accounts, Albright’s account, as well as the narrative attached to the after action report fail to indicate the source of this intelligence. In all likelihood it was information derived electroni-

cally. In Albright’s story, the regiment’s tactical operational center “received an intelligence message in the form of a code word and a location.” The sergeant who received the message, knowing the code word, “rushed the communication” to the regiment’s chief intelligence officer. The officer “realized at once that the message indicated the presence of the headquarters of the 274th Regiment, . . . 5th Viet Cong Division.” The coordinates indicated that the headquarters was just east of Hung Nghia on Highway 1. Consequent to this timely intelligence, the regimental operations officer ordered the helicopter fire team to the battle, and informed the 1st Squadron commander who in turn informed 1st Lt. Neil Keltner. Albright’s narrative is the most detailed account of the engagement. See also an. A (Narrative of the Ambush of 21 November 1966), n.d., p. 3, attached to Combat Operations AAR, Opn ATLANTA 11th ACR, 20 October–8 December 1966, n.d., USARV, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment/Assistant Chief of Staff S-3, Entry P 1559: After Action Reports 10/1966 – 12/1970, box 24, RG 472, NACP (hereafter cited as an. A (Narrative of the Ambush of 21 November 1966.))

34. For the 45 and 500 figures, see Ambush AAR, 11th ACR, 21 Nov 65, box 14, RG 338-82-1515; for the 700 figure, see app. 5 (Basic Data on Major Contacts of 274th VC Regiment [274th PLAF Regiment], 1966–67), attached to an. F (Study of the Operations of the 274th VC Regiment from January 1966 to September 1967), attached to II FFORCEV, PERINTREP No. 46, Historians files, CMH; and for the 1,000-plus figure, see John Albright, “Convoy Ambush on Highway 1, 21 November 1966,” p. 43.

35. An. A (Narrative of the Ambush of 21 November 1966, n.d.), pp. 2–3.

36. John Albright, “Convoy Ambush on Highway 1, 21 November 1966,” pp. 56–57.

37. An. H, sub: Attempted Ambush of an 11th ACR Convoy, attached to II FFORCEV, PERINTREP, No. 37, n.d., Report is in USARV, IIFFV/Assistant Chief of Staff for Intel (G-2), Entry P 358, Periodic Intelligence Reports 1 – 41, box 42, RG 472, NACP. Initially the Americans thought the enemy was withdrawing to the north. This did not make a lot of sense. After all, the heaviest fire had come from the south side of the road, thus indicating that the bulk of the enemy force was on that side. For the enemy force (several hundred strong) to withdraw to the north, he would have had to cross the highway in the open, while American forces in APCs milled about the battle area, American tanks stayed near the highway, and American helicopters and fighter jets remained on station.

38. John Albright, "Convoy Ambush on Highway 1, 21 November 1966," p. 57.

39. An. A (Narrative of the Ambush of 21 November 1966), n.d., p. 3.

40. John Albright, "Convoy Ambush on Highway 1, 21 November 1966," pp. 57–58.

41. Briefing, p. 2, Maj William Coad, Operations Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, attached to Documents for the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 18–29 Oct 66, box 16, RG 334-70A782, NACP.

42. Donn A. Starry, *Mounted Combat in Vietnam*, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1978), p. 77.

43. An. B (Narrative of the Ambush of 2 December 1966), n.d., p. 2.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Starry, *Mounted Combat in Vietnam*, pp. 77–78.

47. An. B (Narrative of the Ambush of 2 December 1966), n.d., p. 2.

48. Starry *Mounted Combat in Vietnam*, p. 78. See also an. B (Narrative of the Ambush of 2 December 1966), n.d., p. 2.

49. An. B (Narrative of the Ambush of 2 December 1966), n.d., p. 3.

50. Ibid., p. 2.

51. Ibid.

52. Combat Operations AAR, Opn ATLANTA, 11th ACR, 20 October–8 December 1966, n.d., Vietnam Collection, MHI, p. 13. See also an. B (Narrative of the Ambush of 2 December 1966), n.d., p. 2.

53. See "Commander[']s Analysis," Combat Operations AAR, Opn ATLANTA, 11th ACR, 20 October–8 December 1966, n.d., USARV,

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment/Assistant Chief of Staff S-3, Entry P 1559: After Action Reports 10/1966 – 12/1970, box 24, RG 472, NACP, p. 21.

54. An. B (Narrative of the Ambush of 2 December 1966), n.d., p. 4.

55. William W. Cobb, "11th Cavalry Report," *Armor* 76, no. 2 (March-April 1967): 31.

56. Direct quotations in this paragraph, with the exception of the one beginning with "when struck" come from an. B (Narrative of the Ambush of 2 December 1966), n.d., p. 4.

57. Starry, *Mounted Combat in Vietnam*, p. 78.

58. AAR, Opn ATLANTA, 11th ACR, p. 17. USARV, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment/Assistant Chief of Staff S-3, Entry P 1559: After Action Reports 10/1966 – 12/1970, box 24, RG 472, NACP.

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U.S. ARMY ARTIFACT SPOTLIGHT

THE CIVIL WAR RIOTS IN BALTIMORE

A MATERIAL CULTURE LEGACY OF THE 6TH REGIMENT, MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEER MILITIA

By Dieter Stenger

On 12 April 1861, just five days after the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, South Carolina, members of the 6th Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, boarded trains in Boston and headed for Washington City. They were responding to President Abraham Lincoln's call for volunteers to suppress the rebellion, but their immediate objective was to protect Washington. Unable to pass through Baltimore on steam locomotives, the soldiers boarded train cars pulled by horses and soon encountered an angry mob of Confederate sympathizers. Companies D, I, K, and L, under the command of Capt. Albert S. Follansbee, became separated from the rest of the regiment. They were assaulted with stones, clubs, and other flying objects. The soldiers were ordered to double-quick march, but as one reported, "the streets had been torn up by the mob and piles of stones and every other obstacle had been laid in the streets to impede our progress. . . . Pistols began to be discharged at us. . . . Shots and missiles were fired from windows and house tops. . . . The crowd followed us to the depot, keeping up an irregular shooting, even after we entered the [railroad] cars."¹ Once the men reached safety, they continued by rail to the nation's capital. The panicked soldiers had returned fire sporadically and twelve civilians had been killed as well as four soldiers from the 6th Regiment.

During the Baltimore Riots, Captain Follansbee wore the wool frock coat shown in the accompanying photograph, and he continued to wear the coat after his future promotion to colonel, indicated by the bullion shoulder straps for the rank of colonel. Capt. J. A. Sawtell, commander of Company D that was attacked, carried the .31-caliber Allen & Wheelock revolver pictured here.

Documented evidence of ownership or use (called provenance) for historical objects enables the Army to combine the material culture study of the artifacts themselves—their utility, defects, and such—with the personal stories of their owners. Both the uniform coat and revolver are maintained in optimum environmental conditions at the U.S. Army's Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Dieter Stenger serves at the Museum Support Center as the curator of firearms and edged weapons.

NOTES

1. "Sixth Massachusetts Volunteer Regiment Organized January 21, 1861," Mass Moments Project, The Massachusetts Foundation for the Humanities, <http://www.massmoments.org>.





Illustration titled "First Blood — The Sixth Massachusetts Regiment Fighting Their Way Through Baltimore, April 19, 1861," appeared in the 4 May 1861 issue of Harper's Weekly.

The .31-caliber Allen & Wheelock belt revolver was a popular type of handgun, much like the pocket revolvers, which were easy to carry and conceal as secondary firearms.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Thomas R. Capel addresses the Regional Command (South) combined joint operations center at Kandahar Airfield, 16 January 2012.



A TIME FOR DIGITAL TRUMPETS

EMERGING CHANGES IN MILITARY HISTORICAL TRADECRAFT

By FRANCIS J. H. PARK

With the virtual demise of the Army's records management system, especially its near failure for a decade to capture operational records from deployed units, the copies of materials brought to the Center (of Military History) by the MHDs (Military History Detachments), unit historians, and other field historians may well be the only available source of key documents. . . . Without the diligent and careful work of hundreds of soldiers and civilians collecting copies of documents and conducting oral history interviews in Afghanistan and Iraq, writing the Army's comprehensive official histories of the operations there would not be possible.

Dr. Richard W. Stewart
Chief Historian, U.S. Army Center of Military History³

With the end of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army and other organizations have started their lessons learned and historical studies based on the wars, with the expectations of capturing those lessons for future conflicts. While the nature of war has not changed, the ways in which the U.S. Army organized and fought have changed, and military historians need to adapt to the skills necessary to write the histories that will be not only accurate, but also relevant to the Army.

CHANGES IN ARMY FORCE EMPLOYMENT

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in Iraq were

the catalyst for sweeping changes in the way the Army prepared its forces and organized them for combat. While the change from a division-centric model to a brigade-centric model was driven by the demand for forces deploying to Iraq, the confluence of the OEF mission with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) provided an even more daunting challenge of complexity. The changes in task organization and the common employment of units in coalition roles, in addition to their divisional roles, will require Army histories to look away from a traditional focus on organizing information along divisional and corps lines. Not doing so risks making the histories of those and future

conflicts less relevant at best, and at worst, misleading.

Operation DESERT STORM marked the last instance of the traditional employment of full Army divisions and corps in combat. Divisions employed their own organic brigades, with relatively few major changes in task organization. If there were changes, they occurred at the brigade level, as was the case for the 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division, which was under the operational control of the 2d Marine Division. Divisions that did not deploy in full strength to the Balkans during peacekeeping operations rotated their personnel and units internally to replace those already committed to operations, as was the case for the 1st Cavalry Division from 1998 to 1999. Major changes



Cmd. Sgt. Maj. William E. High (seated at the head of the table on the right) of the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan briefs Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Marvin L. Hill, senior enlisted leader for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and United States Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), as well as other senior noncommissioned officers, at a training site near Kabul, Afghanistan, 11 May 2011.

in task organization, such as the attachment of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (less its 1st Squadron) to the 49th Armored Division for operations in Bosnia as Task Force EAGLE in 2000, were generally at the brigade level.

One notable exception to the use of divisional task forces was Task Force HAWK in 1998 in Kosovo, comprised of a command post from V Corps and units drawn from the V Corps Artillery; 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment; 12th Aviation Regiment; 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division; and a battalion task force from the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. That task organization reflected the differences in the Task Force HAWK mission from the other units that deployed to the Balkans during the same period. The subsequent deployment of forces for Task Force FALCON in 1999 was a more traditional task organization of units by division, initially under the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized).²

However, the beginning of OEF marked the first time that the norm for conventional force employment was a mix of brigade combat teams from different units. Division headquarters deployed without all of their subordinate brigades and often commanded unfamiliar units, sometimes from different posts. Limitations imposed by policy, as well as the constraints of logistical infrastructure in an austere theater of operations, prevented the use of traditional divisional or even brigade task organizations early in the campaign. Although Army division

headquarters deploying to Afghanistan often took one or more of their home station brigades, they frequently had to task organize with other divisional or separate brigades.

During the 2003 attack on Baghdad, Army maneuver combat forces were organized along divisional lines, and the tactical engagements and battles in that attack were fought mainly by division cavalry squadrons or brigades fighting in their traditional roles. After the first rotation of forces in the summer of 2003, the demand on the force and the resultant mix of task organizations meant that Army division and corps headquarters commanded units that were not associated with them at their home station. Even during the early years of the Iraq campaign, divisions did not deploy with all of their forces; for example, the 82d Airborne Division's subordinate brigades were split between Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003. By 2004, the forces required for certain areas such as Baghdad outstripped the standard task organization of a full division, while the 42d Infantry Division (Mechanized) commanded a variety of Active Army and Army National Guard maneuver brigades, none of which were organic to the 42d's home station structure.

One of the reasons for this shift in organization was a progressive devolution of responsibilities by echelon. The combatant command is no longer the sole headquarters responsible for conducting operational warfare, which in the last two decades has been the role of joint task forces composited at far lower levels. On the other hand, Army corps and divisions fought as single-service organizations in previous conflicts, although the corps started migrating toward jointness as a result of the Army and Air Force's changes in tactical doctrine in the 1980s. In the 1990s, Army divisions joined corps in having increasingly joint and multinational responsibilities.³ As a result, the sorts of tactical responsibilities that typically fell under divisions devolved to brigade combat teams in the Army's reorganization under the Modularity concept. Starting in 2004, brigades became the lowest echelon that had organic combined arms in their task organization, which codified in structure and doctrine what had been long practice for decades. Modularity also codified the role requirement of division and corps headquarters as the nucleus of a joint and/or multinational task force headquarters, a role that had become commonplace after experience

in Somalia, the Balkans, and the first rotation of forces into Afghanistan. At the same time, the Army adopted the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, which essentially treated brigades of like structure as interchangeable. Furthermore, the skyrocketing demand for combat forces in Iraq effectively institutionalized the mixed employment of brigades from different divisions based on which units were available first, a practice that also affected units deploying to Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, division headquarters were routinely augmented for the role of joint task force headquarters from 2001 to 2009, while the corps headquarters—that filled the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and later the U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) national support element headquarters roles—served as a land component and joint task force headquarters, respectively. The Army corps headquarters that deployed to Iraq went through a shift in roles, initially as Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 7, then to a land component as Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I), then back to the joint task force role as U.S. Forces–Iraq at the end of OIF and through Operation NEW DAWN.

In both conflicts, divisions and corps fought in dispersed and often noncontiguous areas of operation. Rather than fighting engagements and battles themselves, divisions and corps became resource providers to their subordinate brigade combat teams. As a result, the true focus of tactical-level histories has moved from divisions and corps to the brigade combat team and below. Although brigades may have been flagged under a divisional designation, Modularity changed those putatively divisional brigades into separate entities; divisions and corps were then responsible for coordinating the aggregated effects of multiple tactical operations against operational and sometimes even strategic objectives, in essence, focusing on operational art. The most extreme examples of that trend occurred in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2009 when the headquarters of the 10th Mountain Division, 82d Airborne Division, and 101st Airborne Division, as CJTF-76, CJTF-82, and

CJTF-101, respectively, had responsibilities for tactical operations subordinate to ISAF. Because these units were also CJTFs, they had separate responsibilities and were subordinate to U.S. Central Command. In that capacity, they served as the national support element for all American forces in both of the ISAF and OEF coalitions (that also included conducting administrative control functions that only run along service lines).

Furthermore, certain joint and service processes that were largely unimportant to Army units at the divisional level and below became critical context for how the Army operated in 2001 and beyond. Some of the joint processes that affected Army units included the Joint Strategic Planning System, but more notably, Global Force Management (GFM) and the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The rotations of Army forces were all managed under GFM, while the sourcing of task organizations occurred through both GFM and JOPES. While those systems existed before, the scale of commitment to the force at large pushed many of those responsibilities downward.

As the Army organizes and employs forces in accordance with Regionally Aligned Forces and other concepts, brigades and their subordinate organizations will continue to deploy independently of their division headquarters, which may not even be aligned to the same area as their subordinate brigades. At the other end, the common use of division headquarters in Afghanistan as the nucleus of a CJTF has greatly reduced the visibility of division headquarters as an Army-only entity. The routine employment of Army divisions and corps to build CJTFs suggests that Army historians will need to be conversant, if not fluent, in the effects of joint processes at progressively lower echelons than in the past.

HISTORIANS AND OPERATIONAL ART

Changes in task organization, increased jointness across Army formations, and the accompanying devolution of responsibilities to tactical

units have greatly increased the need for Army historians to have a solid understanding of operational art and logistics to properly contextualize operations after 2001. Historians without a grounding in operational art face a significant, if not insurmountable, handicap to writing effectively above the small unit level.⁴

However, the developmental path for an Army historian offers little to fill the void in operational art theory or practice.⁵ Developing such expertise requires education and experience in operational and strategic art that is virtually unavailable to most uniformed historians, let alone civilian historians. Unfortunately, the challenges facing those historians are structural in nature and character, and in many cases, not within the ability of history organizations to fix.

For uniformed Army historians in the Active Component, those few able to obtain a terminal degree will usually have been away long enough from their basic branches that they will have little opportunity to gain foundational experience above the brigade level in operational art theory or practice. Those who leave their basic branches for functional areas may have greater opportunity to gain such expertise, but the combination of such expertise and a graduate degree in history is uncommon even at best. There is not enough time in most careers to pursue both a terminal degree and the education and training in operational art available at the School of Advanced Military Studies or a similar advanced military studies program (AMSP).

Uniformed historians who stay in their basic branches to pursue AMSPs and their associated utilization tours are at high risk of being eliminated from the force by selection boards for professional military education, promotion, and most significantly, command. The boards have generally punished iconoclasts who deviate from the golden paths necessary to compete successfully for the tactical command assignments requisite to future promotion. Those pressures are reduced for officers with career fields designated into functional areas, but there are few opportunities for advanced civil school-

ing in history for most functional areas short of Functional Area 59 (Strategist), which is neither structured nor intended to support an official history mission.

For civilian historians, there is no opportunity to gain familiarity in the theory or practice of operational art other than taking the Continuing Education for Senior Leaders (CESL) course or attending a senior service college—by which time it is too late. Furthermore, those experiences are oriented on strategy and policy, not operational art. Unlike their uniformed counterparts, most civilian historians will not have the benefit of tactical experience to both counterbalance and inform discussions of strategy and policy, nor will they have had general staff experience in campaign planning and execution to properly reconstruct historical context at the operational and strategic levels. Gaining such background does not require attendance at an AMSP, but short of personal interest, there is little to promote the development of that knowledge.⁶

CHALLENGES FROM CLASSIFIED SOURCES

Changes in the conduct of operations since 2001 were not merely doc-

trinal or organizational in nature. The proliferation of computers also materially changed the Army's administration, and in turn, created new demands on Army historians. Notably, OEF was the first conflict fought primarily off electronic records from the unified combatant command level on down. While there are paper records, they are usually in the form of personal notes, often written on paper copies of the electronic originals.

To further complicate matters, most of the records generated in contingency operations were, and still are, classified. Unlike Operation DESERT STORM in which historians were the beneficiary of a massive declassification effort soon after the conflict, the nature of the operations in OEF and OIF has virtually ensured that short of a Freedom of Information Act challenge, those records will remain classified for years, if not decades, to come.

Those working with NATO-classified information have an even greater challenge. In accordance with NATO's public disclosure policy, there is a thirty-year threshold for information that is classified NATO Confidential or higher.⁷ That policy excludes much of the information created by NATO organizations that were part of the ISAF mission. The establishment of

NATO and U.S. headquarters under the same commander became commonplace during the ISAF and OEF missions. One example is the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and the USFOR-A Operational Corps headquarters; another is the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan and the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan. Throughout the force, the general lack of knowledge of the differences between command and control relationships for the ISAF and OEF missions virtually guaranteed that information created for the two missions were intermixed.

Due to the lack of foreign disclosure and derivative classification knowledge throughout the force, much information has been either overclassified or worse still, classified as being from the wrong type of organization. Improper classification markings were particularly common at ISAF and IJC, where both U.S. national and NATO ISAF actions were processed in the same headquarters.


Finally, the complexity of working with classified information increases even further when considering the different networks and systems storing that information. In previous conflicts, systems were rarely networked, except to share tactical information. By the end of the twentieth century, however, networked systems were commonplace. Historians may not have anticipated the proliferation of networks that resulted from restrictions on the sensitivity and releasability of classified information during operations. Early in the OEF and OIF campaigns, Army units used the Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNET) for secret information and the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Routing Network (NIPRNET) for unclassified information. However, as coalition forces became a routine part of task organizations under previously Army-only headquarters, the need for coalition networks became painfully apparent.

While NATO had experience creating satellite networks from its unclassified and classified networks for its missions, often including non-NATO



British Army Lt. Gen. Sir Richard Shirreff (center), Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, receives a briefing from ISAF Joint Command leaders at Kabul International Airport, Afghanistan, 14 January 2011.

U.S., ISAF, and NATO Networks



troop contributing nations, the United States had no such system at the beginning of OIF and OEF. The answer was the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), a set of American-operated

classified networks that could be used by nations that were not entitled access to SIPRNET. In Iraq, a CENTRIXS enclave was established primarily for MNC-I in 2003, but it fell into disuse years later as members of the OIF co-

alition withdrew from the operation. In Afghanistan, a separate CENTRIXS enclave was maintained initially for the OEF coalition, then was quickly repurposed during the troop surge in Afghanistan as part of the Afghan Mission Network. Today, the CENTRIXS enclave built for ISAF is the largest national extension connected to the Afghan Mission Network, processing information releasable previously to ISAF, and now the Resolute Support coalition. The use of such networks represents a critical resource that historians of coalition operations ignore at their peril.

FROM PAPER TO A MULTIPLICITY OF DIGITAL RECORDS

The shift to electronic records as the majority of the primary sources for OEF and subsequent operations places a premium on historians who, while trained in traditional historical tradecraft, are also digital natives. If C. P. Snow's 1959 lecture and subsequent book titled *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* was any



AFC Heidelberg Public Affairs Office

Personnel from V Corps and ISAF countries man the joint operations center at NATO's Allied Force Command Heidelberg during a mission rehearsal exercise for the next rotation of forces to ISAF Joint Command, 17 June 2010.

of reading those records. Ongoing security requirements on Army computer systems are likely to close off that access to old data in the future. As a result, guidelines for retaining old hardware and software will be needed so records can remain accessible.

LOOKING TO FUTURE HISTORIES

The demands of producing history that is relevant to the force, while being intellectually rigorous, have not waived the requirements for historians to write clear, compelling narratives based on solid historiography. In fact, the ready availability to the force of lessons learned and other literature besides military history places an even greater premium on accurate historical manuscripts that can be used to frame future education and training. However, traditional historical tradecraft is not enough. The changes in how the Army has fought at the tactical level, as well as the proliferation of joint headquarters at levels below combatant command, bring additional requirements for professional knowledge that is difficult, if not impossible, for historians to gain through current models of education, training, or experience.

The present developmental model for historians needs to factor in more education on the theory and practice of operational art. Doing so may be actually easier for civilian historians, who are not subject to the punishing time and “up-or-out” limits placed on the career paths of uniformed historians from the Active Component. Unfortunately for Reserve Component officers, there are even fewer opportunities for gaining that training, education, and relevant experience. Barring a change to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980, a structural fix to those challenges looks unlikely, which does not bode well for the production of histories for periods since 2001, especially those above the brigade level. Nonetheless, the need for that knowledge will become more pressing as Army tactical units take on tasks with progressively greater strategic significance into the future.



U.S. Air Force

Coalition troops from all the regional commands and several headquarters, as well as members of the Afghan National Army and Police, attend a conference on ways to decrease civilian casualties in Afghanistan, 14 May 2010.



U.S. Army

Soldiers from the United States, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria attend a logistics briefing with their Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams during an exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, 14 May 2012.

The duties of an Army historian covering the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—and likely anything in the foreseeable future—will entail working with electronic classified records as the first and quite possibly most authoritative primary sources available. Certain foundational skills required to work effectively in classified environments—specifically writing for release with the intent of eventual declassifica-

tion—are now critical for official historians who use classified records, which will likely remain classified for decades after their creation. However, none of those skills are taught anywhere in the training or accessions pipeline for uniformed or civilian historians. In fact, the skills necessary for a historian to properly interpret and manage classified markings are effectively the same as those of a foreign disclosure

reviewer. Army historians will need that training to properly contextualize classified historical sources from joint and multinational environments. More importantly, they will also need training so that they can recognize when those sources have been (all too often) improperly marked, thus denying them access to future scholarship. Not having those skills risks the creation of history that will not accurately represent the people, organizations, and actions that actually occurred, and for the purpose of the Army, the reasons why those actions occurred.

Army historians writing about conflicts after the attacks on 11 September 2001 will require some fluency in digital information systems, knowledge management, and security regulations that became a largely unfulfilled requirement in the last decade. Army historians can no longer afford a lack of knowledge in the data structures and networks used in operations, especially given the different contexts that surrounded the use of national networks such as SIPRNET, versus coalition networks such as the NATO Mission Secret networks for Afghanistan or Kosovo, or the different CENTRIXS enclaves that have been established for various coalitions and alliances worldwide. Furthermore, Army historians who are unaware of the distinctions between U.S. national and NATO classification markings, or are unable to discern when a document has been improperly marked, will work at a disadvantage, particularly at the operational level at which strategy and tactics come

together in a joint, interagency, and multinational context.

The greatest beneficiary of building these skills in the military history establishment will be the Army itself. Internalizing short-term lessons learned and identifying broader institutional trends for the future will require a concerted effort, not just by historians, but by the field historians and archivists who collect and maintain the records from which those future histories must be written. Commanders and their staffs must ensure that the information generated by their organizations can be organized in a way that readily enables its collection. Making good on the spirit, blood, and treasure that has been spent since 2001 in combat operations demands nothing less.



NOTES

1. Richard W. Stewart, "Collection to Publication: Historical Sausage Making," *Army History* 81 (Fall 2011): 43

2. R. Cody Phillips, *Operation Joint Guardian: The U.S. Army in Kosovo* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2007), pp. 14–18.

3. While not formally defined, a working definition of "jointness" appeared in the 2007–2008 U.S. Army War College Curriculum Catalogue: "Jointness refers to the mutual support and doctrinal understanding that must exist within all military services. Jointness is a state of mind as well as a statement of fact. It predisposes those who share its goals to emphasize the unique capabilities of the Nation's military services in planning and operations

that are by design, from beginning to end, synergistic, cooperative, and interdependent." Virginia C. Shope, *Jointness: A Selected Bibliography* (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Library, August 2007).

4. Discussions of policy and strategy are the domain of the history offices at the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) or at the Joint Staff, not the Army's history products.

5. For a discussion of the cognitive shifts and education foundations required for the competent conduct of operational art, see Brig Gen John S. Brown, "The Maturation of Operational Art: Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM," in Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips, eds., *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art*, CMH Pub 70–89–1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), pp. 440–44.

6. For a more detailed overview of such background, see Francis Park, "A Framework for Developing Military Strategists," *Infinity Journal* 5, No. 1 (Fall 2015): pp. 9–14.

7. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Archives Committee, Directive AC/324-D(2014)0010 (Brussels, 4 August 2014).


8. C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and The Scientific Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 4–13.

9. In the case of the seasonal operations orders, they were archived on a coalition network that was not readily accessible outside the CJTF future plans directorate and was not collected when the MHD did its end-of-tour collection of information.

10. The most common incidence of this problem is because of a security fix in Microsoft Office. See Microsoft Support, "Information about Certain File Types That Are Blocked after You Install Office 2003 Service Pack 3," 12 September 2011, Article ID 938810, Version 8.0, accessed 24 June 2015 at <https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/938810/en-us>.

BOOKREVIEWS

Coronado's Well-Equipped Army: The Spanish Invasion of the American Southwest



By John M. Hutchins
Westholme Publishing, 2014
Pp. xvii, 374. \$29.95

Review by Gary G. Shattuck

Almost 500 years separates us from the initial Spanish penetration into America's southwest by the expedition of Francisco Vázquez de Coronado (1510–1554), which took place between 1540 and 1542. Many have written in the interim of the event, when those modern-day conquistadors first came face to face with pueblo-dwelling Indians, seeking to understand how the event unfolded and to extract any lessons they might reveal. These writers focused their accounts largely on the violence taking place, frequently concluding

that the effort was a disaster. They become so repetitive and predictable in their retelling that one questions if anything new can come from yet another examination of those times. Fortunately, the answer is a resounding “yes,” as John M. Hutchins makes clear in his highly readable, engaging, and thought-provoking *Coronado's Well-Equipped Army: The Spanish Invasion of the American Southwest*.

Whereas the historiography of Coronado's *entrada* is replete with descriptions of invading, ominous, steel-helmeted conquistadors mounted on horseback, committing unforgivable, plundering mayhem in search of seven golden cities, Hutchins adopts an entirely different view. In doing so, he evokes a deeper appreciation for the challenges he faced, while also forcing readers to reevaluate their own prior understandings. This often required that past, and some present, experts' opinions be reexamined and tested to see if they survived his particular scrutiny, with Hutchins unafraid to either support or refute as warranted. A retired major in the U.S. Army Reserve, graduate of the University of Colorado law school with over thirty years of practice on the local, state, and federal levels, and established historian of the American West, Hutchins brings credentials to the effort that few, if any, others have, and their effectiveness cannot be denied.

Over the course of twenty-one chapters, interspersed with numerous images and supported by an

exhaustive eighty-one pages of notes, Hutchins directs his focus toward the logistical side of the equation, examining the diverse kinds of materiel available to Coronado and how it was most likely used in the context of the times. Throughout, the reader is presented with information describing both the war-like and mundane types of equipment accompanying this eclectic, foot- and horse-borne body as they penetrated deep into the unexplored regions of northern Mexico. They did so during “the greatest age of the conquistadors” (p. 15), taking place between 1513 and 1543, and which saw such noteworthy events as Hernán Cortés conquering Mexico City (1519), Francisco Pizarro in Peru (1524), and Hernando de Soto in Florida (1539). However, Hutchins also reminds us that at the same time, on the other side of the ocean, Europe was also in the midst of widespread war taking place between the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and the sultan of Turkey, occurring between 1536 and 1547. From Hutchins' perspective, in order to fully understand the challenges that Coronado faced in the remote regions of the Spanish Empire it is always necessary to consider what his far-off contemporaries were doing and how they did it.

Coronado did not operate in a vacuum, and the strategies employed, the men recruited, the equipment assembled, and the tactics utilized were common on both sides of the Atlantic; essentially, the New World experience was overlaid by those of

the Old. The only meaningful difference between them concerned their particular goals and the terrain in which they were executed, which, for Coronado, necessitated a high degree of flexibility and willingness to adapt rather than reinvent. Importantly, Coronado was further constricted by the nation-building aspects of his venture, one that measured success by the extent of its “conquest and incorporation” (p. 42) of unexplored lands into the sphere of Spanish rule. Of course, finding gold constituted an important goal, but Mexico’s Viceroy Antonio de Mendoza also made it clear to the young captain general that he expected him to protect the native population as he spread the influence of the Catholic Church.

Many aspects of the expedition are not an issue because of extant inventories that provide much-detailed information. These include the types of personnel recruited, such as Old and New World gentlemen and entrepreneurs (some 300) seeking plunder, title, and land; Indian auxiliaries providing critical support (approximately 800); and various camp followers that included women, servants, and slaves, totaling some 1,700 people. A huge number of animals also accompanied them, including well over 1,000 horses and mules, and herds of cattle and sheep for food (respectively, 500 and 5,000). Feeding this large entourage remained a constant concern throughout and was accomplished by their bringing foodstuffs with them, foraging off the increasingly barren landscape, raiding caches of grain stored by Indians, and assaulting their pueblo complexes in its search. While their logistical plan also included the presence of supply ships in the Gulf of California attempting to shadow their moves, failure to link up defeated efforts to satisfy their persistent hunger.

Hutchins’ strongest contribution to Coronado’s story involves the armaments that accompanied the expedition, many identified with sufficient specificity as to understand their type and number. The expedition was modeled on the contemporary European experience and included

the presence of many pieces of armor (for both man and horse), swords, daggers, pikes, halberds, lances, arquebuses, crossbows, an estimated six small cannon (falcons), battle axes, scaling ladders, and war dogs. The way in which these tools of war were employed under the difficult and varying circumstances that a desert environment presents, as described by Hutchins, provides the reader with ample opportunity to vicariously experience just how challenging it was to achieve even a moderate degree of success.

Making the effort all the more difficult were the Indians themselves, believed to number approximately 20,000, living in some seventy communities extending from northern Arizona (where the expedition discovered the Colorado River and the Grand Canyon), across New Mexico and Texas, and north into modern-day Kansas. Their pueblos constructed of sticks and mud, terraced upward in various numbers of stories, proved an effective, formidable barrier in those instances when the hungry invaders chose to fire their ineffective cannon into them, or to scale upward with their ladders and then push their way through mazes of darkened rooms. It was a form of urban warfare that any modern-day soldier can understand.

Hutchins provides a further service when he considers the expedition’s legacy as it retreated back to Mexico City after two years of wandering across this huge landscape. Because of a possible miscommunication that took place during one battle when quarter was not allowed to surrendering Indians, they came to believe that the Spanish could not be trusted. Whether it was true or not is irrelevant for it became a byword for later generations of Indians that resisted Spanish efforts to subdue them.

Notwithstanding that unfortunate turn, a final contribution from the legally trained Hutchins concerns the ensuing investigation looking into the expedition’s expenditure of money and its degree of success. While Coronado’s efforts were relatively mild compared to those


savage results obtained by other conquistadors (p. 252), he became a scapegoat for several individuals with agendas seeking to impose on him a higher, more exacting, degree of scrutiny that others managed to escape. Hutchins does a great service to Coronado who, albeit did fail in his mission, performed in a more admirable fashion in dealing with the Indians than did his contemporaries fighting in the Old World and where savage revenge was inflicted on those they conquered. For any missteps that might have been made, the justifications used by those critics to support their condemnations of him are, in the end, baseless.

There is little to fault with *Coronado’s Well-Equipped Army*, and it is an important contribution to the historiography of the introduction of western civilization into the wilds of the southwest desert. Hutchins’ imaginative use of records describing the expedition’s capabilities expands significantly on the prior work of others and, in the end, rescues Coronado himself from the condemnation that many have visited on him for so many centuries.

Gary G. Shattuck is a former federal prosecutor currently pursuing a master’s degree in military history, concentrating on the Revolutionary War. He researches historical events from a legal perspective and is the author of *Insurrection, Corruption & Murder in Early Vermont: Life on the Wild Northern Frontier* (Charleston, S.C.: The History Press, 2014) and *Artful and Designing Men: The Trials of Job Shattuck and the Regulation of 1786–1787* (Mustang, Okla.: Tate Publishing, 2013).



All Canada in the Hands of the British: General Jeffery Amherst and the 1760 Campaign to Conquer New France



By Douglas R. Cubbison
University of Oklahoma Press, 2014
Pp. xviii, 283. \$34.95

Review by John R. Maass

In his new book about the 1760 British campaign to capture Montreal, Canada, historian Douglas R. Cubbison seeks to fill a significant historiographical gap in the study of military operations during the French and Indian War (1754–1763) in America. Most popular histories of this conflict, also known as the Seven Years' War, lead readers to conclude that British General James Wolfe's capture of French-held Quebec in September 1759 ended the war, and even many academic studies gloss over the military events in Canada during 1760 as mere "mopping-up" operations. This neglect "is surprising," the author notes, "as this critical campaign resulted in the final reduction of Canada" (p. 209). To remedy this misperception, Cubbison details General Jeffery Amherst's successful campaign to secure a British victory in North America with a complex campaign.

Amherst, the British commander in chief in North America, coordinated a three-pronged simultaneous attack on Montreal in the summer of 1760, designed to approach the Canadian city from different directions. A mixed force of regulars, New England provincial troops, and Indian scouts

under the command of Col. William Haviland sailed north in early August on Lakes George and Champlain to besiege the fortified French post at Île aux Noix, situated on an island on the Richelieu River in Canada. After Haviland positioned his powerful artillery in carefully prepared batteries east of the enemy location, he opened a devastating bombardment lasting several days, which eventually forced the French to abandon their stronghold under cover of night and retreat toward the St. Lawrence River. The British then moved north to reduce two more French posts before arriving on the St. Lawrence opposite Montreal on 8 September.

Another of Amherst's three columns was led by General James Murray from his base at Quebec, where British arms had prevailed over the French the year before. After spending a grueling winter, Murray's army of regulars was defeated by the French at the Battle of Sainte-Foy on 28 April, but managed to regroup inside the city, and by 14 July, he began his march up the St. Lawrence toward Montreal, supported by British Navy vessels in the river. Along the way, Murray conducted successful counterinsurgency measures among the French civilian populace, inducing them to stop fighting, stay home, and sell the redcoats their extra food and supplies. His troops arrived at Montreal on 3 September from the northeast, sealing off any chance the French had to escape the city by way of the river.

Amherst personally led the western prong of his ambitious campaign, leaving with his troops and hundreds of Indians from Fort Ontario at Oswego on Lake Ontario to approach Montreal from the west. In order to do so, he had to reduce the French Fort Lévis in the St. Lawrence River on Isle Royale with his soldiers, small ships, and powerful artillery. After a three-day bombardment, the fort's garrison surrendered on 25 August, then Amherst immediately packed up and set out downriver. After descending the dangerous Cedar Rapids with the loss of one hundred men and numerous boats, Amherst brought his troops to Montreal by 6 September. The city's

defenses were in poor condition and offered little protection for the French troops inside the walls. "Montreal was, for all practical purposes, defenseless against any one of Amherst's columns, much less all three combined," writes Cubbison (p. 202). The city's garrison surrendered on 8 September, which meant that all of Canada was then in British possession.


Cubbison's narrative shows that this campaign was indeed remarkable, as the British under General Amherst were able to successfully manage a well-coordinated campaign in the wilderness of North America with difficult supply and communications challenges. Moreover, the British conducted two effective sieges, and used regulars, colonial provincial troops, and American Indians in their victorious four-week campaign, no small feat during the French and Indian War.

All Canada in the Hands of the British is a well-written narrative, in which the author presents three separate operations of one campaign in a clear, logically organized account, buttressed by numerous vivid quotations and three excellent maps. Cubbison should be commended for bringing to light this often-overlooked final year of the Seven Years' War in North America, and adding his volume to several excellent titles regarding this conflict published over the last few years in the University of Oklahoma Press' Campaigns and Commanders series.

Dr. John R. Maass is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Washington and Lee University and a Ph.D. in early U.S. history from the Ohio State University. He is the author of the first pamphlet in the Center of Military History's Campaigns of the War of 1812 series, titled *Defending a New Nation, 1783–1811* (Washington, D.C., 2013) and *The Road to Yorktown: Jefferson, Lafayette and the British Invasion of Virginia* (Charleston, S.C., 2015).



African Canadians in Union Blue: Volunteering for the Cause in the Civil War



By Richard M. Reid
University of British Columbia
Press, 2014
Pp. xiii, 292. \$35.95

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

During the Civil War, almost 200,000 black men served in the Union army and navy. Included among these soldiers and sailors were almost 2,500 black British North Americans, who served in defiance of their Foreign Enlistment Act, making it illegal for British subjects to enlist in a foreign army during time of war. Richard M. Reid, professor emeritus at the University of Guelph, in Ontario, examines their contributions to the Union cause in this book—a volume in the Canadian War Museum’s Studies in Canadian Military History series.

The Dominion of Canada was not created until 1867, so the author focuses on black British North Americans who were living in Canada West (modern Ontario), Canada East (modern southern Quebec), New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island as the Civil War began. There is disagreement on how many black citizens were living in those colonies in 1861, but it was probably close to 40,000, including thousands who had escaped American slavery by using the so-called Underground Railroad. Canada had become especially attractive as a safe haven for escaped slaves after the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850.

The author documents at least 1,187 black recruits born in British North America—352 sailors and 835 soldiers—and estimates that there were about another 1,250 identifying themselves as Canadian, but who had been born in the United States. Those who volunteered to serve in the Union navy came first, as the federal government did not start actively recruiting black soldiers for its United States Colored Troops (USCT) units until 1863. From the start of the war, the Union navy allowed integrated crews to serve on its warships, but there were few black sailors from British North America—only 18 recruits in 1861, 30 in 1862, and 31 in 1863—until 1864, when 259 enlisted (13 more enlisted in 1865). The reason for the great increase in black recruitment in 1864 was a change in regulations allowing enlistment bounties (previously paid only to soldiers) to be paid to sailors. About 62 percent of these 352 black sailors (220) came from Canada West, with Nova Scotia providing the next largest group of recruits (72). Surprisingly, the author notes that only about one out of seven (53) listed their civilian occupation as “mariner.”

Once black British North Americans began enlisting in the Union army in 1863, most of them opted to serve in the segregated regiments raised in states that were located close to the Canadian border. For example, 137 of them enlisted in the First Michigan Colored Infantry (later redesignated as the 102d USCT), while 170 enrolled in New York’s black regiments, and 56 of them joined the 5th Massachusetts Cavalry. The black soldiers were initially upset by the fact that they were paid less than their white peers, but once that pay dispute was resolved in the summer of 1864, black enlistment from British North America increased considerably. Unfortunately, desertion also increased, from only a dozen in 1863 to sixty-three in 1864 and forty-seven in 1865.

The author also discusses four black British North Americans who served as doctors for the Union war effort. Maj. Alexander T. Augusta,

American-born but educated in Canada West, was appointed as the surgeon of the 7th USCT for a short time, and he was awarded the brevet rank of lieutenant colonel at the end of the war, making him the Union army’s highest-ranking black officer. Three other men with connections to Canada West—Anderson R. Abbott, John H. Rapier, and Jerome Riley—also served the Union as contract surgeons. Despite their demonstrated medical skills, all four men experienced many instances of racial discrimination during their service.

After the war, some black British North American veterans returned to Canada, while others decided to remain in the United States. A few liked military life well enough to enlist in one of the black regiments that were added to the Regular Army in 1866. Many others sought a far lesser degree of martial camaraderie by joining the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), which was the largest postwar Union army and navy veterans’ organization. The GAR was organized into posts located in cities across the United States. At least eight GAR posts also were established in Canada: one in Manitoba, four in Ontario, and three in Quebec, and several of them were integrated. As but one example, in 1892, at least three of the forty-three members of Toronto’s James S. Knowlton Post were black.

The GAR strongly supported the government’s program of postwar disability pensions, and many black British North American veterans applied for them. USCT veterans’ pension claims were disapproved at a higher rate than claims by white veterans, often because it was harder for black veterans to secure the documentation required to justify their claims. Those who persisted, however, or their dependents, were often able to secure monthly payments that were small by today’s standards but nevertheless much appreciated.

African Canadians in Union Blue offers an intriguing examination of an aspect of the Civil War that has been largely ignored. Readers who consider themselves Civil War buffs, as well as those who are interested in black

history, will find this well-researched study to be of great interest, and it is highly recommended.

Roger D. Cunningham graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1972 and retired from the U.S. Army in 1994. He is the author of *The Black Citizen-Soldiers of Kansas, 1864–1901* (Columbia, Mo., 2008), as well as numerous articles and book reviews, many of which have appeared in this journal.



The Hundred Day Winter War: Finland's Gallant Stand Against the Soviet Army



By Gordon F. Sander
University Press of Kansas, 2013
Pp. xi, 390. \$39.95

Review by Joseph Moretz

Given recent and ongoing events in Eastern Europe where a bellicose, if not belligerent Russia, poses fresh worry to immediate neighbors, it is timely that a new survey of the 1939–1940 Winter War fought between the Soviet Union and Finland is at hand. Gordon F. Sander offers a compelling narrative of that war and of those times which witnessed a fierce, proud, and much smaller nation defend its status against a power of continental proportions. This is a story that has been ably told many times before, but Sander offers

a fresh perspective by anchoring his survey in the contemporary reporting of British and American journalists—not all on the ground in Finland—and then portraying the reaction of the West, principally, America, to the war. As propaganda, or information operations to use its current *nom de guerre*, was such a feature of Finnish strategy, this approach has obvious merits.

Of those journalists writing and witnessing Finland's struggle, Martha Gellhorn of *Collier's* was the most noted. Arriving in Helsinki on the eve of war, the timely presence of this veteran observer from the recently concluded Spanish Civil War confirmed that if the war was sudden, then it was not a surprise to many, including her editor (pp. 37–38). Others of note, such as Walter Duranty and Hanson Baldwin of the *New York Times* provided their analysis from afar (pp. 162 and 176). If their conclusions were not always correct, it should not obscure the fact that the Winter War was covered seriously and at length by the Fourth Estate. The lack of activity in the greater European War following the conquest of Poland may partly explain this phenomenon, but surely it also reflects that the audiences of such stories retained an interest in foreign affairs absent from much of today's readership.

In all this, Sander's story confirms that it was easier to shape the opinions of individuals than change the policies of government and never the more so than in the United States. Accordingly, prominent dignitaries, including former president Herbert Hoover, spoke and canvassed in support of Finland, staged charity benefits, and raised monies. Clearly, the leanings of isolationist America were foursquare behind Finland. Yet, that public remained isolationist, as did the levers of American government, demonstrating the limits of suasion. Moreover, this isolationism was rooted in the neutrality laws passed as a response to the deep-seated aversion felt of an earlier European war. In all this, there is much food for thought for the modern observer.

The strength of *The Hundred Day Winter War* lies in its interweaving of personal accounts of the war to the

broader issues at hand. In a campaign in which the home front and the front line frequently merged, this approach allows the contribution and suffering of the populace to be juxtaposed with the soldier and not appear maudlin. The psychological pressures of sustained combat on a small reserve-based army are an important element of the story and Sander does not shy from describing. Still, if only a limited war for the Soviets, it was a life-and-death struggle for Finland and, here, the contribution of Finnish women was key. This too is recounted ably. Yet, weather and terrain governed the lines of this brief war and the initial success Finland enjoyed owed everything to General Winter (p. 132). Sander also takes time to remind the reader that though this was a war fought primarily on the ground, air and naval operations played their part. A number of fine maps are provided to assist in tracing the ebb and flow of the campaign, but more notable still are the excellent photographs accompanying the text.

Surprisingly, for a work written by a sometime academic and published by an academic press, it is not grounded in archival research, though the author has incorporated a number of useful and informative interviews from both Finnish and Russian veterans. This lapse is unfortunate because it stems from two critical weaknesses of *The Hundred Day Winter War*: numerous factual errors are present in the work, while findings are noted as incomplete at best. Of the former, Germany did not invade Norway six months after the end of the Winter War nor was Narvik a British disaster (pp. 323 and 348). Allied forces successfully occupied Narvik in June 1940 in one of the few bright spots of an otherwise lamentable affair and then used that limited success to cover their withdrawal from Norway. Of the latter failing, General Alan Brooke did follow General Edmund Ironside as chief of the Imperial General Staff but not before General John Dill had his turn as well (p. 249). To these errors, a more basic one is the author's tendency to misquote direct citations; Neville Chamberlain's peroration to the House of Commons

on 8 February 1940 (not reproduced in *The Times* of 7 February as cited) being an egregious example (p. 260).

More problematic, however, is that by failing to review the official record available, Sander presents a misleading picture of Allied strategy, military capabilities, and the objective of any intervention. Describing these forces as crack troops is hardly accurate for even the *Chasseurs Alpins* (mountain infantry) had not been tested in conditions as severe as Finland in 1940, to say nothing of the half-trained Territorials who would have made up the bulk of the British military contingent. The last thing Britain desired was a wider war to include fighting the Soviets. This is why a landing at Petsamo as the French proposed was eschewed. Already captured by the Russians, its retaking would bring Allied forces into battle with the Soviets. On the surface, a Petsamo operation obviated the support of Norway and Sweden, but the reality was otherwise. Petsamo could only be taken if the Allies held a port in northern Norway to support its capture. Writing history is never easy and writing good military history remains more difficult yet, as relating the interplay of politics, diplomacy, societal forces, and battle is fraught with compromise. The best history negotiates this web offering both a compelling narrative and a rigorous analysis. However, the first task of the historian remains: be factually true to the record.

The legacy of the Winter War proved even greater than its immediate calculus. It seemingly confirmed that Russia remained militarily weak in the aftermath of the purges of the Red Army. From this calculation, both Britain and France sought to pursue a forward policy in Scandinavia nominally in defense of Finland, but with the ultimate objective of controlling the iron fields of Sweden. This strategy would go terribly wrong in Norway, but not irretrievably. Hitler drew similar conclusions of Soviet weakness leading him to launch Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941. This too would go terribly wrong but this time irretrievably. For this reason alone

the Russo-Finnish War is worthy of greater understanding. Sander's work is worth reading for the vignettes presented, but as an overall history its limitations mar its promise. Thus, the military professional, no less than the academic historian, desiring to know more of the Winter War should look elsewhere for that telling.

Dr. Joseph Moretz earned his doctorate in war studies from King's College, London. A graduate of the U.S. Naval War College, he is the author of *The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar Period: An Operational Perspective* (London, 2002) and *Thinking Wisely, Planning Boldly: The Higher Education and Training of Royal Navy Officers, 1919–1939* (London, 2015). He is currently completing a monograph on British military effectiveness in Scandinavia during 1939–1940.



Exercise Tiger: The D-Day Practice Landing Tragedies Uncovered



By Richard T. Bass
Gemini House, 2012
Pp. 273. \$23

Review by D. J. Judge

Planning for the invasion of Europe began with a concise mission statement issued to General Dwight D. Eisenhower: “You will enter the continent of Europe and, together with other United Nations, undertake operations

aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.” To accomplish the initial stage of this mission, Eisenhower would supervise the planning and execution of an amphibious assault from England into France. Such an undertaking involved many elements and moving parts.

Troops had to be transported from bases throughout England to a location approximately fifteen miles off the coast of France to conduct landing operations in Normandy. The troops would land on five invasion beaches scattered across some sixty miles of coastline. This complex undertaking required men and materiel to be precisely positioned to facilitate movement from the invasion beaches inland. To prepare for these types of combat operations, the Allied force required detailed planning. The preparation aspect demanded a suitable practice landing area within England that closely resembled the French landing beaches.

After much searching, an area on the coast of Devon southwest of Dartmouth known as Slapton Sands was selected. Richard T. Bass, an English battlefield guide and historian, undertakes the task of detailing the history of the U.S. Army Assault Training Center and, specifically, the tragedy of Exercise TIGER in his latest World War II work.

The author describes the selection process that chose Slapton Sands, the responsibilities of the Assault Training Center, and the organization of the landing assault teams. His writing is clear and crisp as he details the complex process of organizing troops and ships for the invasion of Europe. A total of forty-five appendices cover such diverse topics as the instructions for Exercise TIGER, troop boat assignments, and the medical plan for handling simulated combat casualties. These provide insights into the process of exercise staff planning.

With civilians removed from the area, Slapton Sands allowed a vast amount of weaponry and tactical procedures to be employed outside prying eyes. As Bass relates, the practice assault exercise designated Exercise TIGER was designed to place troops from the 4th Infantry Division's 8th Infantry Regiment ashore in Slapton Sands under

conditions simulating, as closely as possible, actual combat conditions. This was the standard format for all training exercises that expended large amounts of live ammunition to provide a realistic tactical environment. According to Bass, the soldiers in the role of enemy forces fired live ammunition at the landing troops. Losses resulted that “saw approximately two hundred or more fatal casualties” according to one source (p. 57). Using statements such as these, at various points in the book, Bass constructs a case for a cover-up based on concealing these deaths from examination. Unfortunately for the reader, Bass does not include a bibliography. He routinely quotes from statements attributed to given participants, but provides no clue as to the source of his information. This is a frustrating deficiency noted throughout the book.

Having planted the seeds for a conspiracy to conceal the friendly fire deaths, Bass then details the events that followed. On 27 April 1944, Assault Force “U” engaged in landing operations. All proceeded smoothly. The only troops left to land at Slapton Sands were those of the follow-up force. These soldiers were mostly from engineer, quartermaster, chemical, and medical units. The convoy sailed during the evening of 27 April and was due to land at 0730 the next morning. But at 0200, at least nine German torpedo boats, known as E-boats, attacked the small convoy. The lone British escort ship was unable to fend off the attackers resulting in two Landing Ship, Tanks (LSTs) that were lost and a third badly damaged.

Bass’ depictions of the events that follow the torpedo attack provide some of the highlights of the book. There was little time to launch lifeboats. Trapped below decks, hundreds of soldiers and sailors went down with their ships. Others escaped over the side into the chilly waters of Lyme Bay. Wearing combat equipment over their coats, many soldiers drowned largely due to improper use of life belts. Designed to be worn under the armpits, many men fashioned them around their waist with tragic results. Incorrectly worn, life belts caused a man to hit the water and pitch forward. Hypothermia took other men. When the day broke on 28 April,

Allied commanders began to take stock of their losses.


The official Army history, *Cross Channel Attack*, states that 749 sailors and soldiers lost their lives as a result of the German attack. Bass disputes this total. Instead, he poses that the friendly fire losses were either added to those suffered from the torpedo attack or attributed to casualties sustained at Utah Beach. He writes that military personnel were ordered to remain silent regarding the incident under threat of court-martial. While the author attributes this blanket of secrecy to a cover-up of the actual losses suffered, most authorities on the subject note that the Allies were attempting to limit any information that might assist the Germans. To ensure this end, the secrecy extended to quartermaster units that handled the remains, hospital personnel who treated the survivors, and personnel who survived the attack.

Exercise Tiger is an interesting review of the rehearsal mechanics that prepared troops for the invasion of Normandy. The texts on loading operations, training methodology, and of Slapton Sands itself are well written and examine the area and subject in a concise manner. However, Bass falls short with his conspiracy theory. His allegations lack the force of a well-thought-out, highly documented, cross-referenced argument. The lack of a bibliography, failure to delineate the source of quotes in the text, and location of the principal document from which his appendixes are drawn detract from what is otherwise an interesting examination of a little-known subject. In the end, Bass fails to provide a convincing argument that the tragedy off Slapton Sands was anything other than a cruel happenstance of war.

D. J. Judge is a retired U.S. Army colonel and former member of the National War College faculty. He holds a master’s degree in history with a concentration in World War II.



*Brothers, Rivals, Victors:
Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley,
and the Partnership That Drove
the Allied Conquest in Europe*



By Jonathan W. Jordan
NAL Caliber, 2011
Pp. xv, 654. \$28.95

Review by Jon B. Mikolashek

The late historian Martin Blumenson wrote that Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley, and George S. Patton, along with Mark W. Clark were part of the “essential quartet of American leaders who achieved victory in Europe.”¹ In *Brothers, Rivals, Victors*, author Jonathan W. Jordan focuses on Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley, and their relationships from their days at West Point to the end of their lives. This book offers nothing new to the historiography of the three men, but it is an easy-to-read study on their complex and often tumultuous relationship.

All three men covered in Jordan’s study are well-known historical figures. Eisenhower became a beloved president after the war, Bradley became the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Patton would have an Academy Award-winning movie made about his service in World War II. While Bradley is clearly the lesser-known figure of the three, he plays a central role in *Brothers, Rivals, Victors*. Never close to Patton, Bradley disliked the rich and flamboyant officer from the first time they met. As Jordan’s book shows, Bradley never got over that

contempt for Patton. This is exceptionally clear when nearing the end of his life, Bradley, unprofessionally for a five-star general, continued to besmirch Patton's name and his personality. There were many egos involved in the United States winning the war in Europe, and while Patton has been written about and torn down as an egomaniac, it is time for professional historians to reconsider the make-believe notion of Bradley as the ego-free "G.I.'s General."

The study examines the beginning of the relationships of all three men. Both Eisenhower and Patton struck up a solid friendship after World War I and instantly became close. While stationed together, the two men planned the next war and their roles in it. During this time, they discussed Army doctrine and built their careers so when the next war would come, the two would be ready. Along with Bradley, Eisenhower and Patton had caught the eye of George C. Marshall who would launch the careers of all three men by the late 1930s and the beginning of American mobilization for war.

The highlight of Jordan's *Brothers, Rivals, Victors* is that he shows the good and the bad in the relationships between the three men. As the war continued, Eisenhower grew closer to Bradley, and his relationship with Patton deteriorated. By the end of Patton's life, he and Eisenhower were more friends mainly of habit, then any real bond between them. Blumenson clearly describes their connection in the last volume of *The Patton Papers*. When Eisenhower decided to relieve Patton from his beloved Third Army and move him to the Fifteenth Army, their friendship ended. Bradley, always supportive of Eisenhower, was not saddened to see Patton relieved as well.

Brothers, Rivals, Victors would appeal to most readers of history. There is no point where the reader would be confused about the three men and their relationships. While the author breaks no new ground on each individual, he does a tremendous job weaving the lives and personalities

together. That alone makes the study a worthy addition to anyone's World War II library.

NOTE

1. Martin Blumenson, *Mark Clark* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), p. 1.

Dr. Jon B. Mikolashek is the author of several articles on World War II and the Global War on Terrorism. He is also the author of *General Mark Clark: Commander of U.S. Fifth Army and Liberator of Rome* (Havertown, Pa., 2013). He is an associate professor of history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.



The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History



By Austin Jersild
University of North Carolina Press,
2014
Pp. xiii, 330. \$36.95

Review by Andrew Kelly

In February 1950, Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin and People's Republic of China Chairman Mao Zedong announced the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. This treaty confirmed China's allegiance to the Communist bloc and subsequently paved the way for extensive Soviet financial, technological, mili-

tary, and advisory programs to China. The conclusion of the alliance was undoubtedly a watershed moment in the history of the Cold War and been the subject of widespread examination, not least because of the eventual Sino-Soviet split by the end of the decade. The ground-level relations between the Soviet Union and China as well as the alliance's international implications for the Communist bloc, however, have been given surprisingly little attention in detailing the relationship and explaining the split.

Austin Jersild's *The Sino-Soviet Alliance* is a lucidly written and thoroughly researched book that addresses both gaps in the current literature. Jersild draws on a number of advisory, embassy, and ministry reports from the lower exchange levels between the Soviet Union and China to demonstrate that rifts in the relationship were present from the beginning of the decade and not just confined to diplomatic interchanges. He also draws on extensive Central European sources, most notably Czechoslovak, to provide a much-needed international dimension to the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Overall, Jersild suggests both Moscow and Beijing share blame in the deterioration of the relationship. He argues convincingly that this decline was because of a Soviet tendency to abuse the relationship and China's sensitivities to foreign influence and "great power chauvinism" (p.123).

Jersild's book is spilt into two sections to correspond with two distinct periods in the alliance. The first three chapters describe the problems associated with the Soviet's initial advisory programs in China, with a particular focus on bilateral tensions, contradictions, and overall national character between 1950 and 1955. In this section, Jersild offers many fascinating examples of the lower-level industrial Sino-Soviet exchanges, two of which particularly stand out. The first is the Shenyang Cable Factory, a company that produced copper and aluminium wires, bare cable, long-distance telephone wires, and several types of insulated wires. During the factory's reconstruction, Chinese engineers accused Soviet advisers of delivering

plans and blueprints late. They also suggested that Soviet advisers ordered too much construction material in certain areas but not enough in others. The second example Jersild explores is the Changchun Automobile Factory, a huge Chinese car production plant that was planned completely in the Soviet Union. During construction, many of the same inefficiencies and difficulties experienced at the Shenyang Cable Factory resurfaced. Over and above these difficulties, the Changchun Automobile Factory also highlighted another issue that was part of the broader Sino-Soviet relationship; namely, the Chinese were determined to simply copy and produce Soviet plans rather than develop their own skills and capabilities.

Jersild's ground-level analysis also explores mutual Soviet-Chinese appreciation for high culture. One particular performance, *The Red Poppy*, was a Soviet ballet performed at the Bol'shoi Theater in the fall of 1950 that detailed the lives of Chinese peasants and their struggle working for an abusive American shipping company. While it was written to celebrate the relationship and Sino-Soviet solidarity against Western imperialism, the performance raised uncomfortable questions among the Chinese in Moscow about Russia's views on European colonialism and broader perceptions of China itself. As Jersild described, the "nuances and tensions that were characteristic of the overall exchange were evident in this early effort at Sino-Soviet cultural collaboration" (p. 86).

The second section of Jersild's book examines the 1956–1964 period of the Sino-Soviet relationship. According to Jersild, this period was characterized by a more assertive China, determined to reshape the nature of its relationship with the Soviet Union. Chapter 4 examines Chinese assistance to the Soviet Union during the "events" of 1956—de-Stalinization and the rebellions in Poland and Hungary—which convinced Mao that his country should take on a greater leadership role in the Communist bloc. This, of course, was not well received in Moscow, where Kremlin officials maintained that only Russia was the

center and ultimate leader of the global Communist movement.


Chapter 5 details China's embark on the ultimately disastrous Great Leap Forward. The Soviet Union and Central Europeans condemned Mao's ambitious plan to radically overhaul and reform Chinese agriculture and industrial production. They worried not just about the destructive and unhealthy trends arising in China but also about "association with a potentially dangerous Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership" (p. 155). Finally, Chapters 6 and 7 examine China's eventual retreat from Soviet "revisionism" and its alliance with Moscow. Here, the so-called Friendship Society that was founded to educate the Chinese about the Soviet Union and overall character of the bloc was gradually subverted and transformed by the Chinese. In so doing, Jersild provides yet another important and underappreciated example of the low-level tensions that invariably made up the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship during the 1950s.

All things considered, Jersild's *The Sino-Soviet Alliance* is an important and long overdue contribution to the literature. His book appeals to both an academic and general audience. Although an unfamiliar reader might struggle in parts to comprehend the greater historical context in which this book is set, anyone interested in Russia, China, or Cold War history would certainly enjoy Jersild's book and learn a great deal from it.

Andrew Kelly is a Ph.D. candidate at Western Sydney University in Australia specializing in early Cold War relations between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS). He has held research positions at Georgetown University and the Museum of Australian Democracy and has published a number of essays on the ANZUS alliance.



Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars



By Daniel P. Bolger
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014
Pp. xlii, 502. \$28

Review by James C. McNaughton

Daniel P. Bolger, who retired from the U.S. Army in 2013 as a lieutenant general, believes the time has come for the Army to do some deep soul-searching. The best way to start, he suggests, is with some straight talk: America lost the war on terrorism. Not the Army's highest senior leaders, nor its civilian masters, but generals like himself, "lower down the food chain, but high enough," bear the lion's share of the blame. "Our primary failing," he states, "involved generalship. . . . This was our war to lose, and we did" (pp. xiv–xv).

Once Bolger gets his confession out of the way, he has surprisingly little to say about why we lost or his own role in the two wars. Instead, he offers a straightforward, soldier-level narrative that describes how America's initial victories in Afghanistan and Iraq were squandered in the years that followed, as individual bravery and brilliant tactical actions time and again failed to bring strategic success. His book will not satisfy future historians or strategic analysts. Rather, he aims to provide a readable narrative for the general reader.

The soul-searching that Bolger calls for is modeled on the Army's self-reckoning after Vietnam, provoked by brutally honest books by Army

intellectuals such as Harry Summers, David Palmer, and Andrew Krepinevich.¹ He believes passionately that Army leaders need to talk openly about what they got wrong, and why. At this point, Bolger provides few answers. Indeed, he never explains how either war was “ours to lose,” or what Army leaders might have done differently. The answers to these questions will emerge much later out of professional discussion and dispassionate scholarship, not from today’s op-ed columns.

Bolger brings to his task considerable talent as both a leader and a writer. He graduated from the Citadel in South Carolina, earned a master’s degree and Ph.D. in Russian history from the University of Chicago, and taught history at West Point. He has written a novel about the Soviet Army and two vivid nonfiction books about U.S. Army units at the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center, among other works. He has also written three readable surveys of Army contingency operations from 1975 through the 1990s.² His latest book extends these sweeping surveys to the period since 9/11.

Why We Lost covers a broad territory and does several things well. The writing is eloquent and vivid. He uses his historian’s skill to place his own observations in the context of what others have written. He places the Global War on Terrorism after 9/11 in the context of Operation DESERT STORM and al-Qaeda’s campaign against the United States in the 1990s. After describing the initial successes in Afghanistan and Iraq (he labels this section “Triumph”), he summarizes eight years of fighting in Iraq (“Hubris”) in little over 150 pages, no easy task. Twelve years in Afghanistan (“Nemesis”) get about 185 pages. Although he pays his respects to the other services and to what he calls the “Task Force,” his story is mostly about the Army. However, in the end his many well-told episodes fail to add up to a coherent argument about “why we lost,” or what military leaders should have done differently. His vignettes do not address the kind of operational-level mistakes that

he believes led to ultimate defeat. An important clue is his occasional references to classic American films of confusion and betrayal such as *The Graduate*, *The Man Who Would Be King*, *Apocalypse Now*, and *Chinatown*. We have seen this movie before, he implies, and it does not turn out well.

Bolger hopes to be read today by an audience of military professionals and the general public, not just future historians. He draws his inspiration from a classic account of the Korean War by T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, which spoke to the American public about the perennial need for a professional Army in an age of push-button warfare. After Vietnam, Army leaders turned to Fehrenbach’s book as a stark reminder of the price of unpreparedness and the inescapable necessity for a nation to put its soldiers in the mud if it wishes to defend what it values.³ Fehrenbach’s book is neither the best nor the most comprehensive about the United States during the Korean War, but his purpose was to prompt a public discussion about the role of the Army in the modern world. Bolger aims for no less.

Bolger’s publisher has done an excellent job, but I do have two quibbles. The three regional maps are inadequate to support the text, and the editor inexplicably declined to use standard unit designations, giving us the “Eighty-Second Airborne Division,” but also the 101st Airborne Division. On the other hand, the publisher did allow the author to include forty-eight pages of valuable endnotes and several dozen well-chosen color photographs.

We need the debate that Bolger calls for. But then what? We now have memoirs by three secretaries of defense and several other generals. Future historians will no doubt turn to the writings of journalists and think tanks, much of it of a very high caliber. What we need next is for Army official historians to dig into the official records to tell the complete story for the first time. They must carry out this difficult but essential task of writing the official histories in scholarly

volumes that may not appear for a decade or more, as happened with the Army’s official histories of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Only at that point will we reach a full accounting of America’s painful experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan since 9/11. Bolger’s book will then be seen as an important milestone along the road to national self-reckoning and healing that must occur, sometimes decades later, for every war.

NOTES

1. Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1981); David R. Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978); Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

2. *Dragons at War: 2-34 Infantry in the Mojave* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986); *Americans at War, 1975–1986* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988); *Feast of Bones* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1990); *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1995); *The Battle for Hunger Hill: The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment at the Joint Readiness Training Center* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1997); and *Death Ground: Today’s American Infantry in Battle* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1999).

3. T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness* (New York: Macmillan, 1963).

Dr. James C. McNaughton is the director of the Histories Division at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He received his bachelor’s degree from Middlebury College, Vermont, and his master’s and doctorate degrees in history from the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland. He is the author of *Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II* (Washington, D.C., 2006) and *The Army in the Pacific: A Century of Engagement* (Washington, D.C., 2012).



THE GUEST HISTORIAN'S FOOTNOTE

DR. JAMES C. McNAUGHTON



THE OFFICIAL HISTORIES OF IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: LET'S GET STARTED

In March 1946, Army Chief of Staff General Dwight D. Eisenhower approved plans for the War Department Historical Division to write a multivolume official history of Army operations during the Second World War. The resulting series, nearly eighty volumes now known as the “Green Books,” met two exacting standards: it educated several generations of Army leaders, while meeting the highest standards of historical scholarship.

The Historical Division, which became the Center of Military History (CMH), went on to write official histories of the Army in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. After the end of the Cold War, CMH began writing the official histories of Army operations in that decades-long “armed peace,” of which three volumes have been published to date. Over the years, CMH has broadened into other areas of history, heritage, and museums, but writing official histories has remained its primary mission.

Now, seventy years after Eisenhower’s directive, a new generation of Army historians is preparing to write official histories for the more recent conflicts in Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM [OIF]) and Afghanistan (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM [OEF]).

Since 11 September 2001, historians and curators have been actively collecting, preserving, and writing about the Army’s involvement in contemporary operations. CMH, the Combat Studies Institute, and the rest of the Army historical community have been engaged in recording these conflicts. Military history detachments have collected a staggering volume of electronic records and thousands of oral history interviews. Interim studies have been published about the attack on the Pentagon and OEF and OIF. More recently, the Army Chief of Staff established two teams of military historians that will publish their overviews of OEF and OIF in 2016–2017. These reports, although produced on tight timelines, will hopefully whet the Army’s appetite for the official histories that will dig deeper and offer more complete historical narratives. CMH is now transitioning to writing the official histories of these two wars under the leadership of Dr. William S. “Shane” Story, the new chief of the Contemporary Studies Branch.

What will these official histories look like? Taken together, the series will address the Army at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. It will analyze battles and campaigns, as well as the Army’s branches and

institutional functions. Each volume will meet the highest standards of scholarship and will strive to be objective, accurate, comprehensive, thorough, and complete. The series will be based on unfettered access to all available sources. It will be subjected to rigorous review and critique by other historians before it goes into editorial production. When it is published, it will bear the imprimatur of the Chief of Military History, the Chief Historian, and an independent panel of historians and Army leaders, and should remain a valuable resource for decades, if not longer.


This series will differ from its predecessors, but in ways that will not detract from these nonnegotiable standards. These volumes will be the first official histories to be written in the digital age when many, if not most, sources are electronic and often dismayingly ephemeral. The writers must reach out to, and work collaboratively with, veterans of these campaigns and other historians. We cannot predict what format scholarly books may assume in the future, although I for one would not place bets against the time-tested technology of paper. Finally, although we now live in an age of “information overload,” I would argue that this very fact increases the enduring value of clear, reliable historical narratives based on official records.

The Histories Division has now begun work on the new series. We are identifying authors, establishing milestones, and laying out how we will draw on the many resources throughout the Army Historical Program and build on the foundational work of previous historians. This spring, Dr. Story will develop a campaign plan for approval by the Chief Historian and Chief of Military History.

We will need the best historians we can find and an institutional structure to guide and support them through the years of research, writing, professional critique, and careful revision. This is what right looks like. This is how Army historians can best honor those who served, render a full accounting to the American people of what their soldiers accomplished, and educate future Army leaders. This is what CMH was created to do.

James C. McNaughton
Director, Histories Division





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